counter-marches they involved, Pope's opportunity was thrown
away, and instead of fighting Jackson's corps alone, it was
the entire army of Lee with which he had to deal,—this, too,
with his forces very much out of position, and he himself
ignorant both of his own situation and that of the enemy.
When, towards noon [August 29], Pope, coming from Centreville,
reached the field near Groveton, he found the situation as
follows: Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and
Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley Springs
road; Reno and Sigel holding the centre,—Sigel's line being
extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike;
Reynolds with his division on the left. But the commander was
ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter and McDowell, and
he knew not that Longstreet had joined Jackson! The troops had
been considerably cut up by the brisk skirmishing that had
been going on all morning. An artillery contest had also been
waged all forenoon between the opposing lines; but it was at
long range and of no effect. The position of the troops in
front of Jackson's intrenched line was one that promised very
little success for a direct attack, and especially for a
partial attack. Nevertheless, at three o'clock, Pope ordered
Hooker to assault. The attempt was so unpromising that that
officer remonstrated against it; but the order being
imperative, he made a very determined attack with his
division," and was driven back.
{3478}
"Too late for united action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's
assistance, and he also suffered repulse. Meanwhile, Pope had
learnt the position of Porter's command, and, at half-past
four in the afternoon, sent orders to that officer to assail
the enemy's right flank and rear,—Pope erroneously believing
the right flank of Jackson, near Groveton, to be the right of
the Confederate line. Towards six, when he thought Porter
should be coming into action, he directed Heintzelman and Reno
to assault the enemy's left. The attack was made with vigor,
especially by Kearney," but the enemy brought up heavy
reserves and repelled the assault. "Turning now to the left,
where Porter was to have assailed the Confederate left
[right], it appears that the order which Pope sent at
half-past four did not reach Porter till about dusk. He then
made dispositions for attack, but it was too late. It is,
however, more than doubtful that, even had the order been
received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted
from its execution. … Contrary to Pope's opinion, he [Porter]
had then, and had had since noon, Longstreet's entire corps
before him. So, as firing now died away in the darkling woods
on the right, a pause was put for the day to the chaos and
confusion of this mismanaged battle [known as the battle of
Groveton], in which many thousand men had fallen on the Union
side. It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the
then condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn
across Bull Run and taken position at Centreville, or even
within the fortifications of Washington. By doing so he would
have united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then
between Washington and Centreville. … With untimely obstinacy,
Pope determined to remain and again try the issue of battle.
To utilize Porter's corps, he drew it over from the isolated
position it had held the previous day to the Warrenton road. …
Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes
occur in battle, it so was that the opposing commanders had
that day formed each the same resolution: Pope had determined
to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to attack
Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when
Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the
refusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to
his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack on
Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were
retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. …
Pope … telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was
'retreating to the mountains,'—a dispatch which, flashed
throughout the land, gave the people a few hours, at least, of
unmixed pleasure. To take advantage of the supposed 'retreat'
of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell with three corps—Porter's in the
advance—to follow up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike, and
'press the enemy vigorously during the whole day.' But no
sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pursuit of a
supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hitherto concealed
in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered themselves." The
result of this misdirected movement was a fatal check,
Porter's troops being fearfully cut up and driven back.
"Jackson immediately took up the pursuit, and was joined by a
general advance of the whole Confederate line—Longstreet
extending his right so as, if possible, to cut off the retreat
of the Union forces." In this attempt, however, he was foiled,
and "under cover of the darkness the wearied troops retired
across Bull Run, by the stone bridge, and took position on the
heights of Centreville. Owing to the obscurity of the night,
and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, Lee attempted no
pursuit." The engagement of this day is called the Second
Battle of Bull Run, or the Second Battle of Manassas, as it
was named by the Confederate victors. "At Centreville, Pope
united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and he remained
there during the whole of the 31st. But Lee had now yet given
up the pursuit. Leaving Longstreet on the battle-field, he
sent Jackson by a detour on Pope's right, to strike the Little
River turnpike, and by that route to Fairfax Courthouse; to
intercept, if possible, Pope's retreat to Washington.
Jackson's march was much retarded by a heavy storm that
commenced the day before and still continued. Pope, meantime,
fell back to positions covering Fairfax Courthouse and
Germantown; and on the evening of the 1st of September,
Jackson struck his right, posted at Ox Hill." The short but
severe action which then occurred (called the battle of
Chantilly) was indecisive. Jackson's attack was repelled, but
the repulse cost the lives of two excellent officers of high
rank and reputation, Generals Kearney and Stevens, besides
many men. "On the following day, September 2d, the army was,
by order of General Halleck, drawn back within the lines of
Washington."
_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
pages 184-193._
"The Second Battle of Bull Hun … was a severe defeat for
General Pope; but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor
anything like a rout. … Lee claims to have captured in these
engagements 30 pieces of artillery and 7,000 unwounded
prisoners."
_J. C. Ropes,
The Army under Pope
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 4),
chapters 8-11._
ALSO IN:
_G. H. Gordon,
History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia,
chapters 11-13._
_The Virginia Campaign of General Pope
(Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 2)._
_J. Pope,
The Second Battle of Bull Run
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 449-494)._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 12, part 2._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland).
Lee's first invasion: His cold reception and disappointment.
"The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not
contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from
Richmond. … He accordingly determined to advance into
Maryland—the fortifications in front of Washington, and the
interposition of the Potomac, a broad stream easily defended,
rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. On the 3d
of September, therefore, and without waiting to rest his army,
which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous marching
and fighting since it had left the Rapidan, General Lee moved
toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to
the music of the bands playing the popular air, 'Maryland, my
Maryland,' advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on
the 7th of September. Lee's object in invading Maryland has
been the subject of much discussion. … It can only be said
that General Lee, doubtless, left the future to decide his
ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and
clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words.
{3479}
His object was to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia. …
The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says,
'encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however
inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington
Government to retain all its available force to provide for
contingencies which its course toward the people of that State
gave it reason to apprehend,' and to cross the Potomac 'might
afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in
any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their
liberty.' It may be said, in summing up on this point, that
Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his
standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the
yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared
this expectation. The identity of sentiment generally between
the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia, and their
strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation
reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result
afterward was extremely bitter. Such were the first designs of
Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear. By advancing into
Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew
that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops
from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the
Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was
accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross
the Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge, called there the
South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the
Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow
him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies,
while his own communications would remain open by way of the
Shenandoah Valley. … The Southern army was concentrated in the
neighborhood of Frederick City by the 7th of September, and on
the next day General Lee Issued an address to the people of
Maryland. … This address, couched in terms of such dignity,
had little effect upon the people. Either their sentiment in
favor of the Union was too strong, or they found nothing in
the condition Of affairs to encourage their Southern feelings.
A large Federal force was known to be advancing; Lee's army,
in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very
uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his
standard, the population in general remaining hostile or
neutral. … Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his
own men for success in his future movements. He faced that
conviction courageously; and, without uttering a word of
comment, or indulging in any species of crimination against
the people of Maryland, resolutely commenced his movements
looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the invasion of
Pennsylvania."
_J. E. Cooke,
Life of Robert E. Lee,
part 5, chapters 1-2._
ALSO IN:
_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 12._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland).
Lee's first invasion: Harper's Ferry.
South Mountain.
Antietam.
"On the 2d of September the President went to General
McClellan's house in Washington, asked him to take command
again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now
been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The
first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of
Miles's force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said,
it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force.
All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and
unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck
intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Halleck's
principal reason appeared to be a reluctance to abandon a
place where so much expense had been laid out. Miles, a worthy
subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders
with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead
of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command
it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland,
McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover
Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a
decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on
the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to
that accorded to the army that had left the town two days
before. … But this flattering reception was not the best
fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his
arrival in the town General McClellan came into possession of
a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in
which the whole campaign was laid out. … General Lee had taken
it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry would be
evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when
he found they were not, he had so far changed or suspended the
plan with which he set out as to send back a large part of his
army to capture those places and not leave a hostile force in
his rear." This was easily accomplished by Jackson and McLaws,
the latter of whom took possession of the heights commanding
the town, where Miles waited to be trapped. "A bombardment the
next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to
attack. General Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last
shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation,
with 73 guns. … Jackson, leaving the arrangements for the
sur·render to A. P. Hill, hurried with the greater part of his
force to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of
the 16th. The range known as the South Mountain, which is a
continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about
1,000 feet high. The two principal gaps are Turner's and
Crampton's, each about 400 feet high, with the hills towering
600 feet above it. When McClellan learned the plans of the
Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart
them. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's
Gap and press on to relieve Harper's Ferry; the corps of Reno
and Hooker, under command of Burnside, he moved to Turner's
Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick
enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the
Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then
have had his whole army between Lee's divided forces, and
could hardly have failed to defeat them disastrously and
perhaps conclusively. But he did not arrive at the passes till
the morning of the 14th; and by that time Lee had learned of
his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, from Boonsboro
and beyond, to defend Turner's Gap, while he ordered McLaws to
look out for Crampton's. … There was stubborn and bloody
fighting all day, with the Union forces slowly but constantly
gaining ground, and at dark the field was won," at both the
passes. The two engagements were called the battle of South
Mountain by the Federals, the Battle of Boonsboro by the
Confederates.
{3480}
At Turner's Gap there was a loss of about 1,500 on each side,
and 1,500 Confederates were made prisoners; at Crampton's Gap,
the loss in killed and wounded was some 500 on each side, with
400 Confederate prisoners taken. The Union army had forced the
passage of the mountains, but Lee had gained time to unite his
scattered forces. "He withdrew across the Antietam, and took
up a position on high ground between that stream and the
village of Sharpsburg. … Lee now had his army together and
strongly posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in
battle and straggling that it numbered but little over 40,000
combatants. … McClellan had somewhat over 70,000 men. … The
ground occupied by the Confederate army, with both flanks
resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam flowing in front, was
advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and
a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly
guarded. The land was occupied by meadows, cornfields, and
patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges.
McClellan only reconnoitered the position on the 15th. On the
16th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to
throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and
unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this
had sufficiently engaged the enemy's attention and drawn his
strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with
his left and centre. … All day long an artillery duel was kept
up. … It was late in the afternoon when Hooker's corps crossed
by the upper bridge, advanced through the woods, and struck
the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood's men.
Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on,
and the lines rested for the night where they were." At
sunrise, next morning, Hooker assaulted Jackson and was
seriously wounded in the fighting which followed. Sumner's
corps finally joined in the attack, and all the forenoon the
battle was desperate in that part of the field. "But while
this great struggle was in progress on McClellan's right, his
centre and left, under Porter und Burnside, did not make any
movement to assist. At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton's
Gap, and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just
in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over
from the Confederate right. At eight o'clock in the morning
Burnside had been ordered to carry the bridge in his front,
cross the stream, and attack the Confederate right. But,
though commanded and urged repeatedly, it was one o'clock
before he succeeded in doing this, and two more precious hours
passed away before he had carried the ridge commanding
Sharpsburg and captured the Confederate battery there. Then
came up the last division of Lee's forces (A. P. Hill's) from
Harper's Ferry, 2,000 strong, united with the other forces on
his left, and drove Burnside from the crest and re-took the
battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was
closed, or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because
both sides had been so severely punished that neither was
inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee's force had
been actively engaged, but not more than two thirds of
McClellan's. The reason why the Confederate army was not
annihilated or captured must be plain to any intelligent
reader. … General McClellan reported his entire loss at
12,469, of whom 2,010 were killed. General Lee reported his
total loss in the Maryland battles as 1,567 killed and 8,724
wounded, saying nothing of the missing; but the figures given
by his division commanders foot up 1,842 killed, 9,399
wounded, and 2,292 missing—total 13,533. … Nothing was done on
the 18th, and when McClellan determined to renew the attack on
the 19th, he found that his enemy had withdrawn from the field
and crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The
National commander reported the capture of more than 6,000
prisoners, 13 guns, and 39 battle-flags, and that he had not
lost a gun or a color. As he was also in possession of the
field … and had rendered Lee's invasion fruitless of anything
but the prisoners carried off from Harper's Ferry, the victory
was his."
_R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Secession,
chapter 12._
ALSO IN:
_F. W. Palfrey,
The Antietam and Fredericksburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5)._
_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 3, chapter 4._
_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 4._
_A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th. Army Corps,
part 2, chapters 2-3._
_Official Records,
series 1, volume 19._
_G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
chapters 33-38._
_D. H. Hill, J. D. Cox, J. Longstreet, and others,
Lee's Invasion of Maryland
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2)._
_W. Allan,
The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862,
chapters 37-48._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September).
President Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation,
and the attitude of Northern parties on the Slavery question.
Abraham Lincoln "believed that without the Union permanent
liberty for either race on this continent would be impossible.
And because of this belief, he was reluctant, perhaps more
reluctant than most of his associates, to strike slavery with
the sword. For many months, the passionate appeals of millions
of his associates seemed not to move him. He listened to all
the phases of the discussion, and stated in language clearer
and stronger than any opponent had used, the dangers, the
difficulties, and the possible futility of the act. In
reference to its practical wisdom, Congress, the Cabinet, and
the country were divided. Several of his generals had
proclaimed the freedom of slaves within the limits of their
commands. The President revoked their proclamations. His first
Secretary of War had inserted a paragraph in his annual report
advocating a similar policy. The President suppressed it. On
the 19th of August, 1862, Horace Greeley published a letter
addressed to the President, entitled 'The Prayer of Twenty
Millions,' in which he said, 'On the face of this wide earth,
Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined,
intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that
all attempts to put down the rebellion and at the same time
uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile.' To
this the President responded in that ever memorable reply of
August 22, in which he said:—'If there be those who would not
save the Union unless they could at the same time save
slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would
not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy
slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to
save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery.
{3481}
If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would
do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would
do it,—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving
others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery
and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save
the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not
believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less
whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause,
and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help
the cause.' Thus, against all importunities on the one hand
and remonstrances on the other, he took the mighty question to
his own heart, and, during the long months of that terrible
battle-summer, wrestled with it alone. But at length he
realized the saving truth, that great unsettled questions have
no pity for the repose of nations. On the 22d of September, he
summoned his Cabinet to announce his conclusion. It was my
good fortune, on that same day, and a few hours after the
meeting, to hear, from the lips of one who participated, the
story of the scene. As the chiefs of the Executive Departments
came in, one by one, they found the President reading a
favorite chapter from a popular humorist. He was lightening
the weight of the great burden which rested upon his spirit.
He finished the chapter, reading it aloud. And here I quote,
from the published Journal of the late Chief Justice, an
entry, written immediately after the meeting, and bearing
unmistakable evidence that it is almost a literal transcript
of Lincoln's words: 'The President then took a graver tone and
said: "Gentlemen I have, as you are aware, thought a great
deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all
remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had
prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections
made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind
has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought
all along that the time for acting on it might probably come.
I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I
wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the
army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have
best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and
Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the
rebel army was at Frederick, I determined as soon as it should
be driven out of Maryland to issue a proclamation of
emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I
said nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and
(hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now
driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got
you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish
your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined
for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect
for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on
this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have
considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I
have written is that which my reflections have determined me
to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in
any minor matter which any of you thinks had best be changed,
I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other
observation I will make, I know very well that many others
might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and
if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully
possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any
constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he
should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I
believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people as
I had some time since, I do not know that, all things
considered, any other person has more; and, however this may
be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put
where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can and bear the
responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to
take." The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation
Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went
on, and showing that he had fully considered the subject in
all the lights under which it had been presented to him.' The
Proclamation was amended in a few matters of detail. It was
signed and published that day."
_J. A. Garfield,
Works,
volume 2, pages 538-540._
"I was alone with Mr. Lincoln more than two hours of the
Sunday next after Pope's defeat in August, 1802. That was the
darkest day of the sad years of the war. … When the business
to which I had been summoned by the President was over—strange
business for the time: the appointment of assessors and
collectors of internal revenue—he was kind enough to ask my
opinion as to the command of the army. The way was thus opened
for conversation, and for me to say at the end that I thought
our success depended upon the emancipation of the slaves. To
this he said: 'You would not have it done now, would you? Must
we not wait for something like a victory?' This was the second
and most explicit intimation to me of his purpose in regard to
slavery. In the preceding July or early in August, at an
interview upon business connected with my official duties, he
said, 'Let me read two letters,' and taking them from a
pigeon-hole over his table he proceeded at once to do what he
had proposed. I have not seen the letters in print. His
correspondent was a gentleman in Louisiana, who claimed to be
a Union man. He tendered his advice to the President in regard
to the reorganization of that State, and he labored zealous]y
to impress upon him the dangers and evils of emancipation. The
reply of the President is only important from the fact that
when he came to that part of his correspondent's letter he
used this expression: 'You must not expect me to give up this
government without playing my last card.' Emancipation was his
last card. He waited for the time when two facts or events
should coincide. Mr. Lincoln was as devoted to the
Constitution as was ever Mr. Webster. In his view, a military
necessity was the only ground on which the overthrow of
slavery in the States could be justified. Next, he waited for
a public sentiment in the loyal States not only demanding
emancipation but giving full assurance that the act would be
sustained to the end. As for himself, I cannot doubt that he
had contemplated the policy of emancipation for many months,
and anticipated the time when he should adopt it."
_G. S. Boutwell,
Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by
Distinguished Men of his Time,
pages 123-125._
{3482}
"It was after all efforts for voluntary emancipation by the
states interested, with pecuniary aid from the national
treasury, had failed [that the President determined to decree
emancipation in the rebellious states by a military order]. To
Mr. Seward and myself the President communicated his purpose,
and asked our views, on the 13th of July 1862. It was the day
succeeding his last unsuccessful and hopeless conference with
the representatives in Congress from the border slave states,
at a gloomy period of our affairs, just after the reverses of
our armies under McClellan before Richmond. The time, be said,
had arrived when we must determine whether the slave element
should be for or against us. Mr. Seward … was appalled and not
prepared for this decisive step, when Mr. Lincoln made known
to us that he contemplated, by an executive order, to
emancipate the slaves. Startled with so broad and radical a
proposition, he informed the President that the consequences
of such an act were so momentous that he was not prepared to
advise on the subject without further reflection. … While Mr.
Seward hesitated and had the subject under consideration, the
President deliberately prepared his preliminary proclamation,
which met the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the
whole Cabinet, though there were phases of opinion not
entirely in accord with the proceedings. Mr. Blair, an
original emancipationist, and committed to the principle,
thought the time to issue the order inopportune, and Mr. Bates
desired that the deportation of the colored race should be
coincident with emancipation. Aware that there were shades of
difference among his counsellors, and hesitation and doubt
with some, in view of the vast responsibility and its
consequences, the President devised his own scheme, held
himself alone accountable for the act, and, unaided and
unassisted, prepared each of the proclamations of freedom."
_G. Welles,
Lincoln and Seward,
pages 210-212._
The preliminary or monitory Proclamation of Emancipation,
issued on the 22d of September, 1862, was as follows:
"'I. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of
America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof,
do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore,
the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically
restoring the constitutional relations between the United
States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which
States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That
it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again
recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering
pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the
slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in
rebellion against the United States, and which States may then
have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt,
the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their
respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of
African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or
elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the
governments existing there, will be continued. That on the
first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves
within any State, or designated part of a State, the people
whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States,
shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the
Executive Government of the United States, including the
military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or
acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts
they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive
will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation,
designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the
people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion
against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the
people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith
represented in the Congress of the United States by members
chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the
qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall,
in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed
conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof,
are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Then,
after reciting the language of 'An act to make an additional
article of war,' approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9
and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and
enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military
and naval service, the proclamation concludes: 'And I do
hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the
military and naval service of the United States to observe,
obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service,
the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will,
in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States,
who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the
rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional
relations between the United States and the people, if that
relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be
compensated for all losses by acts of the United States,
including the loss of slaves.'"
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 6, chapters 6 and 8._
ALSO IN:
_J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, chapter 20._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(September-October: Mississippi).
Union successes under Grant.
Iuka and Corinth.
"In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 17th of
that month Halleck was assigned to the command of all the
armies, superseding McClellan. He repaired at once to
Washington, and Grant was directed to establish his
headquarters at Corinth. Grant's jurisdiction was not,
however, enlarged by the promotion of Halleck: on the
contrary, the new general-in-chief first offered the command
of the Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Robert Allen, a
quarter-master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to
remain under Grant. He was, however, left somewhat more
independent than while Halleck had heen immediately present in
the field. Four divisions of his army (including Thomas's
command), were within the next two months ordered to Buell,
who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, unwieldy snake,
from Eastport to Decatur, and from Decatur towards
Chattanooga. This subtraction put Grant entirely on the
defensive. He had possession of Corinth, the strategic point,
but was obliged to hold the railroads from that place and
Bolivar, north to Columbus, which last, on account of the low
water in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. … He
remained himself eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the
enemy, who, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, harassed and
threatened him continually.
{3483}
During this time, he directed the strengthening and
remodelling of the fortifications of Corinth. … New works,
closer to the town, were … erected. … Van Dorn at last
determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of
Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee and
reënforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified
Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of his
intention to prevent it. … On the 13th [of September], Price
advanced from the south and seized Iuka, 21 miles east of
Corinth. … Grant had called in his forces some days before to
the vicinity of Corinth, had repeatedly cautioned all his
commanders to hold their troops in readiness, and when the
enemy's cavalry moved towards Iuka, and cut the railroad and
telegraph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven miles
to the westward, Grant began his operations. Price was at
Iuka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the southwest,
threatening Corinth. Grant's object was to destroy Price,
before the two could concentrate, and then to get back to
Corinth and protect it against Van Dorn. He accordingly
ordered Brigadier-General Rosecrans, whose troops were posted
south of Corinth, to move by way of Renzi, along the south
side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and attack Iuka
from that direction; while Major-General Ord, with a force
brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jackson, was to push
towards Burnsville, and from there take roads on the north
side of the railroad, attacking Iuka from that quarter. Ord
had 8,000 men, and Rosecrans reported 9,000, a greater force
combined than Price had, according to Grant's estimate."
Rosecrans's movement was delayed, and he was attacked
(September 19) in heavy force as he neared Iuka, Ord's advance
having been held back waiting for him. He kept his ground, but
lost in the action a battery of artillery, besides 736 men,
killed and wounded. That night the enemy retreated from Iuka,
over a road which Rosecrans was expected to occupy, but did
not. "By the battle of Iuka, the enemy was simply checked in
his plans, not seriously crippled in his force. Price moved
around by a circuitous route and joined Van Dorn, and the same
state of affairs continued which had annoyed Grant for so many
weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, and Ord at
Bolivar, and on the 23d of September removed his own
headquarters to Jackson, from which point he could communicate
more readily with all points of his district, including
Memphis and Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and
Ripley. … At last it was rendered certain … that Corinth was
to be the place of attack. Grant thereupon directed Rosecrans
to call in his forces, and sent Brigadier-General McPherson to
his support from Jackson, with a brigade of troops." He also
"hurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Pocahontas from Bolivar, 44
miles away, to be ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear,
as he advanced, and at least to create a diversion, if they
could not get into the town. On the 2d of October the rebel
array, under Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villepigue, and Rust,
appeared in front of Corinth. … On the 3d the fighting began
in earnest. Rosecrans had about 19,000 men, and the enemy had
collected 38,000 for this important movement, which was to
determine the possession of northern Mississippi and West
Tennessee. Rosecrans pushed out about five miles, towards
Chewalla, Grant having ordered him to attack, if opportunity
offered; but the enemy began the fight, and, on the afternoon
of the 3d, the battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rosecrans
was driven back to his defences on the north side of Corinth,
and it was now found how important was the labor bestowed on
these fortifications, by Grant's order, a month previous. The
enemy was checked until morning; but, early on the 4th, the
whole rebel army, flushed with the success of the day before,
assaulted the works. The fighting was fierce; the rebels
charging almost into the town, when an unexpected fire from
the forts drove them back in confusion. Again and again, they
advanced to the works, but each time were received with a
determination equal to their own. Once, the national troops
came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied them in
person, and the rebels were finally repulsed before noon, with
a loss admitted by themselves to be double that of Rosecrans.
The national loss was 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232
prisoners and missing. Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at
1,423, and took 2,225 prisoners. … The repulse was complete,
by 11 o'clock in the morning, but unfortunately was not
followed up by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels,
however, started off in haste and disorder immediately after
the fight; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were struck
in flank, as Grant had planned, by Hurlbut and Ord, and the
disaster was rendered final. This occurred early on the
morning of the 5th, at the crossing of the Hatchie river,
about ten miles from Corinth. … A battery of artillery and
several hundred men were captured, and the advance was
dispersed or drowned. … Had Rosecrans moved promptly the day
before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either
as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this
defile [six miles up the stream, where Van Dorn finally made
his crossing]. In either event, the destruction of the rebels
must have been complete. … These two fights relieved the
command of West Tennessee from all immediate danger."
_A. Badeau,
Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,
volume 1, chapter 4._
"Satisfied that the enemy was retreating [on the 4th], I
ordered Sullivan's command to push him with a heavy skirmish
line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the
lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and
fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required
rest, but that they could not rest longer than was absolutely
necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide
five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early
next morning for the pursuit."
_W. S. Rosecrans,
The Battle of Corinth
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2), page 753._
{3484}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(September-December: Missouri-Arkansas).
Social demoralizations of the Civil War.
Battle of Prairie Grove.
"The dispersion and suppression of the guerrilla bands [in
Missouri] did not serve wholly to terminate local disturbances
and offenses. The restraints of a common public opinion no longer
existed. Neighborhood good-will had become changed to
neighborhood hatred and feud. Men took advantage of the
license of war to settle personal grudges by all the
violations of law, varying from petty theft to assassination;
and parallel with this thirst for private revenge was the
cupidity which turned crime into a source of private gain. … A
rearrangement of military command appears in an order of the
President under date of September 19, 1862, directing that
Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and the bordering Indian Territory
should constitute a new department to be called the Department
of the Missouri, to be commanded by Major-General Samuel R.
Curtis. … This new arrangement served to change the relative
positions of Schofield and Curtis. The former, gathering what
troops he could, took the field in a campaign towards
Southwest Missouri to meet the expected invasion from
Arkansas, while the latter, recalled from a short leave of
absence, came to St. Louis (September 24, 1862) to take up his
headquarters and assume the general administration of the new
Department of the Missouri. … The difficulties in the military
situation had grown primarily out of the error of Halleck … in
postponing the opening of the Mississippi River. When, in the
spring and summer of 1862, Halleck abandoned all thought of
pursuing that prime and comprehensive object, and left
Vicksburg to grow up into an almost impregnable Confederate
citadel, he blighted the possibility of successful Union
campaigns on both sides of the great river. … From the
midsummer of 1862, therefore, until the fall of Vicksburg in
midsummer of 1863, military campaigning in the
trans-Mississippi country ceases to have any general
significance. … The only action of importance which marks the
military administration of Curtis was the battle of Prairie
Grove in the northwest corner of Arkansas, where on the 7th of
December the detachments respectively commanded by the Union
generals James G. Blunt (who had been hovering all summer
along the border of Kansas) and Francis J. Herron, who,
finding Blunt pressed by the enemy coming northward with a
view of entering Missouri, advanced by forced marches from
near Springfield and formed a junction with Blunt just in the
nick of time to defeat the Confederates under General Hindman.
The losses on each side were about equal, and on the day
following the engagement the Confederates retreated southward
across the protecting barrier of the Boston Mountains. It was
in a diminished degree a repetition of the battle of Pea
Ridge, fought in the preceding March within 20 or 30 miles of
the same place. … So effectually did this engagement serve to
scatter the rebel forces that Schofield reported January 31,
1863, 'There is no considerable force of the enemy north of
the Arkansas River; indeed I believe they have all gone or are
going, as rapidly as possible, to Vicksburg. Ten thousand
infantry and artillery can be spared from Southern Missouri
and Northern Arkansas.'"
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 6, chapter 18._
ALSO IN:
_W. Baxter,
Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove._
_O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
division 10, chapter 4 (volume 3)._
_W. Britton,
Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border,
chapter 1._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (October-December: Virginia).
The final removal of McClellan.
Burnside at Fredericksburg.
"Both armies … felt the need of some repose; and, glad to be
freed from each other's presence, they rested on their
arms—the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the
vicinity of Winchester, and the army of the Potomac near the
scene of its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and
vales of Southwestern Maryland. The movement from Washington
into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion was defensive in its
purpose, though it assumed the character of a
defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been
accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained
to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of
grand offensive operations directed at the Confederate army
and towards Richmond. The completion of this work, including
the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc.,
required upwards of a month, and during this period no
military movement occurred, with the exception of a raid into
Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that
enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers,
crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, passed through
Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg,
where he burnt considerable government stores, and after
making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the
Potomac below the mouth of the Monocacy. He was all the way
closely pursued by Pleasonton with 800 cavalry. … On the
recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan
hastened to seize the débouehé of the Shenandoah Valley, by
the possession of Harper's Ferry. … At first McClellan
contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the
Shenandoah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the
line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door
open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being
removed by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the
Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of
the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the
Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berlin, five miles below
Harper's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had crossed
at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he
masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge,
and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to
retain Jackson in the Valley. With such success was this
movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while
Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose
McClellan's advance in that direction, the other half was
still west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the
Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two
days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike
across obliquely westward and interpose between the severed
divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was
prevented from taking by his sudden removal from the command
of the Army of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton.
Late on the night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm,
General Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington,
reached the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He was
the bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to
General McClellan: … 'By direction of the President of the
United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be
relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that
Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.' … It
chanced that General Burnside was at the moment with him in
his tent.
{3485}
Opening the dispatch and reading it, without a change of
countenance or of voice, McClellan passed over the paper to
his successor, saying, as he did so: 'Well, Burnside, you are
to command the army.' Thus ended the career of McClellan as
head of the Army of the Potomac. … The moment chosen was an
inopportune and an ungracious one; for never had McClellan
acted with such vigor and rapidity-never had he shown so much
confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable
fact that not only was the whole body of the army—rank and
file as well his officers—enthusiastic in their affection for
his person, but that the very general appointed as his
successor was the strongest opponent of his removal."
_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 6, sections 2-3. _
"It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, and
our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates'; it is more
dangerous to change the plans of troops moving in the vicinity
of the enemy. But as if impelled to do some new thing … the
new commander of the Army of the Potomac determined upon a
flank movement by his left on the north of the river towards
Fredericksburg. … Only by movements equally wary and rapid, as
well as by sure means of crossing the river, could Burnside's
manœuvre possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on
Halleck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did
not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. Arrived at
Fredericksburg Burnside still might have crossed by the fords,
for the water was low. And once in possession of the heights
beyond the city he could afford to wait. But, slower than even
his predecessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north
side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his movement,
by forced marches concentrated his army on the opposite bank,
and prepared to erect impregnable defences in his front. …
Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, Marye's
Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been crowned by a triple
line of works, and Lee had brought together nearly 90,000
troops to man them. Two canals and a stone wall in front of
the left, as well as open, sloping ground on both flanks,
served to retain an attacking party for a long period under
fire. To assault these works in front was simple madness. To
turn them below necessitated the crossing of a wide and now
swollen river, in the face of a powerful enemy in his
immediate front. … To turn them above was practicable, but it
was a confessed return to McClellan's plan. Burnside chose the
first. Preparations foe crossing were begun. The better part
of three days [December 11-13] was consumed in throwing the
bridges and putting over the two Grand Divisions of Franklin
and Sumner, all of which was accomplished under fire. But Lee
was by no means unwilling to meet the Army of the Potomac
after this fashion. Such another happy prospect for him was
not apt soon again to occur. He did not dispute the crossing
in force. Burnside's one chance in a hundred lay in a
concentrated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy
could oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained
attack, or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered away
this single chance by putting in Franklin on the left and
Sumner on the right, without concerted action." Both assaults
were bloodily repulsed. "Hooker is ordered across. Under
protest, and yet Hooker lacked not stomach for a fight, he
obeys the useless order, and leads his men into the slaughter
pen. … All is in vain. Even the Army of the Potomac cannot do
the impossible. The defeated troops are huddled into
Fredericksburg, and gradually withdrawn across the river.
Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault next
day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him to
desist. No such useless slaughter, with the exception,
perhaps, of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and 13,000
men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but one in three of
ours."
_T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War,
chapter 21._
ALSO IN:
A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps,
part 2, chapters 4-8.
_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapters 5-6._
_B. P. Poore,
Life of Burnside,
chapters 18-19._
_Official Records,
series 1, volume 21._
_J. Longstreet,
D. N. Couch, and others,
Burnside at Fredericksburg,
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._
_F. W. Palfrey,
The Antietam and Fredericksburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5), pages 129-135._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (December: On the Mississippi).
The second attempt against Vicksburg.
General Sherman and Admiral Porter.
Miscarriage of Grant's plans.
"Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi squadron
in October, 1862. … Up to this time the gun-boats had,
strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army, but now
all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all
the other naval forces, was brought directly under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. … The new
arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to
undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in
the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy
Department. … Before Admiral Porter left Washington he was
informed by the President that General McClernand had been
ordered to raise an Army at Springfield, Illinois, to
prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. The President expressed the
hope that the rear-admiral would co-operate heartily with
General McClernand in the operations to be carried on. But as
Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on
General McClernand's raising an Army sufficient for the
purpose, the Admiral, immediately on his arrival at Cairo,
sent a message to General Grant, at Holly Springs,
Mississippi, informing him of McClernand's intention; that he,
Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and
was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where
the services of the Navy could be useful. A few days
afterwards General Grant arrived at Cairo and proposed an
expedition against Vicksburg, and asking the rear-admiral, if
he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats, to accompany
it. Grant's plan was to embark Sherman from Memphis, where he
then was, with 30,000 soldiers, to be joined at Helena,
Arkansas, by 10,000 more. Grant himself would march from Holly
Springs with some 60,000 men upon Granada. General Pemberton
would naturally march from Vicksburg to stop Grant at Granada,
until reinforcements could be thrown into Vicksburg from the
south, and while Pemberton was thus absent with the greater
part of his Army, Sherman and Porter could get possession of
the defences of Vicksburg.
{3486}
General Grant having been informed that the gun-boats would be
ready to move at short notice, and having sent orders to
Sherman to put his troops aboard the transports as soon as the
gun-boats arrived in Memphis, returned immediately to Holly
Springs to carry out his part of the programme. … The
expedition from Memphis got away early in December, 1862.
Commander Walke, in the 'Carondelet,' being sent ahead with
[three iron-clads and two so-called 'tin-clads'] … to clear
the Yazoo River of torpedoes and cover the landing of
Sherman's Army when it should arrive. This arduous and
perilous service was well performed," but one of the
iron-clads engaged in it, the Cairo, was sunk by a torpedo.
"General Sherman moved his transports to a point on the river
called Chickasaw Bayou without the loss of a man from
torpedoes or sharpshooters, his landing [December 27] being
covered in every direction by the gunboats. Sherman first made
a feint on Haines' Bluff, as if to attack the works, and then
landed at Chickasaw Bayou. Owing to the late heavy rains he
found the roads to Vicksburg heights almost impassable, and
when he attempted to advance with his Army he was headed off
by innumerable bayous, which had to be bridged, or corduroy
roads built around them. It was killing work. Even at this
time Vicksburg had been fortified at every point, and its only
approaches by land led through dense swamps or over boggy open
ground, where heavy guns were placed, so as to mow down an
advancing Army. A general has seldom had so difficult a task
assigned him, and there was little chance of Sherman's
succeeding unless Pemberton had drawn off nearly all his
forces to oppose Grant's advance on Granada. … Sherman and his
Army overcame everything and at last reached terra firma. In
the meanwhile the Navy was doing what it could to help the
Army. … Grant had left Holly Springs with a large Army at the
time he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing
Pemberton from Vicksburg and thus helping Sherman in his
attack on that place. … Grant moved towards Granada, and
everything looked well; but the Confederate General, Earl Van
Dorn, dashed into Holly Springs, 28 miles in the rear of the
Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores. At
the same time General Forrest pushed his cavalry into West
Tennessee, cutting the railroad to Columbus at several points
between that place and Jackson. … Due precautions had been
taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind
at Holly Springs, but the commanding officer was not on the
alert and his capture was a complete surprise. In this raid of
the Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were
destroyed. Under the circumstances it was impossible for Grant
to continue his march on Granada, which Pemberton perceiving,
the latter returned to Vicksburg in time to assist in
Sherman's repulse. … Sherman made all his arrangements to
attack the enemy's works on the 20th of December, 1862, and
the assault took place early on that day. One division
succeeded in occupying the batteries on the heights, and hoped
shortly to reach those commanding the city of Vicksburg, but
the division that was to follow the advance was behind time
and the opportunity was lost. A portion of Pemberton's Army
had returned from Granada just in time to overwhelm and drive
back the small force that had gained the hills. … The enemy
did not follow, being satisfied with driving our troops from
the heights, and there was nothing left for Sherman to do but
to get his Army safely back to the transports."
_D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the Civil War,
chapter 24._
ALSO IN:
_S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin,
Sherman and his Campaigns,
chapter 7._
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 11._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862-1863
(December-January: Tennessee).
Bragg and Rosecrans.
The Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough.
"The Confederate government was greatly disappointed with the
issue of Bragg's campaign. Scarcely had he reached Chattanooga
when he was ordered to move northward again. Rosecrans, on
assuming command of Buell's army, … concentrated his forces at
Nashville, and there accumulated large supplies. … Bragg had
already reached Murfreesborough on his second northward march
from Chattanooga. Rosecrans had given out that it was his
intention to take up his winter quarters at Nashville, and
Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent out strong
detachments of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest, the former
being ordered to break Rosecrans's communications. As it was
about the season of Christmas, Murfreesborough was the scene
of much gayety … and the giddy Confederates danced on floors
carpeted with the American flag. Suddenly, on the 26th of
December, Rosecrans moved. His march commenced in a heavy min.
The Confederate outposts retired before his advance, the
pressure upon them being so vigorous that they had not time to
destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesborough
turnpikes. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he was about to be
assailed, had concentrated his army a couple of miles in front
of Murfreesborough. The position of the national army, which
was 43,000 strong on the evening of that day, was on the west
side of Stone River, a sluggish stream fringed with cedar
brakes, and here flowing in a north-northwesterly course. The
line ranged nearly north and south, and was three or four
miles in length. Crittenden was on its left, with three
divisions. Wood, Vancleve, Palmer; Thomas in the centre, with
two divisions, Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve;
McCook on the right with three, Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The
left wing touched the river. … Bragg's army, 62,000, stood
between Rosecrans and Murfreesborough. … Breckinridge's
division formed his right, in his centre, under Polk, were two
divisions, those of Withers and Cheatham; on his left, under
Hardee, two divisions, Cleburne and McCown. The river
separated Breckinridge from the rest of the Confederate army.
Rosecrans had concentrated two thirds of his force on his
left. His intention was that his right wing, standing on the
defensive, should simply hold its ground; but his extreme
left, the divisions of Wood and Vancleve, crossing Stone
River, should assail Breckinridge's division, exposed there,
and seize the heights. … On his part, also, Bragg had
determined to take the offensive. … Both intended to strike
with the left, and therefore both massed their force on that
wing. … In the dawn of the last day of the year (1862), while
Rosecrans's left was rapidly crossing Stone River to make its
expected attack, Bragg, with his left, had already anticipated
him. Coming out of a fog which had settled on the
battle-field, he fell furiously upon Johnson's division, and
so unexpectedly that two of its batteries were taken before a
gun could be fired.
{3487}
The Confederate success was decisive. Johnson's division,
which was on the extreme national right, was instantly swept
away. Davis, who stood next, was assailed in front and on his
uncovered flank. He made a stout resistance, but the shock was
too great; he was compelled to give way, with the loss of many
guns. And now the triumphant Confederate left, the centre also
coming into play, rushed upon the next division—but that was
commanded by Sheridan. Rosecrans's aggressive movement was
already paralyzed; nay, more, it had to be abandoned. He had
to withdraw his left for the purpose of saving his right and
defending his communications. He must establish a new line.
The possibility of doing this—the fate of the battle—rested on
Sheridan." He held his ground for an hour, until "the
cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The time had come when
even Sheridan must fall back. But, if he had not powder, he
had steel. The fixed bayonets of his reserve brigade covered
him, and he retired, unconquered and unshaken, out of the
cedar thicket toward the Nashville road. In this memorable and
most glorious resistance he had lost 1,630 men. 'Here's all
that are left,' he said to Rosecrans, whom he had saved and
now met. After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was
nothing for Negley but to follow. … Meantime, on a knoll in
the plain to which these divisions had receded, Rosecrans had
massed his artillery. He was forming a new line, in which the
army would face southwestwardly, with the Nashville turnpike
on its rear." Against this new line the Confederates dashed
themselves, desperately but vainly, four times that day, and
were repelled with horrible slaughter. "Bragg, unwilling to be
foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been
untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on
Rosecrans's left flank with 7,000 fresh men. His first attack
was repulsed; he made a second; it shared the same fate. So
stood affairs when night came, … the closing night of 1862. On
New Year's Day nothing was done; the two armies, breathless
with their death-struggle, stood looking at each other. On
January 2d Rosecrans was found, not retreating, but busily
engaged in trying to carry out his original plan. He had made
his position impregnable; he had thrown a force across Stone
River, and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to
crown with artillery the heights beyond the east bank.
Hereupon Bragg brought Breckinridge back to his old position,
ordering him to drive the enemy across the river—a task which
that officer bravely tried, but only imperfectly accomplished,
for the artillery on the opposite bank tore his division to
pieces. In twenty minutes he lost 2,000 men. A violent storm
prevented the renewal of the battle on the 3d. On that night
Bragg, despairing of success, withdrew from Murfreesborough,
retreating to Tullahoma. … In these dreadful battles the
Confederates lost 14,700 men. On the national side there were
killed 1,553, wounded more than 7,000, prisoners more than
3,000; more than one third of its artillery and a large
portion of its train were taken. The losses were about one
fourth of each army. Henceforth the Confederates abandoned all
thought of crossing the Ohio River."
_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 53 (volume 2)._
"The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far—only behind
Duck River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma—and but little
endeavor was made to follow him. Indeed, we were not in
condition to pursue, even if it had been the intention at the
outset of the campaign. … The victory quieted the fears of the
West and Northwest, destroyed the hopes of the secession
element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping spirits of the East
Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in Middle
Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned
the result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have
planned the battle with the idea that the enemy would continue
passive, remain entirely on the defensive, and that it was
necessary only to push forward our left in order to force the
evacuation of Murfreesboro'. … Had Bragg followed up with the
spirit which characterized its beginning the successful attack
by Hardee on our right wing—and there seems no reason why he
should not have done so—the army of Rosecrans still might have
got back to Nashville, but it would have been depleted and
demoralized."
_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 12-14._
ALSO IN:
_A. F. Stevenson,
Battle of Stone's River._
_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapters 16-17 (volume 1)._
_Official Records,
series 1, volume 20._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January).
The final Proclamation of Emancipation.
The immediate practical effect of the warning Proclamation of
Emancipation issued by President Lincoln on the 22d of
September, 1862, "did, perhaps, more nearly answer the
apprehensions of the President than the expectations of those
most clamorous for it. It did, as charged, very much 'unite
the South and divide the North.' The cry of 'the perversion of
the war for the Union into a war for the negro' became the
Democratic watchword, and was sounded everywhere with only too
disastrous effect, as was plainly revealed by the fall
elections with their large Democratic gains and Republican
losses. Indeed, it was the opinion of Mr. Greeley that, could
there have been a vote taken at that time on the naked issue,
a large majority would have pronounced against emancipation.
But Mr. Lincoln did not falter. Notwithstanding these
discouraging votes at the North, and the refusal of any
Southern State to avail itself of the proffered immunity and
aid of his Proclamation of September, he proceeded, at the
close of the hundred days of grace allowed by it, to issue his
second and absolute Proclamation, making all the slaves of the
Rebel States and parts of States forever and irreversibly
free." It was in the following words:
"Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a
proclamation was issued by the President of the United States,
containing, among other things, the following, to wit: 'That
on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as
slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the
people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United
States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and
the Executive Government of the United States, including the
military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or
acts to repress such persons or any of them, in any efforts
they may make for their actual freedom.
{3488}
That the Executive will, on the first day of January
aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of
states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall
then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact
that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in
good faith represented in the Congress of the United States,
by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of
the qualified voters of such state shall have participated,
shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be
deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people
thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.'
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power in me vested as
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States,
in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and
government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary
war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first
day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so
to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred
days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate,
as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof
respectively are this day in rebellion against the United
States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana
(except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson,
St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre
Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including
the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except
the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also
the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth
City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of
Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the
present left precisely as if this proclamation were not
issued. And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose
aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as
slaves within said designated states and parts of states are
and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive
Government of the United States, including the military and
naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the
freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people
so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless
in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in
all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable
wages. And I further declare and make known that such persons
of suitable condition will be received into the armed service
of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations,
and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said
service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of
justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military
necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and
the gracious favor of Almighty God.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States
of America the eighty-seventh.
Abraham Lincoln.
By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."
"Though the immediate effects of the Proclamation might not
have answered all that was expected of it, it was not many
months before its happy influences became manifest. Its
tendency from the first was to unify and consolidate the
antislavery and Christian sentiment of the land, to give
dignity and consistency to the conflict. … It strengthened,
too, the cause immensely with other nations, secured the
sympathy and moral support of Christendom, and diminished, if
it did not entirely remove, the danger of foreign
intervention."
_H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power,
volume 3, chapter 28._
"Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed
emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under
his guidance as to render the conception practical and the
decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved
more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of
the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force,
leaguing liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home
and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history
we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its
vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision,
the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom."
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln.
volume 6, chapter 19._
ALSO IN:
_O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
division 10, chapter 9 (volume 3)._
_W. P. and F. J. Garrison,
William Lloyd Garrison,
volume 4. chapters 3-4._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January: Arkansas).
The capture of Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman.
Sherman withdrew his troops from the attempt against Vicksburg
on the 2d of January, and on the 4th he relinquished the
command to General McClernand, who had come down the river
with orders to assume it. On that same day "the expedition
sailed on the same transports that had brought them from
Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to
attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old
French settlement situated on the left or north bank of the
Arkansas River, 50 miles from its mouth and 117 below Little
Rock. … The expedition moved up the White River through the
cut-off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up
the latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort
Hindman. … By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and
the troops were on the march to invest the post. … The
gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the
afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops
were in position." Next morning a combined attack began, which
the garrison endured until 4 o'clock P. M. when the white flag
was raised. "Our entire loss in killed was 129; in wounded,
831; and in missing, 17; total, 977. … By the surrender there
fell into our hands 5,000 men. … After sending the prisoners
to St. Louis, having destroyed the defences and all buildings
used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops
re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon,
Arkansas, whence on the 17th … they returned to Milliken's
Bend."
_S. M. Bowman and R B. Irwin,
Sherman and his Campaigns,
chapters 7-8._
{3489}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January-April: Virginia).
Command given to Hooker.
President Lincoln's Letter to him.
Demoralized state of the Army of the Potomac,
and its improvement.
"General Burnside retired from a position he had never sought,
to the satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the
warm personal regard of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years
had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was relieved at
his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became
senior general officer, and succeeded to the command. No man
enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac.
… His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank,
manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in
constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his
appearance always attracted attention; and he was as well
known to almost every regiment as its own commander. He was a
representative man. … Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot
in Hooker's character than the odd pride he took in Mr.
Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at the time of his
appointment: … 'I have placed you [wrote the President] at the
head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this
upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I
think it best for you to know that there are some things in
regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe
you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like.
I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession,
in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself; which
is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are
ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather
than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command
of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition and
thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great
wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable
brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it,
of your recently saying that both the army and the Government
needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in
spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those
generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask
of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.
The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability,
which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do for
all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to
infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and
withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I
shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you
nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out
of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware
of rashness! Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless
vigilance go forward, and give us victories!' … Hooker was
appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest
words, took leave of the army. The troops received their new
chief with a heartiness and confidence which, since
McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker was
to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of
this weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary
changes he at once began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the
power of organization—were accepted with alacrity; and a
spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded speedily to what had
been almost a defiant obedience. The army was in a lamentably
low state of efficiency. Politics mingled with camp duties;
and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with an
entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the
Potomac to accomplish anything, were pronounced. Desertions
occurred at the rate of 200 a day. … Hooker states that he
found 2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as
absent on the rolls of the army, a large proportion from
causes unknown. Sharp and efficient measures were at once
adopted, which speedily checked this alarming depletion of the
ranks. … The testimony of all general officers of the Army of
the Potomac concurs in awarding the highest praise to Hooker
for the manner in which he improved the condition of the
troops during the three months he was in command prior to
Chancellorsville. … On the 30th of April the Army of the
Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, consisted of about
130,000 men under the colors,—'for duty equipped,' according
to the morning report. … While the Army of the Potomac lay
about Falmouth [opposite Fredericksburg], awaiting orders to
move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from
Banks's Ford above to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck), below
Fredericksburg, a line some 15 miles in length as the crow
flies. … Lee's forces numbered about 60,000 men, for duty."
_T. A. Dodge,
The Campaign of Chancellorsville,
chapters 3-4._
ALSO IN:
_F. A. Walker,
History of the 2nd Army Corps,
chapter 7._
_R. De Trobriand,
Four Years with the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 20._
[Image: Map of Vicksburg and Vicinity.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(January-April: On the Mississippi).
Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg.
Futile operations of the first four months.
"General Grant took personal command of the movement against
Vicksburg on the 30th of January, 1863. … The first plan made
was to dig a canal across the neck of land, or peninsula in
front of Vicksburg,—below the city,—at a point where the
isthmus was only a mile and a fifth in width. This had been
begun before General Grant's arrival. If a canal could have
been made large enough for large steamboats, then no matter
how strong were the fortifications of Vicksburg, the boats
would pass through, far away from their fire. So a canal ten
feet wide and six deep was made here, in the hope that the
freshets of the river would widen it, and so make it large
enough for large steamers. But very little came of the canal.
When the river did rise, it would not flow where it was meant
to do. It flooded the camps of the workmen. Meanwhile the
Rebels had made new batteries below it. Thus ended plan number
one. Another similar plan, to open a route by Lake Providence
and Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Washita and Red River,
did not succeed better. The canals attempted here were both on
the west of the river. A very bold attempt was made on the
east side, by what was known as the Yazoo Pass, into the
Tallahatchee and Yazoo River. The expeditions sent out by this
route would come out above Vicksburg; but it was hoped that
thus the Rebel gunboats on the Yazoo River might be destroyed.
If a practicable route were made here, the whole army could be
moved to Haine's Bluff,—above Vicksburg,—an upland region very
desirable for occupation.
{3491}
But nothing came of this movement, though some hard work and
some hard fighting were done in it. What resulted of
importance was, that the troops found their way into the
granary from which Vicksburg had been fed; and in the
resistance, many of the Rebels were destroyed. In such
attempts February and March passed away. Meanwhile Admiral
Farragut, of the navy, ran by the Rebel batteries at Port
Hudson, so that he communicated with Grant below
Vicksburg,—and Grant could communicate with General Banks, who
was trying to do at Port Hudson what Grant was trying to do
above. The distance from Vicksburg to Port Hudson is about 120
miles in a straight line, and more than twice that by the
crooked river. Grant now determined to pass the city of
Vicksburg on the west side of the river by marching his army
by land—with the help of boats on some bayous if possible—from
Milliken's Bend, which is twenty miles above Vicksburg, to New
Carthage, which is about as far below. At his request Admiral
Porter sent seven of his iron-clads, with three steamers and
ten barges, down the river, past the Rebel batteries. They
were well laden with forage and supplies. The crews of all but
one refused to go. But volunteers from the army offered,
enough to man a hundred vessels had they been needed. On a
dark night of the 16th of April, led by Admiral Porter, they
steamed down, with the barges in tow. They turned the bend
without being noticed. Then the first batteries opened on
them. The Rebels set fire to houses so as to light up the
scene; and from the ships the crews could see the men at the
batteries and in the streets of Vicksburg. Though every vessel
was hit, all got by, except the Henry Clay steamer. Finding
she was sinking, her commander cut off the barge he was
towing, which drifted safely down, and, soon after, the vessel
herself took fire. The crew escaped in their boats,—the vessel
blazed up and lighted up all around. At last, however, after
the boats had been under fire two hours and forty minutes, the
whole fleet except the Henry Clay arrived safely below the
batteries. Grant had thus secured, not only forage and stores,
but the means of transportation. On the 26th of April five
more vessels passed successfully, one being lost as before.
Grant was now strong enough to cross the Mississippi River.
His army had to march seventy miles on the west side by muddy
roads, scarcely above the river line. He feared he might have
to go as far down as a little town called Rodney for a good
landing-place on the east side. But a friendly negro man, who
knew the country, brought in information that there was a good
road inland from Bruinsburg,—and so it proved. Grand Gulf, on
the river, where the Rebels had a post, was still between
Grant and Bruinsburg. Porter attacked it with his gunboats,
and Grant was ready to land 10,000 troops to storm the place
if the batteries were silenced. But Porter did not succeed.
Grant therefore marched his troops down on the west side of
the river. Porter ran by Grand Gulf with transports in the
night, and, on the morning of the 30th of April, Grant crossed
the river with 10,000 men. They did not carry a tent nor a
wagon. General Grant and his staff went without their horses.
It was said afterwards that his whole baggage was a
toothbrush! Other divisions followed, and on the 3d of May he
left the river, and marched, not directly on Vicksburg, but
more inland, to cut off all communication with that city. His
army took three days' rations with them, and relied
principally for provisions on the stores in the rich country
through which they marched."
_E. E. Hale,
Stories of War told by Soldiers,
chapter 7._
ALSO IN:
_F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 4._
_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 31-32._
_G. W. Brown,
The Mississippi Squadron and the Siege of Vicksburg
(Personal Recollections of the War:
New York Com. L. L. of the United States)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D.1863(February-April: Tennessee).
Engagements at Dover and Franklin.
"In February [on the 3d], General Wheeler, Bragg's chief of
Cavalry, tried to capture Fort Donaldson, so as to stop the
navigation of the Cumberland River, by which some of
Rosecrans's supplies came in steamboats to Nashville. The fort
had not been repaired after its capture by Grant, but the
Village of Dover near it had been fortified, and it was then
held by Colonel A. C. Harding with about 600 men. The Union
men fought bravely, and in the evening the gunboat Fair Play
came up and opened a fire on the Confederates which drove them
away in confusion, with a loss of more than 500 men. Harding's
loss was 126. Early in March, General Van Dorn appeared near
Franklin [a little below Nashville] with a large force of
mounted men. Colonel Colburn, of the 33d Indiana, moved
Southward from Franklin with 2,700 men. Van Dorn and Forrest
met him, and after a fight of several hours [March 5] Colburn
had to surrender with 1,300 of his men."
_J. D. Champlin, Jr.,
Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,
chapter 31._
"Sheridan, with his division, and about 1,800 cavalry, under
Colonel Minty, first swept down toward Shelbyville, and then
around toward Franklin, skirmishing in several places with
detachments of Van Dorn's and Forrest's men. In a sharp fight
at Thompson's Station, he captured some of the force which
encountered Colburn. He finally drove Van Dorn beyond the Duck
River, and then returned to Murfreesboro', with a loss during
his ten days' ride and skirmishing of only five men killed and
five wounded. His gain was nearly 100 prisoners. On the 18th
of March, Colonel A. S. Hall, with a little over 1,400 men,
moved eastward from Murfreesboro' to surprise a Confederate
camp at Gainesville. He was unexpectedly met by some of
Morgan's cavalry, when he fell back to Milton, twelve miles
northeast of Murfreesboro' and took a strong position on
Vaught's Hill. There he was attacked by 2,000 men, led by
Morgan in person. With the aid of Harris's Battery skilfully
worked, Hall repulsed the foe after a struggle of about three
hours. Morgan lost between 300 and 400 men killed and wounded.
Among the latter was himself. Hall's loss was 55 men, of whom
only 6 were killed. Early in April, General Granger, then in
command at Franklin, with nearly 5,000 troops, was satisfied
that a heavy force under Van Dorn was about to attack him. He
was then constructing a fort (which afterwards bore his name),
but only two siege-guns and two rifled cannon, belonging to an
Ohio battery, were mounted upon it.
{3492}
The fort … completely commanded the approaches to Franklin. …
On the 10th, Van Dorn, with an estimated force of 9,000
mounted men and two regiments of foot, pressed rapidly forward
along the Columbia and Lewisburg turnpikes, and fell upon
Granger's front. The guns from the fort opened destructively
upon the assailants, and their attack was manfully met by
Granger's troops. Van Dorn soon found himself in a perilous
situation, for Stanley [commanding cavalry] came up and struck
him a heavy blow on the flank. Smith [with cavalry] was
ordered forward to support Stanley, and Baird's troops
were_thrown across the river to engage in the fight. The
Confederates were routed at all points on Granger's front,
with a heavy Joss in killed and wounded, and about 500
prisoners. Van Dorn then turned his whole force upon Stanley
before Smith reached him, and with his overwhelming numbers
pushed him back and recovered most of the captured men. By
this means Van Dorn extricated himself from his perilous
position, and, abandoning his attempt to capture Franklin, he
retired to Spring Hill, with a loss of about three hundred men
in killed, wounded and prisoners. The Union loss was about 37
killed, wounded and missing."
_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 3, chapter 4._
ALSO IN:
_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapter 18, (volume 1)._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 23._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (March).
The Conscription Act.
"The Rebel Congress having long since passed [April 16, 1862]
a conscription act whereby all the "White males in the
Confederacy between the ages of 18 and 35 were placed at the
disposal of their Executive, while all those already in the
service, though they had enlisted and been accepted for
specific terms of one or two years, were held to serve through
the war, our Congress was constrained to follow afar off in
the footsteps of the enemy; since our ranks, [after] our heavy
losses in the bloody struggles of 1862, were filled by
volunteers too slowly for the exigencies of the service. The
act providing 'for the enrollment of the National forces' was
among the last passed [March 3, 1863] by the XXXVIIth Congress
prior to its dissolution. It provided for the enrollment, by
Federal provost-marshals and enrolling officers, of all
able-bodied male citizens (not Whites only), including aliens
who had declared their intention to become naturalized,
between the ages of 18 and 45—those between 20 and 35 to
constitute the first class; all others the second class—from
which the President was authorized, from and after July 1, to
make drafts at his discretion of persons to serve in the
National armies for not more than three years; anyone drafted
and not reporting for service to be considered and treated as
a deserter. A commutation of $300 was to be received in lieu
of such service: and there were exemptions provided of certain
heads of Executive Departments; Federal judges; Governors of
States; the only son of a widow, or of an aged and infirm
father, dependent on that son's labor for support; the father
of dependent motherless children under 12 years of age, or the
only adult brother of such children, being orphans; or the
residue of a family which has already two members in the
service, &c., &c. The passage and execution of this act
inevitably intensified and made active the spirit of
opposition to the War. Those who detested every form of
'coercion' save the coercion of the Republic by the Rebels,
with those who especially detested the National effort under
its present aspects as 'a war not for the Union, but for the
Negro,' were aroused by it to a more determined and active
opposition. The bill passed the House by Yeas 115, Nays 49—the
division being so nearly as might be, a party one—while in the
Senate a motion by Mr. Bayard that it be indefinitely
postponed was supported by 11 Yeas (all Democrats) to 35 Nays:
consisting of every Republican present, with Messrs.
McDougall, of California, Harding and Nesmith of Oregon. The
bill then passed without a call of the Yeas and Nays."
_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 21._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April: South Carolina).
The naval attack on Charleston.
Repulse of the Monitors.
"The engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned
had given to the government and the public a high opinion of
their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if
nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no
projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets. It was
supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty
force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its
numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its
surrender. … On the 7th of April [1863] Admiral Dupont made
the experiment. He had seven Ericsson Monitors, the frigate
Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the
Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the
Monitors. His intention was to disregard the batteries on
Morris's Island, attack the northwest face of Sumter, and
force his way up to the city. His fleet had 32 guns; the
opposing forts, in the aggregate, 300. At noon on that day the
signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, a Monitor,
took the lead. She had a raft-like contrivance attached to her
bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding
torpedoes. This occasioned some delay at the outset, through
its interference with her movements. On her way up she
exploded a torpedo, which, though it lifted her a little, did
no damage. At 2.10 P, M. she encountered obstructions
extending across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter;
beyond these, piles were seen extending from James's Island to
the Middle Ground. At 2.50 P. M. the guns of Fort Moultrie
opened upon her, followed shortly after by all the batteries
on Sullivan's Island, Morris's Island, and Fort Sumter. Not
being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and
subsequently other Monitors, the Passaic, Nahant, etc., were
obliged to turn, which threw the line into confusion, as the
other vessels, advancing, approached. This was particularly
the case with the flag-ship Ironsides, which became entangled
with the Monitors, and could not bring her batteries to bear
upon Fort Sumter without risk of firing into them; she was
obliged, on her way up, to anchor twice to avoid going ashore,
on one of these occasions in consequence of having come into
collision with two of the Monitors. The plan of the
Confederates was, by means of obstructions, to detain the
ships, while a concentrated fire was poured upon them in this
the 'first circle,' as it was termed.
{3493}
Two other still more powerful circles of fire must be passed
before the city could be reached. While in the centre of the
first circle, it was apparent that the Monitors were at a
fearful disadvantage. The forts and earth-works were armed
with heavy guns of the best construction. No ship was exposed
to the severest fire of the enemy for more than forty minutes,
yet in that brief period time of the ironclads were wholly or
partially disabled. In these forty minutes the battle was
substantially over, the question settled. The Keokuk was
struck 99 times, of which 19 were under her water-line. She
was in a sinking condition. She had been able to return only
three shots. The Passaic was struck 27 times; her turret was
jammed, and could not for some time be turned. The Nahant was
most seriously damaged; her turret was jammed, her captain
wounded, her quarter-master killed by a bolt which flew off
and struck him on the head. Many of the bolts of both turret
and pilot-house were thus broken; the latter became nearly
untenable in consequence of the nuts and ends flying across
it. All the other Monitors had received damages more or less
severe. The mailed frigate Ironsides had lost one port
shutter, her bow was penetrated by a red-hot shot. The damage
inflicted on Fort Sumter was comparatively insignificant. It
was Dupont's belief that, had the iron-clads been in action
half an hour longer, they would all have been disabled. 'To my
regret,' he says, 'I soon became convinced of the utter
impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force
under my command.' … The iron-clad fleet had therefore been
unable to pass the first line of obstructions, or to get out
of 'the first circle of fire.' The slowness of its fire was no
match for the rapidity and weight of that of the forts. The
iron-clads were able to fire only 139 times from the 14 guns
they could bring into action; the forts, from 76 guns, fired
2,209 times. The projectiles they used were wrought-iron
bolts, some of them tipped with steel, solid shot, shells, of
which 40 were filled with melted cast-iron, others with
incendiary composition. The total amount of cannon-powder used
by the forts was 21,093 pounds. The government, thus satisfied
that its iron-clad fleet was insufficient for the forcing of
Charleston Harbor and the capture of the city, now changed its
purposes, restricting its attempts to a more complete
blockade, the detention of a large confederate force in the
vicinity by continually threatening military operations, and
the destruction of Fort Sumter for the sake of a moral
effect."
_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 72 (volume 3)._
ALSO IN:
_D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the War,
chapter 33._
_C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
volume 2, chapter 33._
_W. C. Church,
Life of Ericsson,
chapter 21 (volume 2)._
_A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
chapter 30 (volume 2)._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 14._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Virginia).
Hooker's disastrous movement.
Chancellorsville.
Stonewall Jackson's last flank movement.
"Being now [April 28] fully prepared for active operations,
Hooker determined to take the initiative by moving on the left
of his opponent's position. By careful study of Lee's position
he correctly concluded that his left was his most vulnerable
point. In order to mask his real design he sent forward a
force of 10,000 cavalry under General Stoneman to operate upon
Lee's lines of communication with Richmond, and sent Sedgwick
with a force of 30,000 men still further to mask his movement.
Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th,
and Sedgwick appeared on the 28th on the heights below
Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken,
Hooker proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton, after
a picturesque description of the passage of the Rappahannock
and the Rapidan, tells us 'that on the afternoon of the 30th
of April four corps of the Federal army had gained the
position of Chancellorsville, where Hooker at the same time
established his headquarters.' Chancellorsville is situated
ten miles southwest of Fredericksburg. It is not, as its name
implies, a town or village, but simply a farm-house with its
usual appendages, situated at the edge of a small field
surrounded by a dense thicket of second growth, which sprang
up after the primeval forest had been cut to furnish fuel to a
neighboring furnace. This thicket extends for miles in every
direction, and its wild aspect very properly suggests its
name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important
roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while in
reality a more unfavorable place for military operations could
not well be found. Hooker, however, seemed well pleased with
his acquisition, for on reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday
night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced
that 'the enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from
behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground,
where certain destruction awaits him.' … General Lee was fully
aware of the preparations that were being made by his
adversary, but calmly awaited the complete development of his
plans before exerting his strength to oppose him. … On the
28th … Lee ordered Jackson to concentrate his whole corps in
the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg. Early on the morning
of the 29th Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below the mouth
of Deep Run, but made no other aggressive movement on that day
or the day following. On the night of the 30th, Lee was
informed of Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. He had been
previously informed of Stoneman's movements against his line
of operations by General Stuart, and was now satisfied that
the main attack of the enemy would come from the direction of
Chancellorsville. Therefore on the morning of the 1st of May
he made the necessary preparations to meet it. Accompanied by
his staff, he took a position on a height where one of his
batteries overlooked the Rappahannock. He there observed
carefully the position of Sedgwick, while waiting for
information from the direction of Chancellorsville. … Very
soon the sound of cannon indicated that the work had begun. At
the same time couriers arrived from Stuart and Anderson
informing the general that the enemy were advancing on the old
turnpike, the plank road, and on the river roads, and asking
for reinforcements. McLaws was immediately ordered to the
support of Anderson, and shortly after Jackson was ordered to
follow with three of his divisions, leaving … a force of about
9,000 men and 45 pieces of artillery in observation of
Sedgwick. When Jackson joined McLaws and Anderson a lively
skirmish was in progress, in which he immediately
participated.
{3494}
When General Lee arrived he found the Federals were being
driven back to Chancellorsville. At the close of the afternoon
they had retired within their lines. General Lee occupied the
ridge about three-quarters of a mile south-east and south of
Chancellorsville. The opposing armies were hidden from each
other by the intervening thicket of brushwood. … It was
obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be
attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore Lee
proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker
might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no
danger was apprehended by the Federal commander. … The
execution of a movement so much in accordance with his genius
and inclination was assigned to General Jackson. … At dawn on
the morning of the 2d, Jackson's corps, 22,000 strong, was in
motion, and while it was making one of the most famous flank
movements on record, General Lee, with the divisions of
Anderson and McLaws, with 20 pieces of artillery, a force not
exceeding 12,000 men, occupied the position he had assumed the
previous evening, and General Hooker, with 90,000 men, lay
behind his breastworks awaiting the Confederate attack. …
After making a circuitous march of 15 miles, Jackson reached a
point on the Orange Courthouse road three miles in the rear of
Chancellorsville. Had Hooker possessed a handful of cavalry
equal in spirit to the 'Virginia horsemen' under W. H. F. Lee
that neutralized Stoneman's ten thousand, he might have
escaped the peril that now awaited him. On the arrival of
Jackson on the plank road, Fitz Lee, who had covered his
movement with his brigade of cavalry, conducted him to a
position from which he obtained a view of the enemy, which
disclosed the following scene: 'Below and but a few hundred
yards distant ran the Federal line of battle. There was the
line of defence, with abatis in front, and long lines of
stacked arms in rear. … The soldiers were in groups in the
rear, laughing, chatting, and smoking, probably engaged here
and there in games of cards and other amusements indulged in
while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In the
rear of them were other parties driving up and butchering
beeves.' Returning from this point of observation, Jackson
proceeded to make his dispositions of attack, which by six
o'clock were completed. … Howard's corps was first assailed.
This corps, being surprised, was panic-stricken and fled
precipitately, and in its flight communicated the panic to the
troops through which it passed. Jackson's forces followed,
routing line after line, until arrested by the close of day.
The rout of the Federal army was fast becoming general, and it
was only saved from entire defeat by the interposition of
night. When compelled to halt Jackson remarked that with one
more hour of daylight he could have completed the destruction
of the Federal army. This, the most famous of all Jackson's
brilliant achievements, closed his military career. After his
troops had halted, and while the lines were being adjusted, he
rode forward with several of his staff to reconnoitre the
Federal position." The party were mistaken by some of their
own men for Federal horsemen and received a volley which
struck down Stonewall Jackson. He was wounded in both arms by
three bullets, and died from the effects eight days afterward.
"Early on the morning of the 3d the attack was resumed by the
Confederates with great vigor. Hooker, taking advantage of the
night, had restored order in his army and strengthened his
position; his troops regained courage and contested the field
with great stubbornness until ten o'clock when they yielded at
every point and rapidly retreated … within the strong line of
defences which had been previously constructed to cover the
road to the United States Ford. … While the operations above
described were in progress at Chancellorsville, General Early,
by skilful manœuvring, had detained Sedgwick at Fredericksburg
until the 3d, when that general, by a determined advance,
forced back Early, carried Marye's Heights, and proceeded
toward Chancellorsville. The condition of affairs was
communicated to General Lee during the fore·noon. Wilcox's
brigade, then at Banks's Ford, was ordered to intercept
Sedgwick and retard his advance, while McLaws's division was
ordered to support him. Wilcox on reaching Salem Church, six
miles from Chancellorsville, encountered the Federal advance,
and after a sharp conflict he repulsed it with loss. The
success of Wilcox delayed Sedgwick until Anderson and McLaws
could come up. The premeditated attack on Hooker being thus
interrupted, Lee, on the forenoon of the 4th, repaired to the
neighborhood of Fredericksburg. A combined attack was then
directed to be made by Early on the rear, while McLaws and
Anderson bore down upon the front. The battle was hotly
contested during the afternoon, in which the forces of
Sedgwick were defeated, and were only saved from destruction
by a night-passage across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford. On
the 5th Lee collected his forces at Chancellorsville to give
the 'coup de grace' to Hooker, but that general, under cover
of a dark and stormy night, effected his retreat beyond the
Rappahannock at the United States Ford."
_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 14._
The Federal loss at Chancellorsville, in killed and wounded,
was 12,197; missing 5,000; total, 17,197. Confederate loss,
killed and wounded, 10,266; missing 2,753; total, 13,019.
_A. Doubleday,
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6), chapter 8._
ALSO IN:
_T. A. Dodge,
Campaign of Chancellorsville._
_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 8._
_D. N. Couch, O. O. Howard, and others,
Chancellorsville
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 4._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 25._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Mississippi).
Grierson's Raid.
Reporting to headquarters at Washington, on the 5th of May,
1863, General Hurlbut, commanding at Memphis, Tennessee, said:
"As the spring opened, I was daily more and more impressed
with the feasibility of a plan, long entertained, of pushing a
flying column of cavalry through the length of Mississippi,
cutting the Southern Railroad. By consent and approval of
General Grant, I prepared a system of movements along my
entire line from Memphis to Corinth for the purpose of
covering this cavalry dash. At the same time General Rosecrans
proposed to me to cover a movement of 1,800 cavalry from
Tuscumbia down into Alabama and Georgia.
{3495}
This did not interfere with my plan, but simply required extra
force to be developed from Corinth. Delays incident to
combined movements, especially from separate commands, kept
his expeditionary column back for six days. I commenced the
movement from Corinth on the 15th [April]. … On the 17th,
Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, with his own
regiment, the Seventh Illinois, and Second Iowa, moved from La
Grange, by way of Pontotoc, with orders, after passing
Pontotoc, to proceed straight down, throwing one regiment to
the left toward Okolona, and to push for and destroy the
Chunkey River Bridge and any others they could reach, and
either return, or proceed to Baton Rouge, as might be found
advisable. On the same day, April 17, a column of infantry
1,500 strong, and one battery, moved by railroad from La
Grange to Coldwater, with orders to push rapidly between
Coldwater and the Tallahatchee, and take Chalmers in flank and
rear while attacked in front by three regiments, a battery,
and 200 cavalry from Memphis, which left here on the 18th. I
considered that the effect of these movements would be to
puzzle the enemy and withdraw his force from the central line,
which has proven to be correct. … Grierson, on the 19th,
detached the Second Iowa below Pontotoc, which fought its way
gallantly back to La Grange and came home well mounted. The
main cavalry column (Sixth and Seventh Illinois) proceeded,
without loss or engagement, to Newton, on the Southern
Mississippi Railroad, and there destroyed bridges." Colonel
Grierson, in his own full report of the remarkable expedition
thus set on foot, after narrating the proceedings of his
command until it struck Newton Station, on the 24th of April,
continues: "From captured mails and information obtained by my
scouts, I knew that large forces had been sent out to
intercept our return, and having instructions from
Major-General Hurlbut and Brigadier-General Smith to move in
any direction from this point which, in my judgment, would be
best for the safety of my command and the success of the
expedition, I at once decided to move south, in order to
secure the necessary rest and food for men and horses, and
then return to La Grange through Alabama, or make for Baton
Rouge, as I might hereafter deem best. … After resting about
three hours, we moved south to Garlandville. At this point we
found the citizens, many of them venerable with age, armed
with shot-guns and organized to resist our approach. As the
advance entered the town, these citizens fired upon them and
wounded one of our men. We charged upon them and captured
several. After disarming them, we showed them the folly of
their actions, and released them. Without an exception they
acknowledged their mistake, and declared that they had been
grossly deceived as to our real character. One volunteered his
services as guide, and upon leaving us declared that hereafter
his prayers should be for the Union Army. I mention this as a
sample of the feeling which exists, and the good effect which
our presence produced among the people in the country through
which we passed. Hundreds who are skulking and hiding out to
avoid conscription, only await the presence of our arms to
sustain them, when they will rise up and declare their
principles; and thousands who have been deceived, upon the
vindication of our cause would immediately return to loyalty."
It was not until the 2d of May that Grierson and his small
force reached the Union lines at Baton Rouge. The total
accomplishments of the expedition—aside from the important
revelation it made of the condition of things in that region
of the Confederacy—are summed up in the Colonel's report as
follows: "During the expedition we killed and wounded about
100 of the enemy, captured and paroled over 500 prisoners,
many of them officers, destroyed between 50 and 60 miles of
railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over 3,000
stand of arms, and other army stores and Government property
to an immense amount; we also captured 1,000 horses and mules.
Our loss during the entire journey was 3 killed, 7 wounded, 5
left on the route sick; the sergeant-major and surgeon of the
Seventh Illinois left with Lieutenant-Colonel Blackburn, and 9
men missing, supposed to have straggled. We marched over 600
miles in less than sixteen days. The last twenty-eight hours
we marched 76 miles, had four engagements with the enemy, and
forded the Comite River, which was deep enough to swim many of
the horses. During this time the men and horses were without
food or rest. Much of the country through which we passed was
almost entirely destitute of forage and provisions, and it was
but seldom that we obtained over one meal per day. Many of the
inhabitants must undoubtedly suffer for want of the
necessaries of life, which have reached most fabulous prices."
_Official Records,
series 1, volume 24, part 1, pages 520-529._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(April-July: On the Mississippi).
Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg.
The final operations.
His personal account of the siege and capture.
"April 30th was spent in transporting troops across the river
[to Bruinsburg]. The troops were moved out towards Port Gibson
as fast as they were landed. On the 1st of May the advance met
the enemy under Bowen about four miles west of Port Gibson,
where quite a severe battle was fought, resulting in the
defeat of the enemy, who were driven from the field. On May 2d
our troops moved into Port Gibson, and, finding that the
bridges over Bayou Pierre were destroyed, spent the balance of
the day in rebuilding and crossing them, and marching to the
North Fork, where we encamped for the night. During the night
we rebuilt the bridge across the North Fork, which had also
been destroyed, and the next day (the 3d) pushed on, and,
after considerable skirmishing, reached the Big Black, near
Hankinson's Ferry, and the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. … Here I
[General Grant] … received a letter from Banks stating that he
could not be at Port Hudson [which Grant had intended to join
Banks in attacking, before he turned against Vicksburg] for
some days, and then, with an army of only 15,000 men. As I did
not regard this force of as much value as the time which would
be lost in waiting for it, I determined to move on to
Vicksburg. The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May were spent in
reconnoitering towards Vicksburg, and also in crossing
Sherman's troops over to Grand Gulf. On the 7th, Sherman
having joined the main body of the army, the troops across the
Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement was commenced to
get in position on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad so as to
attack Vicksburg from the rear. This occupied the army from the
7th to the 12th, when our position was near Fourteen Mile
creek, Raymond being our right flank, our left resting on the
Big Black.
{3496}
To obtain this position we fought the battle of Raymond, where
Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps defeated
the Confederates under General Gregg, driving him back on
Jackson; Sherman and McClernand both having some skirmishing
where they crossed Fourteen Mile creek. As the army under
Pemberton was on my left flank, and that under General Joseph
E. Johnston on my right at Jackson, I determined to move the
army rapidly on Jackson, capturing and destroying that place
as a military depot; then turn west and destroy the army under
Pemberton, or drive it back into Vicksburg. The 13th was spent
in making the first of these moves. On the 14th Jackson was
attacked with Sherman's and McPherson's corps. The place was
taken, and all supplies that could be of service to the enemy
were destroyed, as well as the railroad bridge. On the 15th
the troops were faced to the west and marched towards
Pemberton, who was near Edwards's Station. The next day, the
16th, we met the enemy at Champion's Hill, and, after a
hard-fought battle, defeated and drove him back towards
Vicksburg, capturing 18 guns and nearly 3,000 men. This was
the hardest-fought battle of the campaign. On the 17th we
reached the Big Black, where we found the enemy intrenched.
After a battle of two or three hours' duration we succeeded in
carrying their works by storm, capturing much artillery and
about 1,200 men. … We crossed on the morning of the 18th, and
the outworks of Vicksburg were reached before night, the army
taking position in their front. On the 19th there was
continuous skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting
into better positions. … At two o'clock I ordered an assault.
It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our
troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the
enemy, and the siege of Vicksburg began. … Most of the army
had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations
issued by the commissary. They had had an abundance of food,
however, but had begun to feel the want of bread. … By the
night of the 21st full rations were issued to all the troops.
… I now determined on a second assault. … The attack was
ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A.
M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in
position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so
that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The
attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps
succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy …
but at no place were we able to enter. … As soon as it was
dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been
obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn,
and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg. A regular siege
was now determined upon. … The Union force that had crossed
the Mississippi river up to this time was less than 43,000
men. … The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on
the roads between these places, quite 60,000 men. … My line
was more than 15 miles long, extending from Haines's Bluff to
Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was
about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton
and Jackson in our rear, who was being constantly reënforced,
we required a second line of defense, facing the other way. I
had not troops enough under my command to man this. General
Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked for
reinforcements, forwarded them with all possible dispatch. …
Johnston … abstained from making an assault on us, because it
would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without
accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken
the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take
any risk of loosing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I
would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves
against an attack by Johnston." The siege was of six weeks'
duration, ending on the memorable 4th of July with the
surrender of Pemberton and 31,000 men, who were released on
parole. "Our men were no sooner inside the lines than the two
armies began to fraternize, We had had full rations from the
time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been
suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself saw our men
taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to those whom
they had so recently been engaged in starving out."
_U. S. Grant,
The Siege of Vicksburg
(Century Magazine, September, 1885)._
ALSO IN:
_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 31-30._
_The Vicksburg Year
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._
_J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapters 6-8._
_F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapters 5-6._
_W. Swinton,
Twelve Decisive Battles of the War,
chapter 7._
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 12._
_Official Records,
series 1, volume 24._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-June).
The arrest of Vallandigham.
President Lincoln to the Copperheads.
"The man whose name became unfortunately pre-eminent for
disloyalty at this time was Clement L. Vallandigham, a
Democrat, of Ohio. General Burnside was placed in command of
the Department of the Ohio, March 25, 1863, and having for the
moment no Confederates to deal with, he turned his attention
to the Copperheads, whom he regarded with even greater
animosity. His Order No. 38, issued on April 13, … warned
persons with treasonable tongues that, unless they should keep
that little member in order, they might expect either to
suffer death as traitors, or to be sent southward within the
lines of 'their friends.' Now Mr. Vallandigham had been a
member of Congress since 1856; … he was the popular and rising
leader of the Copperhead wing of the Democracy. Such was his
position that it would have been ignominious for him to allow
any Union general to put a military gag in his mouth. Nor did
he. On the contrary he made speeches which at that time might
well have made Unionists mad with rage, and which still seem
to have gone far beyond the limit of disloyalty which any
government could safely tolerate. Therefore on May 4 he was
arrested by a company of soldiers, brought to Cincinnati, and
thrown into jail. His friends gathered in anger, and a riot
was narrowly avoided. At once, by order of General Burnside,
he was tried by a military commission. He was charged with
'publicly expressing sympathy for those in arms against the
government of the United States, and declaring disloyal
sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of
weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to
suppress an unlawful rebellion.' …
{3497}
The evidence conclusively sustained the indictment, and the
officers promptly pronounced him guilty, whereupon he was
sentenced by Burnside to confinement in Fort Warren. … The
Democrats throughout the North, rapidly surveying the
situation, seized the opportunity which perhaps had been too
inconsiderately given them. The country rang with plausible
outcries and high sounding oratory concerning military
usurpation, violation of the Constitution, and stifling
freedom of speech. … Mr. Lincoln only showed that he felt the
pressure of the criticism and denunciation by commuting the
sentence, and directing that Vallandigham should be released
from confinement and sent within the Confederate lines,—which
was, indeed, a very shrewd and clever move, and much better
than the imprisonment. Accordingly the quasi rebel was
tendered to and accepted by a Confederate picket, on May 25.
He protested vehemently, declared his loyalty, and insisted
that his character was that of a prisoner of war. But the
Confederates, who had no objection whatsoever to his peculiar
methods of demonstrating 'loyalty' to their opponents,
insisted upon treating him as a friend, the victim of an enemy
common to themselves and him; and instead of exchanging him as
a prisoner, they facilitated his passage through the blockade
on his way to Canada. There he arrived in safety, and thence
issued sundry manifestoes to the Democracy. On June 11 the
Democratic Convention of Ohio nominated him as their candidate
for governor, and it seems that for a while they really
expected to elect him. … On May 16 a monster meeting of 'the
Democrats of New York' was told by Governor Seymour that the
question was: 'whether this war is waged to put down rebellion
at the South, or to destroy free institutions at the North.'
Excited by such instigation, the audience passed sundry
damnatory resolutions and sent them to the President. Upon
receiving these Mr. Lincoln felt that he must come down into
the arena, without regard to official conventionality. On June
12 he replied by a full presentation of the case, from his
point of view. He had once more to do the same thing in
response to another address of like character which was sent
to him on June 11 by the Democratic State Convention of Ohio."
_J. T. Morse,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 2, chapter 6._
To the New York Democrats, Mr. Lincoln said: "It is asserted
in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military
commander, seized and tried 'for no other reason than words
addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of
the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders
of the general.' Now, if there be no mistake about this, if
this assertion is the truth and the whole truth, if there was
no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest
was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a
very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to
the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made
because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the
raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and
to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to
suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the
political prospects of the administration or the personal
interests of the commanding general, but because he was
damaging the army, upon the existence of which the life of the
nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this
gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands
upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military
power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of
fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably
satisfactory evidence. I understand the meeting whose
resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the
rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has
shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall
be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires,
and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment.
Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I
must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to
desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by
getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting,
and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to
write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for
a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak
to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in
such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not
only constitutional, but withal a great mercy. If I be wrong
on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in
believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in
cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires
them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require
them: in other words, that the Constitution is not in its
application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or
invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of
profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself
makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the
government can constitutionally take no strong measures in
time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could
not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be
persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a
sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a
well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended
by the meeting, that the American people will by means of
military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public
discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of
evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the
indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any
more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so
strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to
persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his
healthful life. In giving the resolutions that earnest
consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the
fact that the meeting speak as 'Democrats.' Nor can I, with
full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly
presumed deliberation with which they prepared their
resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by
accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to
designate themselves 'Democrats' rather than 'American
citizens.'
{3498}
In this time of national peril I would have preferred to meet
you upon a level one step higher than any party platform,
because I am sure that from such more elevated position we
could do better battle for the country we all love than we
possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of
habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the
future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and
strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other.
But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful for
the country's sake that not all Democrats have done so. He on
whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and
tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me, and
the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in
these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham
on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these,
having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President
Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly
exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the
battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course
taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a
single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none
such."
_Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 849-350._
To the Ohio Democrats, the President wrote as follows; "You
claim, as I understand, that according to my own position in
the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and
this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military
service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions or
otherwise; and that if he had he should have been turned over
to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I
certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically
and by direct language advised against enlistments and in
favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know
that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the
arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more
recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrolment
preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of
assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had
to be met by military force, and this again has led to
bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility
more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I
solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the
military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course
in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged in a greater degree
than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a
greater degree than to any other one man. These things have
been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr.
Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they
originated with his special friends and adherents. With
perfect knowledge of them, he has frequently if not constantly
made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and
if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the
face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against
them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one
of which is yet I am totally ignorant. When it is known that
the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men
against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of
resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to
counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to
repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of
it. With all this before their eyes, the convention you
represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for governor of
Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to
sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of
course they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide
what are constitutional means; and, unlike the Albany meeting,
you omit to state or intimate that in your opinion an army is
a constitutional means of saving the Union against a
rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an
existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of
destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for
governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to
the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress
the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages
desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it
teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to
believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that
you will become strong enough to do so. After a short personal
intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say
I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I
assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look
upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by
consequence a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false
hope and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the
way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter in
order that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose,
indorse your names upon one of them and return it thus
indorsed to me with the understanding that those signing are
thereby committed to the following propositions and to nothing
else;
1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the
object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union;
and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional
means for suppressing that rebellion;
2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own
judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the
decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy while
engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and
3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have
the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while
engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed,
clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.
And with the further understanding that upon receiving the
letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be
published, which publication shall be, within itself, a
revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham. It
will not escape observation that I consent to the release of
Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him
or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this
because he is not present to speak for himself, or to
authorize others to speak for him; and because I should expect
that on his returning he would not put himself practically in
antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it
chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential
gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of
immense value to the army—thus more than compensating for the
consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to
return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have
suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all
others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the
public safety may seem to require. I have the honor to be
respectfully yours."
_Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, page 362-363._
ALSO IN:
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, .
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 12._
{3499}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-July: On the Mississippi).
Siege and Capture of Port Hudson.
The clear opening of the great River.
"About the middle of May all the available force near the
river was concentrated at Baton Rouge, to assist in the attack
on Port Hudson. Thence Generals Augur and Sherman moved to the
south and east of that position, to cooperate with General
Banks. From Simmesport General Banks moved his army to invest
Port Hudson. … It was on the 21st of May that General Banks
landed, and on the next day a junction was effected with the
advance of Major-General Augur and Brigadier-General Sherman.
… On the 25th, the enemy was compelled to abandon his first
line of works. On the next day General Weitzel's brigade,
which had covered the rear in the march from Alexandria,
arrived, and on the morning of the 27th a general assault was
made on the fortifications. Port Hudson, or Hickey's Landing,
as it was called some years ago, is situated on a bend in the
Mississippi river, about 22 miles above Baton Rouge, and 147
above New Orleans." It was strongly fortified and well
defended by Colonel Frank Gardner. The artillery of General
Banks opened fire on the 27th, and at ten o'clock the same day
an assault was made, in which the colored soldiers showed much
firmness and bravery. The assault failed and the losses in it
were heavy. "A bombardment of the position had been made by
the fleet under Admiral Farragut, for a week previous to this
assault. Reconnoissances had discovered that the defences were
very strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments and
rifle pits, with abatis of heavy trees felled in every
direction. The upper batteries on the river were attacked by
the Hartford and Albatross, which had run the blockade, and
the lower by the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex. On
the 14th of June, after a bombardment of several days, another
assault on Port Hudson was made. … All the assaulting columns
were compelled to fall back under the deadly fire of the
enemy, and the fighting finally ceased about 11 o'clock in the
morning. The loss of General Banks was nearly 700 in killed
and wounded. … After these two attempts to reduce Port Hudson
by a land assault, on the 27th of May and 14th of June, the
purpose to make another was given up by General Banks, until
he had fully invested the place by a series of irresistible
approaches. He was thus engaged in pushing forward his works
when Vicksburg was surrendered. Information of this surrender
was sent to General Banks, and it was made the occasion for
firing salutes and a general excitement in his camp, which
attracted the attention of the enemy, to whom the surrender
was communicated. General Gardner, upon receiving the
information, sent by flag of truce, about midnight of the 7th,
the following note to General Banks: … 'Having received
information from your troops that Vicksburg has been
surrendered, I make this communication to request you to give
me the official assurance whether this is true or not, and if
true, I ask for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the
consideration of terms for surrendering this position.'"
_W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
chapter 29._
ALSO IN:
_F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 7._
_R. B. Irwin,
Port Hudson
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._
_R. B. Irwin,
History of the 19th Army Corps,
chapters 15-18._
_Official Records,
Series 1, volume. 26._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June).
Call for Six-Months Men.
A call for 100,000 men to serve six months, for the repulse of
the invasion of Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and
Ohio, was issued June 15.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June: Virginia).
Lee's second movement of invasion and the inducements to it.
Northern invitation and Southern clamor.
The Southern view.
"The defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville was the
turning-point of the war, and for the first time there was
apparently a possibility of inducing the Federal Government to
relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate
authority in the South. The idea of the formation of a
Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had, up to
this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as
a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the
Federal arms in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had
caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt
whether the South could be coerced to return to the Union;
and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of
President Lincoln, declaring the slaves of the South free, and
placing the United States virtually under martial law, aroused
a violent clamor from the great Democratic party of the North,
who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was
disappearing. This combination of non-success in military
affairs and usurpation by the Government emboldened the
advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their
protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they
declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the
liberties of the country. Journals and periodicals, violently
denunciatory of the course pursued by the Government, all at
once made their appearance in New York and elsewhere. A peace
convention was called to meet in Philadelphia. … On all sides
the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard
raising their importunate voices. … The plan of moving the
Southern army northward, with the view of invading the Federal
territory, seems to have been the result of many
circumstances. The country [Southern] was elated with the two
great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and
the people were clamorous for active operations against an
enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern
steel. The army, which had been largely augmented by the
return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall
of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general
enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear
upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward
movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal
victory and a treaty of peace. Lee yielded to this view of
things rather than urged it. … Another important consideration
was the question of supplies. … More than ever before, these
supplies were now needed; and when General Lee sent, in May or
June, a requisition for rations to Richmond, the
commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper,
'If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in
Pennsylvania.'
{3500}
The considerations here stated were the main inducements for
that great movement northward which followed the battle of
Chancellorsville. … Throughout the month of May, Lee was
busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the
decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations
and improvements in the army. It was divided into three 'corps
d'armée,' each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by
an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet
remained at the head of his former corps. Ewell succeeded
Jackson in command of 'Jackson's old corps', and A. P. Hill
was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two
others. … On the last day of May, General Lee had the
satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped
and admirably-officered army of 68,352 bayonets, and nearly
10,000 cavalry and artillery—in all, about 80,000 men. … Lee
began his movement northward on the 3d day of June, just one
month after the battle of Chancellorsville. … Pursuing his
design of manœuvring the Federal army out of Virginia, without
coming to action, Lee first sent forward one division of
Longstreet's corps in the direction of Culpepper, another then
followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of June, Ewell's entire
corps was sent in the same direction—A. P. Hill remaining
behind on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near
Fredericksburg, to watch the enemy there, and bar the road to
Richmond. These movements became speedily known to General
Hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and
on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below Fredericksburg, and
crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite Hill. This
threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by Lee to
arrest his own movements. … He continued the withdrawal of his
troops, by way of Culpepper, in the direction of the
Shenandoah Valley." On the morning of the 9th of June, "two
divisions of Federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of
'picked infantry,' were sent across the river at Kelly's and
Beverley's Fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the
quarters of Stuart and find what was going on in the Southern
camps. The most extensive cavalry fight [known as the battle
of Brandy Station, or the battle of Fleetwood], probably, of
the whole war, followed. … This reconnoisance in force … had
no other result than the discovery of the fact that Lee had
infantry in Culpepper. … This attempt of the enemy to
penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt
the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley. The
Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg,
still remained facing General Hill, and, two days after the
Fleetwood fight, General Hooker moved up the river with his
main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near
Beverley's Ford. But these movements were disregarded by Lee.
On the same day Ewell's corps moved rapidly toward Chester
Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by
way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of
the 13th, having in three days marched 70 miles. The position
of the Southern army now exposed it to very serious danger,
and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of
soldiership in the general commanding it. In face of an enemy
whose force was at least equal to his own, Lee had extended
his line until it stretched over a distance of about 100
miles. … When intelligence now reached Washington that the
head of Lee's column was approaching the Upper Potomac, while
the rear was south of the Rappahannock, the President wrote to
General Hooker: 'If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg,
and the tail of it on the plank road, between Fredericksburg
and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim
somewhere—could you not break him?' … It would seem that
nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an
attack upon Hill at Fredericksburg, which would certainly have
checked Lee's movement by recalling Longstreet from Culpepper,
and Ewell from the Valley. But … instead of reënforcing the
corps sent across at Fredericksburg and attacking Hill,
General Hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north
bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall
back toward Manassas."
_J. E. Cooke,
Life of General Robert E. Lee,
part 6, chapters 9-12._
ALSO IN:
_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 21._
_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 9._
[Image: Map of the Battlefield of Gettysburg. July 1-3, 1863.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Pennsylvania).
Lee's Invasion.
The Battle of Gettysburg.