VIII. I not only think, that these philosophers did not in their hearts,
adopt the system of universal doubt; but I also believe, there never was
any one who sincerely did it; because there are objects, with respect to
which, there can be no doubt but by implication. No one, for example, can
doubt of his own existence. The very act of doubting, is affirmative of
a certain knowledge, because he who doubts, must certainly be convinced
that he does doubt; and if the sceptics are not certain that they
doubt, how can they affirm they do with such obstinacy and stiffness?
Therefore we should conclude, that it is not from sentiment, but from
their fondness for disputation, that some of them defend the system of
universal scepticism; and if there ever was any one who truly assented
to it, we should not consider him as a philosopher, but as a lunatic;
for it would be improper to call maintaining such a system, a particular
mode of philosophizing, as we ought with more justice, to term it a
particular mode of raving.
IX. It is most likely then, that the most rigid sceptics, and those who
were truly and _bona fide_ such, admitted of some exceptions to the
universality of their system, or understood it in some determined sense,
which limited or restrained it. Socrates, whom some look upon as the
primitive father of the sceptics, said of himself, that he knew nothing
with certainty, except it was his ignorance of all things. This however,
was placing some sort of limitation to the system, although it was but a
very small one. But I am of opinion, that Socrates, who was a very modest
man, only meant to say, that what he knew amounted to but a small matter,
and that therefore we ought to understand his declaring himself totally
ignorant, as an hyperbolical expression. Saint Justin the martyr, and
other fathers who highly applauded that philosopher, would not have done
it, if they had taken him for a rigid sceptic, which would have amounted
to the same, as his having been an impious man; because it is evident,
that he who doubts of every thing, cannot be a person of any religious
principles; but he was so far from such a kind of man, that it is most
probable, the Athenians condemned him to death, because he affirmed the
existence of one only God. It is at least certain, that he treated the
multifarious number of the heathen gods with great derision; from whence
we should conclude, that he knew this important truth, that the Godhead
admits of no multiplication.
X. Other sceptics, who said that they doubted of every thing, and that
we ought to doubt of every thing, did not perhaps mean to exclude all
certainty, but only scientific and demonstrative certainty, which except
in mathematical cases, we must confess is very rare to be found. Even
many mathematical demonstrations, and especially those which are very
complicated, are not exempt from the suspicion, of there being some
occult fallacy contained in them, on which account they ceased to be
true demonstrations. How many have presumed to demonstrate they could
square the circle, whose modes of doing it, and their reasonings upon
the subject, when they came to be submitted to rigorous examination,
have been found to have some sophism involved in them, or to have been
built upon some supposition which was taken for certain, when in reality
it was not so. The geometrical demonstrations, with which they prove
the infinite divisibility of the continued quantity, are sufficiently
simple; notwithstanding which, there are authors, who because the
infinite divisibility of the quantity is imperceptible, suspect, that
there is some occult sophistry involved in those demonstrations.
XI. Others have refused to credit the evidence of their senses; but
not so grossly, but that they have condescended to make use of them to
direct their actions in the common affairs of civil and human life. They
govern themselves by them for the purpose of living, but not for that of
philosophizing. The information of their senses serves them to chuse the
useful, and avoid the pernicious, but not to determine the theory of an
object.
XII. The arguments they assign for this distrust of their senses in the
last instance, may be reduced to three. The first is, the distinction we
should admit between the impression which objects make on our senses, and
the absolute essence or quality contained in the objects themselves. For
example, we say that hemlock is bitter. If by this expression, we mean to
declare, that this herb makes on our palate a determined impression or
sensation, which we call bitterness, we speak properly; but if we mean
to say that the herb in itself contains an absolute quality, which we
describe by the same name, we speak improperly; for if this was the case,
all the animals who relish hemlock would find it bitter; but it happens
otherwise, for the goats are fond of it, and eat it greedily. In the same
manner do all those reason, who adopt this mode of arguing with respect
to all other sensible species. They say, the fire produces in us that
kind of impression, which we call heat; but that we ought not from thence
to conclude, that it is hot in itself. Thus although by approaching very
near to it, it produces pain in us, still it is not sensible of any
itself. Therefore we ought not for this reason, to say the fire contains
pain, it being at most only capable of occasioning pain; neither ought
we to call it hot, but only capable of producing heat; nor can we call
it hot but by equivocation, as we say, Medicine is healthy, because it
produces health in the animal.
XIII. This distinction is the fundamental maxim, by which the modern
philosophers maintain their rejection of all the sensible qualities,
which are assigned by Aristotle and his followers to objects; and they
carry the matter so far, that they will positively assert to you, that
neither snow is white, nor charcoal black, nor a bell sonorous, nor a
flower fragrant; and if you mean to express by these denominations,
intrinsic qualities, or such as proceed from some accidental intrinsic
form contained in objects; they will not allow such descriptions of
things to be good and valid, but only so far as they signify certain
determined impressions, which by means of the physical and corporeal
impulse of the insensible particles of matter, are made on our organs,
which are of the same use to us, to enable us to chuse the good, and
avoid the pernicious, as our knowledge of the real intrinsic forms would
be. They proceed to assert, that men would equally abstain from eating
arsenic, if they believed the moderns, who say this mineral kills by
dissolving the blood, by the rapid motion of its particles; as they
would by believing Aristotle, who imputes all the mischief it occasions
to be the effect of a venomous quality existing in the arsenic, and
that they would be equally anxious to acquire gold, by believing the
moderns, who say its brilliant yellow hue is the effect of a determined
impression made by the light on the retina, where it appears reflected
in that colour, from the particular texture of the insensible particles
of the gold, as they would, by believing Aristotle, who says, the colour
proceeds from an accidental form, inherent in the gold itself. I know
very well, that a learned philosopher said, a little while ago, that
the ladies had great reason to complain of Descartes, for having taken
from their faces that delicate smooth whiteness which makes them look so
tempting, and for having placed it in their admirer’s eyes. But although
this may do very well as a joke, it is certain, that the charm has an
equal effect to make them appear desirable, whether it is stamped on the
eyes, by the particular reflection, which, by the determined texture of
the insensible particles of the skin, is made by the light, or whether
it is produced by the intrinsic quality, which the Aristotelicans assign
as the cause of colours; and I much doubt, whether to this day, the
Carthesian philosophy has served any man as a preservative, against the
venom of that sweet poison, which we call beauty.