I.—The Map of Africa re-arranged.
I
THE MAP OF AFRICA RE-ARRANGED
For some months past eminent publicists in Europe have been busily
engaged in rearranging the map of Africa in the interests first of one
Power, then of another, but the unfortunate native has found scant place
in these arguments. The only question which seems of any significance is
the “price” this or that Power will pay for a given slice of the African
continent. It would be rather interesting surely to know what the natives
themselves think of the proposed change. Some of them have strong views
upon the morality of disposing of other people’s rights, to say nothing
of treaty obligations which they obtained when agreeing to European
sovereignty.
Four territories are, so to speak, in the melting pot of political
speculation—British Gambia, French Congo, Belgian Congo, and the
Portuguese colonies of East and West Africa. None of the Powers in
control of these territories desire to add another foot of tropical
Africa to the burden they carry already. Great Britain has a full share
of responsibilities in the African continent. France, Belgium and
Portugal, even if they desired to enlarge their tropical dependencies,
have not yet established a case for expansion. Quite the reverse. One
Power alone—Germany—is not only capable but apparently desirous of adding
to her colonial possessions.
[Sidenote: BRITISH GAMBIA]
Though Great Britain may have no wish to add to her responsibilities,
her people cannot allow her to relegate any portion of them to another
Power. British Gambia must never be allowed to pass into the hands of
France, and the quicker the French Government is told this, the better,
not only for Anglo-French amity, but for the tranquillity and progress
of our oldest African colony. Thanks to our merchant adventurers and the
goodwill of the natives, Gambia was able to hold her own against the
Portuguese, French and Dutch, until the British Government assumed direct
control.
The British Government made a solemn agreement with the native tribes
for a Protectorate over the Gambia colony, and “this agreement shall
stand for ever.” The British Minister who sets that agreement aside
will be guilty of a crime against the fair fame of his country, but
more especially against the loyal natives who so implicitly trust the
unalterable promise of an Englishman.
The foregoing ethical argument cannot fail to find an echo in the breast
of every Britisher, but there are Imperial reasons which reinforce that
argument. The Gambia river possesses a draught of 30 feet right up the
river to a position of twenty miles beyond Bathurst, providing altogether
forty miles of deep waterway. I am told this is the only safe anchorage
for a British fleet in West Africa, safe, that is, from attack. This
little colony of 4000 square miles is contentedly following on in the
path of progress, its inhabitants are loyally and affectionately attached
to the British Crown. Only one thing troubles the population of Gambia
and that is the periodic rumours of a transfer to another Power. A
categorical and clear statement from a Minister of the Crown that no such
transference is contemplated or would be entertained is the least the
native has a right to expect, and the Empire to demand.
Next in order of discussion has been the question of Portuguese colonies,
and it has been mooted more than once that these should, either as a
whole or in part, be transferred by Portugal to Germany for a financial
consideration. The territories in question comprise Portuguese East and
West Africa together with the islands of the Gulf of Guinea; the area
of the mainland possessions being 778,000 square miles and that of the
islands 460 square miles, making a total area of 778,460 square miles.
No experienced Power would be prepared to purchase, even if Portugal
would be prepared to sell, a portion only of the Portuguese possessions,
because the several colonies properly managed dovetail into each others’
requirements in such a manner that a separation of either would in all
probability spell ruin to all. The richest of the colonies is that small
island of San Thomé, but it cannot maintain its financial prosperity
unless fed by labour from the mainland colonies of East and West Africa.
Then the Angola finances are nearly balanced by the financial position of
the cocoa islands.
Another argument is put forth, to the effect that the Portuguese
treatment of natives demands a transfer of the territory to some more
progressive Power, such as, for instance, Germany. Are those who advocate
this policy quite sure that the “Progressive Power” would treat the
natives better than the Portuguese? if so, where is the evidence? Does
East Africa provide it? Does the treatment of the Herreros and the
shooting of British Kaffirs demonstrate it? Those who support a transfer
on this ground should not lightly pass over these and similar incidents.
They can be absolutely certain of this one thing, that Germany would be
“progressive” enough to see to it that the cocoa plantations of San Thomé
had an abundant supply of labour—no matter what the consequences to such
a subordinate issue as labour conditions.
Then I am told that “in any case the condition of the natives as a whole
could not be so bad under Germany as under the Portuguese.” To this I
cannot agree, for though I admit that a number of colonial Portuguese are
slave traders, and that slavery is prevalent on the mainland and on the
islands, I must, in fairness to the Portuguese, point out first that the
Portuguese have a kindly nature to which one can appeal, and secondly
that signs are not wanting of an awakening of the conscience of the
Portuguese nation in a manner which may lead to a thorough cleansing of
the colonial possessions of the Republic. Thirdly, there is no colour-bar
in the Portuguese dominions.
To this argument I get the reply, “Public opinion in Germany would insist
on the abolition of existing slavery,” but this is an argument which
has no shred of foundation in fact; Germany is, in many respects, a
progressive Power, but she has no philanthropic soul for the well-being
of native races. A single word from Germany indicating a willingness to
co-operate with Great Britain during the Congo agitation would have saved
thousands, if not millions, of lives. That word was never spoken, the
Congo tribes were left to perish, and German public opinion maintained
a cynical attitude until the end. A merchant or two rendered yeoman
service, but they were as voices crying in the wilderness.
Let Portugal retain her colonies, and resolutely begin to purify their
administration and abolish slavery, but she must do it quickly if she is
to retain the goodwill of those—and they are still many—who would deplore
her disappearance from the map of Africa. She has said with an intensity
demanding appreciation that she will not dispose of her ancient colonies,
and this courageous reply evoked a warm response from all her colonists
who to a man are intensely patriotic, but if Portugal should refuse to
abolish slavery, she cannot expect that her most powerful Ally will be
allowed to maintain an Alliance valued to-day by many of us, yet viewed
with increasing uneasiness by a large section of the British Public. No
one wishes to utter a word which can be construed as a threat, but every
one knows that there are paths along which no British Foreign Minister
can lead, much less force the nation.
[Sidenote: BELGIAN CONGO]
Belgian Congo figures largely in every proposal for a rearrangement of
the map of Africa. It is claimed that Belgium has annexed more territory
than she can safely administer; certain it is that in annexing the
Congo she did not take over an ordinary colony. When Great Britain
assumed responsibility for her African colonies their virgin wealth was
practically untapped; the people inhabiting the colonies, as a whole,
welcomed the advent of her rule, and moreover Great Britain had in all
her territories, with the exception of Egypt, a free hand. To a greater
or less extent this applies to all African Powers, other than Belgium.
When Belgian annexation took place, the Congo was in every respect a
“squeezed orange”; not only so, but the administration of that territory
must remain subject to the paternal control of the European Powers. There
is another feature which should not be overlooked, and which may yet
cause difficulty. In the event of a general insurrection in French or
British colonies, or in the event of invasion, these Powers can at once
bring in an outside coloured army, which can, if necessary, be reinforced
with white troops. Belgium can do neither. Let any material section of
the native army revolt, which, by the way, is the ever present fear of
its officers, and the Europeans must run for their lives. They would
call in vain for troops from the Mother Country, for by the Belgian
Constitution the army may not be ordered abroad, and for other reasons
European forces could hardly be used in the Congo. With the unification
of language amongst the native troops which is rapidly taking place, with
the ever increasing spread of knowledge as to the use of arms, this peril
has been gravely accentuated within recent years.
Apart from these general—and some of them, remote—difficulties, there are
existing reasons for believing that the extensive Congo territories are
too heavy a responsibility for Belgium. The country is over eighty times
the size of Belgium, a proportion to the Mother Country not by any means
without parallel, but circumstances differ so widely that they remove
the question from all comparison with any other incident of colonial
expansion. The only countries which at all compare with the Congo are
Uganda and Southern Nigeria, but these have not suffered as the Congo has
done from thirty years of the maddest form of exploitation since Pizarro
plundered Peru.
Uganda is just about 100,000 square miles and the Imperial grant-in-aid
during the last ten years in direct administrative assistance (excluding
railway credits) is no less than £1,075,000, or an average annual
grant-in-aid of £107,500. This, it will be observed, is approximately an
annual grant-in-aid of a sovereign per square mile.
The Belgian Congo cannot be managed upon less than Uganda, therefore it
should require grants-in-aid from the Imperial Exchequer for the next
twenty years, of not less than £1,000,000 sterling per annum. To this,
however, must be added the exceptional demands from which no colony
escapes. The question, therefore, is this: Are the Belgians ready to
invest a sum of twenty to thirty millions sterling in the Congo during
the next twenty to twenty-five years?
The Congo is thirteen times the size of Southern Nigeria; and though the
density of the Congo population is considerably less, the tribes are much
more widely scattered, and therefore require almost the same measure of
white supervision, particularly in view of the direct taxation which
everywhere prevails. There is the further consideration that many of
the Belgian “officials” are to-day necessarily occupied with work which
in other colonies is rightly left to the merchant. In view of these
considerations a _pro rata_ white personnel would seem to be essential.
In Southern Nigeria Great Britain has from 800 to 1000 white men of
all grades engaged in its administration. Taking the lowest figure as a
basis, the Belgium Congo, with its 900,000 square miles of territory,
coupled with the varied enterprises of the administration, would
require over 10,400 men, but the colonial authorities find the greatest
difficulty in maintaining an official personnel of about 2000!
With a few notable exceptions, the type of official on the Congo
gives but little promise of any really effective and enlightened
administration. Can the Belgian Government find the men which the colony
requires? None can say actually what she may be able to do, although none
will deny that up to the present she has failed to find either the number
or the class of men vital to successful colonial government.
The question the Belgians would do well to ask themselves is—whether it
would not be wiser for them to administer a smaller colony properly than
to continue an attempt to govern a vast region like the Congo basin,
which, in the very nature of things, would be an enormous task even for
the most affluent European Power.
If Belgium could retain the Lower Congo, or a considerable portion of
it, and transfer almost the whole of the upper regions to another Power,
the indemnity she might expect to receive would, in such a case, permit
of the development of the Lower Congo in a manner which would absorb all
the activity that she could throw into it for generations. There are
great possibilities in the Lower Congo, possibilities unprejudiced by the
difficulties which obtain in the Upper Congo.
If the Belgians would agree to the disposal of the major part of
the Upper Congo, the problem which would then confront statesmen
would be that of finding another Power willing to assume so large a
responsibility. France has the reversionary right, but could not be
expected to add to her already too great African responsibilities.
Clearly Great Britain could not accept the burden in view of the lead
she took in the work of securing reforms. Portugal cannot effectively
administer the territories she already possesses. We are thus driven to
look to Germany.
[Sidenote: GERMANY AND BELGIAN CONGO]
It seems to be everywhere accepted that Germany would be willing to spend
men and money on the administration of a large tropical colony, but
again, is she prepared to accept the task of governing the Upper Congo?
A readiness to do so could hardly be other than welcome to the European
Powers, always providing that Belgium were willing to share her present
burden with Germany.
Such a transfer would not only unite the German colony of Cameroons
with the Congo colony, but also with German East Africa, thus giving to
Germany a great and uninterrupted trans-African colony larger than that
possessed by any European Power in Africa. But the fatal objection to
this re-arrangement is that there is no short and easy route to the sea
which would be essential to a German control of the Congo. Even if the
Matadi-Leopoldville railway territory were transferred, which would be
extremely unlikely, the German Government would know that it was only a
temporary route to the ocean.
Is it impossible for the Powers of Europe to take a truly large view of
the situation and by making an immediate sacrifice, which in point of
fact would be advantageous to each Power concerned, and thereby place
the peace of the world upon a lasting basis? Is it entirely out of the
question to persuade France for an adequate _quid pro quo_ to transfer
the major part of French Congo also to Germany?
France knows how she has been drawn into an almost impossible situation
in that wretched colony, she knows how difficult it is for her to cleanse
and administer it upon lines which are in accord with the obligations
imposed upon her by the Berlin Conference. If France and Belgium together
could be persuaded to transfer the whole, or the greater part, of French
and Belgian Congo to Germany, a comparatively quick route to the ocean
would be possible for the upper reaches of the Congo basin. If these two
Powers could be brought to agree to such a transfer to Germany, they
would individually be immeasurably the gainers, they would secure the
peace of the world, and they would thereby add a lustre to their names
which neither time nor eternity could tarnish.
Experience has shewn us that commerce need have no fear, for Germany
welcomes and treats fairly the commercial houses of all nations.
No favour is granted to a German firm which is prejudicial to the
representatives of other Powers, whereas to-day the notorious fact is
that merchants refuse to extend their commercial enterprises in French
and Belgian Congo owing to the restrictions and irritating dues and
charges which are imposed.
The remaining difficulty and the chief one is that of the treatment of
the natives. Doubtless if it were possible to consult them, they would
in both colonies vote for a transfer, not because they know anything
of German rule, but because they would hope that a change would not
involve them in a worse condition than they suffer at present. German
administration of French Congo certainly could hardly be more oppressive
than the French Government permits to-day. In Belgian Congo the natives
would probably be treated as humanely and probably more justly than at
present. Finally it is hoped that the German administration will, with
the march of time, become less rigorous in theory and more humane in
practice. On the whole, both from the commercial and native standpoint,
the Congo basin stands to gain by a transfer to the German Empire.
[Sidenote: PEACE IN THE WORLD]
This transfer, joining as it would the Cameroons with German East Africa,
would provide Germany with a single African colony of something over
two million square miles in extent; occupied by a population of from
twenty-five to thirty millions of people. A fertile colony larger than
our Indian Empire, and approximately the same square mileage as the total
possessions of Great Britain in the African continent.
The paramount question is, of course, what _quid pro quo_ could Germany
give in return for a re-arrangement of the African continent which would
provide her with so vast a domain? Belgium would probably be willing to
accept a cash indemnity with the retention of such portion of the Congo
territory as she could safely and effectively administer. France is the
only difficulty; but if France chose to be generous enough to part with
French Congo, might not such a spirit find an echo across the Rhine? To
put this into plain language, would not this vast colonial expansion
thus placed in the hands of Germany be worth a rectification of the
frontier of Alsace-Lorraine—or at least the gift of autonomy?
Such a solution of a great African problem would give a ray of light and
hope to the darkest regions of the “Dark Continent,” whilst in Europe it
would settle for generations the peace of the world; surely a fitting
monument to erect to the memory of the martyred millions of the Congo!
[Illustration]
FOOTNOTES
[1] _Parl. Paper Egypt_, No. 1 of 1904, p. 79.
[2] Stanley estimated the whole of the Congo population at 40,000,000.
[3] There can, I can conceive, be little doubt that colour prejudice
is a much greater obstacle to social intercourse in the case of the
Teutonic—certainly in that of the Anglo-Saxon—races than it is in the
case of Latin Europeans. Mr. Bryce (_American Commonwealth_, Vol. II., p.
355) says: “In Latin America, whoever is not black is white; in Teutonic
America, whoever is not white is black.”
[4] In the early days of the Soudan occupation it was thought by many
that it would be impossible to abolish slavery, and that the employment
of forced labour was imperative. As a matter of fact, by the display
of a little patience, and without the adoption of any very heroic or
sensational measures, slavery has been abolished, no forced labour has
been employed, and the country is prospering.
[5] See also pp. 94, 95.
[6] A good deal, I conceive, depends on the number of old officials whose
services are retained, and on the degree of influence they are allowed to
exert. I speak under correction, but I can well imagine that the abrupt
dismissal of all the experienced administrators, however unsatisfactory
they may be in some respects, and the wholesale substitution of
well-intentioned, but wholly inexperienced men in their place, might
produce inconveniences even more serious than a certain prolongation of
abuses in a mitigated and diminished form.
[7] That this is the main defect of the Congo system has been frequently
pointed out both by myself—in a speech in the House of Lords on February
24, 1908—and others.
[8] Secretary of the Eighty Club.
[9] Italics mine.—J. H. H.
[10] Italics mine.—J. H. H.
INDEX
A
Abeokuta, 101, 283
Absinthe and natives, 99
Aburi, 254, 261
Accra, 256
African, artisan, the, 109;
doctor, the, 110, 120;
educated, the, 108
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 174, 201
Angola, 169
Anklets, brass, 34
“Anti-Slavery Society,” Portuguese, 138
Ants, driver, 18
B
Baketi tribe, the, 24
Bakuba ” the, 29, 40
Bakwala ” the, 39
Bakwiri ” the, 252
Baluba ” the, 27
Bangalla ” the, 27
Bangalla River, 26
Baptist Mission, the, 269
Barrel rolling, 256
Barrister, native, the, 51
Basamba custom, 144, 145
Basel Mission, the, 47, 252, 269, 285
Bashilele tribe, the, 29
Basongo, 180
Batanga, 32
Batanga canoes, 13
Batetela tribe, the, 27, 178, 198
Bathurst, 294
Belgian Congo, the, 203
Belgian Congo, commerce in, 92, 154
Bell, Rev. J., 281
Benguella, 172
Benin Rubber Plantations, 242
Bennett, E. N., 96
Bihean Slave Traders, 197
Blaize, Richard, 283
Bocage, M. Du, 187
Boela tribe, the, 33
Boma, 170
Bopoto, 26
Bridewells, 176
Brine bath, the, 231
British and Foreign Bible Society the, 283
“Bula Matadi,” 152
Burial customs, 25
Burroughs Wellcome and Company, 81, 83
Burtt, Joseph, 186
Bushongo tribe, the, 28
C
Cadbury—_Standard_ Trial, the, 186
Calabar Missions, 280
Cameroons cocoa, 248, 251
Camwood production, 33
Canoes, dug-out, 12
Cape Railway, the, 171
_Capital A, The_, 195
Carrier, the, 4, 151
Carson, Sir Edward, 186
Castelin, Father, 207
Catholic missionaries, Roman, 265
Chapel farms, 250
Charms, 37
Chevalier, Dr., 237, 239, 241
Chinese Labour, 135
Christiansborg, 253, 280
Christy, Dr., 242
Church Missionary Society, 269
Cicatrization, 26, 28
Cicatrization, object of, 30
Cocoa, Butter, 246
Cocoa, Gold Coast, 4, 161, 247, 253
Cocoa, Nigerian, 257
Cocoa, Portuguese, 249
Cocktails, 75
Cogill, Mr., 139
Cold storage, 85
Collars, brass, 34
Commissioners, Assistant District, 96
Congo, Belgian annexation, 209, 215, 220;
assets, 210;
cocoa, 217, 250;
cotton, 216;
railway, 211;
rubber, 213, 216, 237, 243
Convict leasing, 166
Correctional labour, 166
Cotton growing, 57
Cotton, price of, 57
Cromer, the Earl of, 144
Cursing, fear of, 36
D
Dagomba tribe, the, 69
Daysman, the, 42
Death customs, 36, 37
Dennett, Mr. R. E., 143
Dilolo, Lake, 184, 197
Docemo, King, 159, 167
Dualla tribe, the, 252
Du Chaillu, Dr., 36
Dunstan, Professor W., 226
E
Educational grants, 112
Egyptians, 225
Elder Dempster and Company, Messrs., 84
Eleko, Prince, 167
Eloesis Guineensis, 225
F
Fernando Po, 263, 281
Fiji, labour contracts in, 141
Flogging, 127, 181
G
Gambia, the, 293
German colonies and commerce, 88, 90, 302
German Cameroons, 301, 303
German East Africa, 301, 303
Gin “banked,” 101
Gold Coast cocoa, 217
Gold Coast rubber, 242
Grants-in-aid, 299
Grenada, 261
Grey, Sir Edward, 40, 187, 189, 191, 196, 201
Gum copal, 214
H
Hairdressing, native, 32
Hamburg merchants, 225
Harding, Colonel Colin, 197
Hardinge, Sir Arthur, 187, 189, 196
Hausa carriers, 255
Hawkin, Mr. R. C., 135
Hawkins, Jack, 175
Hay, Mr. Drummond, 189, 193, 198
Herreros, the, 252, 296
Holt & Co., Messrs. John, 81, 93
Holt _v._ Rex, 159
Hospitality, native, 106
Hostages, rubber, 206
Hostage system, Congo, 206
“Hot Pot,” native, 233
I
India Office, the, 135, 137
Indians, Pincon’s Brazilian, 235
“Ingleza,” the, 279
J
Janssens, Monsieur, 277
Johnston, Sir Harry, 132
Jones, the late Sir Alfred, 81
Justice, British, 117
K
Kalamba, 180
Kid, the sacrificial, 24
Koran, 268
Kroo boys, 93
Kumasi, 253, 257, 269
L
Labour, contract, 139, 140;
recruiting, 141, 163;
recruiting, official, 142;
forced, 149
Lactation, period of, 68;
prolonged, 68
“Lady of our Salvation,” the, 171
Lagos island, 41, 120, 260
Land tenure, 157
Land war, 158
“Lazy Nigger,” the, 126
Leopold, King, 67, 205, 208, 219, 220, 273, 278
Liberian labour supply, 131
Liquor Traffic and Native Races Committee, 98
Livingstone, David, 269, 272
Loanda, 170, 172
Lobito Bay, 171
Lokele war, 158
Lome, 89, 275
Luebo, 180
Lulua tribe, the, 28
Lunda country, 169, 240
Lunda slave traffic, 188
Lusambo, 184
M
Macintosh, Charles, 235
Mackie, Mr. Consul, 187, 191, 241
Maloney, Sir A., 236
“Mammies,” The, 123
Manioca, preparation of, 52, 158
Mayumbe, 28, 217, 251, 253, 263
Medical missions, 277
Mendes, Dr. Correa, 181, 191
Missionary statistics, 283
Mobeka, 204
Mohammedanism, 268
Money lending, 35
Mongo tribe, the, 34
Monkey calls, 8
Mortality statistics, 78
Motherhood, 68
N
Negrophobia, 107
Neves Hermano, 195
Nevinson, H. W., 175
Nigeria, Christianity in, 268
Nigeria, cocoa cultivation, 257
Nightingale, Mr. Consul, 186
Ngombe, the tribe of, 32
Novo Redondo, 178
O
Oil palm, the, 227, 234
Oil rivers, 69, 90
Ogowé, the, 85
Orator, the African, 42
P
Paddler, the, 10
“Palaver” described, 41
Palm cabbage, 226, 232
“Palm oil chop,” 54
Palm wine, 103, 226, 234
Peace and arbitration, African, 40
Pico da San Thomé, 248
Polygamy, 59
Polygamy and Christianity, 61, 67
Polygamy, obligatory, 59
Polygamy and the birth rate, 63, 65
Portuguese Republic, 162
Principe, island of, 82
Prister, Professor, 175
Prohibition, difficulty of, 102
Protestant missions, 265
R
Race prejudice, 169
_Reforma_, the Portuguese, 194
Renkin, Monsieur, 207, 216
Repatriation fund, 192;
problem of, 199
Rio del Rey, 85
Rouge, native, 33
Rubber, discovery of, 235, 237;
Funtumia, 237;
Hevea Braziliensis, 244;
Ireh, 236;
Landolphia, 237;
Manihot Glaziovii, 244
S
San Thomé cocoa, 247, 264
Schindler, F., 197
Sherboro, Bai, 117
Sheridan, 42
Slave capture, 147
Slavery, domestic, 142, 144, 175
Slavery in French Guinea, 147
Slavery, Portuguese, 161, 262, 266, 271
Sleeping sickness, 132;
Uganda, 132;
Principe, 132, 181
Stanley, Sir H. M., 208, 236, 272
Strachey, J. St. Loe, 202
Swastika cicatrice, 28
T
Termites, 20, 261
Togoland, 88;
taxation, 153;
cocoa, 248;
transport in, 90
Trader, the African, 49
Trinidad cocoa, 262
Tudhope, Mr., 252
Twin customs, 69
Twin murder, 70
U
Uganda grant-in-aid, 299
Uganda mission, 287
Uncle Remus in Africa, 24
V
Vasconcellos, Senhor, 196
Venezuela, 260
Victoria, 79, 230
Villiers, Sir Francis Hyde, 193
W
Wages, native, 46
“White Cap” chiefs, the, 159
Williams, Robert, 91, 171
Wilhelmsthal, incident of the, 136
Wright, Herbert, 244
Wuta the Conqueror, 27
THE END
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