But the new aspirations for national and popular rights were crushed at

the restoration. The liberals of those days cared for freedom, not in

the shape of national independence, but of French institutions; and they

combined against the nations with the ambition of the governments. They

were as ready to sacrifice nationality to their ideal as the Holy

Alliance was to the interests of absolutism. Talleyrand indeed declared

at Vienna that the Polish question ought to have precedence over all

other questions, because the partition of Poland had been one of the

first and greatest causes of the evils which Europe had suffered; but

dynastic interests prevailed. All the sovereigns represented at Vienna

recovered their dominions, except the King of Saxony, who was punished

for his fidelity to Napoleon; but the States that were unrepresented in

the reigning families--Poland, Venice, and Genoa--were not revived, and

even the Pope had great difficulty in recovering the Legations from the

grasp of Austria. Nationality, which the old _regime_ had ignored, which

had been outraged by the revolution and the empire, received, after its

first open demonstration, the hardest blow at the Congress of Vienna.

The principle which the first partition had generated, to which the

revolution had given a basis of theory, which had been lashed by the

empire into a momentary convulsive effort, was matured by the long error

of the restoration into a consistent doctrine, nourished and justified

by the situation of Europe.

The governments of the Holy Alliance devoted themselves to suppress with

equal care the revolutionary spirit by which they had been threatened,

and the national spirit by which they had been restored. Austria, which

owed nothing to the national movement, and had prevented its revival

after 1809, naturally took the lead in repressing it. Every disturbance

of the final settlements of 1815, every aspiration for changes or

reforms, was condemned as sedition. This system repressed the good with

the evil tendencies of the age; and the resistance which it provoked,

during the generation that passed away from the restoration to the fall

of Metternich, and again under the reaction which commenced with

Schwarzenberg and ended with the administrations of Bach and Manteuffel,

proceeded from various combinations of the opposite forms of liberalism.

In the successive phases of that struggle, the idea that national claims

are above all other rights gradually rose to the supremacy which it now

possesses among the revolutionary agencies.

The first liberal movement, that of the Carbonari in the south of

Europe, had no specific national character, but was supported by the

Bonapartists both in Spain and Italy. In the following years the

opposite ideas of 1813 came to the front, and a revolutionary movement,

in many respects hostile to the principles of revolution, began in

defence of liberty, religion, and nationality. All these causes were

united in the Irish agitation, and in the Greek, Belgian, and Polish

revolutions. Those sentiments which had been insulted by Napoleon, and

had risen against him, rose against the governments of the restoration.

They had been oppressed by the sword, and then by the treaties. The

national principle added force, but not justice, to this movement,

which, in every case but Poland, was successful. A period followed in

which it degenerated into a purely national idea, as the agitation for

repeal succeeded emancipation, and Panslavism and Panhellenism arose

under the auspices of the Eastern Church. This was the third phase of

the resistance to the settlement of Vienna, which was weak, because it

failed to satisfy national or constitutional aspirations, either of

which would have been a safeguard against the other, by a moral if not

by a popular justification. At first, in 1813, the people rose against

their conquerors, in defence of their legitimate rulers. They refused to

be governed by usurpers. In the period between 1825 and 1831, they

resolved that they would not be misgoverned by strangers. The French

administration was often better than that which it displaced, but there

were prior claimants for the authority exercised by the French, and at

first the national contest was a contest for legitimacy. In the second

period this element was wanting. No dispossessed princes led the Greeks,

the Belgians, or the Poles. The Turks, the Dutch, and the Russians were

attacked, not as usurpers, but as oppressors,--because they misgoverned,

not because they were of a different race. Then began a time when the

text simply was, that nations would not be governed by foreigners. Power

legitimately obtained, and exercised with moderation, was declared

invalid. National rights, like religion, had borne part in the previous

combinations, and had been auxiliaries in the struggles for freedom, but

now nationality became a paramount claim, which was to assert itself

alone, which might put forward as pretexts the rights of rulers, the

liberties of the people, the safety of religion, but which, if no such

union could be formed, was to prevail at the expense of every other

cause for which nations make sacrifices.

Metternich is, next to Napoleon, the chief promoter of this theory; for

the anti-national character of the restoration was most distinct in

Austria, and it is in opposition to the Austrian Government that

nationality grew into a system. Napoleon, who, trusting to his armies,

despised moral forces in politics, was overthrown by their rising.

Austria committed the same fault in the government of her Italian

provinces. The kingdom of Italy had united all the northern part of the

Peninsula in a single State; and the national feelings, which the French

repressed elsewhere, were encouraged as a safeguard of their power in

Italy and in Poland. When the tide of victory turned, Austria invoked

against the French the aid of the new sentiment they had fostered.

Nugent announced, in his proclamation to the Italians, that they should

become an independent nation. The same spirit served different masters,

and contributed first to the destruction of the old States, then to the

expulsion of the French, and again, under Charles Albert, to a new

revolution. It was appealed to in the name of the most contradictory

principles of government, and served all parties in succession, because

it was one in which all could unite. Beginning by a protest against the

dominion of race over race, its mildest and least-developed form, it

grew into a condemnation of every State that included different races,

and finally became the complete and consistent theory, that the State

and the nation must be co-extensive. "It is," says Mr. Mill, "in general

a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of

governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."[329]

The outward historical progress of this idea from an indefinite

aspiration to be the keystone of a political system, may be traced in

the life of the man who gave to it the element in which its strength

resides,--Giuseppe Mazzini. He found Carbonarism impotent against the

measures of the governments, and resolved to give new life to the

liberal movement by transferring it to the ground of nationality. Exile

is the nursery of nationality, as oppression is the school of

liberalism; and Mazzini conceived the idea of Young Italy when he was a

refugee at Marseilles. In the same way, the Polish exiles are the

champions of every national movement; for to them all political rights

are absorbed in the idea of independence, which, however they may differ

with each other, is the one aspiration common to them all. Towards the

year 1830 literature also contributed to the national idea. "It was the

time," says Mazzini, "of the great conflict between the romantic and the

classical school, which might with equal truth be called a conflict

between the partisans of freedom and of authority." The romantic school

was infidel in Italy, and Catholic in Germany; but in both it had the

common effect of encouraging national history and literature, and Dante

was as great an authority with the Italian democrats as with the leaders

of the mediaeval revival at Vienna, Munich, and Berlin. But neither the

influence of the exiles, nor that of the poets and critics of the new

party, extended over the masses. It was a sect without popular sympathy

or encouragement, a conspiracy founded not on a grievance, but on a

doctrine; and when the attempt to rise was made in Savoy, in 1834, under

a banner with the motto "Unity, Independence, God and Humanity," the

people were puzzled at its object, and indifferent to its failure. But

Mazzini continued his propaganda, developed his _Giovine Italia_ into a

_Giovine Europa_, and established in 1847 the international league of

nations. "The people," he said, in his opening address, "is penetrated

with only one idea, that of unity and nationality.... There is no

international question as to forms of government, but only a national

question."

The revolution of 1848, unsuccessful in its national purpose, prepared

the subsequent victories of nationality in two ways. The first of these

was the restoration of the Austrian power in Italy, with a new and more

energetic centralisation, which gave no promise of freedom. Whilst that

system prevailed, the right was on the side of the national aspirations,

and they were revived in a more complete and cultivated form by Manin.

The policy of the Austrian Government, which failed during the ten years

of the reaction to convert the tenure by force into a tenure by right,

and to establish with free institutions the condition of allegiance,

gave a negative encouragement to the theory. It deprived Francis Joseph

of all active support and sympathy in 1859, for he was more clearly

wrong in his conduct than his enemies in their doctrines. The real cause

of the energy which the national theory has acquired is, however, the

triumph of the democratic principle in France, and its recognition by

the European Powers. The theory of nationality is involved in the

democratic theory of the sovereignty of the general will. "One hardly

knows what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not

to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings

they choose to associate themselves."[330] It is by this act that a

nation constitutes itself. To have a collective will, unity is

necessary, and independence is requisite in order to assert it. Unity

and nationality are still more essential to the notion of the

sovereignty of the people than the cashiering of monarchs, or the

revocation of laws. Arbitrary acts of this kind may be prevented by the

happiness of the people or the popularity of the king, but a nation

inspired by the democratic idea cannot with consistency allow a part of

itself to belong to a foreign State, or the whole to be divided into

several native States. The theory of nationality therefore proceeds from

both the principles which divide the political world,--from legitimacy,

which ignores its claims, and from the revolution, which assumes them;

and for the same reason it is the chief weapon of the last against the

first.

In pursuing the outward and visible growth of the national theory we are

prepared for an examination of its political character and value. The

absolutism which has created it denies equally that absolute right of

national unity which is a product of democracy, and that claim of

national liberty which belongs to the theory of freedom. These two views

of nationality, corresponding to the French and to the English systems,

are connected in name only, and are in reality the opposite extremes of

political thought. In one case, nationality is founded on the perpetual

supremacy of the collective will, of which the unity of the nation is

the necessary condition, to which every other influence must defer, and

against which no obligation enjoys authority, and all resistance is

tyrannical. The nation is here an ideal unit founded on the race, in

defiance of the modifying action of external causes, of tradition, and

of existing rights. It overrules the rights and wishes of the

inhabitants, absorbing their divergent interests in a fictitious unity;

sacrifices their several inclinations and duties to the higher claim of

nationality, and crushes all natural rights and all established

liberties for the purpose of vindicating itself.[331] Whenever a single

definite object is made the supreme end of the State, be it the

advantage of a class, the safety or the power of the country, the

greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the support of any

speculative idea, the State becomes for the time inevitably absolute.

Liberty alone demands for its realisation the limitation of the public

authority, for liberty is the only object which benefits all alike, and

provokes no sincere opposition. In supporting the claims of national

unity, governments must be subverted in whose title there is no flaw,

and whose policy is beneficent and equitable, and subjects must be

compelled to transfer their allegiance to an authority for which they

have no attachment, and which may be practically a foreign domination.

Connected with this theory in nothing except in the common enmity of the

absolute state, is the theory which represents nationality as an

essential, but not a supreme element in determining the forms of the

State. It is distinguished from the other, because it tends to diversity

and not to uniformity, to harmony and not to unity; because it aims not

at an arbitrary change, but at careful respect for the existing

conditions of political life, and because it obeys the laws and results

of history, not the aspirations of an ideal future. While the theory of

unity makes the nation a source of despotism and revolution, the theory

of liberty regards it as the bulwark of self-government, and the

foremost limit to the excessive power of the State. Private rights,

which are sacrificed to the unity, are preserved by the union of

nations. No power can so efficiently resist the tendencies of

centralisation, of corruption, and of absolutism, as that community

which is the vastest that can be included in a State, which imposes on

its members a consistent similarity of character, interest, and opinion,

and which arrests the action of the sovereign by the influence of a

divided patriotism. The presence of different nations under the same

sovereignty is similar in its effect to the independence of the Church

in the State. It provides against the servility which flourishes under

the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying

associations, and giving to the subject the restraint and support of a

combined opinion. In the same way it promotes independence by forming

definite groups of public opinion, and by affording a great source and

centre of political sentiments, and of notions of duty not derived from

the sovereign will. Liberty provokes diversity, and diversity preserves

liberty by supplying the means of organisation. All those portions of

law which govern the relations of men with each other, and regulate

social life, are the varying result of national custom and the creation

of private society. In these things, therefore, the several nations

will differ from each other; for they themselves have produced them, and

they do not owe them to the State which rules them all. This diversity

in the same State is a firm barrier against the intrusion of the

government beyond the political sphere which is common to all into the

social department which escapes legislation and is ruled by spontaneous

laws. This sort of interference is characteristic of an absolute

government, and is sure to provoke a reaction, and finally a remedy.

That intolerance of social freedom which is natural to absolutism is

sure to find a corrective in the national diversities, which no other

force could so efficiently provide. The co-existence of several nations

under the same State is a test, as well as the best security of its

freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilisation; and,

as such, it is in the natural and providential order, and indicates a

state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal

of modern liberalism.

The combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a

condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society.

Inferior races are raised by living in political union with races

intellectually superior. Exhausted and decaying nations are revived by

the contact of a younger vitality. Nations in which the elements of

organisation and the capacity for government have been lost, either

through the demoralising influence of despotism, or the disintegrating

action of democracy, are restored and educated anew under the discipline

of a stronger and less corrupted race. This fertilising and regenerating

process can only be obtained by living under one government. It is in

the cauldron of the State that the fusion takes place by which the

vigour, the knowledge, and the capacity of one portion of mankind may be

communicated to another. Where political and national boundaries

coincide, society ceases to advance, and nations relapse into a

condition corresponding to that of men who renounce intercourse with

their fellow-men. The difference between the two unites mankind not only

by the benefits it confers on those who live together, but because it

connects society either by a political or a national bond, gives to

every people an interest in its neighbours, either because they are

under the same government or because they are of the same race, and thus

promotes the interests of humanity, of civilisation, and of religion.

Christianity rejoices at the mixture of races, as paganism identifies

itself with their differences, because truth is universal, and errors

various and particular. In the ancient world idolatry and nationality

went together, and the same term is applied in Scripture to both. It was

the mission of the Church to overcome national differences. The period

of her undisputed supremacy was that in which all Western Europe obeyed

the same laws, all literature was contained in one language, and the

political unity of Christendom was personified in a single potentate,

while its intellectual unity was represented in one university. As the

ancient Romans concluded their conquests by carrying away the gods of

the conquered people, Charlemagne overcame the national resistance of

the Saxons only by the forcible destruction of their pagan rites. Out of

the mediaeval period, and the combined action of the German race and the

Church, came forth a new system of nations and a new conception of

nationality. Nature was overcome in the nation as well as in the

individual. In pagan and uncultivated times, nations were distinguished

from each other by the widest diversity, not only in religion, but in

customs, language, and character. Under the new law they had many things

in common; the old barriers which separated them were removed, and the

new principle of self-government, which Christianity imposed, enabled

them to live together under the same authority, without necessarily

losing their cherished habits, their customs, or their laws. The new

idea of freedom made room for different races in one State. A nation was

no longer what it had been to the ancient world,--the progeny of a

common ancestor, or the aboriginal product of a particular region,--a

result of merely physical and material causes,--but a moral and

political being; not the creation of geographical or physiological

unity, but developed in the course of history by the action of the

State. It is derived from the State, not supreme over it. A State may in

course of time produce a nationality; but that a nationality should

constitute a State is contrary to the nature of modern civilisation. The

nation derives its rights and its power from the memory of a former

independence.

The Church has agreed in this respect with the tendency of political

progress, and discouraged wherever she could the isolation of nations;

admonishing them of their duties to each other, and regarding conquest

and feudal investiture as the natural means of raising barbarous or

sunken nations to a higher level. But though she has never attributed to

national independence an immunity from the accidental consequences of

feudal law, of hereditary claims, or of testamentary arrangements, she

defends national liberty against uniformity and centralisation with an

energy inspired by perfect community of interests. For the same enemy

threatens both; and the State which is reluctant to tolerate

differences, and to do justice to the peculiar character of various

races, must from the same cause interfere in the internal government of

religion. The connection of religious liberty with the emancipation of

Poland or Ireland is not merely the accidental result of local causes;

and the failure of the Concordat to unite the subjects of Austria is the

natural consequence of a policy which did not desire to protect the

provinces in their diversity and autonomy, and sought to bribe the

Church by favours instead of strengthening her by independence. From

this influence of religion in modern history has proceeded a new

definition of patriotism.

The difference between nationality and the State is exhibited in the

nature of patriotic attachment. Our connection with the race is merely

natural or physical, whilst our duties to the political nation are

ethical. One is a community of affections and instincts infinitely

important and powerful in savage life, but pertaining more to the animal

than to the civilised man; the other is an authority governing by laws,

imposing obligations, and giving a moral sanction and character to the

natural relations of society. Patriotism is in political life what faith

is in religion, and it stands to the domestic feelings and to

home-sickness as faith to fanaticism and to superstition. It has one

aspect derived from private life and nature, for it is an extension of

the family affections, as the tribe is an extension of the family. But

in its real political character, patriotism consists in the development

of the instinct of self-preservation into a moral duty which may involve

self-sacrifice. Self-preservation is both an instinct and a duty,

natural and involuntary in one respect, and at the same time a moral

obligation. By the first it produces the family; by the last the State.

If the nation could exist without the State, subject only to the

instinct of self-preservation, it would be incapable of denying,

controlling, or sacrificing itself; it would be an end and a rule to

itself. But in the political order moral purposes are realised and

public ends are pursued to which private interests and even existence

must be sacrificed. The great sign of true patriotism, the development

of selfishness into sacrifice, is the product of political life. That

sense of duty which is supplied by race is not entirely separated from

its selfish and instinctive basis; and the love of country, like married

love, stands at the same time on a material and a moral foundation. The

patriot must distinguish between the two causes or objects of his

devotion. The attachment which is given only to the country is like

obedience given only to the State--a submission to physical influences.

The man who prefers his country before every other duty shows the same

spirit as the man who surrenders every right to the State. They both

deny that right is superior to authority.

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