FROM C. P. W.

_Oct. 23._ General Saxton returned, as you know, with full powers from

the President to raise one or if possible five negro regiments. I

think it will be difficult to induce the men to enlist. Their

treatment in the spring and summer was such as to prejudice them

against military duty under any circumstances. They were forcibly

drafted, were ill-treated by at least one officer,--who is a terror to

the whole black population,--have never been paid a cent; they

suffered from the change of diet, and quite as much from homesickness.

I think if their treatment in the spring had been different, it would

be possible to raise a regiment on these islands; as it is, I think it

will be surprising if they fill a company from St. Helena. I think,

too, that it would be very difficult, under any circumstances, to

train them into fighting condition under six months, and if they had

at the first the prospect of coming into actual conflict with the

Secesh, the number who would be willing to enlist would be extremely

small. They have not, generally speaking, the pluck to look in the

face the prospect of actual fighting, nor have they the character to

enlist for their own defense. They can understand the necessity of

their knowing how to defend themselves, they acknowledge their

obligations to help the Yankees, and do their part in keeping the

islands against their old masters; a good many of them express their

willingness to fight under white officers, and some have intimated a

desire to know something of drill and how to handle a musket. But they

are very timid and cautious. They fear that when they have learned

their drill they will be drafted. They are very reluctant to leave

their homes to go and live on Hilton Head or Port Royal, in camp, away

from their families and crops. The mere mention of "Captain Tobey,"

with a hint that "General Saxton wants the black people to help the

white soldiers keep the Secesh off the islands," sends them in panic

into the woods. Mr. Philbrick saw the General this morning, and was

told that if the regiment were not raised we should have to give up

the whole enterprise; that the President and the people of the North

were looking to the raising of this regiment as a test experiment.

That if it succeeded and it was found that the negroes could and would

aid the Government, then the Government would be encouraged to hold

the islands, trusting not only that the negroes could aid in defending

them, but that as fast as negroes were freed, they could be used

effectively against the rebels. Moreover, that the success of one

regiment here would make the President's proclamation a more terribly

effective weapon against the Southerners. (There is no doubt that in

many parts of the South, especially on the Mississippi, the negroes

are much more intelligent than here. Those from the main seem a

superior class to those who have always lived on the islands. The

success of armed negroes of this inferior class would indicate the

danger of the masters of other slaves of a higher class, when they

learn that "all slaves of rebel masters who enter into the service of

the United States are forever free," with their families.)

If, on the other hand, no black troops can be raised, the General says

that the Government will be discouraged from attempting any longer to

protect at such an expense a people who cannot or will not aid in

defending themselves. I hope that General Saxton has not held out too

grand hopes of the success of this undertaking to the President and to

others at the North, and I hope he is exaggerating the importance of

the movement. Perhaps the President wants to try his colonization

scheme on these people. He had better lose a campaign than evacuate

these islands and give up this experiment. This experiment and the war

must go on side by side. I hope that before the war is done we shall

have furnished the Government with sufficient facts to enable them to

form a policy for the treatment of the millions whom the conclusion of

the war, if not its continuance, must throw into our hands.

I am very much afraid that the Government will look too much to the

material results of the year's occupation for determining the success

of free labor among the slaves. They will neglect to take into account

the discouragements and drawbacks of the year. The sudden reaction

consequent upon the change from slavery to what they hardly knew as

freedom; the confusion incident upon military occupation (and the

contradictory directions given concerning the year's crops); the

abundance of money where the cotton-agents and officers were

stationed, and the high wages promised and often obtained, at Hilton

Head and Beaufort; the lateness of the cotton crop, the poorness of

the seed, the uncertainty and doubt and want of system in regard to

the management of the crops; the drafting of the able-bodied men at a

critical period, their hardships and subsequent distrust and fear, or

idleness and insubordination; the changing of superintendents, the

fewness of both superintendents and teachers; and lastly, the shameful

delay in the payments, causing distrust, carelessness, neglect of

plantation work, and in some few cases, suffering for want of the

means to purchase clothing. It is too bad to treat people so, and it

is wonderful how much they have done and in what an excellent state

they are, under these discouraging circumstances. If they were assured

of a market at the end of the year, and sufficient money advanced them

to enable them to get "sweetening" and clothes through the year, I

would trust my plantations to go right ahead, put their crops into the

ground, and insure to the Government a handsome surplus next November.

The cheerfulness and hopefulness of the people in regard to next

year's crops, and the interest they take in their success, is

surprising. "If we live to see," "if God spare life," they say, "we

will plant early, and begin in time, and then you will see. O--yes,

sar."

Mr. Philbrick is appointed cotton-agent for this crop. He is going to

have the cotton ginned here, not at New York. Good seed is scarce. The

improved seed, the result of many years' cultivation and selection,

was lost to the island by the policy of ginning last year's crop in

New York.

Letters from Port Royal Written at the Time of the Civil War (1862-1868) · 第 43 / 193 题