Says General McDowell, in his subsequent report of the

movement and the disastrous battle:

"When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with

his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate

of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into

effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday). Every facility

possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the

administrative departments in making the necessary

preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of

transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come

across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and

went forward without my ever seeing them and without having

been together before in a brigade. The sending re-enforcements

to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further

and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean

efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in

every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence,

&c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did

not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed

to move.

{3435}

I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the

desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should

not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 10th ultimo.

When I did set out on the 10th I was still deficient in wagons

for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being

procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly

gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and

wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with

difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in

getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on

Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could

not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier

than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second

day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled

us, so far as they were concerned, to go in to action on the

19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax

Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told

it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only

come from Vienna, about 6 miles, and it was not more than 6½

miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of 12½ miles; but

the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the

distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused

by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to

move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed

to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of

work, and not used to carrying even the load of 'light

marching order.'"

_Brig. General I. McDowell,

Report

(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, pages 323-324)._

The advance of the Union Army was made "in five divisions,

commanded by Generals Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, Runyon, and

Miles. Among the brigade commanders that afterward rose to

eminence were William T. Sherman, Ambrose E. Burnside, Erastus

D. Keyes, and Oliver O. Howard. The total force was somewhat

over 34,000 men; but Runyon's division was left to guard the

line of communication with Washington, and the number that

actually moved against the enemy was about 28,000 with 49 guns

and a battalion of cavalry. So little did strict military

discipline as yet enter into the policy of the Government that

a large number of civilians, including several members of

Congress, obtained passes enabling them to ride out in

carriages, close in the rear of the army, to witness the

expected battle. … The troops marched by the Warrenton

turnpike, and found themselves in the presence of the enemy on

the banks of Bull Run on the 18th. … The enemy's outposts had

fallen back as the army advanced, and the first serious

opposition was met at Blackburn's Ford," where some sharp

fighting occurred between Tyler's division and the Confederate

troops under Longstreet. "McDowell, finding that Beauregard

was very strongly intrenched on his right, and that the roads

in that direction were not good, changed his plan and

determined to attack on the north or left wing. Another reason

for doing this lay in the fact that McDowell had distrusted

Patterson from the first, having no faith that he would hold

Johnston. … The action at Blackburn's Ford had been fought on

Thursday. Friday and Saturday were consumed in reconnoissances

and searching for a suitable ford on the upper part of the

stream, where a column could cross and, marching down on the

right bank, uncover the fords held by the enemy and enable the

remainder of the army to cross. Such a ford was found at

length, and on Sunday morning, the 21st, the army was put in

motion. McDowell did not know that Johnston had easily eluded

Patterson and with two fifths of his forces joined Beauregard

on Saturday. … The Confederate commanders had actually ordered

a forward movement of their own right wing; but as they saw

the development of McDowell's plan they recalled that, and

gradually strengthened their left to meet the onset. … The

battleground was a plateau, wooded and broken."

_R. Johnson,

Short History of the War of Rebellion,

chapter 4._

In the Report of the Confederate General Beauregard, the

plateau which now became the principal battle ground of the

conflict is described as follows: "It is inclosed on three

sides by small water-courses, which empty into Bull Run within

a few yards of each other a half a mile to the south of the

stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100 feet above

the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three

sides to the level of the enclosing streams in gentle slopes,

but which are furrowed by ravines of irregular direction and

length, and studded with clumps and patches of young pines and

oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is

oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the

Brentsville and turnpike roads, which intersect each other at

right angles. Immediately surrounding the two houses …

[mentioned below] are small open fields of irregular outline,

not exceeding 150 acres in extent. The houses, occupied at the

time, the one by the Widow Henry and the other by the free

negro Robinson, are small wooden buildings, the latter densely

embowered in trees and environed by a double row of fences on

two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of the plateau

an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave

excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of

it with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining

the fields, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across the

crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which during the

battle regiments of both armies met and contended for the

mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view

embraces a wide expanse of woods and gently undulating open

country of broad grass and grain fields in all directions."

_General G. T. Beauregard,

Report

(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, pages 493-494)._

At an early hour in the afternoon, the Union forces had driven

the enemy from this plateau and seemed to be in a position

which promised victory to them. Says General McDowell in his

official report: "The enemy was evidently disheartened and

broken. But we had then been fighting since 10.30 o'clock in

the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The

men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made

what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before

coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was

not more that 9½ miles; and though they had three days'

provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt,

either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or

during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had

done much severe fighting.

{3436}

Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in

the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it

had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the

ranks. It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements

came to his aid from the railroad train (understood to have

just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's

army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and

opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to

break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into

disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made

to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but

in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the

hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained

itself until our men could get down to and across the

Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied

in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating

groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in

contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon

degenerated still further into a panic. Finding this state of

affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted

so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining

almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on

that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I

gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging

the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of

organization and force. They returned by the fords to the

Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's

force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps

coming together in small parties, many without officers, they

became intermingled, and all organization was lost."

_Brigadier General I. McDowell,

Report

(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, page 320)._

"The battle of Bull Run was a misfortune, and not a disgrace,

to the Federal arms; but the reports of losses on both sides

prove that it was bravely disputed. … The rout—or, in other

words, the panic— … was one of those accidents to which even

victorious armies are sometimes liable, and against which old

troops are not always able to guard. The importance of the

battle of Bull Run cannot be measured by the amount of losses

sustained by the two contending parties. … Its immediate

effect upon military operations was to produce a sudden change

in the attitude of the belligerents. The possession of

Virginia, with the exception of that portion which had been

recaptured by McClellan, was secured to the Confederates.

Richmond was beyond danger of any attack, and Washington was

threatened anew. … But it was chiefly through its moral effect

that this first encounter was to exercise a powerful influence

upon the war of which it was only the prelude. The South saw

in this victory a kind of ratification of her claims. It was

not only the Federal soldiers who were vanquished on that day,

but with them all who had remained more or less openly loyal

to the Union in the Southern States. … This disaster, which

might have discouraged the North, proved, on the contrary, a

salutary lesson."

_Comte de Paris,

History of the Civil War in America,

volume 1, book 3, chapter 2._

"Those only can realize the condition of our Army, at that

time, who can recall the incidents of this memorable campaign

and the battle with which it closed. The crowds of curious and

impertinent spectators who accompanied and often rode through

our ranks; the long and fatal delay of Hunter's column, on the

morning of the battle—a delay occasioned by a few

baggage-waggons, which should have been miles in rear—the many

ludicrous, yet sad, scenes on the field; the heroic, but

fruitless, gallantry of separate regiments, each attempting,

in detail, the accomplishment of a work which required the

combined effort of all; the dread, on the part of our men, of

those terrible 'masked batteries' and 'the fierce Black-horse

Cavalry,' neither of which ever had an existence except in the

imaginative brains of our newspaper reporters, all help to

fill up the picture. … I believe the plan of this battle to

have been well-conceived, notwithstanding its disastrous

result. We were compelled to take the offensive against troops

in position, and upon a field, the topography of which was

unknown to nearly all our officers. Notwithstanding these

facts, successes would have been achieved but for the

impatient spirit which hurried us on, without the slightest

preparation. Of the march, the battle, the rout, and the

disorderly retreat to Washington, the description given by

William H. Russell was not greatly exaggerated. It was far

more truthful than many of the descriptions given by the

reporters of our own papers. Who has forgotten the newspaper

accounts of the conduct of the celebrated Fire Zouaves—of the

prodigies of valor performed by them—of their bayonet

charges—of their heroic assaults—of the fearful destruction

inflicted by them upon the enemy—and, finally, when the order

to retreat came, of the great difficulty experienced by the

officers in forcing 'these gallant, but bloodthirsty lambs,'

as they were called, to cease fighting and commence

retreating? We all remember these accounts, and many others of

a similar character; and yet, every intelligent officer who

was on the field knows that this regiment dispersed at the

first fire, and so thoroughly was it dispersed that it was

from that day never again known as a military organization.

This campaign, and every subsequent one, of the War, taught us

that the rough element of our cities—the prize-fighter, the

veteran of a score of street-fights—does not necessarily make

the most valuable soldier. On the contrary, many a pale-faced

boy, who, from a sense of duty, has left school or

counting-room to join our Army, has exhibited a degree of

endurance on the march and of bravery on the field, seldom

equalled by the rough element of our cities."

_General H. W. Slocum,

Military Lessons taught by the War

(Historical Magazine, February 1871)_.

"The failure of the Confederate army to pursue after the

battle of Manassas has been much criticised, and has caused

much acrimonious discussion. General Johnston, however, never

hesitated to assume his share of the responsibility for the

action taken, though insisting that the course pursued was

proper, and the only practicable one under the circumstances.

… The troops who had been actually engaged all day, in the hot

summer season, were in no condition to follow up the enemy.

But the great obstacle to any effective pursuit was the

weakness of the cavalry arm in the Southern army. Its entire

strength was considerably under 2,000 men, and a large

proportion of these were not in call.

{3437}

Many of those within reach had been fighting for hours, and

were in little better condition than the infantry. All who

were available were sent off in immediate pursuit, with the

result of greatly swelling the number of prisoners and

captured guns. But by the time the captors turned their prizes

over to proper guards, the Northern army had covered a

sufficient distance to be out of danger, being protected in

their retreat by large bodies of troops that had not been

engaged. This was all that could be accomplished. … The fact

that the condition of the Confederate troops put any active

pursuit out of the question is established by the official

reports. General Johnston's report says: 'Our victory was as

complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be.' …

The same reasons apply with equal force to any attempted

advance during the few days succeeding the battle. The army

was not in a condition to make the movement, being itself much

demoralized by the engagement. Many thought the war over and

went home; many accompanied wounded comrades to their homes;

for the ties of discipline were not as strong then as in a

veteran army. But a yet stronger obstacle to an advance was

the lack of necessary transportation. … Even if the

Confederates had advanced and captured the intrenchments

opposite Washington, they could have accomplished nothing.

They could not have crossed the river on the bridge under the

fire of the Federal vessels of war. They had no artillery of

sufficient range to bombard Washington from the southern side,

even if they had been disposed to wage war in that manner.

They had no sufficient supply of ammunition."

_R. M. Hughes,

General Johnston,

chapter 6._

ALSO IN:

_W. T. Sherman,

Memoirs,

volume 1, chapter 8._

_J. G. Nicolay,

Outbreak of the Rebellion,

chapters 13-16._

_J. B. Fry and others,

Campaign of the First Bull Run

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1)._

_J. E. Cook,

Stonewall Jackson,

part 1, chapter 12._

_A. Roman,

Military Operations of General Beauregard,

volume 1, chapter 9._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (JULY).

Enlistment of volunteers authorized by Congress.

The enlistment of 500,000 volunteers was authorized by Acts of

Congress passed July 22 and 25.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July-September: Missouri).

Sigel's well-conducted retreat from Carthage.

Death of Lyon at Wilson's Creek.

Siege of Lexington.

Fremont in command.

The flight of Governor Jackson and his followers from

Booneville was westward, to Warsaw, on the Osage, first, and

thence into Vernon County, where they were joined, July 3, by

General Sterling Price.

See MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

"Their united force is stated by Pollard, at 3,600. Being

pursued by Lyon, they continued their retreat next day,

halting at 9 P. M., in Jasper County, 23 miles distant. Ten

miles hence, at 10 A. M. next morning, they were confronted by

a Union force 1,500 strong, under Colonel Franz Sigel, who had

been dispatched from St. Louis by the 'Southwestern Pacific

road, to Rolla, had marched thence to Springfield, and had

pushed on to Mount Vernon, Lawrence County, hoping to prevent

a junction between Jackson and some forces which his

Brigadiers were hurrying to his support. Each army appears to

have started that morning with intent to find and fight the

other; and such mutual intentions are seldom frustrated. Sigel

found the Rebels, halted after their morning march, well

posted, vastly superior in numbers and in cavalry, but

inferior in artillery, which he accordingly resolved should

play a principal part in the battle. In the cannonade which

ensued, he inflicted great damage on the Rebels and received

very little, until, after a desultory combat of three or four

hours, the enemy resolved to profit by their vast superiority

in cavalry by outflanking him, both right and left. This

compelled Sigel to fall back. … The retreat was made in

perfect order … to Carthage, and through that town to

Sarcoxie, some fifteen miles eastward. It was well, indeed,

that he did so; for Jackson's force was augmented, during that

night and next morning, by the arrival of Price from the

southward, bringing to his aid several thousand Arkansas and

Texas troops, under Generals Ben McCulloch and Pearce. Our

loss in the affair of Carthage was 13 killed and 31

wounded—not one of them abandoned to the enemy; while the

Rebels reported their loss at 40 to 50 killed and 125 to 150

wounded. Sigel, now outnumbered three or four to one, was

constrained to continue his retreat, by Mount Vernon, to

Springfield; where General Lyon, who had been delayed by lack

of transportation, joined and outranked him on the 10th."

_H. Greeley,

The American Conflict,

volume 1, chapter 35._

"The month of August came, and found General Lyon at

Springfield, hoping to receive reenforcements; but the battle

of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it impossible to send

him aid. Major General Fremont had been appointed [July 9] to

the command of the Western Department, and had reached St.

Louis (July 25). Meantime Confederate troops were pouring over

the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, finding that they

were advancing upon him in two columns, determined to strike

before he should be overwhelmed by the combined Louisiana,

Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas troops. His force did not exceed

5,500, his antagonist had more than 12,000. A skirmish

occurred at Dug Spring (August 1st), in which he had the

advantage; but he could not prevent the junction of the two

columns. Hereupon he fell back to Springfield. His position

had now become one of great difficulty. Political as well as

military considerations rendered it almost impossible for him

to retreat farther. He therefore determined to resume the

offensive, and compensate for his weakness by audacity. Moving

out of Springfield on a very dark night (August 9-10), and

having ordered Sigel, with 1,200 men and six guns, to gain the

enemy's rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day

broke, to make an attack on their front [on Wilson's Creek].

But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was

overwhelmed. He lost five out of his six guns, and more than

half his men. The attack in front was conducted by Lyon in

person with very great energy. His horse was shot under him;

he was twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final

charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose colonel

was at that moment severely wounded, 'Come on, I will lead

you,' and in so doing was shot through the heart. After the

death of Lyon the battle was still continued, their artillery

preserving the national troops from total defeat. News then

coming of Sigel's disaster, a retreat to Springfield, distant

about nine miles, was resolved on. It was executed without

difficulty.

{3438}

In this battle of Wilson's Creek there were 223 killed, 721

wounded, 292 missing, on the national side; and, as may be

inferred from the determined character of the assault, the

loss of the Confederates was very great. They had been so

severely handled that they made no attempt at pursuit, and the

retreat was continued by the national troops, who, on the

19th, had fallen back to Rolla. After this action, the

Confederate commanders, McCulloch and Price, quarreling with

each other, and unable to agree upon a plan for their

campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter advanced

from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he found a national

force of about three thousand (2,780) under Colonel Mulligan.

Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce Mulligan,

but they did not succeed. Meantime the assailing forces were

steadily increasing in number, until they eventually reached

28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. They surrounded the

position and cut off the beleaguered troops from water. They

made repeated assaults without success until [September] 20th,

when they contrived a movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which

they rolled before them as they advanced, and compelled

Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to surrender

unconditionally. On receiving news of this disaster, Fremont

at once left St. Louis with the intention of attacking Price,

but that general instantly retreated, making his way back to

the southwest corner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch

and his Confederate troops."

_J. W. Draper,

History of the American Civil War,

chapter 47 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:

_T. L. Snead,

The Fight for Missouri,

chapters 11-14._

_J. Peckham,

General Lyon and Missouri in 1861,

book 4._

_J. C. Fremont, F. Sigel and others,

Wilson's Creek, Lexington and Pea Ridge

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War', volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July-November).

McClellan's rise to the chief command.

Creation of the Army of the Potomac.

Reorganization of the western armies.

"Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, Major General

McClellan was assigned to the command of the Military

Department of Washington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieutenant

General Scott retained his command as general in chief of the

American army, until the end of October. 'I found,' says

General McClellan in his report, 'no army to command—a mere

collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac,

some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat.

Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the

southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive

works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the

avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The

number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000

infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, with nine

imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces.' … General McClellan

at once commenced the organization of the great army

authorized by Congress. His views of the military position and

appropriate military conduct were, for the most part,

accepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the

resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that the

Army of the Potomac had reached, on October 27th, a strength

of … 168,318. It was the general's opinion that the advance

upon the enemy at Manassas should not be postponed beyond the

25th of November. It was his desire that all the other armies

should be stripped of their superfluous strength, and, as far

as possible, every thing concentrated in the force under his

command. On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found

his bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a letter to the

Secretary of War requesting to be placed on the retired list.

… His desire was granted. An order was simultaneously issued

appointing General McClellan commander-in-chief under the

President. This change in his position at once produced a

change in General McClellan's views. Hitherto he had

undervalued the importance of what was to be done in the West.

He had desired the Western armies to act on the defensive. Now

he wished to institute an advance on East Tennessee, and

capture Nashville contemporaneously with Richmond. … In

preparation for this, the Department of the West was

reorganized. On the day following that of McClellan's

promotion, Fremont was removed from his command. His

department was subdivided into three: (1.) New Mexico, which

was assigned to Colonel Canby; (2.) Kansas, to General Hunter;

(3.) Missouri, to General Halleck. To General Buell was

assigned the Department of the Ohio, and to General Rosecrans

that of West Virginia. The end of November approached, and

still the Army of the Potomac had not moved. The weather was

magnificent, the roads excellent. … Winter at last came, and

nothing had been done. … Considering the military condition of

the nation when General McClellan undertook the formation and

organization of the great Army of the Potomac, the time

consumed in bringing that force into a satisfactory condition

was far from being too long. … From the resources furnished

without stint by Congress McClellan created that army. Events

showed that his mental constitution was such that he could not

use it on the battlefield. … There probably never was an army

in the world so lavishly supplied as that of the Potomac

before the Peninsular expedition. General McDowell, who knew

the state of things well, declared, in his testimony before

the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 'There

never was an army in the world supplied as well as ours. I

believe a French army of half the size could be supplied with

what we waste.'"

_J. W. Draper,

History of the American Civil War,

chapters 44 and 49 (volume 2)._

"Some persons, who ought to have known better, have supposed

that in organizing the Army of the Potomac I set too high a

model before me and consumed unnecessary time in striving to

form an army of regulars. This was an unjustifiable error on

their part. I should, of course, have been glad to bring that

army to the condition of regulars, but no one knew better than

myself that, with the means at my command, that would have

been impossible within any reasonable or permissible time.

What I strove for and accomplished was to bring about such a

condition of discipline and instruction that the army could be

handled on the march and on the field of battle, and that

orders could be reasonably well carried out. … In spite of all

the clamor to the contrary, the time spent in the camps of

instruction in front of Washington was well bestowed, and

produced the most important and valuable results. Not a day of

it was wasted.

{3439}

The fortifications then erected, both directly and indirectly,

saved the capital more than once in the course of the war, and

enabled the army to manœuvre freely and independently. … No

other army we possessed could have met and defeated the

Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. And, with all the

courage, energy, and intelligence of the Army of the Potomac,

it probably would not have been equal to that most difficult

task without the advantage it enjoyed during its sojourn in

the camps around Washington."

_G. B. McClellan,

McClellan's Own Story,

chapter 6._

ALSO IN:

_G. B. McClellan,

Report on the Organization and Campaigns

of the Army of the Potomac._

_Prince de Joinville,

The Army of the Potomac._

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,

37th Congress, 3d session, H. R., part. 1._

_W. Swinton,

Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,

chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August).

Act of Congress freeing Slaves employed

in the service of the Rebellion.

In August, Congress passed an "Act to confiscate property used

for insurrectionary purposes." As originally framed, it only

confiscated "any property used or employed in aiding, abetting

or promoting insurrection, or resistance to the laws," which

would not include slaves. A new section was added, declaring

that "whenever hereafter during the present insurrection

against the Government of the United States, any person held

to labor or service under the law of any State shall be

required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or

service is due to take up arms against the United States, or

to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory,

intrenchment or in any military or naval service whatever

against the Government of the United States, the person to

whom such service or labor is due shall forfeit his claim

thereto." The law further provided that, "whenever any person

shall seek to enforce his claim to a slave, it shall be a

sufficient answer to such claim, that the slave had been

employed in the military or naval service against the United

States contrary to the provisions of this Act."

_J. G. Blaine,

Twenty Years of Congress,

volume 1, page 342._

ALSO IN:

_H. Greeley,

The American Conflict,

volume 1, pages 568-570._

_E. McPherson,

Political History of the United States during the Rebellion,

page 195._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August: North Carolina).

The Hatteras expedition.

"General Wool relieved General Butler August 16th, 1861, of

the command at Fortress Monroe. Butler was detailed to active

duty. The War and Navy Departments having arranged the first

of a series of expeditions against the Southern coast, the

command of the land forces was conferred upon Butler—Commodore

S. H. Stringham directing the naval arm. Materials for the

adventure were rapidly gathered at Fortress Monroe from the

date of August 16th to the 26th, on which day the fleet took

its departure. … Not until the vessels were at sea were any

but the directors of the enterprize aware of the point of

attack. Forts Hatteras and Clark commanded the entrance to the

Sounds of Pamlico and Albemarle, whose waters were a great

rendezvous for traders running the blockade. … Fort Hatteras

was an exceedingly formidable battery. It was nearly

surrounded by water, and was only approached by a circuitous

and narrow neck of land. … The secrecy and rapidity of

preparation by the Federals caught the rebels somewhat

unprepared for the attack. … The bombardment opened Wednesday

morning, at ten o'clock, preparatory to the landing of the

land forces on the beach above Fort Hatteras. … A heavy surf

rolled in upon the treacherous sands. After infinite labor,

and the beaching of three small boats, the landing was

suspended for the day. Those already on shore—315 in

number—were safe under the guns of the fleet. … The

bombardment continued during the entire first day. No land

assault was attempted. Fort Hatteras replied with great vigor,

but with little avail. … On the morning of the 29th, the

cannonade opened early. A cloudless sky and a clear sea

blessed the cause of the assailants. During the night a

transport heavily laden with troops reenforced the fort,

running down the Sound which was yet open. Fort Clark was

occupied by the Federal forces, and refused its aid to assist

its late confederate. The conflict soon raged with extreme

vigor on both sides. At eleven o'clock the Confederate flag

fluttered uneasily a moment—then ran down the halyards and a

white flag was slowly run to the peak. … Articles of

capitulation were signed on board the flag-ship Minnesota.

Butler then landed and took formal possession of the largest

fortification. The number of prisoners surrendered was 615,

who were all placed on the Minnesota. In four days time they

were in New York harbor. … The first design, it would appear,

was to destroy the forts, stop up the channel with old hulks,

and to return, temporarily at least, to Fortress Monroe with

the entire force; but the place proved to be so strong that

Butler left Weber and Hawkins' commands in possession."

_O. J. Victor,

History of the Southern Rebellion,

volume 2, division 5, chapter 11._

ALSO IN:

_D. Ammen,

The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,

chapter 8._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August-October: Missouri).

Fremont's premature proclamation of freedom to slaves of

rebels and Lincoln's modification of it.

The change of command.

"On the 31st of August, General Fremont [commanding in the

West] issued a proclamation declaring martial law, defining

the lines of the army of occupation, and threatening with

death by the bullet all who should be found within those lines

with arms in their hands. Furthermore, the real and personal

property of all persons in the state [Missouri] who should

take up arms against the United States was declared

confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they had

any, were declared free men. This proclamation produced a

strong effect upon the public mind. The proclaiming of freedom

to the slaves of rebels struck the popular chord, particularly

among thoroughly loyal men in the free states. Of course, it

maddened all the sympathizers with the rebellion, infuriated

the rebels themselves, and perplexed those loyal men who had

upon their hands the task of so conducting affairs as to hold

to their allegiance the border slave states which had not

seceded. Mr. Lincoln did not approve some features of General

Fremont's proclamation. As soon as he read it, he wrote, under

date of September 2d, to the General, that there were two

points in it which gave him anxiety. The first was, that, if

he should shoot a man according to his proclamation, 'the

confederates would certainly shoot our best men in their hands

in retaliation, and so, man for man, indefinitely.'

{3440}

He therefore ordered him to allow no man to be shot under the

proclamation without first having his (the President's)

approbation or consent. The second cause of anxiety was that

the paragraph relating to the confiscation of property and the

liberation of slaves of traitorous owners would alarm

Unionists at the South, and perhaps ruin the fair prospect of

saving Kentucky to the Union. He, therefore, wished General

Fremont, as of his own motion, so to modify his proclamation

as to make it conformable to the confiscation act just passed

by the extra session of Congress, which only freed such slaves

as were engaged in the rebel service. … General Fremont

received the President's letter respectfully, and replied to

it September 8th, stating the difficulties under which he

labored, with communication with the government so difficult,

and the development of perplexing events so rapid in the

department under his command. As to the part of his

proclamation concerning the slaves, he wished the President

openly to order the change desired, as, if he should do it of

his own motion, it would imply that he thought himself wrong,

and that he had acted without the reflection which the gravity

of the point demanded. This the President did, in a dispatch

under date of September 11th, in the words: 'It is therefore

ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so

modified, held, and constructed, as to conform to, and not to

transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the

act of Congress entitled, An act to confiscate property used

for insurrectionary purposes, approved August 6, 1861; and

that such act be published at length with this order.' Before

this order had been received, or on the day following its

date, General Fremont, though acquainted with the President's

wishes, manumitted two slaves of Thomas L. Snead of St. Louis,

in accordance with the terms of his proclamation. Although Mr.

Lincoln desired General Fremont so to modify his proclamation

as to make it accordant with the act of Congress approved

August 6th, it is hardly to be supposed that he did it solely

out of respect to that act. … If he had believed that the time

had come for the measure of liberating the slaves of rebels by

proclamation, the act of Congress would not have stood in his

way. This act was an embodiment of his policy at that time,

and he used it for his immediate purpose. … Complications in

the personal relations of General Fremont and Colonel F. P.

Blair, under whose personal and family influence General

Fremont had received his position, occurred at an early day.

Colonel Blair doubtless thought that he had not sufficient

weight in the General's counsels, and the General, doubtless,

exercised his right in choosing his own counselors. … It was a

very unhappy quarrel, and it is quite likely that there was

blame upon both sides, though it occurred between men equally

devoted to the sacred cause of saving the country to freedom

and justice. … Mr. Lincoln always gave to each the credit due

to his motives, and so far refused to mingle in the general

quarrel that grew out of the difficulty, that he kept the

good-will of both sides, and compelled them to settle their

own differences. … General Fremont at length took the field in

person. On the 8th of October he left Jefferson City for

Sedalia. As he advanced with his forces, Price retreated,

until it was widely reported that he would give battle to the

national forces at Springfield. Just as Fremont was making

ready to engage the enemy, he was overtaken by an order

relieving him of his command. He was succeeded by General

Hunter; but Hunter's command was brief, and was transferred at

an early day to General Halleck. General Fremont was relieved

of his command by the President not because of his

proclamation, not because he hated slavery, and not because he

believed him corrupt or vindictive or disloyal. He relieved

him simply because he believed that the interests of the

country, all things considered, would be subserved by

relieving him and putting another man in his place. The matter

was the cause of great excitement in Missouri, and of much

complaint among the radical anti-slavery men of the country:

but the imputations sought to be cast upon the President were

not fastened to him; and did not, four years later, when

Fremont himself became a candidate for the presidency, prevent

the warmest anti-slavery men from giving Mr. Lincoln their

support. The federal army under General Hunter retreated

without a battle; and thus the campaign, inaugurated with

great show and immense expense, was a flat failure."

_J. G. Holland,

Life of Abraham Lincoln,

chapter 20._

ALSO IN:

_J. C. Fremont,

In Command in Missouri

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1),

pages 278-288._

_W. Dorsheimer,

Fremont's Hundred Days in Missouri

(Atlantic Monthly, volume 9, 1862)._

_Official Record,

series 1, volume 3, pages 466-564._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861

(August-December: West Virginia).

Rosecrans against Lee.

Battles of Carnifex Ferry and Cheat Summit.

"When General McClellan was called [July 22] to take General

McDowell's place at the head of the Army of the Potomac,

Brigadier-General William S. Rosecrans was left in command of

the troops in West Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, the

Confederate commander, who had gathered together the forces

which had been defeated under Garnett and Pegram, and some

others, found himself in August at the head of about 16,000

men. Lee made his headquarters at Huntersville, while General

John B. Floyd … took up a position on the Gauley River for the

purpose of cutting off General Cox of Ohio, who, with a

brigade of Rosecrans's army, had just driven a Confederate

force under ex-Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia out of the

Kanawha Valley. Floyd surprised and routed the Seventh Ohio

under Colonel Tyler, and then moved to a place on the Gauley

River called Carnifex Ferry, hoping to cut off Cox from

Rosecrans. But early in September Rosecrans, leaving part of

his army under General Joseph J. Reynolds to watch Lee,

marched southward with about 10,000 men and [September 10]

attacked Floyd, who had strongly fortified himself with about

2,000 men on the banks of the river. After a severe fight of

three or four hours, in which the Union troops lost heavily,

Rosecrans, finding the position much stronger than he

expected, gave orders at twilight to stop the assault until

morning; but when morning came no enemy was to be seen; Floyd,

finding his enemy much superior in numbers, had crossed the

river in the night over a bridge hastily built of logs, and

retreated to the mountains 30 miles away. Rosecrans followed,

but finally fell back again to the Gauley. When Rosecrans

marched against Floyd, Reynolds took up a strong position on

Cheat Mountain."

_J. D. Champlin,

Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,

chapter 10._

{3441}

"General Lee proposed first to win a victory, if possible,

over Reynolds. He was combative, anxious to strike, but many

difficulties confronted him. He fully realized he had been

sent to West Virginia to retrieve Confederate disasters, and

that he had a most difficult task to perform. The Federal

commander [his main force at Elk Water] held the center summit

of Cheat Mountain pass, the mountain having three well-defined

summits. … It was necessary first to carry this well-selected

position of the Federal troops. A citizen surveyor, in

sympathy with the South and familiar with the mountain paths,

had made a trip to an elevated point where he could clearly

see the Federal position, and reported his observations to

General Lee. Afterward he made a second reconnoissance,

accompanied by Colonel Albert Rust, of the Third Arkansas

Regiment, who was anxious to see the nature of the ground and

the strength of the position for himself. They reported to

General Lee that in their opinion the enemy's position could

be assailed with success with troops which could be guided to

the point they had reached. General Lee decided to make the

attack, and gave to Rust a column of 1,200 infantry. … The

movement was to begin at night, which happened to be a very

rainy one. All the troops, however, got in the positions

assigned to them without the knowledge of the enemy, where

they waited, every moment expecting to hear the rattle of

Rust's muskets, who had been charged with the capture of the

pass on Cheat Mountain; but hour after hour passed, and no

sounds were heard. After a delay of many hours, and the enemy

had divined the nature of the attack, the troops were ordered

back to their former position. There had been only a small

conflict between cavalry, in which Colonel John A. Washington,

General Lee's aid-de-camp, who had been sent with Major W. H.

F. Lee to reconnoiter the enemy, was killed from an ambuscade.

… Rust claims in his reports that spies had communicated the

movements of the Confederate troops to the enemy. This officer

evidently did not attack, because he found, on getting close

to the Federal position, that it was much stronger than he had

thought it was from the preliminary reconnoissances he had

made. As the attack of the whole depended on the assault of

this force, the failure to attack caused a corresponding

failure of the whole movement. … This movement having failed,

and knowing that the enemy would be prepared for any second

attempt which, from the nature of the country, would have to

be similar to the one already tried, General Lee decided to

turn his attention to the commands of Wise and Floyd in front

of Rosecrans, leaving General H. R. Jackson in Reynolds's

front. He proceeded at once to Floyd's command, which he

reached on September 20th, and then to Wise's camp, closely

inspecting both. He at once perceived that Wise's position was

the strongest and offered the best means for successful

defense, and promptly concentrated his forces at that point. …

Rosecrans had advanced to the top of Big Sewell Mountain and

had placed his army in a strong position. General Lee, with te

troops of Wise, Floyd, and Loring—about 8,000 men—occupied a

position on a parallel range. The two armies were now in close

proximity to each other, both occupying strong defensive

positions. Lee and Rosecrans, having been officers of the

engineers, were fully aware of the great disadvantage an

attacking army would have, and each waited, hoping the other

would attack. After occupying these positions for twelve days,

Rosecrans, on the night of October 6th, retreated. The

condition of the roads, the mud, the swollen streams, the

large numbers of men with typhoid fever and measles, the

condition of the horses, of the artillery, and transportation,

were such that Lee decided not to pursue. … The rapid approach

of winter and the rainy season terminated the campaign in this

section. … At the termination of this campaign of General

Lee's the Confederate Government did not bestow much attention

upon this section. The majority of the people seemed inclined

to support the Federal side. … It must be admitted that

General Lee retired from West Virginia with diminished

military reputation. Great results had been expected from his

presence there. Garnett's defeat and death were to be avenged,

and the whole of that portion of Virginia speedily wrested

from the Federal arms. The public did not understand the

difficulties of the situation, or comprehend why he did not

defeat Reynolds, or the failure to attack Rosecrans."

_F. Lee,

General Lee,

chapter 6._

After Lee left General H. R. Jackson in front of Reynolds'

position, the former established himself in a fortified camp

on Buffalo Hill, and was unsuccessfully attacked there by

Reynolds, October 3. Two months later, on the 13th of

December, the attack was repeated by Reynolds' successor in

command, General Milroy, and again without success. Meantime,

Floyd had been driven into the mountains, with little

fighting, by Rosecrans, and military operations, for the time,

were at an end.

_Comte de Paris,

History of the Civil War in America,

volume 1, book 4, chapter 2._

ALSO IN:

_V. A. Lewis,

History of West Virginia,

chapter 28._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861

(September-November: On the Mississippi).

General Grant's first battle, at Belmont.

In August, General Ulysses S. Grant, who had been serving for

a few weeks in Missouri, first as Colonel of the 21st Illinois

Regiment, and later as a brigadier-general, was assigned by

General Fremont to "the command of the district of south-east

Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in

Missouri, as well as all southern Illinois." On the 4th of

September he established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois,

and the next day, having learned from a scout that the rebels

were preparing to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee

River, he placed a couple of regiments of troops and a light

battery on board of steamers: and occupied the place on the

6th,—telegraphing meanwhile for orders, but not waiting for

them. His movement anticipated the enemy by a few hours, only,

and secured a command of the Tennessee, the importance of

which was afterward demonstrated by Grant, himself, when he

moved on Forts Henry and Donelson. In his "Memoirs" General

Grant says: "From the occupation of Paducah up to the early

part of November, nothing important occurred with the troops

under my command.

{3442}

I was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled

and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to

come. By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men.

… About the 1st of November I was directed from department

headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the

Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels within

their lines. Before my troops could be got off, I was notified

from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy

on the St. Francis River about 50 miles west, or south-west,

from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against

them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops

sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy.

On the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were

about to detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by

boats down the Mississippi and up the White River, in

Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to

prevent this movement if possible." To carry out these orders,

General Grant directed a demonstration to be made from Paducah

towards Columbus, while, at the same time, he conveyed some

3,000 troops down the river, in steamers, and attacked a camp

of rebels at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus. The

battle was a severe one. "The officers and men engaged at

Belmont were then under fire for the first time. Veterans,"

says General Grant, "could not have behaved better than they

did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point

they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap

its full reward. … The moment the camp was reached our men

laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick

up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better

than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men

to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the

Union cause and the achievements of the command." The result

was a rallying of the defeated rebels and a reinforcement from

Columbus which forced the Unionists to retire with haste. "Our

loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About

125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We

returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four

other pieces. The loss of the enemy, as officially reported,

was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about

2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports.

The enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops

brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first

defence of Belmont. The two objects for which the battle of

Belmont was fought were fully accomplished. The enemy gave up

all idea of detaching troops from Columbus. … If it had not

been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably have been captured

or destroyed with his 3,000 men. Then I should have been

culpable indeed."

_U. S. Grant,

Personal Memoirs,

chapters 19-20 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:

_A. Badeau,

Military History of U. S. Grant,

chapter 1._

_W. P. Johnston,

Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,

chapter 24._

_Official Records,

series 1, volume 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia).

Confederate project for the invasion of the North

vetoed by Jefferson Davis.

"Between the 4th of August and the 15th of October more than

110 regiments and thirty batteries, comprising at least

100,000 men, were added to the forces in Washington and its

neighborhood, and there appeared to be no limit to the

resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Northern

troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the

immense resources at the disposal of the United States

Government, that there was every reason to expect in the

spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and

vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities, on

the part of the soldiers. The army at Manassas, on the other

hand, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate

Government, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of

clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward

with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter. … It was

easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if

the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active

operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have

learned 'the trade of the soldier,'—should have acquired

familiarity with the use of arms, habits of obedience, trust

in their officers and superiors, discipline,—the Federal

general would enter on the next campaign with all those

chances of success which attend largely superior numbers,

better arms and equipment, and a sound and thorough

organization of his army. Such in fact was the view of the

situation taken by the sagacious officer who commanded the

lately victorious army at Manassas Junction, Joseph E.

Johnston. In his opinion his two corps commanders, Beauregard

… and G. W. Smith, … entirely concurred. They saw that

something must be done to break up this constantly increasing

Federal army while it was yet in the process of formation. The

Confederate generals determined to urge their views upon the

President of the Southern Confederacy. Mr. Davis responded at

once to their expressed wish for a conference upon the

military situation, and he reached Manassas on September 30,

1861. The conference was held the next day. The generals

strongly advised Mr. Davis to reinforce the army at Manassas

so that they might cross the Potomac, cut the communications

of Washington with the North, and carry the war into the

enemy's country. Johnston and Beauregard fixed the strength of

an army adequate to these tasks at 60,000 men. Smith was

content with a force of 50,000. Additional transportation and

supplies of ammunition were also demanded. The army then at

Manassas numbered about 40,000 men. With the quality of the

soldiers the generals seemed to be perfectly content. They

only asked that the additional troops sent should be of an

equal degree of efficiency,—'seasoned soldiers' as

distinguished from 'fresh volunteers.' But President Davis

decided that he could not furnish the required reinforcement

without 'a total disregard of the safety of other threatened

positions.' The project was therefore dropped, and no further

attempt was made during the ensuing autumn and winter to

interfere with the uninterrupted development of the Federal

army at and near Washington in organization and efficiency. …

It is altogether probable that the Confederate army was at

that time decidedly the superior of its antagonist in many

important respects. It had the prestige of victory. … We may

fairly say therefore, that an invasion of the North,

undertaken in October, 1861, held out a very fair promise of a

successful result for the Confederate arms."

_J. C. Ropes,

The Story of the Civil War,

chapter 10._

{3443}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia).

The affair at Ball's Bluff, or Leesburg.

"The true story of the affair of Ball's Bluff, is, in brief,

as follows: One of General Stone's officers, Captain

Philbrick, of the 15th Massachusetts, thought that he had

discovered a camp of the enemy about one mile beyond

Harrison's island in the direction of Leesburg. Having

completed the feint of crossing made in the course of the

20th, General Stone at 10.30 P. M. of the same day issued his

orders for the surprise of the supposed camp at daybreak of

the 21st. Colonel Devens, of the 15th Massachusetts, was

entrusted with the duty, with four companies of his regiment.

Colonel Lee, of the 20th Massachusetts, was directed to

replace Colonel Devens in Harrison's island with four

companies of his own regiment, one of which was to pass over

to the Virginia shore and hold the heights there to cover

Colonel Devens's return. Colonel Devens was directed to

'attack the camp at daybreak, and, having routed, to pursue

them as far as he deems prudent, and to destroy the camp, if

practicable, before returning.' … Having accomplished this

duty, Colonel Devens will return to his present position,

unless he shall see one on the Virginia side near the river

which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced, and one which

can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In

which case he will hold on and report.' In obedience to these

orders Colonel Devens crossed about midnight with five

companies (instead of four), numbering about 300 men, and

halted until daybreak in an open field near the bluffs

bordering the shore. While there he was joined by Colonel Lee

with 100 men of the 20th Massachusetts, who halted here to

cover his return. At daybreak he advanced about a mile towards

Leesburg, and then discovered that the supposed camp did not

exist. After examining the vicinity and discovering no traces

of the enemy, he determined not to return at once, but at

about half-past six A. M. sent a non-commissioned officer to

report to General Stone that he thought he could remain where

he was until reinforced. At about seven o'clock a company of

hostile riflemen were observed on the right, and a slight

skirmish ensued. A company of cavalry being soon observed on

the left, the skirmishers were drawn back to the woods, and,

after waiting half an hour for attack, the command was

withdrawn to the position held by Colonel Lee; but, after

again scouting the woods, Colonel Devens returned to his

advanced position. About eight o'clock the messenger returned

from General Stone with orders for Colonel Devens to remain

where he was, and that he would be reinforced. The messenger

was again sent back to report the skirmish that had taken

place. Colonel Devens then threw out skirmishers and awaited

reinforcements. At about ten o'clock the messenger again

returned with the information that Colonel Baker [Senator

Edward D. Baker, of California] would soon arrive with his

brigade and take command. Between nine and eleven Colonel

Devens was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Learned with the

remainder of the 15th. bringing up his command to 28 officers

and 625 men. About midday Colonel Devens learned that the

enemy were gathering on his left, and about half-past twelve

or one he was strongly attacked; and as he was in great danger

of being outflanked, and no reinforcements had arrived, at

about a quarter-past two he fell back to the bluff, where he

found Colonel Baker, who directed him to take the right of the

position he proposed to occupy. … At about three o'clock the

enemy attacked in force, the weight of his attack being on our

centre and left. At about four our artillery was silenced, and

Colonel Devens was ordered to send two of his companies to

support the left of our line; shortly after he learned that

Colonel Baker had been killed. Colonel Coggswell then assumed

command, and, after a vain attempt to cut his way through to

Edward's Ferry, was obliged to give the order to retreat to

the river-bank and direct the men to save themselves as best

they could. I have gone thus much into detail because at the

time I was much criticised and blamed for this unfortunate

affair, while I was in no sense responsible for it."

_G. B. McClellan,

McClellan's Own Story,

chapter 11._

In connection with the disaster at Ball's Bluff (called the

battle of Leesburg by the Confederates) a great wrong seems to

have been done to General Stone. Accused of disloyalty, he was

arrested, but on no specific charge, imprisoned for six

months, denied a trial, and set free without explanation. He

went abroad and for many years was Chief of the General Staff

to the Khedive of Egypt.

_J. G. Blaine,

Twenty Years of Congress,

volume 1, chapter 17._

ALSO IN:

_R. B. Irwin,

Ball's Bluff and the arrest of General Stone

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,

volume 2, pages 123-134)._

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,

37th Congress, 3d session, H. R., part 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861

(October-December: South Carolina-Georgia).

The Port Royal Expedition.

Capture of Hilton Head.

Extensive occupation of the coast.

Savannah threatened.

"On the 29th of October, another and far stronger naval and

military expedition [than that against the Hatteras forts] set

forth from Hampton Roads, and, clearing the capes of Virginia,

moved majestically southward. Genera] T. W. Sherman [not to be

confused with General William T. Shennan of the Western

armies] commanded the land forces, consisting of 13 volunteer

regiments, forming three brigades, and numbering not less than

10,000 men; while the fleet—commanded by Commodore Samuel F.

Du Pont—embraced the steam-frigate Wabash, 14 gun-boats, 22

first-class and 12 smaller steamers, with 26 sailing vessels.

After a stormy passage, in which several transports were

disabled and four absolutely lost, Commodore Du Pont, in his

flag-ship, came to off Port Royal, South Carolina, during the

night of November 3d and 4th; and, after proper soundings and

reconnoissances, which developed the existence of a new fort

on either side of the entrance, the commodore brought his most

effective vessels into action at 9 A. M., on Thursday,

November 7th, taking the lead in his flagship, the Wabash—the

gunboats to follow at intervals in due order. Thus the

fighting portion of the fleet steamed slowly up the bay by the

forts, receiving and returning the fire of the batteries on

Bay Point as they passed up, and exchanging like compliments

with the stronger fort on Hilton Head as they came down. Thus

no vessel remained stationary under fire; so that the enemy

were at no time enabled to gain, by experiment and

observation, a perfect aim. The day was lovely; the spectacle

magnificent; the fight spirited, but most unequal.

{3444}

Despite the general presumption that batteries, well manned

and served, are superior to ships when not ironclad, the

terrible rain of shot and shell upon the gunners in the Rebel

forts soon proved beyond human endurance. … The battle … raged

nearly five hours, with fearful carnage and devastation on the

part of the Rebels, and very little on ours, when the

overmatched Confederates, finding themselves slaughtered to no

purpose, suddenly and unanimously took to flight. … The Rebel

forts were fully manned by 1,700 South Carolinians, with a

field battery of 500 more stationed not far distant. The

negroes, save those who had been driven off by their masters,

or shot while attempting to evade them, had stubbornly

remained on the isles."

_H. Greeley,

The American Conflict,

chapter 36._

"The effect of the battle of Port Royal was as largely felt in

the North, where it revived the hopes of her people, as in the

South, to whose people it revealed the presence of a new and

pressing danger. The Federals had conquered a strong base of

operations on the enemy's coast; they had carried the war into

South Carolina. … Sherman might, perhaps, at the first moment

of his adversary's disorder, have been able to push his

success farther, and to lead his army upon Charleston, or

Savannah. But he was afraid of risking such a venture. … The

occupation of most of the islands in the vicinity of the St.

Helena group was the natural consequence of the victory of

Hilton Head. It was effected gradually before the end of the

year. Among all the points of the coast which the Federals had

thus seized without striking a blow, thanks to the prestige of

their success, the most important was Tybee Island, at the

entrance of the Savannah River. Situated on the right bank of

the mouth of that river, and being the spot where the

lighthouse stands, Tybee Island enabled the Federals, as soon

as they became masters of it, to obstruct the passage of the

blockade-runners on their way to the great mart of Savannah.

At a distance of about 600 feet from its borders, on an islet

in the middle of the river, stood Fort Pulaski. … A few days

after, the navy extended its conquests still farther south,"

occupying the channel between the Tybee Island group and the

Warsaw Islands, "and thus opening a passage for future

operations, which would enable them to reach Savannah by

turning Fort Pulaski. … At the end of the year, Dupont's

fleet, supported by detachments from Sherman's army, was in

possession of the five large bays of North Edisto, St. Helena,

Port Royal, Tybee, Warsaw, and the whole chain of islands

which forms the coast of Carolina and Georgia between those

bays."

_Comte de Paris,

History of the Civil War in America,

book 4, chapter 3 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:

_C. B. Boynton,

History of the Navy during the Rebellion,

volume 1, chapter 26._

_D. Ammen,

The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,

chapter 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (November).

The Trent affair.

Arrest of Mason and Slidell.

"On the 8th of November, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, of the

United States Steamer San Jacinto, intercepted on the ocean H.

B. M. [His Britannic Majesty] mail packet boat Trent, having

on board four rebel emissaries bound for England. Having

boarded the Trent, an officer of the San Jacinto, with an

armed guard, arrested the rebels Mason, Slidell, McFarland and

Eustis, and transferred them to the San Jacinto. The Trent

then proceeded on her voyage. Captain Wilkes conveyed his

captives to Boston, where they were consigned to Fort Warren,

then a receptacle for political prisoners. When this

transaction became known to the British government, immediate

preparations were made for war. In the United States, the act

was hailed as a victory. The Secretary of the Navy publicly

applauded Captain Wilkes, and the House of Representatives did

the same. The Secretary of State, upon whom the chief

responsibility in the matter rested, saw, more clearly than

others, that a breach of international law had been committed

by the commander of the San Jacinto. The President coincided

with Mr. Seward, and it was at once resolved to restore the

rebel captives to the protection of the British flag."

_G. E. Baker,

Biographical Memoir of William H. Seward

(volume 5 of Seward's Works, pages 10-11)._

In his diplomatic correspondence as quoted in the volume cited

above, under the caption "Diary or Notes on the War,"

Secretary Seward wrote:

"November 30, 1861.—Captain Wilkes, in the Steamer San

Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken

from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on

an errand of treason against their own country. Lord Lyons has

prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I

presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing

on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not

furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course

now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by

the British government should be first made to us here, and

that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here.

In the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British

vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions

from the government, the subject is therefore free from the

embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been

specially directed by us. …

January 20, 1862.—We have reason to be satisfied with our

course in the Trent affair. The American people could not have

been united in a war which, being waged to maintain Captain

Wilkes's act of force, would have practically been a voluntary

war against Great Britain. At the same time it would have been

a war in 1861 against Great Britain for a cause directly the

opposite of the cause for which we waged war against the same

power in 1812." In a despatch to Lord Lyons, British Minister,

Mr. Seward had written: "If I decide this case in favor of my

own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles,

and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The

country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those

principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the

case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this government

could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in

this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the

British nation just what we have always insisted all nations

ought to do to us. … By the adjustment of the present case

upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as I trust,

mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a

question is finally and rightly settled between them, which,

heretofore exhausting not only all forms of peaceful

discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more

than half a century alienated the two countries from each

other."

_W. H. Seward,

To Lord Lyons, December 26, 1861

(Works, volume 5, Diplomatic History of the War,

pages 308-309)._

ALSO IN:

_M. Bernard,

Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain,

chapter 9._

_D. M. Fairfax,

Captain Wilkes's Seizure of Mason and Slidell

(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 135-142)._

{3445}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862

(December-March: Virginia).

Protracted inaction of McClellan.

His Plan of Campaign and its frustration by

the rebel evacuation of Centreville.

"When Congress assembled … in the beginning of December, 1861,

so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and

so zealously had the people responded to their country's call,

that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your

committee by the adjutant general of the army, showed that,

exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the

army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men. During the

time this large army had been collecting and organizing,

nothing of importance had transpired in connexion with it,

except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the

rebels, which your committee treat of more at length in

another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of

Ball's Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate report.

The weather during the fall season, and for some weeks after

the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for

active military operations. As month after month passed

without anything being done by the army of the Potomac, the

people became more and more anxious for the announcement that

the work of preparation had been completed and active

operations would soon be commenced. From the testimony before

your committee it appeared that the army of the Potomac was

well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of

discipline by the last of September or the first of October.

The men were ready and eager to commence active operations.

The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed

to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared

they had no expectation of doing so. … Your committee

endeavored to obtain as accurate information, as possible in

relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of

Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here

upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in

December an order had been issued from headquarters

prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any

persons who should come into our lines from the direction of

the enemy; but all such persons were to be sent, without

examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions

were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was,

that the generals examined appeared to be almost entirely

ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having

only such information as they were allowed to obtain at

headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously

estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the

highest estimate based their opinion upon information received

at headquarters. … Subsequent events have proved that the

force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these

estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very

greatly overestimated. Your committee also sought to ascertain

what number of men could be spared from this army for

offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the

enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be

advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the

force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act

entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure

against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses

examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men,

leaving 100,000 or upwards that could be used for expeditions

at other points. … The subject of the obstruction of the

navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration

of your committee. … As was well urged by the Navy Department,

the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army

co-operate with the navy in securing the unobstructed

navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation

at that time, permit so important a channel of communication

to be closed. After repeated efforts, General McClellan

promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to

proceed down the river. … The troops did not arrive, and the

Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven.

Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan

why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was

informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so

large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he

had concluded not to send them. Captain Fox replied that the

landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy

Department had charge. … It was then agreed that the troops

should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again

notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the

arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that

time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain

Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the committee as to what

reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to

the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as

he could ascertain, was, that General McClellan feared it

might bring on a general engagement. … Upon the failure of

this plan of the Navy Department, the effective vessels of the

Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The

navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter

closed, and remained closed until the rebels voluntarily

evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps

having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening

communication by that route. On the 19th of January, 1862, the

President of the United States, as commander-in-chief of the

army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the

armies of the United States, one result of which was the

series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which

so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every

loyal man in the land. After this long period of inaction of

the army of the Potomac, the President of the United States,

on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order: …

'Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the

Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington,

be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of

seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward

of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in

the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to

move before or on the 22d day of February next. Abraham

Lincoln.'

{3446}

To this order General McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of

the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as

involving 'the error of dividing our army by a very difficult

obstacle, (the Occoquan,) and by a distance too great to

enable the two portions to support each other, should either

be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is

held in check.' He then proceeded to argue in favor of a

movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving

the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30

days would be required to provide the necessary means of

transportation. He stated that he regarded 'success as

certain, by all the chances of war,' by the route he proposed,

while it was 'by no means certain that we can beat them (the

enemy) at Manassas.' … Your committee have no evidence, either

oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the

arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the

President that led him to relinquish his own line of

operations and consent to the one proposed by Genera]

McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in

February, 1862. That council, the first, so far as your

committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by General

McClellan, and then by direction of the President, was

composed of twelve generals. … To them was submitted the

question whether they would indorse the line of operations

which General McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the

deliberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the

movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake

bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and across the

country to Richmond. The four generals who voted against the

proposed movement were Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman,

and Barnard. General Keyes voted for it with the qualification

that no change should be made until the enemy were driven from

their batteries on the Potomac. … Before the movement by way

of Annapolis could be executed, the enemy abandoned their

batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at

Centreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the

Rappahannock. When General McClellan, then in the city of

Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he

proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of

the whole army in the direction of the position lately

occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning of the

10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further

than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded

to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock,

ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and

destroyed the railroad bridge across it. … On the 13th of

March General McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a

council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of

army corps, (General Banks being absent,) and informed them

that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the

Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement

by way of the York and James rivers."

_Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War,

37th Congress, 3d session, H. R. Rep.,

part 1, pages 6-12._

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, consisting of

Senators Wade, Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, and of

Representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell, was

appointed in December, 1861. This Committee "was for four

years one of the most important agencies in the country. It

assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great

range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of

both the army and the Government; it called soldiers and

statesmen before it, and questioned them like refractory

schoolboys. … It was often hasty and unjust in its judgments,

but always, earnest, patriotic, and honest. … General

McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee

with something like contempt. But the President, with his

larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take

into account an agency of such importance; and though he

steadily defended General McClellan and his deliberateness of

preparation before the committee, he constantly assured him in

private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself

in readiness for a forward movement. … December was the fifth

month that General McClellan had been in command of the

greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was

impossible to convince the country that a longer period of

preparation was necessary before this army could be led

against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in

discipline or equipment. … McClellan reported to the Secretary

of War, that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered

150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an

advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of

240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective

total of 41,000 men. … Aware that his army was less than

one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented

himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the

time in drilling and disciplining his troops, who, according

to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not

account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military

operations, he says, were practicable until the end of

December; but he was never molested."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,

Abraham Lincoln,

volume 5, chapter 9._

McClellan says, "It certainly was not till late in November,

1861, that the Army of the Potomac was in any condition to

move, nor even then were they capable of assaulting entrenched

positions. By that time the roads had ceased to be practicable

for the movement of armies, and the experience of subsequent

years proved that no large operations could be advantageously

conducted in that region during the winter season. Any success

gained at that time in front of Washington could not have been

followed up and a victory would have given us the barren

possession of the field of battle, with a longer and more

difficult line of supply during the rest of the winter. If the

Army of the Potomac had been in condition to move before

winter, such an operation would not have accorded with the

general plan I had determined upon after succeeding General

Scott as general in command of the armies"

_G. B. McClellan,

McClellan's Own Story,

pages 199-200._

ALSO IN:

_J. E. Johnston,

Narrative of Military Operations,

chapters 3-4._

_A. S. Webb,

The Peninsula

(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 3) chapter 2._

_Comte de Paris,

History of the Civil War in America,

book 5, chapter 4 (volume 1)._

_G. B. McClellan,

The Peninsular Campaign

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,

volume 2, pages 160-187)._

_G. B. McClellan,

Complete Report._

_J. G. Barnard,

The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents._

_J. C. Ropes,

Gen. McClellan's Plans

(Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 1)._

{3447}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862

(December-April: Virginia).

Jackson's first campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.

Battle of Kernstown.

"Soon after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was

promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government

having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department

of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E.

Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac

District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by

Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes," In November,

Jackson's force was about 10,000 men. "His only movement of

note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition at the end of

December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio

railroad and a dam or two near Hancock, on the Chesapeake and

Ohio canal. … In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and

General McClellan collected his army of more than 100,000 men

on the Peninsula. … Jackson's little army in the Valley had

been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so

that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5,000 men

of all arms available for the defense of his district, which

began to swarm with enemies all around its borders,

aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having

retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to

withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to

cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an

aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by

General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8,000

to 10,000 men. A little after the middle of March, Jack·son

concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied

a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of

Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe

engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's

repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the

Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit

was not vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired

before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting

qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops

from the Valley. The result was so pleasing to the Richmond

government and General Johnston that it was decided to

reënforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him

at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May."

_J. D. Imboden,

Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah

(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 282-285)._

"The losses at Kernstown were:

Union, 118 killed, 450 wounded, 22 missing=590;

Confederate, 80 killed, 375 wounded, 263 missing=718."

_N. Kimball,

Fighting Jackson at Kernstown

(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, page 307, footnote)._

ALSO IN:

_G. H. Gordon,

Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,

chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1863.

President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus.

On the 27th of April, 1861, President Lincoln issued the

following order "To the Commanding General, Army of the United

States"—at that time, General Scott: "You are engaged in

suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United

States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military

line which is now or which shall be used between the city of

Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance

which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas

corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the

officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs,

are authorized to suspend that writ." On the 2d of July,

another order was issued in exactly the same language, except

that it gave authority to suspend the writ at "any point on or

in the vicinity of any military line … between the city of New

York and the city of Washington." On the 14th of October, a

third order to General Scott declared: "The military line of

the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may

be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer

acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend

the writ of habeas corpus in any place between that place and

the city of Washington." On the 2d of December a specific

order to General Halleck, commanding in the Department of

Missouri, authorized the suspension of the writ within the

limits of his command; and a similar order, long previously,

had specially empowered the commander of the forces of the

United States on the coast of Florida to do the same. On the

24th of September, 1862, a general proclamation by the

President subjected to martial law "all rebels and insurgents,

their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all

persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia

drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and

comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States";

and suspending the writ of habeas corpus "in respect to all

persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the

rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal,

military prison, or other place of confinement, by any

military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or

military commission." On the 3d of March, 1863, the authority

of the President to suspend habeas corpus (which some thought

questionable) was confirmed by act of Congress; and on the

15th of September in that year another general proclamation

was issued, referring to the act and declaring a suspension of

the writ "throughout the United States, in the cases where, by

the authority of the President of the United States, military,

naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of

them, hold persons under their command, or in their custody,

either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of

the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or

drafted or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land

or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters

therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules

and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed

for the military or naval service by authority of the

President of the United States; or for resisting a draft, or

for any other offense against the military or naval service."

_Abraham Lincoln,

Complete Works,

volume 2, pages 38, 45, 54, 85, 93, 239, 406._

{3448}

"Whether it is the President or Congress that has power under

the constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus was a burning question during the civil war. …

The case of John Merryman … was the first to come up for

judicial interpretation. Merryman lived near Baltimore, and

appears to have been suspected of being captain of a secession

troop, of having assisted in destroying railroads and bridges

for the purpose of preventing troops from reaching Washington,

and of obstructing the United States mail. By order of General

Keim of Pennsylvania he was arrested at night in his own

house, and taken to Fort McHenry at that time in command of

General George Cadwallader. Taney, who was then chief justice

of the United States, granted a habeas corpus, but Cadwallader

refused to obey it, saying that the privilege had been

suspended by the President. On the return of the writ, the

Chief Justice filed an opinion denying that the President had

any power to suspend habeas corpus and affirming that such

power rested with Congress alone. Lincoln continued to arrest

and imprison without any regard to this opinion, and indeed

was advised by his Attorney-General that he was not bound to

notice it. … The writ of habeas corpus was … not suspended by

Congress until the rebellion was half over. In other words,

Lincoln suspended it for two years of his own accord and

without authority from anyone; for two years he made arrests

without warrants and held men in prison as long as he pleased.

… There are few things in American history more worthy of

discussion than the power exercised by Lincoln in those two

years. It was absolute and arbitrary and, if unauthorized, its

exercise was a tremendous violation of the constitution.

Whether it was justifiable and necessary is another matter. If

it was unconstitutional and yet necessary in order to save the

Union, it shows that the constitution is defective in not

allowing the government the proper means of protecting itself.

That Lincoln used this power with discretion and forbearance

there is no doubt. He was the most humane man that ever

wielded such authority. He had no taste for tyranny, and he

knew the temper of the American people. But, nevertheless,

injustice was sometimes done. His subordinates had not always

their master's nature."

_S. G. Fisher,

The Suspension of Habeas Corpus

during the War of the Rebellion

(Political Science Quarterly,

September, 1888)._

The view which President Lincoln himself entertained, and

under which he assumed and exercised authority to suspend the

writ of habeas corpus, was submitted to Congress in his first

Message, when it convened in special session, July 4, 1861. He

said: "Soon after the first call for militia, it was

considered a duty to authorize the commanding general in

proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to

arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes

and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous

to the public safety. This authority has purposely been

exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and

propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and

the attention of the country has been called to the

proposition that one who has sworn to 'take care that the laws

be faithfully executed' should not himself violate them. Of

course some consideration was given to the questions of power

and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of

the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were

being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one third of

the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution,

even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means

necessary to their execution some single law, made in such

extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically,

it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to

a very limited ex·tent be violated? To state the question more

directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the

government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even

in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if the

government should be overthrown, when it was believed that

disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it

was not believed that this question was presented. It was not

believed that any law was violated. The provision of the

Constitution that 'the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or

invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to

a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be

suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public

safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of

rebellion, and that the public safety does require the

qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was

authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and

not the executive, is vested with this power. But the

Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to

exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for

a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of

the instrument intended that in every case the danger should

run its course until Congress could be called together, the

very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended

in this case, by the rebellion. … Whether there shall be any

legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted

entirely to the better judgment of Congress."

_Abraham Lincoln,

Complete Works,

volume 2, pages 59-60._

Congress gave tacit approval to this view of the President's

powers by passing no act on the subject until nearly two years

afterwards, as shown above.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862

(January-February: Kentucky—Tennessee).

The first breaking of the Confederate line.

Grant's capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.

"At the beginning of the new year the Union armies were over

660,000 strong, backed by a fleet of 212 vessels. McClellan

lay quiet upon the Potomac all winter, drilling, organizing,

disciplining the Army of the Potomac. In his front was Joe

Johnston, with a much smaller force, pushing forward with

equal energy the schooling of his soldiers. The Western

generals were more active. Albert Sidney Johnston, perhaps the

most promising Southern officer, was in command in the West,

with headquarters at Bowling Green. Buell lay in Johnston's

front, having superseded Sherman, whose 'crazy' suggestion

that 250,000 men would be required for operations on the

Western field had lost him the confidence of his superiors.

There was abundant method in his madness, as time all too

fully showed. In [Eastern] Kentucky the Confederate Humphrey

Marshall had been creating more or less political trouble, and

General Garfield was sent against him with some 2,000 men.

Marshall somewhat outnumbered Garfield; but in a vigorous

January campaign [beginning at Paintsville, January 7, and]

culminating at Prestonburg [January 10], Garfield quite

dispersed his forces, and drove him into the mountains.

{3449}

About the same time, Zollicoffer, with some 12,000 men, had

retreated from his post in advance of Cumberland Gap, where he

held the extreme right of the Southern line, to Mill Spring,

in Central Kentucky. General George H. Thomas was charged with

the duty of disposing of him. With about an equal force Thomas

promptly moved upon his enemy, and in a sharp action at Mill

Spring [January 19] utterly broke up his army. He thus early

showed the rare vigor he afterwards so fully developed.

Zollicoffer was killed. This first of our substantial western

victories (called 'Fishing Creek' by the enemy) [and also

called the battle of Logan Cross Roads by some Union writers]

was a great encouragement to our arms. Crittenden, who

succeeded to the command, withdrew his troops across the

Cumberland, abandoning his artillery and trains. Eastern

Kentucky was thus freed from the Confederates. Halleck's first

task as commander of the Western armies was to penetrate the

Confederate line of defense. This could be done by breaking

its centre or by turning one of its flanks. The former

appeared most feasible to Grant, and Commodore Foote, who

commanded the naval forces. Under instructions from Halleck,

seven of the gun-boat flotilla, with Grant's 17,000 men in

reserve, moved up the Tennessee river to attack Fort Henry and

essay the value of gun-boats in amphibious warfare. Grant

landed below the fort, and Foote then opened fire upon it.

Tilghman, in command, foreseeing its capture, was shrewd

enough to send off the bulk of his force to Fort Donelson. He

himself made a mock defense with a handful of men,

surrendering the fort after the garrison was well on its way.

Without the twin citadel of Donelson [distant about eleven

miles, southeastwardly, on the Cumberland River], however,

Fort Henry was but a barren triumph, for no column could

advance up the Tennessee river while this garrison threatened

its flank. It was here that Grant earned his first laurels as

a stanch soldier, by compelling, after a stubborn fight, the

surrender of this second fortress with its entire garrison.

Every effort had been made by Johnston to hold the place. He

must here fight for the possession of Nashville. Fort Donelson

was strongly fortified and garrisoned. Grant moved against it

from Fort Henry with 15,000 men; 5,000 less than the enemy.

The ground is difficult; the troops are green. But

reinforcements and the fleet come to Grant's assistance. The

fort is fully invested, under great difficulties from severity

of weather and the inexperience of the men. Happily there is

not much ability in the defense. Floyd, the senior officer,

determines to cut his way out. He falls heavily upon Grant's

right, held by McClernand and backed by Wallace, thinking to

thrust them aside from the river and to escape over the road

so won. A stubborn resistance defeats this sortie, though but

narrowly. A general assault is ordered, which effects a

lodgment in the works. Divided responsibilities between Floyd,

Buckner, and Pillow weaken the defense so as to operate a

surrender. Our loss was 2,300. The Confederates captured were

over 15,000 men. These successes broke through the centre of

the Confederate line, established with so much pains, and

compromised its flanks. Johnston found that he must retire to

a new line. This lay naturally along the Memphis and

Charleston Railroad. He had retreated from Bowling Green on

receipt of the news of the fall of Fort Henry, and was forced

thereby to cede to Buell possession of Nashville, and

practically of Kentucky. The advanced flank on the Mississippi

at Columbus was likewise compromised, and with the bulk of the

armament was withdrawn to Island No. 10, some forty miles

below Cairo. We could congratulate ourselves upon a very

substantial gain."

_T. A. Dodge,

Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War,

chapter 6._

ALSO IN:

_U. S. Grant,

Personal Memoirs,

chapters 21-23._

_J. M. Hoppin,

Life of Rear Admiral Foote,

chapters 16-18._

_W. P. Johnston,

Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,

chapters 26-28._

_Official Records,

series 1, volume 7._

_Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,

volume 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862

(January-March: Missouri-Arkansas).

Expulsion of the Confederates from Missouri.

Battle of Pea Ridge.

"Late in December General Samuel R. Curtis took command of

12,000 National troops at Rolla, and advanced against Price,

who retreated before him to the northwestern corner of

Arkansas, where his force was joined by that of General

McCulloch, and together they took up a position in the Boston

Mountains. Curtis crossed the line into Arkansas, chose a

strong place on Pea Ridge, in the Ozark Mountains, intrenched,

and awaited attack. Because of serious disagreements between

Price and McCulloch, General Earl Van Dorn, who ranked them

both, was sent to take command of the Confederate force,

arriving late in January. There is no authentic statement as

to the size of his army. He himself declared that he had but

14,000 men, while no other estimate gave fewer than twice that

number. Among them was a large body of Cherokee Indians,

recruited for the Confederate service by Albert Pike, who

thirty years before had won reputation as a poet. On March 5,

1862, Van Dorn moved to attack Curtis, who knew of his coming

and formed his line on the bluffs along Sugar Creek, facing

southward. His divisions were commanded by Generals Franz

Sigel and Alexander S. Asboth and Colonels Jefferson C. Davis

and Eugene A. Carr, and he had somewhat more than 10,000 men

in line, with 48 guns. The Confederates, finding the position

too strong in front, made a night march to the west, with the

intention of striking the Nationals on the right flank. But

Curtis discovered their movement at dawn, promptly faced his

line to the right about, and executed a grand left wheel. His

army was looking westward toward the approaching foe, Carr's

division being on the right, then Davis, then Asboth, and

Sigel on the left. But they were not fairly in position when

the blow fell. Carr was struck most heavily, and, though

reenforced from time to time, was driven back a mile in the

course of the day. Davis, opposed to the corps of McCulloch,

was more successful; that General was killed and his troops

were driven from the field. In the night Curtis reformed and

strengthened his lines, and in the morning the battle was

renewed. This day Sigel executed some brilliant and

characteristic manœvres. To bring his division into its place

on the left wing, he pushed a battery forward, and while it

was firing rapidly its infantry supports were brought up to it

by a right wheel; this movement was repeated with another

battery and its supports to the left of the first, and again,

till the whole division had come into line, pressing back the

enemy's right.

{3450}

Sigel was now so far advanced that Curtis's whole line made a

curve, enclosing the enemy, and by a heavy concentrated

artillery fire the Confederates were soon driven to the

shelter of the ravines, and finally put to rout. The National

loss in this action [called the battle of Elk Horn by the

Confederates]—killed, wounded, and missing—was over 1,300,

Carr and Asboth being among the wounded. The Confederate loss

is unknown. Generals McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, and

Generals Price and Slack wounded. Owing to the nature of the

ground, any effective pursuit of Van Dorn's broken forces was

impracticable."

_R. Johnson,

Short History of the War of Secession,

chapter 6._

ALSO IN:

_W. Baxter,

Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove._

_O. J. Victor,

History of the Southern Rebellion,

volume 3, pages 56-71._

_Official Records, series 1,

volume 8, pages 189-330._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862

(January-April: North Carolina).

Burnside's expedition to Roanoke and

capture of Newbern and Beaufort.

"Roanoke Island, lying behind Bodie's Island, the sand-bar

that shuts off Upper North Carolina from the Atlantic Ocean,

offers some of the most interesting souvenirs of early

American history. … As stated by General Wise, to whom its

defense was intrusted by the Confederate government, it was

the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two

sounds, eight rivers, four canals, two railroads. It guarded

more than four fifths of the supplies of Norfolk. The seizure

of it endangered the subsistence of the Confederate army

there, threatened the navy yard, interrupted the communication

between Norfolk and Richmond, and intervened between both and

the South. … After the capture of Hatteras Inlet in August,

1861, light-draught steamers, armed with a rifle gun, often

stealthily came out of these waters to prey upon commerce. …

An expedition for operating on this part of the North Carolina

coast was placed under command of General Burnside, who was

ordered (January 7th, 1862) to unite with Flag-officer

Goldsborough, in command of the fleet, at Fortress Monroe,

capture Newbern, seize the Weldon Railroad, and reduce Fort

Macon. The force consisted of 31 steam gun-boats, some of them

carrying heavy guns; 11,500 troops, conveyed in 47 transports;

a fleet of small vessels for the transportation of sixty days'

supplies. It left Hampton Roads on the night of January 11th,

and arrived off Hatteras in two days, as a storm was coming

on. The commander found with dismay that the draught of

several of his ships was too great to permit them to enter. …

Some dishonest ship-sellers in New York had, by

misrepresentation, palmed off on the government unsuitable

transport vessels, of which several were lost in that

tempestuous sea. … It was only by the greatest exertion and

perseverance, and not until a whole fortnight had elapsed,

that the entrance to Pamlico Sound was completed. The villainy

that led to this delay gave the Confederates ample time for

preparation. Not until the end of another week (February 7th)

had the reorganized expedition gained the entrance to Croatan

Sound, and worked through its shallow, marshy passes. The

weather was beautiful by day; there was a bright moonshine at

night. The gun-boats found a Confederate fleet drawn up behind

the obstructions, across the channel, near Pork Point. They

opened fire on the fort at that point. It was returned both

from the works and the shipping. Meantime troops were being

landed at Ashby's, a small force, which was attempting to

resist them, being driven off by the fire of the ships. The

debarkation went on, though it was raining heavily and night

had set in. It was continued until 10,000 men had been landed

on the marsh. Before dark, however, the work at Pork Point had

been silenced, and the Confederate fleet had retired to Weir's

Point. … When day broke, Burnside commenced forcing his way up

the island. He moved in three columns, the central one,

preceded by a howitzer battery, upon the only road, the right

and left through the woods. The battery that obstructed this

road was soon carried, though not without resistance. The men

had to wade waist-deep in the water of the pond that protected

it. … Toward Nag's Head the Confederate force, expelled from

the captured work, attempted to retreat. They were, however,

overtaken, and the rest of the command on the north of the

island, 2,500 strong, was compelled to surrender. The

Confederate fleet was pursued to Elizabeth City, whither it

had fled, and there destroyed. A large part of the town was

burned. A portion of the national fleet went into the harbor

of Edenton and captured that town. Winton, on the Chowan

River, shared the same fate. Burnside next made an attack

(March 14th) on Newbern, one of the most important sea-ports

of North Carolina. As the troops advanced from the place of

landing, the gun-boats shelled the woods in front of them, and

thereby cleared the way. A march of 18 miles in a rain-storm,

and over execrable roads, did not damp the energy of the

soldiers. … Newbern was captured, and with it 46 heavy guns, 3

batteries of light artillery, and a large amount of stores.

Burnside's losses were 90 killed and 466 wounded. Preparations

were next made for the reduction of Fort Macon, which commands

the entrance of Beaufort Harbor. On April 25th it was

bombarded by three steamers and three shore batteries; the

former, however, in the course of an hour and a half, were

compelled to withdraw. But the shore batteries, continuing

their attack, silenced the guns of the garrison, and, in the

course of the afternoon, compelled the surrender of the fort.

In connection with this expedition some operations of minor

importance occurred. … The chief result, however, was the

closure of the ports and suppression of commerce. General

Burnside's forces were eventually, for the most part,

withdrawn. They were taken to Alexandria, and joined the army

of General Pope."

_J. W. Draper,

History of the American Civil War,

chapter 59 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:

_D. Ammen,

The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,

chapters 8-9._

_A. Woodbury,

Burnside and the 9th Army Corps,

part 1, chapters 3-5._

_B. P. Poore,

Life of Burnside,

chapters 12-14._

{3451}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862

(February-April: Georgia-Florida).

Siege and capture of Fort Pulaski.

Temporary occupation of Florida.

Discouragement of Unionists.

The blockade of Fort Pulaski may be dated from the 22d of

February. Preparations were then made on Tybee Island to

bombard it. The most of the work had to be done in the night.

The work was carried on under the supervision of General

Gillmore, who was in chief command, and on the 9th of April

eleven batteries, containing an aggregate of 36 guns, were in

readiness to open fire. General David Hunter, who had just

succeeded General Sherman in command of the Department,

arrived at Tybee on the evening of the 8th. At sunrise, on the

morning of the 10th, Hunter sent Lieutenant J. H. Wilson to

the fort, with a summons to the commander of the garrison to

surrender. The latter refused, saying: "I am here to defend

this fort, not to surrender it." At a few minutes after eight

o'clock the batteries opened fire, and at the end of thirty

hours the garrison surrendered. In reporting the capture,

General Hunter wrote: "At the end of eighteen hours' firing

the fort was breached in the southeast angle, and at the

moment of surrender, 2 p. m. on the 11th instant, we had

commenced preparations for storming. The whole armament of the

fort—47 guns, a great supply of fixed ammunition, 40,000

pounds of powder, and large quantities of commissary stores,

have fallen into our hands; also 360 prisoners, of whom the

officers will be sent North by the first opportunity that

offers. The result of this bombardment must cause, I am

convinced, a change in the construction of fortifications as

radical as that foreshadowed in naval architecture by the

conflict between the Monitor and Merrimac. No works of stone

or brick can resist the impact of rifled artillery of heavy

caliber." General Benham, immediately commanding the

operations, remarked in his report: "This siege is … the first

trial, at least on our side of the Atlantic, of the modern

heavy and rifled projectiles against forts erected and

supposed to be sufficiently strong prior to these inventions,

almost equaling, as it would appear, the revolution

accomplished in naval warfare by the iron-clad vessels

recently constructed." Captain (acting Brigadier-General) Q.

A. Gillmore, the officer immediately in charge of the works on

Tybee Island, has given, in a report made in 1865 to the

Adjutant-General of the United States of America, an account

of the difficulties under which the batteries which performed

the chief part in the siege were erected: "Tybee Island is

mostly a mud marsh, like other marsh islands on this coast.

Several ridges and hummocks of firm ground, however, exist

upon it, and the shore of Tybee Roads, where the batteries

were located, is partially skirted by low sand banks, formed

by the gradual and protracted action of the wind and tides.

The distance along this shore from the landing place to the

advanced batteries is about 2½ miles. The last mile of this

route, on which the seven most advanced batteries were placed,

is low and marshy, lies in full view of Fort Pulaski, and is

within effective range of its guns. The construction of a

causeway resting on fascines and brush-wood over this swampy

portion of the line; the erection of the several batteries,

with the magazines, gun platforms, and splinter-proof

shelters; the transportation of the heaviest ordnance in our

service by the labor of men alone; the hauling of ordnance

stores and engineer supplies, and the mounting of the guns and

mortars on their carriages and beds had to be done almost

exclusively at night, alike regardless of the inclemency of

the weather and of the miasma from the swamps. No one except

an eye-witness can form any but a faint conception of the

herculean labor by which mortars of 8½ tons' weight and

columbiads but a trifle lighter were moved in the dead of

night over a narrow causeway, bordered by swamps on either

side, and liable at any moment to be overturned and buried in

the mud beyond reach. The stratum of mud is about 12 feet

deep, and on several occasions the heaviest pieces,

particularly the mortars, became detached from the

sling-carts, and were with great difficulty, by the use of

planks and skids, kept from sinking to the bottom. Two hundred

and fifty men were barely sufficient to move a single piece on

sling-carts. The men were not allowed to speak above a

whisper, and were guided by the notes of a whistle. The

positions selected for the five most advanced batteries were

artificially screened from view from the fort by a gradual and

almost imperceptible change, made little by little every

night, in the condition and appearance of the brush-wood and

bushes in front of them. No sudden alteration of the outline

of the landscape was permitted. After the concealment was once

perfected to such a degree as to afford a good and safe

parapet behind it less care was taken, and some of the work in

the batteries requiring mechanical skill was done in the

daytime, the fatigue parties going to their labor before break

of day and returning in the evening after dark. … The three

breaching batteries—Sigel, Scott, and McClellan—were

established at a mean distance of 1,700 yards from the scarp

walls of Fort Pulaski. The circumstance, altogether new in the

annals of sieges, that a practicable breach, which compelled

the surrender of the work, was made at that distance in a wall

7½ feet thick, standing obliquely to the line of fire and

backed by heavy casemate piers and arches, cannot be ignored

by a simple reference to the time-honored military maxims that

'Forts cannot sustain a vigorous land attack,' and that 'All

masonry should be covered from land batteries.'"

_Official Records,

series 1, volume 6, pages 134-135, 155, 161._

"By this victory, won on the first anniversary of the fall of

Fort Sumter [April 12], the port of Savannah was sealed

against blockade-runners. The capture of Fort Jackson above,

and of the city, would have been of little advantage to the

Nationals then, for the forces necessary to hold them were

needed in more important work farther down the coast. While

Gillmore and Viele were besieging Fort Pulaski, Commodore

Dupont and General Wright were making easy conquests on the

coast of Florida." Fort Clinch, on Amelia Island, Fernandina,

Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and other places, were abandoned

by the Rebels on the approach of the National forces. But

these conquests proved rather unfortunate than otherwise. "At

first, the hopes they inspired in the breasts of the Union

people developed quite a widespread loyalty. A Union

convention was called to assemble at Jacksonville on the 10th

of April, to organize a loyal State Government, when, to the

dismay of those engaged in the matter, General Wright prepared

to withdraw his forces, two days before the time when the

convention was to meet. … In consequence, … very little Union

feeling was manifested in Florida during the remainder of the

war."

_B. J. Lossing,

Field Book of the Civil War,

volume 2, chapter 12._

{3452}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (February-April: Tennessee).

The advance up River.

Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.

"By the end of February, 1862, Major-General Halleck commanded

all the armies in the valley of the Mississippi, from his

headquarters in St. Louis. These were, the Army of the Ohio,

Major-General Buell, in Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee,

Major-General Grant, at Forts Henry and Donelson; the Army of

the Mississippi, Major-General Pope; and that of General S. R.

Curtis, in Southwest Missouri. He posted his chief of staff,

General Cullum, at Cairo, and me [General Sherman] at Paducah,

chiefly to expedite and facilitate the important operations

then in progress up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. …

General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which had

retreated hastily from Bowling Green to and through Nashville,

a city of so much importance to the South that it was at one

time proposed as its capital. Both Generals Grant and Buell

looked to its capture as an event of great importance. On the

21st General Grant sent General Smith with his division to

Clarksville, 50 miles above Donelson, toward Nashville, and on

the 27th went himself to Nashville to meet and confer with

General Buell, but returned to Donelson the next day." Orders

sent by General Halleck to Grant did not reach the latter, and

a supposed disobedience occurred which caused him to be

hastily relieved from his command, which was transferred to

General C. F. Smith, on the 4th of March. Halleck's purpose

"was evidently to operate up the Tennessee River, to break up

Bear Creek Bridge and the railroad communications between the

Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, and no doubt he was provoked

that Generals Grant and Smith had turned aside to Nashville.

In the mean time several of the gunboats, under Captain

Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up the Tennessee as far

as Florence, and on their return had reported a strong Union

feeling among the people along the river. On the 10th of

March, having received the necessary orders from General

Halleck, I embarked my division at Paducah. … I … steamed up

the Tennessee River, following the two gunboats, and, in

passing Pittsburg Landing, was told by Captain Gwin that, on

his former trip up the river, he had found a rebel regiment of

cavalry posted there, and that it was the usual landing-place

for the people about Corinth, distant 30 miles. I sent word

back to General Smith that, if we were detained up the river,

he ought to post some troops at Pittsburg Landing. We went on

up the river cautiously, till we saw Eastport and Chickasaw,

both of which were occupied by rebel batteries and a small

rebel force of infantry. We then dropped back quietly to the

mouth of Yellow River, a few miles below," where the troops

were landed and an attempt made to push out and destroy the

Memphis and Charleston railroad; but heavy rains had so

swollen all the streams that the expedition was foiled and

returned. "Once more embarked, I concluded to drop down to

Pittsburg Landing, and to make the attempt from there. During

the night of the 14th, we dropped down to Pittsburg Landing,

where I found Hurlbut's division in boats. Leaving my command

there, I steamed down to Savannah, and reported to General

Smith in person, who saw in the flooded Tennessee the full

truth of my report; and he then instructed me to disembark my

own division, and that of General Hurlbut, at Pittsburg

Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room for

his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in

person, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the

railroad, contemplated by General Halleck's orders. … Within a

few days, Prentiss's division arrived and camped on my left,

and afterward McClernand's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions,

which formed a line to our rear. Lew Wallace's division

remained on the north side of Snake Creek, on a road leading

from Savannah or Crump's Landing to Purdy. General C. F. Smith

remained back at Savannah, in chief command, and I was only

responsible for my own division. I kept pickets well out on

the roads, and made myself familiar with all the ground inside

and outside my lines. … We were all conscious that the enemy

was collecting at Corinth, but in what force we could not

know, nor did we know what was going on behind us. On the 17th

of March, General U. S. Grant was restored to the command of

all the troops up the Tennessee River, by reason of General

Smith's extreme illness, and because he had explained to

General Halleck satisfactorily his conduct after Donelson; and

he too made his headquarters at Savannah, but frequently

visited our camps. … From about the 1st of April we were

conscious that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting

bolder and more saucy. … On Sunday morning, the 6th, early,

there was a good deal of picket-firing, and I got breakfast,

rode out along my lines, … and saw the rebel lines of battle

in front coming down on us as far as the eye could reach. All

my troops were in line of battle, ready, and the ground was

favorable to us. … In a few minutes the battle of 'Shiloh'

began with extreme fury, and lasted two days. … Probably no

single battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging

reports. It was publicly asserted at the North that our army

was taken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us in

our tents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that General Grant

was drunk; that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of

the Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These reports were

in a measure sustained by the published opinions of Generals

Buell, Nelson, and others, who had reached the

steamboat-landing from the east, just before nightfall of the

6th, when there was a large crowd of frightened, stampeded

men, who clamored and declared that our army was all destroyed

and beaten. Personally I saw General Grant, who with his staff

visited me about 10 A. M. of the 6th, when we were desperately

engaged. But we had checked the headlong assault of our enemy,

and then held our ground. This gave him great satisfaction,

and he told me that things did not look as well over on the

left. … He came again just before dark, and described the last

assault made by the rebels at the ravine, near the

steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery

collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and

he was convinced that the battle was over for that day. He

ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning,

saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis

of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed

the offensive was sure to win.

{3453}

General Grant also explained to me that General Buell had

reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg

Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at

the time he was speaking to me. About half an hour afterward

General Buell himself rode up to where I was. … Buell said

that Nelson's, McCook's, and Crittenden's divisions of his

army, containing 18,000 men, had arrived and could cross over

in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle. I argued

that with these reënforcements we could sweep the field. Buell

seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not

like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing,

and I really feared he would not cross over his army that

night, lest he should become involved in our general disaster.

… Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we assumed

the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle

decisively. Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept

up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as

usual maintained an imperturbable silence. … Beauregard [who

took the rebel command after General Albert Sidney Johnston

fell in the first day's battle afterward reported his entire

loss as 10,699. Our aggregate loss, made up from official

statements, shows 1,700 killed, 7,495 wounded, 3,022

prisoners; aggregate, 12,217, of which 2,167 were in Buell's

army, leaving for that of Grant 10,050. This result is a fair

measure of the amount of fighting done by each army. … The

battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most

fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6,

1862, the five divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W.

H. L. Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about 32,000 men. We

had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon

as Buell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the

enemy. The rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney

Johnston, was, according to their own reports and admissions,

45,000 strong."

_W. T. Sherman,

Memoirs, 4th edition,

chapter 10 (volume 1);

or 1st edition, chapter 9 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:

_U. S. Grant,

Personal Memoirs,

chapters 23-25._

_W. P. Johnston,

Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,

chapters 30-35._

_U. S. Grant, D. C. Buell, and others,

Shiloh

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1)._

_Official Records,

Series 1, volume 10._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March).

President Lincoln's proposal of Compensated Emancipation

approved by Congress.

On the 6th of March President Lincoln addressed to Congress

the following Special Message: "Fellow-citizens of the Senate

and House of Representatives: I recommend the adoption of a

joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be

substantially as follows: Resolved, That the United States

ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual

abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to

be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for

the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such

change of system. If the proposition contained in the

resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the

country, there is the end; but if it does command such

approval, I deem it of importance that the States and people

immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified

of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to

accept or reject it. The Federal Government would find its

highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most

efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the

existing insurrection entertain the hope that this government

will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of

some part of the disaffected region, and that all the slave

States north of such part will then say, 'The Union for which

we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with

the Southern section.' To deprive them of this hope

substantially ends the rebellion; and the initiation of

emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the

States initiating it. The point is not that all the States

tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate

emancipation; but that while the offer is equally made to all,

the more Northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain

to the more Southern that in no event will the former ever

join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say

'initiation' because, in my judgment, gradual and not sudden

emancipation is better for all. In the mere financial or

pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the census tables

and treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself

how very soon the current expenditures of this war would

purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named

State. Such a proposition on the part of the General

Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to

interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it

does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the

State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as

a matter of perfectly free choice with them. In the annual

message, last December, I thought fit to say, 'The Union must

be preserved, and hence all indispensable means must be

employed.' I said this not hastily, but deliberate]y. War has

been made, and continues to be, an indispensable means to this

end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority

would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease.

If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue;

and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may

attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem

indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency,

toward ending the struggle, must and will come. The

proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be

esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration

tendered would not be of more value to the States and private

persons concerned than are the institution and property in it,

in the present aspect of affairs? While it is true that the

adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely

initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is

recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important

practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to

my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of

Congress and the people to the subject. Abraham Lincoln,

Washington, March 6, 1862."

_Abraham Lincoln,

Complete Works,

volume 2, pages 129-130._

{3454}

"Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, having moved and carried a

reference of this Message by the House to a Committee of the

Whole on the State of the Union, and Mr. R. Conkling, of New

York, having moved the resolve above recommended, a debate

sprung up thereon; which is notable only as developing the

repugnance of the Unionists of the Border Slave States, with

that of the Democrats of all the States, to compensated or any

other Emancipation. … It passed the House by 89 Yeas

(Republicans, West Virginians, and a few others not strictly

partisans) to 31 Nays." On the 2d of April, the resolution

passed the Senate, by 32 Yeas to 10 Nays. "The President of

course approved the measure; but no single Slave State ever

claimed its benefits; and its only use inhered in its

demonstration of the willingness of the Unionists to increase

their already heavy burdens to pay for the slaves of the

Border States—a willingness which the infatuation of the

ruling class in those States rendered abortive."

_H. Greeley,

The American Conflict,

volume 2, chapter 12._

ALSO IN:

_H. Wilson,

History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America,

volume 3, chapter 23._

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,

Abraham Lincoln,

volume 5, chapter 12._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March).

The Battle of the Monitor and the Merrimac.

"In August 1861 the Northern States had determined to obtain

ironclad steam vessels, and at the end of that month Ericsson

offered to construct in a few months a vessel which would

destroy the rebel squadron. A board of officers was appointed

to consider plans proposed, and in September it recommended

that a vessel on Ericsson's design should be built. She was

commenced in October, launched on January 30th, 1862, and

completed on February 15th, 1862. The design provided for a

hull not more than 2 ft. above the water, and with a flat

bottom, that the draught might not exceed 10 ft. The sides, to

a short distance below the water line, were protected with

4-in. plates. In the centre of the deck was built a circular

turret, revolving on a central spindle, and protected with 8

in. of iron. Inside the turret were mounted two 11-in. smooth

bore guns, pointing through port holes. They could thus fire

in any direction without turning the vessel, an obvious

advantage not only on the open sea but especially in narrow

waters, for which she was more intended. Such was the famous

'Monitor,' a name given by Ericsson to his creation to

admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion, and to be also

a monitor to the Lords of the Admiralty in England, suggesting

to them doubts as to the propriety of their building four

broadside ironclads at three and a half million dollars each."

_S. Eardley-Wilmot,

The Development of Navies,

chapter 4._

"While the Secretary of the Navy was urging forward the

construction of the first iron-clads, it was known that the

rebel government was making great exertions in the same

direction. Iron-clad vessels were under way at New Orleans,

Charleston, and at some other points, while at Norfolk the

Merrimack [the old frigate of that name, roofed slopingly with

railroad iron, was very near completion in the winter of

1861-62.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1861 (APRIL)

ACTIVITY OF REBELLION.

The formidable character of this mailed frigate constrained

the Government to make every effort to complete the Monitor

[the first of the turreted iron-clads, invented by John C.

Ericsson] in season to meet her whenever she should come out;

and it is stated that information obtained by a rebel spy of

the state of forwardness in which the Monitor was, induced the

rebels to put a double force upon their frigate, so that she

might be able to attack our fleet in Hampton Roads before the

Monitor's arrival, and, if possible, also to make a raid upon

Washington or the Northern cities. This extra labor, it is

said, gained the one day in which the Merrimack destroyed the

Cumberland and Congress. … The Monitor, commanded by

Lieutenant John L. Worden, reached the scene of late disaster

to our cause, and of her coming triumph, on the 8th of March,

at 9 o'clock P. M., and Lieutenant Worden reported for orders

to Captain Marston, the commander of the Roanoke. The

Minnesota, one of our noblest frigates, the Roanoke of the

same class, but partially disabled, the frigate Congress, and

the sloop Cumberland, had been stationed at the mouth of the

James River to watch for, to engage, and, if possible,

destroy, capture, or stop the expected rebel iron-clad frigate

then ready for sea at Norfolk. These vessels carried very

heavy batteries, and it was hoped that they would be able to

cope with the Merrimack. How vain such an expectation was, her

first day's operations fully and sadly demonstrated. It is

probably no exaggeration to say that she would have destroyed

easily, and without any material damage to herself, every

wooden ship then in our Navy, had they been within her reach,

and with none but themselves to oppose her."

_C. B. Boynton,

History of the Navy during the Rebellion,

chapter 21._

"Such was the state of affairs when the Monitor arrived at

Hampton Roads, that the sturdy commanders trembled in face of

the coming day, and all was silence and gloom. The

sloop-of-war Cumberland, having a crew of 300 men, and

mounting 24 guns, now lay on the bottom with only her

top-gallant masts and pennant above the water, marking the

spot where 117 mangled bodies lay buried beneath the waves.

The Congress, a 50-gun frigate, had also met her destruction,

and now lay on shore with the flames kindled by hot shot of

the Merrimac sweeping out her hull. The Roanoke and Minnesota,

steam frigates of 40 guns each, the pride of the navy and the

most perfect of any men-of-war of the period, laid hard and

fast on shore, with broken machinery and as powerless as if

they had been unarmed. The capture or entire destruction of

the Federal fleet at Hampton Roads and the escape of the

Merrimac and the rebel cruisers seemed inevitable." Arriving

in the evening of the 8th, the Monitor anchored near the

frigate Minnesota at Newport News. "At half-past five in the

morning all hands were called, and the ship was immediately

cleared of her sea-rig and got ready for battle. … At

half-past seven o'clock a long line of black smoke was seen,

preceded by the steamers Jamestown, Patrick Henry and Teazer.

It was the signal for battle. The crews of the different

vessels stood by their guns, fuzes in hands. The Monitor

steamed slowly from beneath the bows of the Minnesota, where

she had been partly concealed, to meet the challenger in an

open field. It was alike an astonishment to the rebels and our

own people; neither had seen her when she arrived, and many

were the conjectures of what it could be. Some said a huge

water tank; others an infernal machine; none that she had

guns, and not till they saw steam rise from her deck did they

think she had power to move herself. … The Merrimac stopped

her engines, as if to survey and wonder at the audacity of the

nondescript. The Monitor was approaching on her starboard bow.

{3455}

Then, as if seized with impulsive rage, and as if a huge

breath would waft her enemy away, the Merrimac poured a

broadside of solid shot at her. For an instant she was

enveloped in smoke, and people who were looking on held their

breath in doubt of seeing the Monitor again. It was a moment

of great suspense. Then as a gentle breeze swept over the

scene the Monitor appeared. At this instant the flash of her

own guns was seen, and then their report, louder than any

cannon that had ever been heard, thundered across the sea. It

seemed to jar the very earth, and the iron scales of the

invincible crumbled and cracked from their fastenings. One on

board the Merrimac at this time has told me that, though at

first entirely confident of victory, consternation took hold

of them all. 'D-n it!' said one, 'the thing is full of guns!'

The enthusiasm at this moment among the thousand of civilians

and soldiers, who lined the shore to witness the fight, was

beyond description and their own control. Such a spontaneous

burst of cheers was never before heard. Men were frantic with

joy. The Monitor continued her approach, reserving fire that

every shot might take effect, until she came parallel with the

Merrimac, but heading in the opposite direction. In this way

they passed slowly within a few yards of each other, both

delivering and receiving the other's fire. … Captain Worden

headed again towards the Merrimac with renewed confidence and

engaged her at close quarters. Again they joined in close

combat, the Monitor lying bow on, at times touching, both

delivering their fire as rapidly as possible. At the same time

the marines on the Merrimac poured an incessant fire of

musketry at the peek-holes about the pilot-house and turret.

The speed of the two vessels was about equal, but the light

draught of the Monitor gave her an advantage. The rebels

finding that they could make nothing of the invulnerable

cheese-box, as they called her, and foiled and maddened at the

loss of their coveted prize, turned towards the Minnesota,

determined, if possible, to destroy her. The Merrimac went

head on and received a full broadside of the Minnesota. Fifty

solid nine-inch shot struck square. Any wooden vessel that

ever floated would have gone to pieces under such a fire. The

Merrimac was unharmed. She returned the fire with her forward

rifle guns. One shell passed through four rooms, tearing away

partitions and setting the ship on tire. Another passed

through the boiler of the steamer Dragon which lay alongside,

blowing her up and killing and wounding 17 men. Before a third

was fired the Monitor interposed, compelling the Merrimac to

change her position. The two combatants then made a complete

circle in their endeavors to get a favorable position, each

seeking to discharge a broadside into some vital part. The

Merrimac then turned sharp and made a plunge towards the

Minnesota, but Worden was vigilant, and crossed the stern of

the Merrimac, sending two solid shot into her. To get back

again between her and the Minnesota, the Monitor had almost to

cross her bow. The Merrimac steamed up quickly, and finding

that the Monitor would be struck with her prow Worden sheered

towards the enemy's stern, avoiding a direct blow, and, as

they came into collision, each vessel delivered a broadside

into the other. At this point a shell from the Merrimac struck

the pilot-house exactly over the peek-hole through which

Captain Worden was looking. The shell exploding, filled his

face and eyes with powder and fragments of iron, utterly

blinding and for a time rendering him unconscious. Lieutenant

Greene, who had been in charge of the turret division,

immediately left the guns and spent full thirty minutes

nursing the wounded commander, during which time the gunners

shotted the guns, and, as the Merrimac was turning away,

discharged them at close range into her stern, a blow that

made her whole frame shudder and seemed at once to be fatal.

There was no officer to direct the movements of the vessel

except the pilot Howard. As the two combatants parted from the

struggle they were headed in opposite directions, both away

from their goal. Presuming that the fight would be continued,

Pilot Howard ran the vessel a short distance down the channel

and turning brought her again close to the protection of the

Minnesota, when Lieutenant Greene stepped into the pilot-house

and assumed command. It was then observed that the Merrimac

had taken the channel and was heading towards Norfolk. She was

soon joined by her consorts, and taken up to their refuge

under the batteries of Craney Island, the Merrimac apparently

sagging down astern. Thus ended the greatest naval battle of

the world. … The only perceptible danger to those on board the

Monitor, after the first round from the Merrimac, was to those

in the turret, who were in great danger from the flying of

bolt heads driven with great force across the turret, and from

the concussion, which would for a time paralyze a man if he

should in any way be in contact with the turret when struck by

a shot."

_F. B. Butts,

The Monitor and the Merrimac

(Soldiers' and Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode Island,

Fourth series, Number 6)._

"The engagement in Hampton Roads on the 8th of March, 1862,

between the Confederate iron-clad Virginia, or the Merrimac,

as she is known at the North, and the United States wooden

fleet, and that on the 9th, between the Virginia and the

Monitor, was, in its results, in some respects the most

momentous naval conflict ever witnessed. No battle was ever

more widely discussed or produced a greater sensation. It

revolutionized the navies of the world. … Rams and iron-clads

were in future to decide all naval warfare. In this battle old

things passed away, and the experience of a thousand years of

battle and breeze was forgotten. The naval supremacy of

England vanished in the smoke of this fight, only to reappear

some years later more commanding than ever. The effect of the

news was best described by the London 'Times,' which said:

'Whereas we had available for immediate purposes 149

first-class war-ships: we have now two, these two being the

Warrior and her sister Ironside. There is not now a ship in

the English navy apart from these two that it would not be

madness to trust to an engagement with that little Monitor.'

The Admiralty at once proceeded to reconstruct the navy. … The

same results were produced in France, which had but one

sea-going iron-clad, La Gloire, and this one, like the

Warrior, was only protected amidships. … And so with all the

maritime powers. In this race the United States took the lead,

and at the close of the war led all the others in the numbers

and efficiency of its iron-clad fleet. … Our loss [that is,

the Confederate loss on the Virginia, or Merrimac, in the

first day's battle, with the wooden ships] in killed and

wounded was 21.

{3456}

The armor was hardly damaged, though at one time our ship was

the focus on which were directed at least 100 heavy guns

afloat and ashore. But nothing outside escaped. … We slept at

our guns, dreaming of other victories in the morning. But at

daybreak we discovered, lying between us and the Minnesota, a

strange-looking craft, which we knew at once to be Ericsson's

Monitor, which had long been expected in Hampton Roads, and of

which, from different sources, we had a good idea. She could

not possibly have made her appearance at a more inopportune

time for us, changing our plans, which were to destroy the

Minnesota, and then the remainder of the fleet below Fortress

Monroe. She appeared but a pigmy compared with the lofty

frigate which she guarded. But in her size was one great

element of her success. … After an early breakfast, we got

under way and steamed out toward the enemy, opening fire from

our bow pivot, and closing in to deliver our starboard

broadside at short range, which was returned promptly from her

11-inch guns. Both vessels then turned and passed again still

closer. The Monitor was firing every seven or eight minutes,

and nearly every shot struck. Our ship was working worse and

worse, and after the loss of the smoke-stack, Mr. Ramsay,

chief engineer, reported that the draught was so poor that it

was with great difficulty he could keep up steam. Once or

twice the ship was on the bottom. Drawing 22 feet of water, we

were confined to a narrow channel, while the Monitor, with

only 12 feet immersion, could take any position, and always

have us in range of her guns. … Several times the Monitor

ceased firing, and we were in hopes she was disabled, but the

revolution again of her turret and the heavy blows of her

11-inch shot on our sides soon undeceived us. … Lieutenant

Jones now determined to run her down or board her. For nearly

an hour we manœuvred for a position. … The ship was as

unwieldy as Noah's Ark. … And so, for six or more hours, the

struggle was kept up. At length, the Monitor withdrew over the

middle ground where we could not follow. … The battle was a

drawn one, so far as the two vessels engaged were concerned.

But in its general results the advantage was with the

Monitor."

_J. T. Wood,

The First Fight of Iron Clads

(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,

volume 1, pages 692-711)._

ALSO IN:

_J. Ericsson,

The Building of the Monitor

(Battles and Leaders. volume 1, pages 730-744)._

_W. C. Church,

Life of John Ericsson,

chapters 15-18 (volume 1)._

_Gideon Welles,

The First Iron-Clad Monitor

(Annals of the War by leading Participants),

page 17._

_C. B. Boynton,

History of the Navy during the Rebellion,

chapter 21._

On the evacuation of Norfolk by the Confederates, in May,

1862, the Merrimac was destroyed. The following December the

Monitor went down in a storm at sea, while on her way to

Charleston, and only a few of her crew were saved.