At that time there was some truth in the old joke which describes the

English dislike of speculation by saying that all our philosophy

consists of a short catechism in two questions: "What is mind? No

matter. What is matter? Never mind." The only accepted appeal was to

tradition. Patriots were in the habit of saying that they took their

stand upon the ancient ways, and would not have the laws of England

changed. To enforce their argument they invented a story that the

constitution had come from Troy, and that the Romans had allowed it to

subsist untouched. Such fables did not avail against Strafford; and the

oracle of precedent sometimes gave responses adverse to the popular

cause. In the sovereign question of religion, this was decisive, for the

practice of the sixteenth century, as well as of the fifteenth,

testified in favour of intolerance. By royal command, the nation had

passed four times in one generation from one faith to another, with a

facility that made a fatal impression on Laud. In a country that had

proscribed every religion in turn, and had submitted to such a variety

of penal measures against Lollard and Arian, against Augsburg and Rome,

it seemed there could be no danger in cropping the ears of a Puritan.

But an age of stronger conviction had arrived; and men resolved to

abandon the ancient ways that led to the scaffold and the rack, and to

make the wisdom of their ancestors and the statutes of the land bow

before an unwritten law. Religious liberty had been the dream of great

Christian writers in the age of Constantine and Valentinian, a dream

never wholly realised in the Empire, and rudely dispelled when the

barbarians found that it exceeded the resources of their art to govern

civilised populations of another religion, and unity of worship was

imposed by laws of blood and by theories more cruel than the laws. But

from St. Athanasius and St. Ambrose down to Erasmus and More, each age

heard the protest of earnest men in behalf of the liberty of conscience,

and the peaceful days before the Reformation were full of promise that

it would prevail.

In the commotion that followed, men were glad to get tolerated

themselves by way of privilege and compromise, and willingly renounced

the wider application of the principle. Socinus was the first who, on

the ground that Church and State ought to be separated, required

universal toleration. But Socinus disarmed his own theory, for he was a

strict advocate of passive obedience.

The idea that religious liberty is the generating principle of civil,

and that civil liberty is the necessary condition of religious, was a

discovery reserved for the seventeenth century. Many years before the

names of Milton and Taylor, of Baxter and Locke were made illustrious by

their partial condemnation of intolerance, there were men among the

Independent congregations who grasped with vigour and sincerity the

principle that it is only by abridging the authority of States that the

liberty of Churches can be assured. That great political idea,

sanctifying freedom and consecrating it to God, teaching men to treasure

the liberties of others as their own, and to defend them for the love of

justice and charity more than as a claim of right, has been the soul of

what is great and good in the progress of the last two hundred years.

The cause of religion, even under the unregenerate influence of worldly

passion, had as much to do as any clear notions of policy in making

this country the foremost of the free. It had been the deepest current

in the movement of 1641, and it remained the strongest motive that

survived the reaction of 1660.

The greatest writers of the Whig party, Burke and Macaulay, constantly

represented the statesmen of the Revolution as the legitimate ancestors

of modern liberty. It is humiliating to trace a political lineage to

Algernon Sidney, who was the paid agent of the French king; to Lord

Russell, who opposed religious toleration at least as much as absolute

monarchy; to Shaftesbury, who dipped his hands in the innocent blood

shed by the perjury of Titus Oates; to Halifax, who insisted that the

plot must be supported even if untrue; to Marlborough, who sent his

comrades to perish on an expedition which he had betrayed to the French;

to Locke, whose notion of liberty involves nothing more spiritual than

the security of property, and is consistent with slavery and

persecution; or even to Addison, who conceived that the right of voting

taxes belonged to no country but his own. Defoe affirms that from the

time of Charles II. to that of George I. he never knew a politician who

truly held the faith of either party; and the perversity of the

statesmen who led the assault against the later Stuarts threw back the

cause of progress for a century.

When the purport of the secret treaty became suspected by which Louis

XIV. pledged himself to support Charles II. with an army for the

destruction of Parliament, if Charles would overthrow the Anglican

Church, it was found necessary to make concession to the popular alarm.

It was proposed that whenever James should succeed, great part of the

royal prerogative and patronage should be transferred to Parliament. At

the same time, the disabilities of Nonconformists and Catholics would

have been removed. If the Limitation Bill, which Halifax supported with

signal ability, had passed, the monarchical constitution would have

advanced, in the seventeenth century, farther than it was destined to do

until the second quarter of the nineteenth. But the enemies of James,

guided by the Prince of Orange, preferred a Protestant king who should

be nearly absolute, to a constitutional king who should be a Catholic.

The scheme failed. James succeeded to a power which, in more cautious

hands, would have been practically uncontrolled, and the storm that cast

him down gathered beyond the sea.

By arresting the preponderance of France, the Revolution of 1688 struck

the first real blow at Continental despotism. At home it relieved

Dissent, purified justice, developed the national energies and

resources, and ultimately, by the Act of Settlement, placed the crown in

the gift of the people. But it neither introduced nor determined any

important principle, and, that both parties might be able to work

together, it left untouched the fundamental question between Whig and

Tory. For the divine right of kings it established, in the words of

Defoe, the divine right of freeholders; and their domination extended

for seventy years, under the authority of John Locke, the philosopher of

government by the gentry. Even Hume did not enlarge the bounds of his

ideas; and his narrow materialistic belief in the connection between

liberty and property captivated even the bolder mind of Fox.

By his idea that the powers of government ought to be divided according

to their nature, and not according to the division of classes, which

Montesquieu took up and developed with consummate talent, Locke is the

originator of the long reign of English institutions in foreign lands.

And his doctrine of resistance, or, as he finally termed it, the appeal

to Heaven, ruled the judgment of Chatham at a moment of solemn

transition in the history of the world. Our Parliamentary system,

managed by the great revolution families, was a contrivance by which

electors were compelled, and legislators were induced to vote against

their convictions; and the intimidation of the constituencies was

rewarded by the corruption of their representatives. About the year 1770

things had been brought back, by indirect ways, nearly to the condition

which the Revolution had been designed to remedy for ever. Europe seemed

incapable of becoming the home of free States. It was from America that

the plain ideas that men ought to mind their own business, and that the

nation is responsible to Heaven for the acts of the State,--ideas long

locked in the breast of solitary thinkers, and hidden among Latin

folios,--burst forth like a conqueror upon the world they were destined

to transform, under the title of the Rights of Man. Whether the British

legislature had a constitutional right to tax a subject colony was hard

to say, by the letter of the law. The general presumption was immense on

the side of authority; and the world believed that the will of the

constituted ruler ought to be supreme, and not the will of the subject

people. Very few bold writers went so far as to say that lawful power

may be resisted in cases of extreme necessity. But the colonisers of

America, who had gone forth not in search of gain, but to escape from

laws under which other Englishmen were content to live, were so

sensitive even to appearances that the Blue Laws of Connecticut forbade

men to walk to church within ten feet of their wives. And the proposed

tax, of only L12,000 a year, might have been easily borne. But the

reasons why Edward I. and his Council were not allowed to tax England

were reasons why George III. and his Parliament should not tax America.

The dispute involved a principle, namely, the right of controlling

government. Furthermore, it involved the conclusion that the Parliament

brought together by a derisive election had no just right over the

unrepresented nation, and it called on the people of England to take

back its power. Our best statesmen saw that whatever might be the law,

the rights of the nation were at stake. Chatham, in speeches better

remembered than any that have been delivered in Parliament, exhorted

America to be firm. Lord Camden, the late Chancellor, said: "Taxation

and representation are inseparably united. God hath joined them. No

British Parliament can separate them."

From the elements of that crisis Burke built up the noblest political

philosophy in the world. "I do not know the method," said he, "of

drawing up an indictment against a whole people. The natural rights of

mankind are indeed sacred things, and if any public measure is proved

mischievously to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that

measure, even if no charter at all could be set up against it. Only a

sovereign reason, paramount to all forms of legislation and

administration, should dictate." In this way, just a hundred years ago,

the opportune reticence, the politic hesitancy of European

statesmanship, was at last broken down; and the principle gained ground,

that a nation can never abandon its fate to an authority it cannot

control. The Americans placed it at the foundation of their new

government. They did more; for having subjected all civil authorities to

the popular will, they surrounded the popular will with restrictions

that the British legislature would not endure.

During the revolution in France the example of England, which had been

held up so long, could not for a moment compete with the influence of a

country whose institutions were so wisely framed to protect freedom even

against the perils of democracy. When Louis Philippe became king, he

assured the old Republican, Lafayette, that what he had seen in the

United States had convinced him that no government can be so good as a

Republic. There was a time in the Presidency of Monroe, about fifty-five

years ago, which men still speak of as "the era of good feeling," when

most of the incongruities that had come down from the Stuarts had been

reformed, and the motives of later divisions were yet inactive. The

causes of old-world trouble,--popular ignorance, pauperism, the glaring

contrast between rich and poor, religious strife, public debts, standing

armies and war,--were almost unknown. No other age or country had solved

so successfully the problems that attend the growth of free societies,

and time was to bring no further progress.

But I have reached the end of my time, and have hardly come to the

beginning of my task. In the ages of which I have spoken, the history of

freedom was the history of the thing that was not. But since the

Declaration of Independence, or, to speak more justly, since the

Spaniards, deprived of their king, made a new government for themselves,

the only known forms of liberty, Republics and Constitutional Monarchy,

have made their way over the world. It would have been interesting to

trace the reaction of America on the Monarchies that achieved its

independence; to see how the sudden rise of political economy suggested

the idea of applying the methods of science to the art of government;

how Louis XVI., after confessing that despotism was useless, even to

make men happy by compulsion, appealed to the nation to do what was

beyond his skill, and thereby resigned his sceptre to the middle class,

and the intelligent men of France, shuddering at the awful recollections

of their own experience, struggled to shut out the past, that they might

deliver their children from the prince of the world and rescue the

living from the clutch of the dead, until the finest opportunity ever

given to the world was thrown away, because the passion for equality

made vain the hope of freedom.

And I should have wished to show you that the same deliberate rejection

of the moral code which smoothed the paths of absolute monarchy and of

oligarchy, signalised the advent of the democratic claim to unlimited

power,--that one of its leading champions avowed the design of

corrupting the moral sense of men, in order to destroy the influence of

religion, and a famous apostle of enlightenment and toleration wished

that the last king might be strangled with the entrails of the last

priest. I would have tried to explain the connection between the

doctrine of Adam Smith, that labour is the original source of all

wealth, and the conclusion that the producers of wealth virtually

compose the nation, by which Sieyes subverted historic France; and to

show that Rousseau's definition of the social compact as a voluntary

association of equal partners conducted Marat, by short and unavoidable

stages, to declare that the poorer classes were absolved, by the law of

self-preservation, from the conditions of a contract which awarded to

them misery and death; that they were at war with society, and had a

right to all they could get by exterminating the rich, and that their

inflexible theory of equality, the chief legacy of the Revolution,

together with the avowed inadequacy of economic science to grapple with

problems of the poor, revived the idea of renovating society on the

principle of self-sacrifice, which had been the generous aspiration of

the Essenes and the early Christians, of Fathers and Canonists and

Friars, of Erasmus, the most celebrated precursor of the Reformation, of

Sir Thomas More, its most illustrious victim, and of Fenelon, the most

popular of bishops, but which, during the forty years of its revival,

has been associated with envy and hatred and bloodshed, and is now the

most dangerous enemy lurking in our path.

Last, and most of all, having told so much of the unwisdom of our

ancestors, having exposed the sterility of the convulsion that burned

what they adored, and made the sins of the Republic mount up as high as

those of the monarchy, having shown that Legitimacy, which repudiated

the Revolution, and Imperialism, which crowned it, were but disguises of

the same element of violence and wrong, I should have wished, in order

that my address might not break off without a meaning or a moral, to

relate by whom, and in what connection, the true law of the formation of

free States was recognised, and how that discovery, closely akin to

those which, under the names of development, evolution, and continuity,

have given a new and deeper method to other sciences, solved the ancient

problem between stability and change, and determined the authority of

tradition on the progress of thought; how that theory, which Sir James

Mackintosh expressed by saying that Constitutions are not made, but

grow; the theory that custom and the national qualities of the governed,

and not the will of the government, are the makers of the law; and

therefore that the nation, which is the source of its own organic

institutions, should be charged with the perpetual custody of their

integrity, and with the duty of bringing the form into harmony with the

spirit, was made, by the singular co-operation of the purest

Conservative intellect with red-handed revolution, of Niebuhr with

Mazzini, to yield the idea of nationality, which, far more than the idea

of liberty, has governed the movement of the present age.

I do not like to conclude without inviting attention to the impressive

fact that so much of the hard fighting, the thinking, the enduring that

has contributed to the deliverance of man from the power of man, has

been the work of our countrymen, and of their descendants in other

lands. We have had to contend, as much as any people, against monarchs

of strong will and of resources secured by their foreign possession,

against men of rare capacity, against whole dynasties of born tyrants.

And yet that proud prerogative stands out on the background of our

history. Within a generation of the Conquest, the Normans were compelled

to recognise, in some grudging measure, the claims of the English

people. When the struggle between Church and State extended to England,

our Churchmen learned to associate themselves with the popular cause;

and, with few exceptions, neither the hierarchical spirit of the foreign

divines, nor the monarchical bias peculiar to the French, characterised

the writers of the English school. The Civil Law, transmitted from the

degenerate Empire to be the common prop of absolute power, was excluded

from England. The Canon Law was restrained, and this country never

admitted the Inquisition, nor fully accepted the use of torture which

invested Continental royalty with so many terrors. At the end of the

Middle Ages foreign writers acknowledged our superiority, and pointed to

these causes. After that, our gentry maintained the means of local

self-government such as no other country possessed. Divisions in

religion forced toleration. The confusion of the common law taught the

people that their best safeguard was the independence and the integrity

of the judges.

All these explanations lie on the surface, and are as visible as the

protecting ocean; but they can only be successive effects of a constant

cause which must lie in the same native qualities of perseverance,

moderation, individuality, and the manly sense of duty, which give to

the English race its supremacy in the stern art of labour, which has

enabled it to thrive as no other can on inhospitable shores, and which

(although no great people has less of the bloodthirsty craving for glory

and an army of 50,000 English soldiers has never been seen in battle)

caused Napoleon to exclaim, as he rode away from Waterloo, "It has

always been the same since Crecy."

Therefore, if there is reason for pride in the past, there is more for

hope in the time to come. Our advantages increase, while other nations

fear their neighbours or covet their neighbours' goods. Anomalies and

defects there are, fewer and less intolerable, if not less flagrant than

of old.

But I have fixed my eyes on the spaces that Heaven's light illuminates,

that I may not lay too heavy a strain on the indulgence with which you

have accompanied me over the dreary and heart-breaking course by which

men have passed to freedom; and because the light that has guided us is

still unquenched, and the causes that have carried us so far in the van

of free nations have not spent their power; because the story of the

future is written in the past, and that which hath been is the same

thing that shall be.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 3: An address delivered to the members of the Bridgnorth

Institution at the Agricultural Hall, 28th May 1877.]

[Footnote 4: [Poynet, in his _Treatise on Political Power_.]]

III

SIR ERSKINE MAY'S DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE[5]

Scarcely thirty years separate the Europe of Guizot and Metternich from

these days of universal suffrage both in France and in United Germany;

when a condemned insurgent of 1848 is the constitutional Minister of

Austria; when Italy, from the Alps to the Adriatic, is governed by

friends of Mazzini; and statesmen who recoiled from the temerities of

Peel have doubled the electoral constituency of England. If the

philosopher who proclaimed the law that democratic progress is constant

and irrepressible had lived to see old age, he would have been startled

by the fulfilment of his prophecy. Throughout these years of

revolutionary change Sir Thomas Erskine May has been more closely and

constantly connected with the centre of public affairs than any other

Englishman, and his place, during most of the time, has been at the

table of the House of Commons, where he has sat, like Canute, and

watched the rising tide. Few could be better prepared to be the

historian of European Democracy than one who, having so long studied the

mechanism of popular government in the most illustrious of assemblies at

the height of its power, has written its history, and taught its methods

to the world.

It is not strange that so delicate and laborious a task should have

remained unattempted. Democracy is a gigantic current that has been fed

by many springs. Physical and spiritual causes have contributed to

swell it. Much has been done by economic theories, and more by economic

laws. The propelling force lay sometimes in doctrine and sometimes in

fact, and error has been as powerful as truth. Popular progress has been

determined at one time by legislation, at others by a book, an

invention, or a crime; and we may trace it to the influence of Greek

metaphysicians and Roman jurists, of barbarian custom and ecclesiastical

law, of the reformers who discarded the canonists, the sectaries who

discarded the reformers, and the philosophers who discarded the sects.

The scene has changed, as nation succeeded nation, and during the most

stagnant epoch of European life the new world stored up the forces that

have transformed the old.

A history that should pursue all the subtle threads from end to end

might be eminently valuable, but not as a tribute to peace and

conciliation. Few discoveries are more irritating than those which

expose the pedigree of ideas. Sharp definitions and unsparing analysis

would displace the veil beneath which society dissembles its divisions,

would make political disputes too violent for compromise and political

alliances too precarious for use, and would embitter politics with all

the passion of social and religious strife. Sir Erskine May writes for

all who take their stand within the broad lines of our constitution. His

judgment is averse from extremes. He turns from the discussion of

theories, and examines his subject by the daylight of institutions,

believing that laws depend much on the condition of society, and little

on notions and disputations unsupported by reality. He avows his

disbelief even in the influence of Locke, and cares little to inquire

how much self-government owes to Independency, or equality to the

Quakers; and how democracy was affected by the doctrine that society is

founded on contract, that happiness is the end of all government, or

labour the only source of wealth; and for this reason, because he always

touches ground, and brings to bear, on a vast array of sifted fact, the

light of sound sense and tried experience rather than dogmatic precept,

all men will read his book with profit, and almost all without offence.

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