The discrepancy between communist theory and individualist practice in
Russia was one cause of the next disaster which befell Europe. Between
Russia and Germany there should have been close partnership, based on
interchange of machinery and corn. But the theory of communism stood in
the way, and in a strange manner. Russian industrial organization had
proved impossible without American capital; and little by little this
influence had transformed the communistic system. From the Baltic to the
Himalayas and the Bering Straits, pasture, timberlands, machine-tilled
corn-lands, oil-fields, and a spreading rash of industrial towns, were
increasingly dependent on American finance and organization. Yet not
America but the far less individualistic Germany had become in the
Russian mind the symbol of capitalism. Self-righteous hate of Germany
compensated Russia for her own betrayal of the communistic ideal. This
perverse antagonism was encouraged by the Americans; who, strong in
their own individualism and prosperity, and by now contemptuously
tolerant of Russian doctrines, were concerned only to keep Russian
finance to themselves. In truth, of course, it was America that had
helped Russia’s self-betrayal; and it was the spirit of America that was
most alien to the Russian spirit. But American wealth was by now
indispensable to Russia; so the hate due to America had to be borne
vicariously by Germany.
The Germans, for their part, were aggrieved that the Americans had
ousted them from a most profitable field of enterprise, and in
particular from the exploitation of Russian Asiatic oil. The economic
life of the human race had for some time been based on coal, but
latterly oil had been found a far more convenient source of power, and
as the oil store of the planet was much smaller than its coal store, and
the expenditure of oil had of course been wholly uncontrolled and
wasteful, a shortage was already being felt. Thus the national ownership
of the remaining oil-fields had become a main factor in politics and a
fertile source of wars. America, having used up most of her own
supplies, was now anxious to compete with the still prolific sources
under Chinese control, by forestalling Germany in Russia. No wonder the
Germans were aggrieved. But the fault was their own. In the days when
Russian communism had been seeking to convert the world, Germany had
taken over England’s leadership of individualistic Europe. While greedy
for trade with Russia, she had been at the same time frightened of
contamination by Russian social doctrine, the more so because communism
had at first made some headway among the German workers. Later, even
when sane industrial reorganization in Germany had deprived communism of
its appeal to the workers, and thus had rendered it impotent, the habit
of anti-communist vituperation persisted.
Thus the peace of Europe was in constant danger from the bickerings of
two peoples who differed rather in ideals than in practice. For the one,
in theory communistic, had been forced to delegate many of the
community’s rights to enterprising individuals; while the other, in
theory organized on a basis of private business, was becoming ever more
socialized.
Neither party desired war. Neither was interested in military glory, for
militarism as an end was no longer reputable. Neither was professedly
nationalistic, for nationalism, though still potent, was no longer
vaunted. Each claimed to stand for internationalism and peace, but
accused the other of narrow patriotism. Thus Europe, though more pacific
than ever before, was doomed to war.
Like most wars, the Anglo-French War had increased the desire for peace,
yet made peace less secure. Distrust, not merely the old distrust of
nation for nation, but a devastating distrust of human nature, gripped
men like the dread of insanity. Individuals who thought of themselves as
wholehearted Europeans, feared that at any moment they might succumb to
some ridiculous epidemic of patriotism, and participate in the further
crippling of Europe.
This dread was one cause of the formation of a European Confederacy, in
which all the nations of Europe, save Russia, surrendered their
sovereignty to a common authority and actually pooled their armaments.
Ostensibly the motive of this act was peace; but America interpreted it
as directed against herself, and withdrew from the League of Nations.
China, the ‘natural enemy’ of America, remained within the League,
hoping to use it against her rival.
From without, indeed, the Confederacy at first appeared as a close-knit
whole: but from within it was known to be insecure, and in every serious
crisis it broke. There is no need to follow the many minor wars of this
period, though their cumulative effect was serious, both economically
and psychologically. Europe did at last, however, become something like
a single nation in sentiment, though this unity was brought about less
by a common loyalty than by a common fear of America.
Final consolidation was the fruit of the Russo-German War, the cause of
which was partly economic and partly sentimental. All the peoples of
Europe had long watched with horror the financial conquest of Russia by
the United States, and they dreaded that they also must presently
succumb to the same tyrant. To attack Russia, it was thought, would be
to wound America in her only vulnerable spot. But the actual occasion of
the war was sentimental. Half a century after the Anglo-French War, a
second-rate German author published a typically German book of the baser
sort. For as each nation had its characteristic virtues, so also each
was prone to characteristic follies. This book was one of those
brilliant but extravagant works in which the whole diversity of
existence is interpreted under a single formula, with extreme detail and
plausibility, yet with amazing _naïvéte_. Highly astute within its own
artificial universe, it was none the less in wider regard quite
uncritical. In two large volumes the author claimed that the cosmos was
a dualism in which a heroic and obviously Nordic spirit ruled by divine
right over an un-self-disciplined, yet servile and obviously Slavonic
spirit. The whole of history, and of evolution, was interpreted on this
principle; and of the contemporary world it was said that the Slavonic
element was poisoning Europe. One phrase in particular caused fury in
Moscow, ‘the anthropoid face of the Russian subman’.
Moscow demanded apology and suppression of the book. Berlin regretted
the insult but with its tongue in its cheek; and insisted on the freedom
of the press. Followed a crescendo of radio hate, and war.
The details of this war do not matter to one intent upon the history of
mind in the Solar System, but its result was important. Moscow,
Leningrad and Berlin were shattered from the air. The whole West of
Russia was flooded with the latest and deadliest poison gas, so that not
only was all animal and vegetable life destroyed, but also the soil
between the Black Sea and the Baltic was rendered infertile and
uninhabitable for many years. Within a week the war was over, for the
reason that the combatants were separated by an immense territory in
which life could not exist. But the effects of the war were lasting. The
Germans had set going a process which they could not stop. Whiffs of the
poison continued to be blown by fickle winds into every country of
Europe and Western Asia. It was spring-time; but save in the Atlantic
coast-lands the spring flowers shrivelled in the bud, and every young
leaf had a withered rim. Humanity also suffered; though, save in the
regions near the seat of war, it was in general only the children and
the old people who suffered greatly. The poison spread across the
Continent in huge blown tresses, broad as principalities, swinging with
each change of wind. And wherever it strayed, young eyes, throats, and
lungs were blighted like the leaves.
America, after much debate, had at last decided to defend her interests
in Russia by a punitive expedition against Europe. China began to
mobilize her forces. But long before America was ready to strike, news
of the widespread poisoning changed her policy. Instead of punishment,
help was given. This was a fine gesture of good will. But also, as was
observed in Europe, instead of being costly, it was profitable; for
inevitably it brought more of Europe under American financial control.
The upshot of the Russo-German war, then, was that Europe was unified in
sentiment by hatred of America, and that European mentality definitely
deteriorated. This was due in part to the emotional influence of the war
itself, partly to the socially damaging effects of the poison. A
proportion of the rising generation had been rendered sickly for life.
During the thirty years which intervened before the Euro-American war,
Europe was burdened with an exceptional weight of invalids. First-class
intelligence was on the whole rarer than before, and was more strictly
concentrated on the practical work of reconstruction.
Even more disastrous for the human race was the fact that the recent
Russian cultural enterprise of harmonizing Western intellectualism and
Eastern mysticism was now wrecked.