[Read to the Cabinet September 18, 1833]
Having carefully and anxiously considered all the facts and arguments
which have been submitted to him relative to a removal of the public
deposits from the Bank of the United States, the President deems it his
duty to communicate in this manner to his Cabinet the final conclusions
of his own mind and the reasons on which they are founded, in order to
put them in durable form and to prevent misconceptions.
The President's convictions of the dangerous tendencies of the Bank of
the United States, since signally illustrated by its own acts, were so
overpowering when he entered on the duties of Chief Magistrate that he
felt it his duty, notwithstanding the objections of the friends by whom
he was surrounded, to avail himself of the first occasion to call the
attention of Congress and the people to the question of its recharter.
The opinions expressed in his annual message of December, 1829, were
reiterated in those of December, 1830 and 1831, and in that of 1830
he threw out for consideration some suggestions in relation to a
substitute. At the session of 1831-32 an act was passed by a majority
of both Houses of Congress rechartering the present bank, upon which
the President felt it his duty to put his constitutional veto. In his
message returning that act he repeated and enlarged upon the principles
and views briefly asserted in his annual message, declaring the bank
to be, in his opinion, both inexpedient and unconstitutional, and
announcing to his countrymen very unequivocally his firm determination
never to sanction by his approval the continuance of that institution
or the establishment of any other upon similar principles.
There are strong reasons for believing that the motive of the bank in
asking for a recharter at that session of Congress was to make it a
leading question in the election of a President of the United States the
ensuing November, and all steps deemed necessary were taken to procure
from the people a reversal of the President's decision.
Although the charter was approaching its termination, and the bank was
aware that it was the intention of the Government to use the public
deposit as fast as it has accrued in the payment of the public debt,
yet did it extend its loans from January, 1831, to May, 1832, from
$42,402,304.24 to $70,428,070.72, being an increase of $28,025,766.48
in sixteen months. It is confidently believed that the leading object of
this immense extension of its loans was to bring as large a portion of
the people as possible under its power and influence, and it has been
disclosed that some of the largest sums were granted on very unusual
terms to the conductors of the public press. In some of these cases the
motive was made manifest by the nominal or insufficient security taken
for the loans, by the large amounts discounted, by the extraordinary
time allowed for payment, and especially by the subsequent conduct of
those receiving the accommodations.
Having taken these preliminary steps to obtain control over public
opinion, the bank came into Congress and asked a new charter. The object
avowed by many of the advocates of the bank was _to put the President
to the test_, that the country might know his final determination
relative to the bank prior to the ensuing election. Many documents and
articles were printed and circulated at the expense of the bank to bring
the people to a favorable decision upon its pretensions. Those whom the
bank appears to have made its debtors for the special occasion were
warned of the ruin which awaited them should the President be sustained,
and attempts were made to alarm the whole people by painting the
depression in the price of property and produce and the general loss,
inconvenience, and distress which it was represented would immediately
follow the reelection of the President in opposition to the bank.
Can it now be said that the question of a recharter of the bank was not
decided at the election which ensued? Had the veto been equivocal, or
had it not covered the whole ground; if it had merely taken exceptions
to the details of the bill or to the time of its passage; if it had not
met the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency, then there
might have been some plausibility for the allegation that the question
was not decided by the people. It was to compel the President to take
his stand that the question was brought forward at that particular
time. He met the challenge, willingly took the position into which his
adversaries sought to force him, and frankly declared his unalterable
opposition to the bank as being both unconstitutional and inexpedient.
On that ground the case was argued to the people; and now that the
people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the array of
influence and power which was brought to bear upon him, it is too late,
he confidently thinks, to say that the question has not been decided.
Whatever may be the opinions of others, the President considers his
reelection as a decision of the people against the bank. In the
concluding paragraph of his veto message he said:
I have now done my duty to my country. If sustained by my
fellow-citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if not, I shall find
in the motives which impel me ample grounds for contentment and peace.
He was sustained by a just people, and he desires to evince his
gratitude by carrying into effect their decision so far as it depends
upon him.
Of all the substitutes for the present bank which have been suggested,
none seems to have united any considerable portion of the public in its
favor. Most of them are liable to the same constitutional objections for
which the present bank has been condemned, and perhaps to all there are
strong objections on the score of expediency. In ridding the country of
an irresponsible power which has attempted to control the Government,
care must be taken not to unite the same power with the executive
branch. To give a President the control over the currency and the power
over individuals now possessed by the Bank of the United States, even
with the material difference that he is responsible to the people, would
be as objectionable and as dangerous as to leave it as it is. Neither
one nor the other is necessary, and therefore ought not to be resorted
to.
On the whole, the President considers it as conclusively settled that
the charter of the Bank of the United States will not be renewed, and
he has no reasonable ground to believe that any substitute will be
established. Being bound to regulate his course by the laws as they
exist, and not to anticipate the interference of the legislative power
for the purpose of framing new systems, it is proper for him seasonably
to consider the means by which the services rendered by the Bank of the
United States are to be performed after its charter shall expire.