Corps (then not incorporated with it) in the battle of the
Wilderness were "2,265 killed, 10,220 wounded, and 2,902
missing. Total, 15,387. Killed and wounded, 12,485. … The
woods took fire in many places, and it is estimated that 200
of our wounded perished in the flames and smoke. According to
the tabular statement, Part First, 'Medical and Surgical
History of the War,' the casualties in the Army of Northern
Virginia were 2,000 killed, 6,000 wounded, and 3,400 missing.
The authority for this statement is not given, and I do not
find anywhere records of the loss of that army in the
Wilderness. … Both sides lost many valuable officers in this
battle, [including, on the Union side, General Wadsworth]. …
So far as I know, no great battle ever took place before on
such ground. But little of the combatants could be seen, and
its progress was known to the senses chiefly by the rising and
falling sounds of a vast musketry that continually swept along
the lines of battle many miles in length, sounds which at
times approached to the sublime."
_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865
(Campaigns of the Civil war, volume 12), chapter 2._
"All the peculiar advantages of the Army of the Potomac were
sacrificed in the jungle-fighting into which they were thus
called to engage. Of what use here were the tactical skill and
the perfection of form, acquired through long and patient
exercise; of what use here the example and the personal
influence of a Hays or a Hancock, a Brooke or a Barlow? How
can a battle be fitly ordered in such a tangle of wood and
brush, where troops can neither be sent straight to their
destination nor seen and watched over, when, after repeatedly
losing direction and becoming broken into fragments in their
advance through thickets and jungles, they at last make their
way up to the line of battle, perhaps at the point they were
designed to reinforce, perhaps far from it? … It will never
cease to be an object of amazement to me that, with such a
tract in prospect, the character of it being known, in
general, to army headquarters through the Chancellorsville
campaign … a supreme effort was not made … to carry the Army
of the Potomac either through these jungles toward Mine Run,
or past it, toward Spottsylvania."
_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 13._
ALSO IN:
_E. M. Law, A. S. Webb, and others,
The Wilderness Campaign
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 50-51 (volume 2)._
_W. Swinton,
The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War,
chapter 9._
_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 17._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
Sheridan's raid to Richmond.
"When the Army of the Potomac emerged from the Wilderness,
Sheridan was sent to cut Lee's communications. This was the
first of the remarkable raids of that remarkable leader, in
Virginia, and, though short, was a destructive one. He took
with him a greater portion of the cavalry led by Merritt,
Gregg and Wilson, and, cutting loose from the army, he swept
over the Po and the Ta, crossed the North Anna on the 9th, and
struck the Virginia Central railway at Beaver Dam Station,
which he captured.
{3525}
He destroyed ten miles of the railway; also its rolling stock,
with a million and a half of rations, and released 400 Union
prisoners, on their way to Richmond from the Wilderness. There
he was attacked in flank and rear by General J. E. B. Stuart
and his cavalry, who had pursued him from the Rapid Anna
[Rapidan], but was not much impeded thereby. He pushed on,
crossed the South Anna at Ground-squirrel Bridge, and at
daylight on the morning of the 11th, captured Ashland Station,
on the Fredericksburg road, where he destroyed the railway
property, a large quantity of stores, and the road itself for
six miles. Being charged with the duty of not only destroying
these roads, but of menacing Richmond and communicating with
the army of the James, … Sheridan pressed on in the direction
of the Confederate capital, when he was confronted by Stuart
at Yellow Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond, where that
able leader, having made a swift circuitous march, had
concentrated all of his available cavalry. Sheridan attacked
him at once, and, after a sharp engagement, drove the
Confederates toward Ashland, on the north fork of the
Chickahominy, with a loss of their gallant leader, who, with
General Gordon, was mortally wounded. Inspirited by this
success, Sheridan pushed along the now open turnpike toward
Richmond, and made a spirited dash upon the outer works.
Custer's brigade carried them at that point and made 100
prisoners. As in the case of Kilpatrick's raid, so now, the
second line of works were too strong to be carried by cavalry.
The troops in and around the city had rallied for their
defense, and in an attack the Nationals were repulsed. Then
Sheridan led his command across the Chickahominy, at Meadow
Bridge, where he beat off a considerable force of infantry
sent out from Richmond, and who attacked him in the rear,
while another force assailed his front. He also drove the foe
on his front, when he destroyed the railway bridge there, and
then pushed on southward to Haxall's Landing, on the James
River, where he rested three days and procured supplies. Then,
by way of White House and Hanover Court House, he leisurely
returned to the Army of the Potomac, which he rejoined on the
25th of May."
_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 3, chapter 11._
ALSO IN:
_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 18-19._
_H. B. McClellan,
Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart,
chapter 20._
_J. B. Jones,
A Rebel War Clerk's Diary,
volume 2, pages 202-208._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
Grant's movement upon Richmond: Spottsylvania Court House.
The Bloody Angle.
"Throughout the entire day succeeding this first great
conflict [in The Wilderness], General Lee remained quiet,
watching for some movement of his adversary. His success in
the preliminary struggle had been gratifying, considering the
great disproportion of numbers, but he indulged no expectation
of a retrograde movement across the Rapidan, on the part of
General Grant. He expected him rather to advance, and
anxiously awaited some development of this intention. There
were no indications of such a design up to the night of the
7th, but at that time, to use the words of a confidential
member of Lee's staff, 'he all at once seemed to conceive the
idea that his enemy was preparing to forsake his position, and
move toward Hanover Junction via the Spottsylvania
Court-House, and, believing this, he at once detailed
Anderson's division with orders to proceed rapidly toward the
court-house. General Anderson commenced his march about nine
o'clock at night, when the Federal column was already upon its
way. A race now began for the coveted position, and General
Stuart, with his dismounted sharp-shooters behind improvised
breastworks, harassed and impeded the Federal advance, at
every step, throughout the night. This greatly delayed their
march, and their head of column did not reach the vicinity of
Spottsylvania Court-House until past sunrise. General Warren,
leading the Federal advance, then hurried forward, followed by
General Hancock, when suddenly he found himself in front of
breastworks, and was received with a fire of musketry. Lee had
succeeded in interposing himself between General Grant and
Richmond. On the same evening the bulk of the two armies were
facing each other on the line of the Po. … General Lee had
taken up his position on the south bank of one of the four
tributaries of the Mattapony. These four streams are known as
the Mat, Ta, Po, and Nye Rivers, and bear the same relation to
the main stream that the fingers of the open hand do to the
wrist. General Lee was behind the Po, which is next to the
Nye, the northern-most of these water-courses. Both were
difficult to cross, and their banks heavily wooded. It was now
to be seen whether, either by a front attack or a turning
movement, General Grant could oust his adversary, and whether
General Lee would stand on the defensive or attack. All day,
during the 9th, the two armies were constructing breastworks
along their entire fronts, and these works, from the Rapidan
to the banks of the Chickahominy, remain yet [1871] in
existence. On the evening of this day a Federal force was
thrown across the Po, on the Confederate left, but soon
withdrawn; and on the 10th a similar movement took place near
the same point, which resulted in a brief but bloody conflict,
during which the woods took fire, and many of the assaulting
troops perished miserably in the flames. The force was then
recalled, and, during that night and the succeeding day,
nothing of importance occurred, although heavy skirmishing and
an artillery-fire took place along the lines. On the morning
of the 12th, at the first dawn of day, General Grant made a
more important and dangerous assault than any yet undertaken
in the campaign. This was directed at a salient on General
Lee's right centre, occupied by Johnson's division of Ewell's
corps, and was one of the bloodiest and most terrible
incidents of the war. For this assault [made by three
divisions of Hancock's corps] General Grant is said to have
selected his best troops. These advanced in a heavy charging
column, through the half-darkness of dawn, passed silently
over the Confederate skirmishers, scarcely firing a shot, and,
just as the first streak of daylight touched the eastern
woods, burst upon the salient, which they stormed at the point
of the bayonet. The attack was a complete surprise, and
carried everything before it. The Southern troops, asleep in
the trenches, woke to have the bayonet thrust into them, to be
felled with clubbed muskets, and to find the works apparently
in secure possession of the enemy before they could fire a
shot.
{3526}
Such was the excellent success of the Federal movement, and
the Southern line seemed to be hopelessly disrupted. Nearly
the whole of Johnson's division were taken prisoners—the
number amounting to more than 3,000—and 18 pieces of artillery
fell into the hands of the assaulting column. The position of
affairs was now exceedingly critical; and, unless General Lee
could reform his line at the point, it seemed that nothing was
left him but an abandonment of his whole position. The Federal
army had broken his line; was pouring into the opening; and,
to prevent him from concentrating at the point to regain
possession of the works, heavy attacks were begun by the enemy
on his right and left wings. It is probable that at no time
during the war was the Southern army in greater danger of a
bloody and decisive disaster. At this critical moment General
Lee acted with the nerve and coolness of a soldier whom no
adverse event can shake. … Line of battle was promptly formed
a short distance in rear of the salient then in the enemy's
possession, and a fierce charge was made by the Southerners,
under the eye of Lee, to regain it. … The word ferocious best
describes the struggle which followed. It continued throughout
the entire day, Lee making not less than five distinct
assaults in heavy force to recover the works. The fight
involved the troops on both flanks, and was desperate and
unyielding. The opposing flags were at times within only a few
yards of each other, and so incessant and concentrated was the
fire of musketry that a tree of about 18 inches in diameter
was cut down by bullets, and is still preserved, it is said,
in the city of Washington, as a memorial of this bloody
struggle. The fighting only ceased several hours after dark.
Lee had not regained his advanced line of works, but he was
firmly rooted in an interior and straighter line, from which
the Federal troops had found it impossible to dislodge him."
_J. E. Cooke,
Life of General Robert E. Lee,
part 8, chapter 4._
"For the distance of nearly a mile, amid a cold, drenching
rain, the combatants [on the 12th, at the salient] were
literally struggling across the breastworks. They fired
directly into each other's faces, bayonet thrusts were given
over the intrenchments; men even grappled their antagonists
across the piles of logs and pulled them over, to be stabbed
or carried to the rear as prisoners. … Never before, since the
discovery of gunpowder, had such a mass of lead been hurled
into a space so narrow as that which now embraced the scene of
combat. Large standing trees were literally cut off and
brought to the ground by infantry fire alone; their great
limbs whipped into basket stuff that could be woven by the
hand of a girl. … If any comparisons can be made between the
sections involved in that desperate contest, the fiercest and
deadliest fighting took place at the west angle, ever
afterwards known as 'The Bloody Angle.' … All day the bloody
work went on. … The trenches had more than once to be cleared
of the dead, to give the living a place to stand. All day
long, and even into the night, the battle lasted, for it was
not till twelve o'clock, nearly twenty hours after the command
'Forward' had been given to the column at the Brown House,
that the firing died down, and the Confederates, relinquishing
their purpose to retake the captured works, began in the
darkness to construct a new line to cut off the salient."
_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 15._
General Humphreys estimates Grant's losses in killed and
wounded on the 12th at 6,020; missing 800. Lee's losses that
day in killed, wounded and prisoners he concludes to have been
between 9,000 and 10,000. His estimate of losses on the 10th
is 4,100 (killed and wounded) on the Union side, and 2,000 on
the Confederate side. Major General John Sedgwick, commanding
the Sixth Army Corps, was killed in the skirmishing of the
9th.
_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865,
chapter 3._
ALSO IN:
_C. N. Galloway,
Hand to Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 36._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
Grant's movement upon Richmond:
from Spottsylvania to the Chickahominy.
"The lines of Spottsylvania remained still intact, and General
Grant, who might easily have turned the position and manœuvred
his antagonist out of it, seemed bent on carrying it by direct
attack. Accordingly, during the succeeding week [after the
battle of the 12th], various movements of corps were made from
flank to flank, in the endeavor to find a spot where the lines
could be broken. These attempts were skilfully met at every
point—the Confederates extending their line to correspond
with the shiftings of the army; so that wherever attack was
essayed, the enemy bristled out in breastworks, and every
partial assault made was repulsed. Day by day Grant continued
to throw out towards the left, in the hope of overlapping and
breaking in the Confederate right flank: so that from
occupying, as the army did on its arrival, a line extending
four or five miles to the northwest of Spottsylvania
Courthouse, it had at the end of ten days assumed a position
almost due east of that place, the left resting at a distance
of four miles at Massaponax Church. After twelve days of
effort, the carrying of the position was seen to be hopeless;
and General Grant, abandoning the attempt, resolved by a
turning operation to disengage Lee from a position seen to be
unassailable. Preparations for this movement were begun on the
afternoon of the 19th; but the enemy, observing these,
retarded its execution by a bold demonstration against the
Union right. … This attack somewhat disconcerted the
contemplated movement, and delayed it till the following
night, May 20th, when the army, moving by the left, once more
took up its march towards Richmond. Before the lines of
Spottsylvania the Army of the Potomac had for twelve days and
nights engaged in a fierce wrestle, in which it had done all
that valor may do to carry a position by nature and art
impregnable. … Language is inadequate to convey an impression
of the labors, fatigues, and sufferings of the troops. … Above
40,000 men had already fallen in the bloody encounters of the
Wilderness and Spottsylvania [General Humphreys—in 'Virginia
Campaign of 1864 and 1865,' page 117—makes the total of
killed and wounded from May 5 to 21, to be 28,207, and the
entire losses of the army, including the missing and the sick
sent back to Washington, 37,335]. … The exhausted army began
to lose its spirit.
{3527}
It was with joy, therefore, that it at length turned its back
upon the lines of Spottsylvania. … The two armies once fairly
on the march … neither … seems to have sought to deal the
other a blow … and both headed, as for a common goal, towards
the North Anna. … The advances of the 21st and 22d brought the
different corps [of the Army of the Potomac], which had moved
on parallel roads at supporting distance, within a few miles
of the North Anna River. Resuming the march on the morning of
Monday, May 23d, the army in a few hours reached the northern
bank of that stream. But it was only to descry its old enemy
planted on the opposite side." Warren's corps crossed the
river at Jericho Ford without resistance, but was furiously
assailed late in the afternoon and held its ground, taking
nearly 1,000 prisoners. The left column, under Hancock, forced
a passage in the face of the enemy, carrying a bridge by
storm. But nothing was gained by these successes. "While Lee,
after the passage of Hancock on the left, threw his right wing
back from the North Anna, and on the passage of Warren on the
right threw back his left wing, he continued to cling with his
centre to the river; so that … his army took up a very
remarkable line in the form of an obtuse-angled triangle. …
The game of war seldom presents a more effectual checkmate
than was here given by Lee; for after Grant had made the
brilliantly successful passage of the North Anna, the
Confederate commander, thrusting his centre between the two
wings of the Army of the Potomac, put his antagonist at
enormous disadvantage, and compelled him, for the
reenforcement of one or the other wing, to make a double
passage of the river. The more the position of Lee was
examined, the more unpromising attack was seen to be; and
after passing the two following days in reconnoissances, and
destroying some miles of the Virginia Central Railroad,
General Grant determined to withdraw across the North Anna and
take up a new line of advance. The withdrawal from the North
Anna was begun at dark of the 26th of May, when the Second,
Fifth and Sixth Corps retired by different bridges to the
north bank. … The Second Corps held position till the morning
of the 27th, when it covered the rear. From the North Anna the
line of march of the army made a wide circuit eastward and
then southward to pass the Pamunkey. This river is formed by
the confluence of the North and South Anna; and the Pamunkey
in turn uniting with the Mattapony forms the York River,
emptying into Chesapeake Bay. Thus the successful passage of
the Pamunkey would not only dislodge Lee from the lines of the
North and South Anna, but would bring the army in
communication with a new and excellent water-base." The
crossing of the Pamunkey, at and near Hanovertown, was
accomplished without difficulty on the 27th and 28th, "and the
routes to White House, at the head of York River, being opened
up, the army was put in communication with the ample supplies
floated by the waters of Chesapeake Bay. Grant's new turning
movement was met by a corresponding retrograde movement on the
part of Lee, and as he fell back on a direct line less than
half the distance of the great detour made by the Army of the
Potomac, it was not remarkable that, on crossing the Pamunkey,
the Confederate force was again encountered, ready to accept
the gage of battle. Lee assumed a position in advance of the
Chickahominy. … The region in which the army was now operating
revived many reminiscences in the minds of those who had made
the Peninsular Campaign under McClellan. … Gaines' Mill and
Mechanicsville were within an hour's ride; Fair Oaks could be
reached in a two hours' trot; Richmond was ten miles off. …
Reconnoissances showed Lee to be in a very strong position
covering the approaches to the Chickahominy, the forcing of
which it was now clear must cost a great battle."
_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
part 11, chapters 3-5._
ALSO IN:
_A. Badeau,
Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,
chapters 18-19 (volume 2)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
The Co-operative movement of the Army of the James.
In the plan and arrangement of General Grant's campaign,
General Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe, was instructed
"to collect all the forces of his command that could be spared
from garrison duty estimated at not less than 20,000, and
operate on the south side of James river, Richmond being his
objective. To his force 10,000 men from South Carolina, under
Gillmore, were to be added. He was ordered to take City Point
as soon as notification of movement was given, and fortify it.
By this common advance from the Rapidan and Fortress Monroe
the two armies would be brought into co-operation. … As
arranged, Butler moved from Fortress Monroe on May 4th,
Gillmore having joined him with the 10th Corps. The next day
he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda
Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 7th he
made a reconnoissance against the Richmond and Petersburg
Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On
the night of the 9th he received dispatches from Washington
informing him that Lee was retreating to Richmond and Grant in
pursuit. He had, therefore, to act with caution, fearing that
he might have Lee's whole army on his hands. On the evening of
the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the
enemy's first line of defenses at Drury's Bluff, or Fort
Darling. The time thus consumed from the 6th left no
possibility of surprising and capturing Richmond and
Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his
forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the
defense of these places. On the 16th the Confederates attacked
Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff, forced him
back into his entrenchments between the forks of James and
Appomattox Rivers [in the district called Bermuda Hundred],
and, intrenching strongly in his front, not only covered the
railroads and city, but completely neutralized his forces. …
Butler's army being confined at Bermuda Hundred, most of the
re-enforcements from the South were now brought against the
Potomac Army. In addition to this, probably not less than
15,000 men, under Breckenridge, arrived from the Western part
of Virginia. The position of Bermuda Hundred being easy to
defend, Grant, leaving only enough to secure what had heen
gained, took from it all available forces under W. F. Smith,
and joined them to the Army of the Potomac."
_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
volume 3, pages 368 and 382-385._
ALSO IN:
_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865,
chapter 5._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 36, part 2._
{3528}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Georgia).
Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: Johnston's Retreat.
Sherman now held command of the three armies of the Tennessee,
the Cumberland, and the Ohio, having McPherson, Thomas and
Schofield for their subordinate commanders, respectively. The
main army of the rebellion in the West, Joe Johnston
commanding, was at Dalton, northern Georgia, confronting
Thomas at Chattanooga. "Grant and Sherman had agreed to act in
concert. While the former should thrust Lee back upon
Richmond, his late lieutenant was to push Johnston towards
Atlanta. And Banks was to transfer his forces from New Orleans
to Mobile and thence move towards and join hands with the
Western armies. Sherman devoted his earliest energies to the
question of transportation and railroads. Baggage was reduced
to the lowest limits, the higher officers setting the example.
Actual supplies and fighting-material were alone to be
carried. Luxuries were to be things of the past; comforts to
be forgotten. War's stern reality was to be each one's lot.
Probably no officer in such high command ever lived so
entirely from hand to mouth as did Sherman and his military
family during the succeeding campaigns. The entire equipment
of his army head-quarters would have shamed the shabbiest
regimental outfit of 1861. Spring was to open with a general
advance. It was agreed to put and keep the Confederates on the
defensive by a policy of constant hammering. Bragg had been
removed to satisfy public opinion in the South, but was
nominally called to Richmond to act as Mr. Davis'
chief-of-staff. Johnston, as commander of the Department, had
personally undertaken to hold head against Sherman. But the
fact that he possessed neither the President's good will nor
that of his new adviser, militated much against a happy
conduct of the campaign. Sherman's forces occupied a front
sixteen miles in advance of Ringgold, just south of
Chattanooga. McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee was on
his right with 25,000 men and 100 guns. Thomas and the Army of
the Cumberland held the centre with 60,000 men and 130 guns.
Schofield and the Army of the Ohio formed the left wing. His
command was 15,000 men and 30 guns. This grand total of
100,000 men and 260 guns formed an army of as good stuff as
ever bore arms, and the confidence of the leader in his men
and of the men in their leader was unbounded. Johnston himself
foresaw the necessity of a strictly defensive campaign, to
which his far from sanguine character, as well as his judgment
as to what the existing conditions demanded, made him
peculiarly suited. Counted after the same fashion as Sherman's
army, Johnston had some 75,000 men. … He intrenched every step
he took; he fought only when attacked; he invited battle only
when the conditions were largely in his favor. Subsequent
events showed how wise beyond his critics he could be. Sherman
took the measure of the intrenchments at Dalton with care,
and, though he outnumbered his antagonist, preferred not to
hazard an engagement at such odds when he might force one on
better ground. This conduct shows in strong contrast with
Grant's, when the latter first met his opponent at this same
moment in Virginia. Sherman despatched McPherson towards
Resaca, on the railroad in Johnston's rear, with instructions
to capture the town if possible. Combined with this flanking
movement, a general advance was made upon the Confederate
lines, and after tactical manœuvring of several days in front
of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston concluded to retire from his
stronghold. McPherson had strangely failed to seize Resaca,
though an excellent chance had offered, and at this place the
Confederate army took up its new stand. … Sherman faced his
antagonist on the line of Camp Creek in front of Resaca, with
his right flank resting on the Oostanaula. From this position
he operated by unintermitted tapping upon Johnston's defences
at constantly varying points, without, however, bringing on a
general engagement [though the losses were 2,747 Union and
2,800 Confederate]. … Sherman's uniform tactics during this
campaign, varied indefinitely in details, consisted, as will
be seen, in forcing the centre of the army upon Johnston's
lines, while with the right and left he operated upon either
flank as chance or ground best offered. Johnston did not
propose to hazard an engagement unless all conditions were in
his favor. He attempted a stand at Adairsville, twenty miles
south of Resaca, but shortly withdrew to Kingston and
Cassville. Each captain manœuvred for a chance to fight the
other at a disadvantage. … From Cassville, Johnston retired
across the Etowah. So far this campaign had been one of
manœuvres. Neither combatant had suffered material loss. Like
two wrestlers, as yet ignorant of each other's strength or
quickness, they were sparring for a hold. … The Union army was
growing skillful. Local difficulties multiplied many fold by
bad maps and hostile population were overcome in considerable
measure by an able corps of topographical engineers. … Bridges
were uniformly burned and railroads wrecked by the retreating
Confederates. To save delays in rebuilding, so far as
possible, trestles were fitted in the rear to a scale with
interchangeable timbers, so that bridges could be constructed
with a speed never before dreamed of. No sooner had the
Confederates put torch to a bridge, than a new one arose as by
magic, and the whistle of the locomotive always followed hard
upon the heels of the army."
_T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War,
chapters 42-43._
ALSO IN:
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapter 15 (volume 2)._
_T. B. Van Horn,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapters 25-28 (volume 2)._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 38, part 1._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-June: Virginia).
Grant's Movement upon Richmond: The Battle of Cold Harbor.
"The passage of [the Pamunkey] had been completed on May 28,
and then, after three days of marching, interspersed with the
usual amount of fighting, the army found itself again
confronted by Lee's main line on the Totopotomoy. The
operations which followed were known as the battle of Cold
Harbor. On the afternoon of May 31st, Sheridan, who was on the
left flank of the army, carried, with his cavalry, a position
near the old well and cross roads known as Old Cold Harbor,
and, with his men dismounted behind rough breast-works, held
it against Fitzhugh Lee until night. To this point, during the
night, marched the van·guard of the Army of the Potomac. …
About 9 the next day (June 1st) the head of the column reached
Sheridan's position, and the cavalry was withdrawn.
{3529}
The enemy, who had been seriously threatening Sheridan,
withdrew from our immediate front within their lines and
awaited us, occupying a strong outer line of intrenchments in
front of our center, somewhat in advance of their main
position, which included that on which the battle of Gaines'
Mill had been fought two years before. It covered the
approaches to the Chickahominy, which was the last formidable
obstacle we had to meet before standing in front of the
permanent works of Richmond. A large detachment, composed of
the Eighteenth Corps and other troops from the Army of the
James, under General W. F. Smith, had disembarked at White
House on the Pamunkey, and was expected to connect that
morning with the Sixth Corps at Cold Harbor. A mistake in
orders caused an unnecessary march and long delay. In the
afternoon, however, Smith was in position on the right of the
Sixth Corps. Late in the afternoon both corps assaulted. The
attack was made vigorously and with no reserves. The outer
line in front of the right of the Sixth and the left of the
Eighteenth was carried brilliantly, and the enemy was forced
back, leaving several hundred prisoners in our hands. … This
left the well and the old tavern at Cold Harbor in our rear,
and brought us in front of the most formidable position yet
held by the enemy. In front of him was a wooded country,
interspersed with clearings here and there, sparsely
populated, and full of swamps. Before daylight the Army of the
Potomac stood together once more almost within sight of the
spires of Richmond, and on the very ground where, under
McClellan, they had defended the passage of the river they
were now endeavoring to force. On the 2d of June our
confronting line, on which the burden of the day must
necessarily fall, consisted of Hancock on the left, Wright in
the center, and Smith on the right. Warren and Burnside were
still farther to the right, their lines refused, or drawn
back, in the neighborhood of Bethesda Church, but not
confronting the enemy. … No reconnoissance had been made other
than the bloody one of the evening before. Everyone felt that
this was to be the final struggle. No further flanking marches
were possible. Richmond was dead in front. No further wheeling
of corps from right to left by the rear; no further dusty
marches possible on that line, even 'if it took all summer.'
The general attack was fixed for the afternoon of the 2d, and
all preparations had been made, when the order was
countermanded and the attack postponed until half-past four
the following morning. Promptly at the hour named on the 3d of
June the men moved from the slight cover of the rifle-pits,
thrown up during the night, with steady, determined advance,
and there rang out suddenly on the summer air such a crash of
artillery and musketry as is seldom heard in war. No great
portion of the advance could be seen from any particular
point, but those of the three corps that passed through the
clearings were feeling the fire terribly. Not much return was
made at first from our infantry, although the fire of our
batteries was incessant. The time of actual advance was not
over eight minutes. In that little period more men fell
bleeding as they advanced than in any other like period of
time throughout the war. A strange and terrible feature of
this battle was that as the three gallant corps moved on
[necessarily diverging, the enemy's line forming an arc of a
circle, with its concave side toward them] each was enfiladed
while receiving the full force of the enemy's direct fire in
front. … At some points the slashings and obstructions in the
enemy's front were reached. Barlow, of Hancock's corps, drove
the enemy from an advanced position, but was himself driven
out by the fire of their second line. R. O. Tyler's brigade
(the Corcoran Legion) of the same corps swept over an advance
work, capturing several hundred prisoners. One officer alone;
the colonel of the 164th New York [James P. McMahon], seizing
the colors of his regiment from the dying color-bearer as he
fell, succeeded in reaching the parapet of the enemy's main
works, where he planted his colors and fell dead near the
ditch, bleeding from many wounds. Seven other colonels of
Hancock's command died within those few minutes. No troops
could stand against such a fire, and the order to lie down was
given all along the line. At points where no shelter was
afforded, the men were withdrawn to such cover as could be
found, and the battle of Cold Harbor, as to its result at
least, was over. … Shortly after midday came the order to
suspend for the present all further operations, and directing
corps commanders to intrench, 'including their advanced
positions,' and directing also that reconnoissances be made,
'with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular
approaches'. … When night came on the groans and moaning of
the wounded, all our own, who were lying between the lines,
were heart-rending. Some were brought in by volunteers from
our intrenchments, but remained for three days uncared for
beneath the hot summer suns and the unrefreshing dews of the
sultry summer nights. … An impression prevails in the popular
mind, and with some reason perhaps, that a commander who sends
a flag of truce asking permission to bury his dead and bring
in his wounded, has lost the field of battle. Hence the
reluctance upon our part to ask a flag of truce. In effect it
was done at last on the evening of the third day after the
battle, when, for the most part, the wounded needed no further
care and our dead had to be buried almost where they fell."
_M. T. McMahon,
Cold Harbor
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
"According to the report of the Medical Director, Surgeon
McParlin, the wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle
of the 3d of June numbered 4,517. The killed were at least
1,100. The wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle of
the 1st of June were 2,125; the killed were not less than 500.
The wounded on the 1st and 3d of June were, therefore, 6,642,
and the killed not less than 1,600; but, adopting the number
of killed and missing furnished General Badeau from the
Adjutant General's office, 1,769 killed, 1,537 missing
(many—most, indeed—of them, no doubt, killed), we have 8,411
for the killed and wounded, and for the total casualties,
9,948."
_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865
(Campaigns of the Civil War),
page 191._
"I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor
was ever made. … At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was
gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed,
the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on
the Confederate side. … This charge seemed to revive their
hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect
upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached
the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold
Harbor seemed to have disappeared."
_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapter. 55 (volume 2)._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 36._
{3530}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-June: Virginia).
The Campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley, and
Sheridan's raid to Trevillian Station.
"In the spring of 1864, the Department of West Virginia, which
included the Shenandoah Valley, was under the command of
Major-General Franz Sigel. A large portion of his forces was
in the Kanawha region, under Brigadier-General George Crook. …
In opening his Virginia campaign, Lieutenant-General Grant
directed Sigel to form two columns, whereof one, under Crook,
should break the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at the New
River bridge, and should also, if possible, destroy the
salt-works at Saltville; while the other column, under Sigel
himself, proceeding up the Shenandoah Valley, was to distract
attention from Crook by menacing the Virginia Central Railroad
at Staunton."
_G. E. Pond,
The Shenandoah Valley in 1864
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 11),
chapter 2._
"Early in May, General Sigel entered the Valley with a force
of 10,000 or 12,000 men [6,000 or 7,000, according to Pond, as
above], and proceeded to advance toward Staunton. The Valley
at that time was occupied only by a small force under General
Imboden, which was wholly inadequate for its defence. General
Breckenridge was therefore withdrawn from South-Western
Virginia to oppose Sigel. On the 15th of May, Breckenridge
with a force of 3,000 men [4,600 to 5,000—Pond] encountered
Sigel at Newmarket and defeated him and compelled him to
retire behind Cedar Creek. The cadets of the Virginia Military
Institute formed a portion of Breckenridge's division, and
behaved with distinguished gallantry. … After the battle of
Newmarket Breckenridge was withdrawn from the Valley to
reinforce Lee … in the neighborhood of Hanover Junction. In
the meantime Crook and Averill had reached the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad, where they inflicted some damage, but were
compelled to retire by a force sent against them by General
Sam Jones. They then proceeded to join the main column
operating in the Valley. After the battle of Newmarket, Sigel
was relieved by General David Hunter, who was instructed by
General Grant to advance upon Staunton, thence to
Charlottesville, and on to Lynchburg if circumstances favored
that movement. Breckenridge having been withdrawn, General W.
E. Jones was ordered to the Valley to oppose Hunter, who
slowly advanced, opposed by Imboden with an almost nominal
force. About the 4th of June, Imboden was joined by General
Jones in the neighborhood of Harrisonburg with a force of
between 3,000 and 4,000 men, which he had hastily collected in
Southwestern Virginia. … Although greatly outnumbered, he
[Jones] engaged Hunter near Port Republic [at the village of
Piedmont, which gives its name to the battle], where he was
defeated and killed. … After the fall of Jones, McCauslin
opposed Hunter with gallantry and vigor, but his small force
was no match for the greatly superior force against which he
contended. The affairs in the Valley now began to attract the
attention of the commanding generals of both armies. It was
evident that if Hunter could succeed in taking Lynchburg and
breaking up the canal and Central Railroad, it would only be
necessary to tap the Richmond and Danville and the Petersburg
and Weldon railroads to complete a line of circumvallation
around Richmond and Petersburg. On the 7th of June General
Grant detached General Sheridan, with a large cavalry force,
with instructions to break up the Central Railroad between
Richmond and Gordonsville, then proceed to the James River and
Kanawha Canal, break that line of communication with Richmond,
and then to co-operate with Hunter in his operations against
Lynchburg. About the same time General Lee sent General
Breckenridge with his division, 2,500 strong, to occupy
Rockfish Gap of the Blue Ridge to deflect Hunter from
Charlottesville and protect the Central Railroad as far as
practicable. A few days later General Early was detached by
General Lee to oppose Hunter, and take such other steps as in
his judgment would tend to create a diversion in favor of
Richmond. General Sheridan, in compliance with his
instructions, proceeded by a circuitous route to strike the
railroad somewhere in the neighborhood of Gordonsville. This
movement was, however, discovered by General Hampton, who,
with a considerable force of cavalry encountered Sheridan on
the 12th of June at Travillians [or Trevillian's] Station.
After much severe and varied fighting Sheridan was defeated,
and in order to escape was obliged to make a night-retreat.
[In his 'Memoirs,' Sheridan claims the victory, having forced
Hampton back and taken 500 prisoners; but learning that Hunter
would not meet him, as expected, at Charlottesville, he turned
back to rejoin Grant south of Richmond]. … This was one of the
most masterly and spirited cavalry engagements of the war.
Hunter, finding Rockfish Gap occupied in force, was unable to
comply with that part of his instructions which directed him
to Charlottesville. He therefore continued his march up the
Valley, with the view of reaching Lynchburg by way of some one
of the passes of the Blue Ridge south of the James River. In
the neighborhood of Staunton he was joined by Crook and
Averill, increasing his force to about 20,000 men, including
cavalry and artillery. From Staunton he advanced by way of
Lexington and Buchanan, burning and destroying everything that
came in his way, leaving a track of desolation rarely
witnessed in the course of civilized warfare." Before Hunter's
arrival at Lynchburg, General Early, who withdrew his corps
(formerly Stonewall Jackson's, and lately commanded by Ewell),
from Richmond on the 13th of June, had reached that city and
was prepared to defend it. "Hunter, finding himself
unexpectedly confronted by Early, relinquished his intended
attack upon the city and sought safety in a rapid
night-retreat."
_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 18._
ALSO IN:
_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1. chapter 21._
[Image: Map of the Atlanta Campaign. Page 331.]
{3532}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-September: Georgia).
Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: New Hope Church.
Kenesaw.
Peach Tree Creek.
The siege and capture of the city.
From Cassville, for reasons given in his memoirs, Johnston
continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to
Allatoona. "Pausing for a few days," writes General Sherman,
"to repair the railroad without attempting Allatoona, of which
I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, I resolved to push
on toward Atlanta by way of Dallas; Johnston quickly detected
this, and forced me to fight him, May 25th-28th, at New Hope
Church, four miles north of Dallas, with losses of 3,000 to
the Confederates and 2,400 to us. The country was almost in a
state of nature—with few or no roads, nothing that a European
could understand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as
surely as at Sevastopol. Johnston had meantime picked up his
detachments, and had received reënforcements from his rear
which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and
warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far
from our base, and that when the right moment should come he
would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident,
and not the least alarmed. He then fell back to his position
at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his right, Kenesaw his
center and Lost Mountain his left. His line of ten miles was
too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and
concentrated on Kenesaw. We closed down in battle array,
repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared
for the contest. Not a day, not an hour, not a minute was
there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute
contact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in
rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June
27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full
cooperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, McPherson and
Schofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for
their country's cause; but we failed, losing 3,000 men to the
Confederate loss of 630. Still, the result was that within
three days Johnston abandoned the strongest possible position
and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River. We were
on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the
4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee
on the 10th, covered and protected by the best line of field
intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance. … We
had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a
single-track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food,
ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000
animals. The city of Atlanta, the gate city, opening the
interior of the important State of Georgia, was in sight; its
protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had
to go. … We feigned to the right, but crossed the
Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy
behind his first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek,
prepared in advance for this very occasion. At this critical
moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable
service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General
Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to
command the Confederate army [July 18]. Hood was known to us
to be a 'fighter' … and I confess I was pleased at this
change. … I was willing to meet the enemy in the open country,
but not behind well-constructed parapets. Promptly, as
expected, General Hood sallied from his Peach Tree line on the
20th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps
(Hooker), which had just crossed Peach Tree Creek by
improvised bridges. The troops became commingled and fought
hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the
Confederates were driven back within their lines, leaving
behind their dead and wounded. These amounted to 4,796 men, to
our loss of 1,710. We followed up and Hood fell back to the
main lines of the city of Atlanta. We closed in, when again
Hood, holding these lines with about one-half his force, with
the other half made a wide circuit by night, under cover of
the woods, and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank 'in
air,' a movement that led to the hardest battle of the
campaign. He encountered the Army of the Tennessee—skilled
veterans who were always ready to fight, were not alarmed by
flank or rear attacks, and met their assailants with heroic
valor. The battle raged from noon to night, when the
Confederates, baffled and defeated, fell back within the
intrenchments of Atlanta. Their losses are reported 8,499 to
ours of 8,641; but among our dead was McPherson, the commander
of the Army of the Tennessee. While this battle was in
progress, Schofield at the center and Thomas on the right made
efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts,
but found them too strong to assault. The Army of the
Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (Howard),
from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach if
possible, the railroad by which Hood drew his supplies, when,
on the 28th of July, he repeated his tactics of the 22d,
sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4,632 men to our
700. These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor,
General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive.
Thereafter the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to its
parapets. I never intended to assault these, but gradually
worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies,
because soldiers, like other mortals, must have food. Our
extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but
nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I
resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to
the rear, and move with the other five to a point (Jonesboro')
on the railroad 20 miles below Atlanta, not fortified. This
movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted
in our occupation of Atlanta, on the 2d of September, 1864.
The result had a large effect on the whole country, at the
time, for solid and political reasons. I claim no special
merit to myself, save that I believe I followed the teachings
of the best masters of the 'science of war' of which I had
knowledge. … But I had not accomplished all, for Hood's army,
the chief 'objective,' had escaped. Then began the real
trouble. We were in possession of Atlanta, and Hood remained
at Lovejoy's Station, 30 miles south-east, on the Savannah
Railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war,
and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies,
independent of the railroads."
_W. T. Sherman and others,
Atlanta
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
ALSO IN:
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapters 15-18 (volume 2)._
_J. D. Cox,
Atlanta
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 9),
chapters 7-16._
_C. C. Chesney,
The Atlanta Campaign
(Fort. Rev., Nov. 1895)._
_J. E. Johnston,
Narrative,
chapters 9-11._
_Official Records,
series 1, volume 38._
_J. B. Hood,
Advance and Retreat,
chapters 12-13._
{3533}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-November).
The Twentieth Presidential Election.
Renomination and Re-election of Abraham Lincoln.
"Preparations for the nomination of candidates had begun to be
made, as usual, early in the spring of 1864. Some who saw most
clearly the necessities of the future, had for some months
before expressed themselves strongly in favor of the
renomination of President Lincoln. But this step was contested
with great warmth and activity by prominent members of the
political party by which he had been nominated and elected
four years before. Nearly all the original Abolitionists and
many of the more decidedly anti-slavery members of the
Republican party were dissatisfied, that Mr. Lincoln had not
more rapidly and more sweepingly enforced their extreme
opinions. Many distinguished public men resented his rejection
of their advice, and many more had been alienated by his
inability to recognize their claims to office. The most
violent opposition came from those who had been most
persistent and most clamorous in their exactions. And as it
was unavoidable that, in wielding so terrible and so absolute
a power in so terrible a crisis, vast multitudes of active and
ambitious men should be disappointed in their expectations of
position and personal gain, the renomination of Mr. Lincoln
was sure to be contested by a powerful and organized effort.
At the very outset this movement acquired consistency and
strength by bringing forward the Honorable S. P. Chase,
Secretary of the Treasury, a man of great political boldness
and experience, and who had prepared the way for such a step
by a careful dispensation of the vast patronage of his
department, as the rival candidate. But it was instinctively
felt that this effort lacked the sympathy and support of the
great mass of the people, and it ended in the withdrawal of
his name as a candidate by Mr. Chase himself. The National
Committee of the Union Republican party had called their
convention, to be held at Baltimore, on the 8th of June."
Those who opposed Mr. Lincoln's nomination issued a call for a
convention to be held at Cleveland, Ohio, on the 31st of May.
The Cleveland Convention, attended by about 150 persons, put
in nomination General John C. Fremont, for President, and
General John Cochrane, of New York, for Vice President.
"General Fremont's letter of acceptance was dated June 4th.
Its main scope was an attack upon Mr. Lincoln for
unfaithfulness to the principles he was elected to defend, and
upon his administration for incapacity and selfishness. … He
intimated that if the Baltimore convention would nominate
anyone but Mr. Lincoln he would not stand in the way of a
union of all upon the nominee. … The Convention, the
nomination and the letter of acceptance, fell dead upon the
popular feeling [and Fremont withdrew his candidacy in
September]. … The next form which the effort to prevent Mr.
Lincoln's nomination and election took was an effort to bring
forward General Grant as a candidate." But this was decisively
checked by General Grant, himself. The Convention at
Baltimore, when it assembled on the 8th of June, showed no
hesitation in nominating Abraham Lincoln for reelection, and
it associated with him, Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, as its
candidate for Vice President. The National Convention of the
Democratic party was held at Chicago, beginning August 29th,
The second resolution which it adopted in its platform
declared that, "after four years of failure to restore the
Union by the experiment of war … justice, humanity, liberty
and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made
for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate
convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end
that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be
restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States." On
this issue, having nominated General George B. McClellan for
President, and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, for Vice
President, the opponents of the war went to the country in the
election, in November, and were overwhelmingly defeated. "Of
all the States which voted on that day, General McClellan
carried but three—New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky."
_H. J. Raymond,
Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln,
chapter 18._
The electoral vote was for Lincoln 212, for McClellan 21. The
popular vote cast was, for Lincoln 2,213,665, for McClellan,
1,802,237. Many of the States had made provision for taking
the votes of soldiers in the field, and the army vote was
116,887 for Lincoln against 33,748 for McClellan.
_E. Stanwood,
History of Presidential Elections,
chapter 21._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June).
Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws.
At every session of Congress from 1861 to 1864 ineffectual
attempts were made in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives to accomplish the repeal of the Fugitive Slave
Laws of 1793 and 1850. It was not until June of the latter
year that the necessary bill was passed—by the House on the
6th, by a vote of 82 to 57, and by the Senate on the 22d by 27
to 12. The President approved it on the 28th, and it became a
law.
_H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power,
volume 3, chapter 29._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June).
Revenue Measures.
The War Tariff and Internal Taxes.
See TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861-1864 (UNITED STATES).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June).
The destruction of the Alabama by the Kearsarge.
See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June: Virginia).
Grant's movement to the south of James River.
The Siege of Petersburg.
"In consequence of the check at Cold Harbor, a restlessness
was becoming general among the people, which the government in
vain pretended not to notice. … Public opinion, shaken in its
confidence, already began to listen to the sinister
interpretations of the opposition journals, when, in the last
half of June, it learned that the lieutenant: general had
boldly crossed the James and laid siege before Petersburg. …
This passage of the James was … a very fine movement, as ably
executed as it was boldly conceived. It inaugurated a new
phase in the campaign. … Henceforth, the battering not having
produced the expected effect, Grant was about to try the
resources of military science, and give precedence to
strategic combinations. In the first place, he took his
measures so well to conceal his intentions from the enemy that
the latter did not recognize the character of the movement
until it was already executed. Warren was ordered to occupy
Lee's attention by the menace of an advance on Richmond from
the direction of White Oak Swamp, while Smith (W. F.)
reëmbarked from White House to return to Bermuda Hundred, and
Hancock, with the Second Corps, would be transferred to the
right bank of the James by a flotilla of large steamers
collected at Wilcox Landing for that purpose.
{3534}
At the same time, a bridge of boats was thrown across a little
below, where there were thirteen fathoms of water in the
channel, and where the river was more than 2,000 feet broad.
The Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed over on the bridge. Grant
hoped to get hold of Petersburg by a 'coup de main.' If he had
succeeded, the fall of Richmond would have soon followed in
all probability. Unfortunately, delays occurred and
contretemps which caused the opportunity to fail and
completely modified the course of events. General Smith (W.
F.), after having carried the first line, which was defended
by militia only, did not know how to take advantage of his
first success. Proceeding methodically and cautiously, where
it was, above all, necessary to act with vigor and promptness,
he put off the serious work until the next morning. Hancock,
in his turn, debarked on the right bank, did not receive the
order to march on Petersburg until he had been delayed to wait
for rations which were behind-hand, and went astray in his
march owing to false indications on a map which had been sent
to him as correct. In short, he lost precious hours in the
afternoon of June 15, and on the morning of the 16th it was
too late; Lee's troops had arrived. Nevertheless, the
intrenchments thrown up hastily by the enemy were not so
formidable that they might not be carried. In the morning, a
fresh attack, with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, met with
some success, but with no decisive results. In the afternoon,
the Ninth Corps having arrived, the attempt was renewed on a
greater scale, and it ended by carrying the line at sundown,
after a hard fight and considerable loss. On the next morning,
a new assault, always by the Second Corps, supported by the
Ninth. The enemy lost more ground and a redoubt of importance.
In the evening, he succeeded in surprising the intrenchments
which Burnside had taken from him. All these fights were not
without cost; the loss of that day alone, on our side,
amounted to 4,000 men. The Confederates defended the ground
step by step, with such determination, only to gain the time
necessary to finish a stronger and better selected line, on
the hills immediately around the city. They retired to these
lines in the following night, and during the whole of the 18th
they sustained in them a series of attacks which met with no
success. From that day, the siege of Petersburg was resolved
upon, and regular works were begun. It must be remarked that
this siege was not a siege, properly speaking. The place was
never even invested. It lies 22 miles south of Richmond, on
the right, bank of the Appomattox, eight miles southwest of
City Point, where that river empties into the James, and where
the new base of supplies of the army was naturally
established. So that we had turned Richmond to put ourselves
across a part of the enemy's communications with the South,
and directly threaten the rest. These communications were: the
railroads to Norfolk, Weldon and Lynchburg, and the Jerusalem
and Boydton roads, all ending at Petersburg. Besides these,
the Confederate capital had only the James River Canal, to the
west, and the Dansville railroad, to the south. The latter did
not extend beyond the limits of Virginia, but it crossed the
Lynchburg railroad at Burksville, which doubled its resources.
If, then, we succeeded in enveloping Petersburg only on the
right bank of the Appomattox, the population and the
Confederate army would be reduced to draw all their supplies
from Richmond by a single-track railroad. To accomplish that
was our effort; to prevent it, the enemy's: that was the point
towards which all the operations of the siege were directed
for nine months. On the day on which we finally succeeded,
Petersburg and Richmond fell at the same blow, and the whole
structure of the rebellion crumbled with these two cities."
_R. de Trobriand,
Four Years with the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 28._
ALSO IN:
_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapters 19-23._
_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapter 56 (volume 2)._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 40._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July).
The Greeley and the Jaques-Gilmore Peace Missions.
"Two abortive efforts to open a door to accommodation between
the belligerents were made during this gloomy period. One of
these originated with certain Confederates then in Canada, one
of whom wrote [July 5, 1864] to the author of this work
[Horace Greeley], averring that Messrs. Clement C. Clay, of
Alabama, James P. Holcombe, of Virginia, and George N. Sanders
(the writer) would proceed to Washington in the interest of
Peace, if full protection were accorded them. Being otherwise
confidentially assured that the two former had full powers
from Richmond, Mr. Greeley forwarded the application to
President Lincoln, urging that it be responded to, and
suggesting certain terms of reunion and peace which he judged
might be advantageously proffered to the Rebels, whether they
should be accepted or rejected. … The 'Plan of Adjustment,'
which he suggested that the President might advantageously
offer," contemplated the restoration of the Union, abolition
of slavery, with $400,000,000 paid in compensation to the
slave states, and complete amnesty for all political offenses.
"The President hereupon saw fit—alike to the surprise and the
regret of his correspondent—to depute him to proceed to
Niagara, and there communicate with the persons in question.
He most reluctantly consented to go, but under a
misapprehension which insured the failure of the effort in any
event. Though he had repeatedly and explicitly written to the
President that he knew nothing as to what the Confederates in
Canada might or would propose as a basis of adjustment … it
was expected on the President's part that he was virtually and
substantially to negotiate and settle the basis of a
pacification with them; so that their visit to Washington was,
in effect, to be the result, and not the possible occasion, of
adjustment und peace. … The whole matter thus terminated in
failure and disappointment, with some exasperation on the
Rebel side, and very decided condemnation on the part of the
opposition. … Happily, another negotiation—even more irregular
and wholly clandestine—had simultaneously been in progress at
Richmond, with a similar result. Rev. Colonel James F. Jaques,
73d Illinois, with Mr. J. R. Gilmore, of New York, had, with
President Lincoln's knowledge, but without his formal
permission, paid a visit to the Confederate capital on a Peace
errand; being allowed to pass through the lines of both armies
for the purpose.
{3535}
Arrived in Richmond they addressed a joint letter to Judah P.
Benjamin, Secretary of State, requesting an interview with
President Davis, which was accorded; and a long, familiar,
earnest colloquy ensued, wherein the Confederate chief
presented his ultimatum in these terms: … The North was mad
and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the
war came; and now it must go on till the last man of this
generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his
musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right
to self-government. We are not fighting for Slavery, we are
fighting for Independence; and that or extermination we will
have'. … Thus it was not only incontestably settled but
proclaimed, through the volunteered agency of two citizens,
that the War must go on until the Confederacy should be
recognized as an independent power, or till it should be
utterly, finally overthrown. The knowledge of this fact was
worth more than a victory to the National cause."
_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 30._
ALSO IN:
_E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States
during the Great Rebellion,
pages 301-307._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia-Maryland.)
Early in the Shenandoah Valley.
His invasion of Maryland and approach to Washington.
"… [General Jubal Anderson] Early had forced Hunter into the
Kanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could
not again be threatened from that direction;
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (MAY-JUNE: VIRGINIA).
[Early then] united to his own corps General John C.
Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of Generals
J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland, B. T. Johnson, and J. D.
Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and
western Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with
the column thus formed, was ready to turn his attention to the
lower Shenandoah Valley. At Early's suggestion General Lee
authorized him to move north at an opportune moment, cross the
upper Potomac into Maryland and threaten Washington. … By
rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and
on the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of
that place the same day that Hunter's troops, after their
fatiguing retreat through the mountains, reached Charlestown,
West Virginia. Early was thus enabled to cross the Potomac
without difficulty, when, moving around Harper's Ferry,
through the gaps of the South Mountain, he found his path
unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where Ricketts's
division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had been
collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the
Confederates till the other reinforcements that had been
ordered to the capital from Petersburg could be brought up.
Wallace contested the line of the Monocacy with obstinacy, but
had to retire finally toward Baltimore. The road was then open
to Washington, and Early marched to the outskirts and began
against the capital the demonstrations [July 11-12] which were
designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main
purpose in front of Petersburg. Early's audacity in thus
threatening Washington had caused some concern to the
officials in the city, but as the movement was looked upon by
General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive
issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the
Confederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the
alarm and consternation of two years before, fears for the
safety of the capital being magnified by the confusion and
discord existing among the different generals in Washington
and Baltimore; and the imaginary dangers vanished only with
the appearance of General Wright, who with the Sixth Corps and
one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed out to attack
Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in hand, but
under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement; and
as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury,
retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by
some Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County
by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry
by the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early
retired through Winchester toward Strasburg, but when the head
of his column reached this place he found that he was being
followed by General Crook with the combined troops of Hunter
and Sigel only, Wright having returned to Washington under
orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. This reduction of the
pursuing force tempting Early to resume the offensive, he
attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded in administering
such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat to
Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawal
restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so,
recrossing this stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and
sending McCausland on to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that
town in ashes [July 30] leaving 3,000 non-combatants without
shelter or food. … This second irruption of Early and his
ruthless destruction of Chambersburg led to many
recommendations on the part of General Grant looking to a
speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among the
Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the
authorities at Washington would approve none of his
propositions. … Finally the manœuvres of Early and the raid to
Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant had
somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to
appoint a commander for the forces in the field that were to
operate against Early. On the 31st of July General Grant
selected me as this commander. … On the evening of August 1, I
was relieved from immediate duty with the Army of the Potomac,
but not from command of the cavalry as a corps organization. I
arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day
received instructions from General Halleck, to report to
General Grant at Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct
from City Point, in consequence of a characteristic despatch
from the President indicating his disgust with the confusion,
disorder and helplessness prevailing along the upper Potomac,
and intimating that Grant's presence there was necessary."
_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 23._
ALSO IN:
_G. E. Pond,
The Shenandoah Valley in 1864,
chapters 4-6._
_F. Sigel,
Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
{3536}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia).
The siege of Petersburg: The Mine.
"Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of
Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the
nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards
of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average
front. Under this fort a mine had been run from a convenient
ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened
from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have
been completed not only without countermining by the Rebels,
but without being even suspected by them; though a report of
its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter
or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals. All
being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing
the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by
the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault
at the chasm opened in the enemy's defences by the explosion.
… The explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air,
annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead
a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by
some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all
along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have
supposed them the thunders of doom. But it was indispensable
to success that a column of assault should rush forward
instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain
the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise;
and, on this vital point failure had already been secured. The
9th corps, as then constituted, was not that from which any
commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet
because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without
discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His
inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions,
that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service;
but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the
three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders
of these divisions were allowed to cast lots to see which of
them should go in—or rather which two of them should stay
out—and the lot fell on the 1st, Brigadier-General Ledlie—and
no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice
of the three. … Several minutes passed—precious, fatal
minutes!—before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty
the obstacles in its path—went forward into the chasm, and
there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still
paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then
parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's
and Wilcox's) followed; but once in the crater, Ledlie's men
barred the way to a farther advance, and all huddled together,
losing their formation and becoming mixed up; General Potter
finally extricating himself, and charging toward the crest;
but with so slender a following that he was soon obliged to
fall back. Two hours were thus shamefully squandered, while
the Rebels recovering their self-possession, were planting
batteries on either side, and mustering their infantry in an
adjacent ravine; and now—when more men in the crater could
only render the confusion more hopeless and magnify the
disaster—Burnside threw in his Black division; which, passing
beyond and rather to the right of the crater, charged toward
the crest, but were met by a fire of artillery and musketry
which speedily hurled them back into the crater, where all
order was lost, all idea of aught beyond personal safety
abandoned, while the enemy's shells and balls poured into it
like hail, rendering it an arena of unresisted slaughter. … A
first Rebel assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer
desperation; and thousands of course took the risk of darting
out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines;
but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400;
while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort,
was barely 1,000."
_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, pages 590-591._
ALSO IN:
_W. H. Powell and others,
The Battle of the Petersburg Crater
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
_A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th Army Corps,
part 4, chapter 5._
_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865,
chapter 9._
_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,
38th Congress, 2d Session: volume 1._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Virginia).
The Siege of Petersburg: Fighting for the Weldon Road.
Battle of Reams's Station.
The Dutch Gap Canal.
"Taking advantage of the absence of many of Lee's troops from
Petersburg, Grant made a vigorous movement for securing
possession of the Weldon road, not more than three miles from
the left flank of his lines on the Jerusalem plank road. This
movement was made by Warren, with the Fifth Corps, on the
morning of the 18th of August, and at noon he reached the
coveted railway without opposition, where he left Griffin to
hold the point seized, while with the divisions of Ayres and
Crawford he moved toward Petersburg. He had marched but a
short distance when a division of Confederates suddenly and
heavily fell upon his flank. … Warren held the ground he had
gained at a cost of 1,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners."
The next day (August 19), Lee sent Hill with a heavy force to
drive Warren from the road, and the attempt, desperately made,
was nearly successful, but not quite. Two days later it was
repeated, and the Confederates were repulsed with a loss of
1,200 men. "In his entire movement for the possession of the
road Warren lost, in killed, wounded and missing, 4,450 men.
He now rendered his position almost impregnable, and General
Lee was compelled to see one of his most important lines of
communication wrested from him. On the day of Warren's Victory
[August 21], Hancock, who … had been called from the north
bank of the James [where an unsuccessful demonstration towards
Richmond had been made from Deep Bottom], and who had moved
with part of his corps rapidly toward the Weldon road, in the
rear of Warren, struck that highway north of Reams's Station,
and destroyed the track to that point and some miles south of
it. He formed an intrenched camp at Reams's," and was attacked
there on the 25th by Hill with such determination that he was
forced back to a rear line, "where the troops had been
rallied, and when night fell Hancock withdrew from Reams's
Station. He had lost in the fight 2,400 of his 8,000 men, and
five guns; 1,700 of the men were made prisoners. Hill's loss
was but little less, and he, too, withdrew from Reams's. But
this disaster did not loosen Warren's hold upon the Weldon
road. … For about a month after the battle of Reams's Station
there was comparative quiet along the lines of the opposing
armies. … A strong party of colored soldiers had been set to
work by General Butler on the north side of the James, under
cover of a battery on that side mounting 100-pounder Parrott
guns, in digging a canal across the narrow isthmus of a
peninsula formed by a sharp bend in the river, called Farrar's
Island.
{3537}
By this canal it was intended to secure a nearer base of
operations against Richmond, and afford a passage for the
National war vessels, by which they might flank several
important works of the Confederates." The Dutch Gap Canal, as
it was called, did not prove successful, the necessary depth
of water never being secured during the war, though the canal
has been brought into use since.
_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 3, chapter 13._
ALSO IN:
_P. S. Michie,
Dutch Gap Canal
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 575)._
_O. B. Willcox,
Actions on the Weldon Railroad
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 568)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Alabama).
The Battle of Mobile Bay.
Capture of Confederate forts and fleet.
"After the capitulation of Vicksburg the vessels of the
so-called Gulf Squadron which had been cruising on the lower
Mississippi and its tributaries were in part joined to the
Upper Squadron, under the command of Admiral Porter. The
remainder were recalled to their duties on the outside
blockade. Admiral Farragut was now free to turn his whole
attention to the coast of the Gulf, whither he returned in
January, 1864, after a well-earned rest at the North. Mobile
was now the principal port in the possession of the
Confederates in this quarter, and earnestly did the Admiral
desire to attack and reduce the forts at the entrance of the
bay. But troops were required to invest the forts after the
fleet had passed them, and at this moment it seemed that there
were no troops to be spared. It was also much to be desired
that at least a few monitors should be added to the fleet, but
neither were these as yet available. So the time wore on;
winter passed into spring and spring into summer, but still
the attack was not made. This delay was of incalculable
advantage to the enemy, enabling him to complete his
preparations. The Confederate force afloat in Mobile Bay was
commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan. … This force consisted
of only four vessels, but they nevertheless made an important
addition to the defences of the place. Three of them were only
paddle-wheel gun-boats … while the fourth was the iron-clad
ram Tennessee … the most formidable vessel that the
Confederates had ever built. … The City of Mobile lies at the
head of a long bay, which is about 20 miles wide at its lower
end. The greater portion of the bay is very shallow, too
shallow even for vessels of moderate draft. The entrance lies
between a long sandspit … and a shoal. … The ship-channel
between the shoals, five miles in length, is perhaps half a
mile wide at its narrowest point. Two forts guarded the
passage,—on the right hand Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point, and
on the left Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island. … In addition to
the land and naval defences, additional protection had been
given by obstructions in the water. A line of piles ran out
from Fort Gaines, which was continued nearly across the main
ship-channel by a triple line of torpedoes. The eastern end of
the row of torpedoes was marked by a red buoy, and between the
buoy and Fort Morgan the channel had been left open for
blockade runners. The open space, only 100 yards wide, lay
directly under the guns of the fort, and it was through this
narrow passage that Admiral Farragut intended to carry his
fleet. The ships were gradually assembled toward the latter
part of July. The Admiral's plan of action was simple, but in
the highest degree effective. His fleet consisted of four
monitors and fourteen wooden vessels, seven of the latter
large and seven small. The wooden vessels were arranged in
pairs, as at Port Hudson, each of the larger vessels having a
smaller one lashed to her port side, so that if one was
disabled the engines of the other would carry both past the
forts. The four monitors were placed in a flanking column
inshore, between the fleet and Fort Morgan. … At six o'clock
on the morning of the 5th of August the fleet started with the
flood tide. The Admiral took up his position in the port main
rigging of the Hartford, so that he might have a good post of
observation. [According to accounts given by officers who were
on board the Hartford, Admiral Farragut climbed the rigging,
after the battle began, in order to get above the thickest of
the smoke, and Captain Drayton sent a man to lash him where he
stood, so that, if wounded, he might not fall to the deck]. …
Above the fort, and just beyond the obstructions, lay the
Confederate ram Tennessee and her three attendant gunboats. …
Soon after half-past six the Tecumseh [the leading monitor]
fired the first two shots at Fort Morgan. For half an hour
after this, the ships advanced in silence. Then the fort
opened on the Brooklyn, and presently the whole line of
vessels was hotly engaged. Their concentrated fire kept down
that of the enemy, and all seemed at this time to be going
well with the fleet. The Tecumseh, though all the while
advancing, was now silent, reserving her fire for the
Tennessee, which lay beyond the obstructions. Captain Craven
saw the red buoy, but it seemed so close to the beach that he
thought there must have been a mistake in his orders; and
altering his course, he headed straight for the Tennessee,
passing to the westward of the buoy right over the line of
torpedoes. Suddenly there came a frightful explosion; the huge
mass of iron gave a lurch first to one side, then to the
other; her bow made one downward plunge, her screw was seen
for a moment revolving high in air, and she sank to the bottom
of the channel. Of 120 men on board only 21 were saved. … From
the Brooklyn, leading the main column, something was now
descried in the water ahead which resembled torpedo-buoys, and
the sloop, with the Octorara lashed to her side, suddenly
stopped, and in a moment they were backing down on the vessels
astern of them. The bows of the two ships turned, falling off
towards the fort, so that they blocked up the channel. The
Hartford, the Admiral's flag-ship, which was next astern, also
stopped to prevent a collision, but she was drifting fast with
the Metacomet toward the two vessels ahead, and the Richmond
and Port Royal were close upon them, followed by the others.
At that moment it seemed as if nothing could save the vessels
of the fleet from being thrown into hopeless confusion, massed
together as they were directly under the guns of the fort. It
was in that moment, at the crisis of the battle, that the calm
and dauntless spirit of the Admiral rose to its greatest
height. … 'Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!'
came the command, in clear, ringing tones from the Admiral's
place in the rigging.
{3538}
In a moment the Hartford had turned, and dashing with the
Metacomet past the Brooklyn, rushed straight over the barrier.
Snap, snap, went the primers of the torpedoes under the bottom
of the ship,—the officers and men could hear them,—but no
explosion followed, and the Hartford passed safely into the
waters above. Meanwhile the four ships lay entangled under
Fort Morgan. A collision seemed inevitable, but Captain
Jenkins of the Richmond, an officer of cool head and splendid
courage, backed away from the others, and began a furious
cannonade on the fort with his whole broadside, driving the
enemy out of the water-batteries. The Brooklyn was by this
means able to recover, and presently she steamed ahead,
followed by the Richmond and the rest of the fleet. … No
sooner was the battle with the fort over than a new battle
began with the Tennessee. The moment that the ships had fairly
entered the bay, the Confederate ram … came charging down the
whole line, taking each vessel in turn," but doing no serious
injury to any. On the arrival of the monitors, which had
lagged behind, "the Tennessee took refuge under the guns of
the fort, and the fleet rejoined the Hartford, now four miles
up the bay." Meantime the Hartford and the Metacomet had
disposed of two of the Confederate gunboats: the Selma, which
surrendered, and the Gaines, which had been run ashore and set
on fire. The third, the Morgan, took shelter, with the
Tennessee, near the fort. "The Hartford had by this time come
to anchor, and her crew went to breakfast. The other ships
gradually joined her. But the battle was not yet over. It was
now a little before nine o'clock, and suddenly the Tennessee
was reported approaching." In the battle which ensued, the
stout iron-clad was rammed repeatedly by the Monongahela, the
Lackawanna, the Hartford and the Ossipee, and pounded by the
terrible guns of the monitor Chickasaw, until, with her
commander wounded, her tiller-chains and smoke stack gone, her
port shutters jammed, and her armor starting from the frame,
she raised the white flag. "A few days later the forts
surrendered, and Mobile, as a Confederate port, ceased to
exist. The fall of the city did not come about until some time
afterward; indeed no immediate attempt was made upon it, for
the capture of the forts and the occupation of Mobile Bay
served every purpose of the Federal Government."
_J. R. Soley,
The Sailor Boys of '61,
chapter 13._
"This great victory cost the Union fleet 335 men. … The losses
in the rebel fleet were 10 killed and 16 wounded—confined to
the Tennessee and Selma—and 280 prisoners taken. The loss in
the forts is unknown."
_Loyal Farragut,
Life of David Glasgow Farragut,
chapter 27._
ALSO IN:
_J. O. Kinney and J. D. Johnston;
Farragut at Mobile Bay,
and
The Ram Tennessee at Mobile Bay,
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._
_A. T. Mahan,
The Gulf and Inland Waters
(The Navy in the Civil War, volume 3),
chapter 8._
_A. T. Mahan,
Admiral Farragut,
chapter 10._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 39._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August-October: Virginia).
Sheridan's Victories in the Shenandoah Valley.
Winchester.
Fisher's Hill.
Cedar Creek.
The famous Ride.
"The events of July showed the urgent need of unity of command
in Northern Virginia, and the lieutenant-general, in August,
consolidated these four departments [of Washington, the
Susquehanna, West Virginia and the Middle Department] into
one, named the Middle Military Division, under General Hunter.
That officer, however, before entering on the proposed
campaign, expressed a willingness to be relieved, and General
P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred from the Army of the
Potomac to the command of the forces in the field under
Hunter, was appointed in his stead." General Sheridan was
appointed to the command on the 7th of August, and took the
field with an effective force (which included the Sixth and
Nineteenth Corps) of 40,000 men, 10,000 being cavalry. "His
operations during that month and the fore part of September
were mainly confined to manœuvres having for their object to
prevent the Confederates from gaining the rich harvests of the
Shenandoah Valley. But after once or twice driving Early
southward to Strasburg, he each time returned on his path
towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant had hesitated in
allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, as defeat would
lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania
before another army could be interposed to check him. Finding,
however, while on a personal visit to General Sheridan, in the
month of September, that that officer expressed great
confidence of success, he authorized him to attack. At this
time the Confederate force held the west bank of Opequan
Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force lay in front
of Berryville, twenty miles south of Harper's Ferry. The
situation of the opposing armies was peculiar: each threatened
the communications of the other, and either could bring on a
battle at any time. It would appear that General Early had
designed assuming the offensive." He made a movement which
General Sheridan was prompt to take advantage of, on the
morning of September 19th, and a battle ensued—known as the
battle of Winchester, but some times called the battle of
Opequan Creek—which resulted in a victory for the latter. "It
is due to state that there was a great disparity in the
numbers engaged—Early's force consisting of 8,500 muskets and
3,000 sabres, while Sheridan's strength was thrice that of the
aggregate Confederate force. Sheridan's preponderance in horse
enabled him to extend far beyond and overlap the Confederate
left, and when, after several hours of indecisive fighting
between the infantry, a general advance was, at four P. M.,
made by the whole line, the cavalry, by an impetuous charge,
carried the fortified heights: the Confederates … broke in
confusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester,
with the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented
Sheridan from following up the victory, among the trophies of
which were 2,500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine
battle-flags. … After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not
pause in his southward retreat till he reached Fisher's Hill,
near Strasburg, 30 miles south of Winchester. This is a very
defensible position, commanding the débouché of the narrow
Strasburg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah
River and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested
his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on the
morning of the 22d and formed his force for a direct attack,
while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavalry by the
parallel Luray Valley, to gain New Market, 20 miles in Early's
rear. After much manœuvring, and several ineffectual efforts
to force the position, an attack of cavalry was made from the
right.
{3539}
Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry was moved to that
flank, and by an impetuous assault carried the Confederate
left resting on the North Mountain. A general attack in front
then disrupted Early's whole line, and the Confederates
retired in great disorder, leaving behind 16 pieces of
artillery and several hundred prisoners. … Early's retreat was
not stayed until he reached the lower passes of the Blue
Ridge, whither he retired with a loss of half his army.
Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as Staunton, and
operating destructively against the Virginia Central Railroad,
returned and took position behind Cedar Creek near Strasburg.
Previously to abandoning the country south of Strasburg, it
was laid waste by the destruction of all barns, grain, forage,
farming implements, and mills. The desolution of the
Palatinate by Turenne was not more complete. On the withdrawal
of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, and being
re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and 600 cavalry
from Lee's army, again marched northward down the Valley, and
once more ensconced himself at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan
continued to hold position on the north bank of Cedar Creek.
Nothing more important than cavalry combats, mostly favorable
to the Federal arms, took place, until the 19th of October,
when Early assumed a bold offensive that was near giving him a
victory as complete as the defeat he had suffered. … The army
was, at this time, temporarily under the command of General
Wright—Sheridan being absent at Washington. The position held
by the Union force was too formidable to invite open attack,
and Early's only opportunity was to make a surprise. This that
officer now determined on, and its execution was begun during
the night of the 18-19th of October." A flanking column,
"favored by a heavy fog … attained, unperceived, the rear of
the left flank of the Union force, formed by Crook's Corps …
and rushed into the camp—the troops awaking only to find
themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their bewilderment
was impossible, and Crook's Corps, being thoroughly broken up,
fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy.
As soon as this flank attack was developed, Early, with his
other column, emerged from behind the hills west of Cedar
Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on
the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and
the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass,
against which the Confederates directed the captured artillery
(18 guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the main
turnpike. Such was the scene on which the light of day dawned.
The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the
Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. With
this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front,
throwing it forward at right angles to its former position,
and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service was,
however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now
ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force.
… At the first good position between Middletown and Newtown,
Wright was able to rally and reform the troops, form a compact
line, and prepare either to resist further attack, or himself
resume the offensive. It was at this time, about half-past ten
A. M., that General Sheridan arrived upon the field from
Winchester, where he had slept the previous night. Hearing the
distant sounds of battle rolling up from the south, Sheridan
rode post to the front, where arriving, his electric manner
had on the troops a very inspiriting effect. General Wright
had already brought order out of confusion and made
dispositions for attack. … A counter-charge was begun at three
o'clock in the afternoon. … A large part of Early's force, in
the intoxication of success, had abandoned their colors and
taken to plundering the abandoned Federal camps. The refluent
wave was as resistless as the Confederate surge had been. …
The retreat soon became a rout. … In the pursuit all the
captured guns were retaken and 23 in addition, The captures
included, besides, near 1,500 prisoners. … With this defeat of
Early all operations of moment in the Shenandoah forever
ended," and most of the troops on both sides were recalled to
the main field of operations, at Petersburg.
_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 12, part 8._
ALSO IN:
_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 2, chapters 1-4._
_G. E. Pond,
The Shenandoah Valley in 1864,
chapters 7-13._
_M. M. Granger,
The Battle of Cedar Creek
(Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery,
L. L. of the United States, volume 3)._
_W. Merritt,
Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley._
_J. A. Early,
Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
_R. B. Irwin,
History of the 19th Army Corps,
chapters 33-34._
_H. C. King,
The Battle of Cedar Creek
(Personal Recollections of the War:
New York Com. L. L. of the United States)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (September-October: Georgia)
Atlanta cleared of its former inhabitants.
Sherman's Preparations for the March to the Sea.
Hood's Raid to the rear.
"During the month of September, Sherman's army remained
grouped about Atlanta. … The Army of the Cumberland, under
Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee,
commanded by Major-General Howard, was at East Point; and the
Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. … Sherman now determined to
make Atlanta exclusively a military post. On the 4th of
September he issued the following orders: 'The city of Atlanta
belonging exclusively for warlike purposes, it will at once be
vacated by all except the armies of the United States and such
civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments
of the Government.' … This order fell upon the ears of the
inhabitants of Atlanta like a thunderbolt." To a remonstrance
addressed to him by the mayor and two councilmen of the city,
he replied: "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in
all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now
desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war,
we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the
laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To
defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in
their recesses. … My military plans make it necessary for the
inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of
services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and
comfortable as possible. … War is cruelty and you cannot
refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve
all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. … You
might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against
these terrible hardships of war." A truce of ten days was
arranged, during which "446 families were moved south,
comprising 705 adults, 860 children and 79 servants, with an
average of 1,651 pounds of furniture and household goods of
all kinds to each family."
_S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin,
Sherman and his Campaigns,
chapter 18._
{3540}
"Gen. Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in the neighborhood of
Jonesboro, receiving his supplies by the Macon road. His army
numbered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the Georgia militia;
and, as if to show that no immediate offensive movement was
contemplated, the latter were withdrawn from him by Governor
Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta. … To allow their
principal Southern army to rust in inactivity, was not however
the intention of the rebel authorities. … Something must be
done, and that speedily, to arrest the progress of the Federal
army, or Georgia and perhaps the Gulf States, would be
irretrievably lost. … The whole army of General Hood, it was
decided, should rapidly move in a compact body to the rear of
Atlanta, and, after breaking up the railroad between the
Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and
destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee river
at that place. Should this be accomplished, Atlanta would be
isolated from Chattanooga, and the latter in turn isolated
from Nashville, and General Sherman, cut off from his primary
and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest
to be relinquished almost as soon as gained, and would be
obliged to return to Tennessee. Atlanta would then fall from
lack of provisions, or in consequence of the successful
attacks of the Georgia militia. In connection with this
movement, General Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry
officer, was already operating in Southern Tennessee. … A week
sufficed to complete General Hood's arrangements, and by the
2d of October his army was across the Chattahoochee and on the
march to Dallas, where the different corps were directed to
concentrate. At this point he was enabled to threaten Rome and
Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to
Chattanooga; and there remained open, in case of defeat, a
line of retreat southwest into Alabama. From Dallas he
advanced east toward the railroad, and, on the 4th, captured
the insignificant stations of Big Shanty and Ackworth,
effecting a thorough destruction of the road between the two
places. He also sent a division under General French to
capture the Federal post at Allatoona Pass, where he had
ascertained that a million and a half of rations for the
Federal army were stored, on which he probably depended to
replenish his commissariat. … General Sherman, … immediately
upon hearing that General Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee,
… despatched General Corse with reënforcements to Rome, which
he supposed the enemy were aiming at. During the previous week
he had sent General Thomas with troops to Nashville to look
after Forrest. His bridges having meanwhile been carried away
by a freshet which filled the Chattahoochee, he was unable to
move his main body until the 4th, when three pontoons were
laid down, over which the armies of the Cumberland, the
Tennessee, and the Ohio crossed, and took up their march in
the direction of Marietta, with 15 days' rations. The 20th
corps, General Slocum, was left to garrison Atlanta. Learning
that the enemy had captured Big Shanty and Ackworth, and were
threatening Allatoona, and alive to the imperative necessity
of holding the latter place, General Sherman at once
communicated by signals instruction to General Corse at Rome
to reënforce the small garrison and hold the defences until
the main body of the Federal army could come to his
assistance. Upon receiving the message General Corse placed
900 men on the cars, and reached Allatoona before the attack
of French. With this addition the garrison numbered 1,700 men,
with six guns. Early on the morning of the 5th, General
French, with 7,000 troops, approached Allatoona, and summoned
the Federal commander, 'in order to save the unnecessary
effusion of blood,' to make an immediate surrender; to which
the latter replied: 'I shall not surrender, and you can
commence the unnecessary effusion of blood whenever you
please.' The battle opened at 8 A. M., and was waged hotly
until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Driven from fort to fort,
until they reached their last defence, the garrison fought
with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of the great stake
for which they contended. Their general was wounded early in
the action, but relaxed in no degree his efforts to repel the
enemy. … During the heat of the contest General Sherman
reached the summit of Kenesaw Mountain, whence he repeatedly
signalled to General Corse to hold out to the last. The
announcement of approaching succor animated the garrison to
renewed exertions, and they threw back the assaulting columns
of the enemy again and again, finally compelling them to
retire, beaten and disheartened, in the direction of Dallas.
Their retreat was hastened by the rapid approach of Stanley's
(4th) corps from the direction of Pine Mountain. The enemy
left 700 to 800 killed, wounded and prisoners in the hands of
the Federals, and their total loss must have exceeded 1,000.
The garrison lost 600 men. The town of Allatoona was reduced
to a mere wreck by the [severe fire of the enemy, and all the
Federal artillery and cavalry horses were killed; but the
valuable stores were saved, and the fort and pass held. The
only important injury done by the rebels, was the destruction
of six or seven miles of railroad between Big Shanty and
Allatoona, which General Sherman immediately commenced to
repair. For several days subsequent to the fight at Allatoona,
General Sherman remained in the latter place, watching the
movements of Hood, who, he suspected, would march for Rome,
and thence toward Bridgeport, or else to Kingston. … General
Hood, however, crossing the Etowah and avoiding Rome, moved
directly north, and on the 12th Stuart's corps of his army
appeared in front of Resaca, the defences of which were held
by Colonel Weaver with 600 men and three pieces of artillery.
… No serious attack was made upon the garrison, the enemy
being more intent upon destroying the railroad toward Dalton
than wasting their time or strength upon the reduction of a
post, the possession of which they wisely considered would be
of no particular advantage to them. … Meanwhile the rebel
army, pursuing its devastating march north, reached Dalton on
the 14th. … The 14th and 15th were employed by the enemy in
continuing the destruction of the railroad as far as Tunnel
Hill. …
{3541}
The approach of the Federal columns now warned General Hood to
move off to the west, and the 16th found him in full retreat
for Lafayette, followed by General Sherman. … From Lafayette
the enemy retreated in a southwesterly direction into Alabama
through a broken and mountainous country, but scantily
supplied with food for man or beast; and passing through
Summerville, Gaylesville, and Blue Pond, halted at Gadsdens,
on the Coosa River, 75 miles from Lafayette. Here he paused
for several days, receiving a few reënforcements brought up by
General Beauregard, who had on the 17th assumed command of the
Confederate military division of the West. … General Hood
still retained his special command, subject to the supervision
or direction of General Beauregard, and his army, after
remaining a few days in Gadsden, moved, about the 1st of
November, for Warrington, on the Tennessee River, 30 miles
distant. General Sherman meanwhile remained at Gaylesville,
which place his main body reached about the 21st, watching the
enemy's movements. … Whatever … might be the final result of
Hood's flanking movement, it had entirely failed to interrupt
the Federal communications to a degree that would compel the
evacuation of Atlanta. … In the light of subsequent events it
would now appear that General Sherman, making only a show of
following his adversary, deliberately lured him into Northern
Alabama, for the purpose of pursuing an uninterrupted march
with his own army through the heart of Georgia. The
ill-advised plan of General Hood had given him the very
opportunity which he desired, and he prepared at once to avail
himself of it."
_W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History in the United States,
chapter 45. _
ALSO IN:
_J. D. Cox,
Atlanta
(Campaigns of the Civil war, volume 9),
chapter 17._
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapter 19 (volume 2)._
_T. B. Van Horne,
Life of Major-General George H. Thomas,
volume 2, chapter 12._
_J. B. Hood,
Advance and Retreat,
chapter 15._
_Official Records,
1st Series, volume 39._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October).
Admission of Nevada into the Union.
See NEVADA: A. D. 1848-1864.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October).
Report on secret disloyal associations in the North.
Knights of the Golden Circle, etc.
"During more than a year past [this report bears date October
8, 1864], it has been generally known to our military
authorities that a secret and treasonable organization,
affiliated with the Southern Rebellion, and chiefly military
in its character, has been rapidly extending itself throughout
the West. A variety of agencies … have been employed, and
successfully, to ascertain its nature and extent, as well as
its aims and its results; and, as this investigation has led
to the arrest, in several States, of a number of its prominent
members, as dangerous public enemies, it has been deemed
proper to set forth in full the acts and purposes of this
organization. … This secret association first developed itself
in the West in the year 1862, about the period [August] of the
first conscription of troops, which it aimed to obstruct and
resist. Originally known in certain localities as the 'Mutual
Protection Society,' the 'Circle of Honor,' or the 'Circle' or
'Knights of the Mighty Host,' but more widely as the 'Knights
of the Golden Circle,' it was simply an inspiration of the
Rebellion, being little other than an extension, among the
disloyal and disaffected at the North, of the association of
the latter name, which had existed for some years at the South
[see GOLDEN CIRCLE, KNIGHTS OF], and from which it derived all
the chief features of its organization. During the Summer and
Fall of 1863, the Order, both at the North and South,
underwent some modifications as well as a change of name. In
consequence of a partial exposure which had been made of the
signs and ritual of the Knights of the Golden Circle, Sterling
Price had instituted, as its successor in Missouri, a secret
political association, which he called the Corps de Belgique,
or Southern League, his principal coadjutor being Charles L.
Hunt, of St. Louis, then Belgian Consul at that city. …
Meanwhile, also, there had been instituted at the North, in
the autumn of 1863, by sundry disloyal persons, prominent
among whom were Vallandigham and P. C. Wright, of New York, a
secret, Order intended to be general throughout the country …
and which was termed, and has since been widely known as the
O. A. K., or 'Order of American Knights.' … The secret signs
and character of the Order having become known to our military
authorities, further modifications in the ritual and forms
were introduced, and its name was finally changed to that of
the O. S. L., or 'Order of the Sons of Liberty,' or the
'Knights of the Order of the Sons of Liberty.' These later
changes are represented to have been first instituted … in May
last [1864], but the new name was at once generally adopted
throughout the West, though in some localities the association
is still better known as the 'Order of American Knights.'
Meanwhile, also, the Order has received certain local
designations. In parts of Illinois it has been called at times
the 'Peace Organization,' in Kentucky the 'Star Organization,'
and in Missouri the 'American Organization;' these, however,
being apparently names used outside of the lodges of the
Order. Its members have also been familiarly designated as
'Butternuts' by the country people of Illinois, Indiana, and
Ohio. … The 'Temples' or 'Lodges' of the Order are numerously
scattered through the States of Indiana, Illinois, Ohio,
Missouri, and Kentucky. They are also officially reported as
established, to a less extent, in Michigan and the other
Western States, as well as in New York, Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Delaware, and Tennessee. … It has been asserted by delegates
to the Supreme Council of February last, that the number was
there represented to be from 800,000 to 1,000,000; but
Vallandigham, in his speech last summer at Dayton, Ohio,
placed it at 500,000, which is probably much nearer the true
total. … Although the Order has, from the outset, partaken of
the military character, it was not till the summer or fall of
1863 that it began to be generally organized as an armed
body.' … In March last the entire armed force of the Order
capable of being mobilized for effective service was
represented to be 340,000 men."
_J. Holt,
Judge Advocate General's Report on Secret Associations
and Conspiracies against the Government._
ALSO IN:
_E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States
during the Great Rebellion,
appendix, pages 445-454._
_J. A. Logan,
The Great Conspiracy,
page 499, and appendix chapter B._
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 1._
See, also, COPPERHEADS.
{3542}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October).
The St. Albans Raid.
"Along the Northern border … the rebel agents, sent thither on
'detached service' by the Rebel Government, were active in
movements intended to terrify and harass the people. On the
19th of October, a party of them made a raid into St. Albans,
Vermont, robbing the banks there, and making their escape
across the lines into Canada with their plunder, having killed
one of the citizens in their attack. Pursuit was made, and
several of the marauders were arrested in Canada. Proceedings
were commenced to procure their extradition [which were
protracted until after the close of the war]. … The Government
received information that this affair was but one of a
projected series, and that similar attempts would be made all
along the frontier. More than this, there were threats,
followed by actual attempts, to set fire to the principal
Northern cities."
_H. J. Raymond,
Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln,
page 611._
ALSO IN:
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 1._
_Correspondence relating to the Fenian Invasion
and the Rebellion of the Southern States
(Ottawa, 1869), pages 117-138._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October: North Carolina).
The destruction of the ram Albemarle.
The ram Albemarle, which had proved in the spring so dangerous
an antagonist to the blockading vessels in the North Carolina
Sounds, was still lying at Plymouth, in the Roanoke River, and
another attack from her was feared by the fleet.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864
(APRIL-MAY: NORTH CAROLINA).
"She was finally destroyed by a brave young lieutenant,
William B. Cushing, who blew her up with a torpedo. Though
only twenty years old, he was one of the most daring officers
in the navy, and he had become noted for his fearlessness in
the expeditions in the sounds and rivers of North Carolina.
One dark night (October 27) he set out from the fleet in a
steam launch—a long open boat used by naval vessels—with a
crew of thirteen officers and men. The launch was fitted with
a torpedo which could be run out forward on the end of a long
boom so as to be thrust under the vessel to be attacked.
Cushing got within sixty feet of the Albemarle before his boat
was seen. The guards then shouted the alarm, rang the boat's
bell, and began firing their muskets at the launch. There was
a raft of logs thirty feet wide around the Albemarle to
protect her from just such attacks, but Cushing ran the bow of
the launch upon the logs, lowered the boom so that the torpedo
came right under the side of the vessel, and fired it. At the
same moment a shot from one of the great guns of the ram
crashed through the launch, and it was overwhelmed by a flood
of water thrown up by the explosion of the torpedo. The
Confederates called out to Cushing to surrender, but he
refused, and ordering his men to save themselves as they best
could, he sprang into the water amid a shower of musket balls
and swam down the river. He succeeded in reaching the shore,
almost exhausted, and hid himself during the next day in a
swamp, where he was cared for by some negroes. From them he
heard that the Albemarle had been sunk by his torpedo. The
next night he found a small boat in a creek, paddled in it
down the river, and before midnight was safe on board one of
the vessels of the fleet. Only one other man of the party
escaped, all the rest being either drowned or captured. The
Albemarle being thus put out of the way, Plymouth was
recaptured a few days afterward."
_J. D. Champlin, Jr.
Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,
chapter 33._
ALSO IN:
_W. B. Cushing, E. Holden, and others,
The Confederate Ram Albemarle
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (November: Tennessee).
Hood's advance Northward.
The Battle of Franklin.
When General Sherman started on his march to the sea General
Thomas was left to oppose Hood. "The force Thomas had for this
purpose was curiously small, considering how formidable Hood's
army had been in the Atlanta Campaign, and still was. All
Thomas had for immediate field service were the Fourth and
Twenty-Third Corps, numbering together about 22,000 infantry,
and also about 3,000 cavalry. These troops were sent to
Pulaski, Tennessee, in command of General Schofield, Thomas,
himself remaining at Nashville. A little after the middle of
November, 1864, Hood crossed the Tennessee River and
inaugurated his campaign by a flank movement. He made a rapid
march upon Columbia, with the view of getting in behind
Schofield, who was at Pulaski. But Schofield retired to
Columbia in time to frustrate Hood's plans. The two armies
remained in close proximity to each other at Columbia until
November 28th, when Hood made another skilfully-planned flank
movement … to Spring Hill, in rear of Schofield. Again Hood
was foiled. … General Thomas at Nashville wanted the
Confederates held back as long as possible, in order that he
might have time to receive there his expected reinforcement of
A. J. Smith's corps. It was, therefore, Schofield's duty to
check Hood's advance as long as he could. … He started General
Stanley, with a division of 5,000 men, and a great part of his
artillery, to Spring Hill (12 miles north of Columbia) early
in the morning. He put two other divisions on the road. He
held one division in front of Columbia, and prevented the
enemy from crossing the river during the entire day, and also
that night. Stanley reached Spring Hill in time to prevent
Hood from occupying that place. He skirmished and fought with
Hood's advance troops at Spring Hill during the afternoon of
November 29th. … Schofield … accomplished exactly what he
believed he could accomplish. He held back his enemy at
Columbia with one hand and fenced off the blow at Spring Hill
with the other. … The beneficial result of all this bold
management of Schofield, November 29th, was apparent the next
day in the battle of Franklin. Hood fought that great battle
practically without his artillery. He only had the two
batteries which he took with him on his detour to Spring Hill.
Those two he used. … But his vast supply of artillery had all
been detained at Columbia too long to be of any service at the
time and place it was most needed. … The Federal troops left
Spring Hill in the night for Franklin, ten miles distant.
Early in the morning of November 30th they began to arrive at
Franklin, and were placed in position covering the town. Early
the same morning the Confederates moved up from Spring Hill,
following hard upon the rearmost of the Federals. …
{3543}
General Stanley says, in his official report: 'From one
o'clock until four in the evening, the enemy's entire force
was in sight and forming for attack. Yet, in view of the
strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course
of the rebels during the campaign, nothing appeared so
improbable as that they would assault.'" The assault was made,
however, with a terrible persistency which proved the ruin of
Hood's army, for it failed. "The Confederate loss in this
dreadful battle can be estimated from data given. There is
good authority for stating the killed at 1,750. The usual
proportion of killed and wounded is four or five to one. This
would make the killed and wounded not less than 7,000 or
8,000. The attacking force numbered full 20,000. … Hood's loss
was, indeed, more than one-third of the attacking force. The
Federal loss was much smaller, being 1,222 killed and wounded.
… One of the features of this battle was the enormous
expenditure of ammunition [100 wagon loads] in the short time
of its duration. … The expenditure of so much ammunition
produced a dense smoke, which hung over the field, and brought
on sudden darkness, like an eclipse. So noticeable was this
phenomenon, it is mentioned in all the official reports. … In
the darkness of the night the battle ended. The Confederates
desisted, and the Federal line became quiet. … In their front,
and so near that the outstretched hand could almost reach
them, were thousands of men in the agonies of death. The wail
that went up from that field as the thunder of the battle
ceased can never be forgotten by those who heard it. … The
[Federal] troops were quietly withdrawn before midnight. A
silent rapid march brought them to Nashville the next morning,
and weary with fighting and marching they bivouacked in the
blue grass pastures under the guns of Fort Negley."
_T. Speed,
The Battle of Franklin
(Sketches of War History,
Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3). _
ALSO IN:
_T. B. Van Horne,
Life of General George H. Thomas,
chapter 13._
_J. B. Hood,
Advance and Retreat,
chapters 10-17._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (November-December: Georgia).
Sherman's March to the Sea.
"It was at Alatoona, probably, that Sherman first realized
that, with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his
line of communications with the North would be impossible if
he expected to retain any force with which to operate
offensively beyond Atlanta.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864
(September-October: Georgia).
He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to
Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter
place garrisoned. … Sherman thought Hood would follow him,
though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the
latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by
making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I
myself [writes General Grant] was thoroughly satisfied that
Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of November I
telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to move
according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose
from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to
Chattanooga. … Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it
worthless for military purposes before starting, Sherman
himself remaining over a day to superintend the work and see
that it was well done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were
perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled
and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured
soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. … The
army was expected to live on the country. … Each brigade
furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and
provisions for the command to which they belonged. … The skill
of these men, called by themselves and the army 'bummers,' in
collecting their loads and getting back to their respective
commands, was marvellous."
_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapter 59 (volume 2)._
All preparations being completed, General Sherman caused the
foundries, mills and shops of every kind in Rome to be
destroyed on the 10th of November, and "started on the 12th
with his full staff from Kingston to Atlanta. … As Sherman
rode towards Atlanta that night he met railroad trains going
to the rear with furious speed. He was profoundly impressed
with the strange aspect of affairs: two hostile armies
marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that
it was achieving a final and conclusive result in the great
war. 'I was strongly inspired,' he writes, 'with a feeling
that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the
rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though a full
thousand miles of hostile country intervened; and that for
better or worse it would end the war.' The result was a
magnificent vindication of this soldierly intuition. His army
consisted in round numbers of 60,000 men, the most perfect in
strength, health, and intelligence that ever went to war. He
had thoroughly purged it of all inefficient material, sending
to the rear all organizations and even all individuals that he
thought would be a drag upon his celerity or strength. His
right wing, under Howard, consisted of the Fifteenth Corps,
commanded by Osterhaus, in the absence of John A. Logan; and
the Seventeenth Corps, commanded by Frank P. Blair, Jr. The
left wing, commanded by Slocum, comprised the Fourteenth
Corps, under Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, under A.
S. Williams. In his general orders he had not intimated to the
army the object of their march. 'It is sufficient for you to
know,' he said, 'that it involves a departure from our present
base and a long, difficult march to a new one.' His special
field orders are a model of clearness and conciseness. The
habitual order of march was to be, wherever practicable, by
four roads as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at
points to be indicated from time to time. There was to be no
general train of supplies; behind each regiment should follow
one wagon and one ambulance; a due proportion of wagons for
ammunition and provision behind each brigade; the separate
columns were to start at seven in the morning and make about
fifteen miles a day. The army was to subsist liberally on the
country; forage parties, under the command of discreet
officers, were to gather near the routes traveled whatever was
needed by the command, aiming to keep in the wagons a reserve
of at least ten days' provisions; soldiers were strictly
forbidden to enter dwellings of inhabitants or commit
trespasses; the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins,
etc., was intrusted to corps commanders alone.
{3544}
No destruction of property was to be permitted in districts
where the army was unmolested; but relentless devastation was
ordered in case of the manifestation of local hostility by the
shooting of soldiers or the burning of bridges. … Precisely at
seven o'clock on the morning of the 16th of November the great
army started on its march. A band struck up the anthem of
'John Brown's body lies a-moldering in the grave'; the
soldiers caught up the refrain, and, to the swelling chorus of
'Glory, Hallelujah,' the great march was begun. The month that
followed will always remain to those 60,000 men the most
romantic and inspiring memory of their lives. The weather was
favorable all the way; to veterans the marches were of
reasonable length; the work of destroying the Southern
railroads was so easy to their experienced hands that it
hardly delayed the day's march. With the exception of the
affair on the 22d of November, when P. J. Phillips with a
division of Smith's Georgia troops attacked C. C. Walcutt's
Brigade, which was marching as the rear-guard of the right
wing at Griswoldville, and met with a severe repulse, and a
series of cavalry fights between Wheeler and Kilpatrick near
'Waynesboro', there was no fighting to do between Atlanta and
Savannah. A swarm of militia and irregular cavalry hung, it is
true, about the front and flank of the marching army, but were
hardly a source of more annoyance than so many mosquitoes
would have been. The foragers brought in every evening their
heterogeneous supplies from the outlying plantations, and
although they had to defend themselves every day from
scattered forces of the enemy, the casualties which they
reported each evening were insignificant. The utmost efforts
of Sherman and his officers to induce the negroes to remain
quietly at home were not entirely successful. The promise of
freedom which was to come to them from the victory of the
Union cause was too vague and indefinite to content them. …
The simple-hearted freedmen gathered in an ever-increasing
cloud in rear of the army; and when the campaign was over they
peopled the sea-islands of Georgia and furnished, after the
war, the principal employment of the Freedmen's Commission.
The march produced an extraordinary effervescence throughout
the Confederacy. If words could avail anything against heavy
battalions, Sherman would have been annihilated in his first
day's march. … As Sherman drew near to Milledgeville on the
23d of November the Georgia Legislature passed an act to levy
the population en masse; but this act of desperate legislation
had no effect in checking the march of the 'Yankees,' and the
Governor, State officers, and Legislature fled in the utmost
confusion as Sherman entered the place. The Union general
occupied the Executive Mansion for a day; some of the soldiers
went to the State House, organized themselves into a
constituent assembly, and after a spirited mock-serious
debate, repealed the ordinance of secession. Sherman took the
greatest possible pains to prevent any damage to the city and
marched out on the 24th on the way to Millen. … Finding it
impossible to stop him, the Georgia State troops by sharp
marching had made their way directly to the vicinity of
Savannah, where Sherman himself arrived and invested the city
from the Savannah to the little Ogeechee River, on the 10th of
December."
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 9, chapter 20._
On the 13th, Fort McAllister, which commanded the Ogeechee
River, was stormed and taken by Hazen's division, and
communication was opened with Admiral Dahlgren, and with
General Foster, the Union commander at Port Royal. On the
17th, General Hardee, the Confederate commander at Savannah,
refused a demand for the surrender of the city, but on the
night of the 20th he escaped, with his forces, and on the 22d
General Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln: "I beg to
present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with
150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition; also about 25,000
bales of cotton."
ALSO IN:
_J. D. Cox,
The March to the Sea
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 10),
chapter 3._
_O. O. Howard, and others,
Sherman's March
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapter 20 (volume 2)._
_G. W. Nichols,
The Story of the Great March._
_W. B. Hazen,
Narrative of Military Service,
chapters 21-22._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (December: Tennessee).
The Battle of Nashville and the destruction of Hood's army.
After the battle of Franklin Hood went forward to Nashville,
with his badly shaken army, and invested that place.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE).
Thomas was strongly fortified, and quietly took his time to
make ready before striking his audacious antagonist, unmoved
by repeated demands for an advance, from the War Office, the
President, and General Grant. "With all just confidence in
Thomas' ability, the entire North insisted on instant action,
and Grant finally ordered Thomas either to move upon Hood at
once or else turn over the command to Schofield. Thomas
quietly replied that he would cheerfully do the latter, if
directed, but would not attack Hood until he was satisfied
that the time was ripe. He desired both favorable weather and
to increase his force of mounted men. But the enemy was
devastating a considerable part of Tennessee and was forcing
all the young men into their ranks; and everyone was fearful
of a repetition of Bragg's march to the Ohio in 1862. Logan
was finally ordered to Nashville to supplant Thomas. But
before he could reach the ground, Thomas had struck his blow.
His preparations had been two weeks before substantially
completed. Small detachments were at Murfreesboro',
Chattanooga, and along the railroad. This latter had been,
however, interrupted by Hood for a number of days. A heavy
storm of sleet and ice had made the country almost impassable
and would render the operations of the attacking party
uncertain. Thomas had made up his mind to wait for clearing
weather. Finally came sunshine and with it Thomas' advance.
Hood lay in his front, with Stewart on his left, Lee in the
centre and Cheatham on the right, while a portion of Forrest's
cavalry was operating out upon his left. He had some 44,000
men, but his check and heavy losses at Franklin had seriously
impaired the 'morale' of his army as well as thinned his
ranks. Hood could, however, not retreat. He was committed to a
death-struggle with Thomas. It was his last chance as a
soldier. The Union general had placed A. J. Smith on his
right, the Fourth corps in the centre, and Schofield on the
left. He advanced on Hood, bearing heavily with his right,
while sharply demonstrating with his left. The position of the
Confederate Army had placed A. J. Smith's corps obliquely to
their general line of battle, an advantage not to be
neglected.
{3545}
Smith pushed in, later supported by Schofield, and
successively capturing the field-works erected by the enemy's
main line and reserves, disastrously crushed Hood's left
flank. Meanwhile Wood was making all but equal headway against
Hood's right, and the first day closed with remarkable success
for the amount of loss sustained. Still this was not victory.
The morrow might bring reverse. Hood's fight promised to be
with clenched teeth. Hood seriously missed Forrest, whom he
had detached on a raiding excursion and without whose cavalry
his flanks were naked. Cheatham he moved during the night over
from the right to sustain his left, which had proved the
weaker wing. On the morning of the next day he lay intrenched
upon the hills back of his former line, with either flank
somewhat refused. Thomas sent Wilson with his cavalry to work
his way unobserved around the extreme left flank thus thrown
back. At 4 P. M. a general assault was made all along the
line. Upon our left, Wood's advance did not meet with success.
On the right, however, A. J. Smith's onset, concentrated at
the salient of Hood's left centre, proved heavy enough to
break down the Confederate defense. Sharply following up his
successes, allowing no breathing time to the exultant troops,
Smith pushed well home, and overcoming all resistance, drove
the enemy in wild confusion from the field. Meanwhile Wilson's
troopers, dismounted, fell upon the Confederate flank and rear
and increased the wreck tenfold. This advantage again enabled
Wood to make some headway, and with renewed joint effort the
rout of the enemy became overwhelming. Almost all organization
was lost in Hood's army as it fled across the country towards
Franklin. Pursuit was promptly undertaken, but though
seriously harassed, Hood saved himself beyond the Tennessee
river with the remnants of his army. Thomas' losses were 3,000
men, Hood's were never officially given, but our trophies
included 4,500 prisoners and 53 guns. Thomas had settled all
adverse speculation upon his slowness in attacking Hood by the
next to annihilation he wrought when he actually moved upon
him. No army was so completely overthrown during our war."
_T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War,
chapter 58._
ALSO IN:
_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapter 35 (volume 2)._
_W. Swinton,
The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War,
chapter 11._
_J. D. Cox,
The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 10),
chapters 6-7._
_H. Stone,
Repelling Hood's Invasion
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
_H. Coppée,
General Thomas,
chapter 11-12._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864-1865
(December-January: North Carolina).
The Capture of Fort Fisher.
"In the latter part of 1864 two ports only, Wilmington and
Charleston, remained to the Confederates. … The northward
march of Sherman would cut off Charleston, too, so that the
Confederates would have to abandon it. The National government
now desired to complete its work by capturing Fort Fisher, and
thus finally shutting off the Confederacy from all
communication with the foreign world. The accomplishment of
this task was in no wise easy. … The army and navy co-operated
in the attempts to reduce Fort Fisher. There were more than 50
men-of-war tossing on the waves before the lowering sea-front
of the work. Six thousand five hundred men were in the
military force. They were in command of General B. F. Butler,
whom we saw last in New Orleans. The General's active and
ingenious mind conceived a plan for destroying the fort
without sacrificing a single Federal soldier. He procured an
old gun-boat, painted it white and otherwise disguised it, so
as to look like a blockade-runner, stored 250 tons of
gunpowder in its hold with fuses penetrating every part, ran
the craft in within 1,500 feet of the works and exploded it.
Butler expected that the shock would demolish the seaward face
of the fort altogether, and perhaps bury the guns under great
masses of sand, but in this he was mistaken, for the heavy
bastions were not in the least disturbed by the shock. … The
navy then took its turn, and for some hours the heavy vessels
of Admiral Porter's fleet poured so rapid and well aimed a
fire upon the work, that the garrison were driven from their
guns, and only the occasional report of a heavy cannon told
that the fort was still tenanted. But secure in their heavy
bomb-proofs, the garrison minded the storm of shells and solid
shot no more than the well-housed farmer heeds a hailstorm. It
was very clear that Fort Fisher could not be taken at long
range. … The original plan had contemplated an assault as soon
as the fire of the fleet should have silenced the guns of the
fort, and in pursuance of this 700 men had been landed from
the army transports. But the weather was too rough to permit
of landing more troops that day, and the next morning General
Butler concluded that Fort Fisher was impregnable, withdrew
his men already landed, and sailed away, greatly to the
disgust of the navy. This was on the 25th of December, 1864.
The chagrin of the whole North over the failure of the
expedition was so great that it was speedily determined to
renew the attempt. January 13th saw a new Federal force, this
time under command of General A. H. Terry, landing on the
shore of the sandy neck of land above the fort. … At early
dawn of the 15th the attack was begun. The ships arranged in a
great semicircle poured their fire upon the fort, dismantling
guns, driving the garrison to the bomb-proofs, and mowing down
the stockade. A line of sharp-shooters, each carrying a shovel
in one hand and a gun in the other, spring out from Terry's
most advanced lines, rush forward to within 175 yards of the
fort and dig pits for their protection before the Confederates
can attack them. Then the sharpshooters and the navy occupy
the attention of the enemy, while Curtis's brigade dashes
forward and digs a trench within 500 yards of the fort. By
this time too a party of 2,000 sailors and marines has been
landed from the fleet. They are to storm the sea-wall of the
fort while the army attacks its landward face. Suddenly the
thunder of the naval artillery is stilled. There is a moment
of silence, and then the shrill scream of the whistles rises
from every steamer in the fleet. It is the signal for the
assault. The sailors on the beach spring to their feet and
dash forward at a rapid run; they fire no shot, for they carry
no guns. Cutlasses and pistols, the blue-jackets' traditional
weapons, are their only arms. Toward the other side of the
fort came Terry's troops. … The fate of the naval column is
quickly determined. Upon it is concentrated the fire of the
heaviest Confederate batteries, Napoleon guns, Columbiads, and
rifles shotted with grape and cannister.
{3546}
The blue-jackets, unable to reply to this murderous fire, and
seeing their companions falling fast around them, waver, halt,
and fall back to the beach, throwing themselves upon the
ground to escape the enemy's missiles. But though repulsed
they have contributed largely to the capture of the fort.
While the chief attention of Confederates has been directed
toward them, the troops have been carrying all before them on
the other front. Colonel Lamb turns from his direction of the
defense against the naval column to see three Union flags
waving over other portions of the work. … The Confederates
were determined, even desperate. Long after the fort was
virtually in the hands of its captors they stubbornly clung to
a bomb-proof. Finally they retreated to Battery Buchanan and
there maintained themselves stoutly until late at night when,
all hope being at an end, they surrendered themselves, and the
National victory was complete."
_W. J. Abbot,
Battle-Fields and Victory,
chapter 15._
ALSO IN:
_D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the Civil War,
chapters 49-51._
_W. Lamb and T. O. Selfridge, Jr.,
The Capture of Fort Fisher
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (January).
Congressional adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.
"On the last day of [January, 1865] … one of the grandest
events of the century was witnessed in the House of
Representatives in the final passage of the Constitutional
Amendment [the Thirteenth] forever prohibiting slavery.
Numerous propositions on the subject had been submitted, but
the honor of drafting the one adopted belongs to Lyman
Trumbull, who had introduced it early in the first session of
this Congress. It passed the Senate on the 8th of April, 1864,
only six members voting against it, … but failed in the House
on the 15th of June following. It now came up on the motion of
Mr. Ashley to reconsider this vote. Congress had abolished
slavery in the District of Columbia, and prohibited it in all
the Territories. It had repealed the Fugitive Slave law, and
declared free all negro soldiers in the Union armies and their
families; and the President had played his grand part in the
Proclamation of Emancipation. But the question now to be
decided completely overshadowed all others. The debate on the
subject had been protracted and very spirited. … The time for
the momentous vote had now come, and no language could
describe the solemnity and impressiveness of the spectacle
pending the roll-call. The success of the measure had been
considered very doubtful, and depended upon certain
negotiations, the result of which was not fully assured, and
the particulars of which never reached the public. The anxiety
and suspense during the balloting produced a deathly
stillness, but when it became certainly known that the measure
had prevailed the cheering in the densely-packed hall and
galleries surpassed all precedent and beggared all
description. Members joined in the general shouting, which was
kept up for several minutes, many embracing each other, and
others completely surrendering themselves to their tears of
joy. It seemed to me I had been born into a new life."
_G. W. Julian,
Political Recollections,
chapter 11._
"The Joint Resolution passed [the House of Representatives, on
the 31st of January], 119 to 56, 8 not voting, 10 Democrats
voting aye. … It was the greatest day the House had ever seen,
nor is it likely ever to see a greater."
_O. J. Hollister,
Life of Schuyler Colfax,
page 245._
The Thirteenth Amendment, which was ratified before the close
of the year by three-fourths of the States, and its embodiment
in the Constitution of the United States proclaimed by the
Secretary of State on the 18th of December, 1865, is as
follows:
"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (February).
The Hampton Roads Peace Conference.
"Several informal attempts at opening negotiations for the
termination of hostilities were made in the course of this
Winter—Honorable Francis P. Blair, of Maryland, visiting
Richmond twice on the subject, with the consent, though not by
the request, of President Lincoln. At length, upon their
direct application, Messrs. Alex. H. Stephens, John A.
Campbell, and Robert M. T. Hunter, were permitted to pass
General Grant's lines before Petersburg, and proceed to
Fortress Monroe; where [on board a steamer in Hampton Roads]
they were met by Gov. [Secretary of State] Seward, followed by
President Lincoln; and a free, full conference was had."
_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 30._