LXXXII. Saint Austin says wisely, that what is most surprizing, does not
seem to strike us, although it is the object of our daily experience;
which is a maxim, the saint applies to the wonders of nature, and falls
in exceedingly _à propos_ to suit with our present discussion. All the
philosophers he observes, admire as portentous things, the flight of
the iron to the load-stone, the pointing of this last to the poles,
and the flux and reflux of the ocean. If we ask them why they consider
these motions as wonderful, they will answer, it is because they cannot
ascertain their causes. But we cannot help remarking, that this answer
amounts to a virtual acknowledgment, that all the movements of nature are
equally wonderful, with those of the iron, the load-stone, and the ocean,
for their causes are equally disputed, because we are equally ignorant
of them. The only difference between them is, that these motions are
confined to particular or determined entities, and the others are common,
or nearly common to all.
LXXXIII. I confess for my own part, that on whatever side I view nature,
I equally wonder, because I find myself equally ignorant of it. The same
Saint Austin, whom we have just quoted (Tract. 24. in Johan.), observes,
that the ordinary multiplication of grain, which is obtained at harvest,
by means of the fertility of the earth, is equally a prodigy, with that
extraordinary multiplication of loaves and fishes, which was effected
by the majesty of Christ in the desert. Let now the vain philosopher
boast, that he is able to decipher that great mystery, only because
he is possessed of a compleat apparatus of faculty phrases; such as
_seminal virtue, previous dispositions, the corruption of one form, and
the introduction of another, attraction of the nutritious juice, the
conversion of it into the proper substance, vegetation, nutrition_, &c.
Was Saint Austin peradventure ignorant of those phrases, or of others
equivalent to them? Yet notwithstanding this, he looked upon that natural
multiplication of grain, as an impenetrable mystery. These phrases,
only express or describe those operations which are familiar and open
to our experience; but do not reveal to us, their causes, or the manner
in which they are performed. The rustics, are acquainted with many more
terms than we, expressive of the various operations with which nature in
succession, proceeds to perfect that work. Are they peradventure on this
account great philosophers? what do I explain, by calling vegetation or
nutrition, that progression, by which a plant acquires its increase in
bulk? does this afford me any philosophical knowledge, respecting the
manner in which that operation is performed? There are two principal
things to be considered in vegetation; the first is, the ascent of
the nutritious juice by the fibres of the plant; the second is, the
conversion of this juice into the vegetable substance; and we perceive in
those two things, two great mysteries. If we ask the school philosophers,
how the nutritious juice which is ponderous, rises spontaneously to
the very uppermost leaves of the highest trees, they will tell us that
it rises by attraction. And what is this, but placing us in the same
state of doubt and difficulty, with respect to the most common work of
vegetation, that we remain in, with respect to the motion of the iron to
the load-stone? Both the one and the other are called attraction, but we
are equally ignorant, why, or how, the highest leaves of a tree attract
the juice which rises from the bowels of the earth, as we are, why or how
the load-stone attracts the iron.
LXXXIV. Let us proceed to the second mystery. Who can explain to me, the
manner in which a juice that is so exceedingly fluid, subtil, and fine,
as to be able to circulate through the smallest channels of the fibres,
is afterwards converted into the solidity of wood or grain; and this
difficulty will increase, if we cast our eyes on the other mixtures,
and reflect, that from another juice, or rather most fluid vapour, is
generated copper and marble. Aristotle had certainly some reason for
saying, that nature was the very devil: _Natura dæmonia est, non divina_
(Lib. de Præsens. per somnum); for by observing her works with attention,
it seems as if she did every thing by enchantment.