ZAPATA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH
Undoubtedly there is no Mexican who has been talked about, described,
praised and vilified more than Emiliano Zapata, in the last four years.
Now everybody can pronounce his name in America, for it has become a
byword of the revolution in Mexico.
Innumerable articles have been written in America on Zapata but I have
only met two men who had seen him,--one was a Mexican newspaperman and
the other was a federal major who slept in the same room with him,
unconscious of the fact that a few feet from his bed there was the
man he was supposed to capture dead or alive for Huerta, with three
thousand soldiers. When he did discover this interesting fact, Zapata
was miles away. This incident proved conclusively that the southern
chief could not be caught by force, and that the Indians in Morelos
would as soon think of committing suicide as to betray him.
The nature of the volcanic country in the State of Morelos makes it
very hard for a body of soldiers to march through it without danger of
being surprised and ambushed almost every hundred yards. Every peon in
Morelos and many other southern States is a Zapatista.
No man could have held such power as Zapata over the population of
almost three States, by offering in return only the spoils of war
or brigandage. No bandit ever controlled thirty thousand men on the
mere results or promise of loot or theft. The Zapatistas, with few
exceptions, are all for the abolition of all forms of slavery and for
the distribution of lands. Although Zapata is not the intellectual
leader of the Zapatistas, his name has become a legend. Many people
claim that he never existed, others claim that Genovevo de la O was the
braver and more intelligent of the two, and the real leader.
There were several leaders who fought Diaz before Zapata became
prominent, but the Morelian chief represented the deepest yearnings,
the most profound aspirations and all the unspoken desires of a
miserable, downtrodden, but patient, long-suffering and kindly race.
Any one who has visited that Garden of Eden of Mexico, the State of
Morelos, will bear testimony to the simplicity, morality and patience
of the Morelian Indians, their love of the soil which is almost a
passion, their sterling qualities.
The injustices, robberies and cruelties perpetrated on the Indians are
almost incredible, and almost unbelievable in our century. Until the
European war started, civilized people did not believe that soldiers
could be so cruel, reckless and ruthless against an enemy.
Zapata’s and Villa’s wholesale shooting of prisoners, the looting of
haciendas, banks and stores in captured cities, their retaliation
against federal officers, now seem like kid-glove, pink-tea affairs,
after the stories of German atrocities. In the light of these
atrocities, Villa might be a Mexican Chesterfield, and Zapata a
scrupulous Morelian hidalgo of the most fastidious tastes. Strange
to relate, the most virulent attacks against Mexican civilization,
methods of warfare and revolutionary barbarities, were written by
German editorialists. The Mexicans had no Treitschkes, Nietzsches,
von Bernhardis to sing the pæans of war, of the destruction and
annihilation of enemies, and inoffensive non-combatants in the name of
a higher culture and a greater civilization.
The precedents of cruelties and wanton destruction were created by the
federal officers under Diaz and Huerta. Where the Federals passed, they
left a trail of death and desolation. To prove that they had fought
valiantly the Federals killed peaceful peons and sent the ears of the
Indians as vouchers to the War Department.
Whole villages passed through fire and sword--in others all the men
were impressed into the army, and the women and children concentrated
in the cities. Thousands of fruit trees that had been growing for
years, bearing fruit, and which were the sole source of income of
families of peons, were ruthlessly cut down to be sold for firewood by
greedy Jefes Políticos. A whole population was decimated because it
would not stay under the leash of the slave driver on the sugar and
tobacco plantations owned by half a dozen rich families.
Their day of reckoning has almost arrived, and no matter what Zapata or
any other leader may do politically, the peons of Morelos know that the
lands are theirs for the taking.
Morelos is one of the smallest States in Mexico, and one of the
richest, and has an area of 2,734 square miles and a population of
179,114. As many as thirty thousand soldiers with machine guns and
cannon were sent to conquer Zapata and his army, but Zapata remained
unconquered. All the generals, including Huerta, who had won laurels in
many battlefields, invariably lost them in Morelos. The Federals fought
according to book-strategy, while Zapata and his chiefs fought with
the same fabian tactics which defeated Hannibal in Italy and Napoleon
in Spain. When the patient, ignorant, but physically powerful Indians
discovered that they could shoot and fight as well as the trained
Federals, and that a few thousand Indians banded together could keep at
bay a whole army of Federals, the struggle for land was won.
But there is the reverse of the medal. As all strong people have their
compensation in some flaw, so has Zapata a great weakness which
prevents him from becoming the greatest factor for good in his country.
His illiteracy, coupled with a lack of knowledge of politicians of the
middle and higher class, make him an easy prey to all sorts of schemers
and intriguers.
For years Zapata kept up his guerrilla warfare, accompanied by a staff
of officers and several secretaries. One of the most famous was a
certain Montaño, a school-teacher who wrote the first plan which Zapata
endorsed. The second plan, which was written by a certain Palafox,
another secretary, and was named the Plan of Ayala, which acknowledged
Orozco as the provisional president, when he rebelled against Madero,
assisted by Científico money.
After Madero’s murder, Orozco joined the standard of Huerta, who, true
to his usual methods, tried to use Orozco’s influence with Zapata, to
eliminate him. Orozco went to Morelos for the purpose of conferring
with Zapata, but the wily Morelian had discovered that the meeting was
not meant to bring peace, but to facilitate his capture and murder. As
Orozco was not very brave, and his conscience not very clear, instead
of going personally to the meeting, he sent instead his father and
two other agents. As an answer to the contemplated plot, Zapata took
Orozco’s father and his two agents as prisoners. Later they were found
dead, after an attack by the Federals.
Orozco vowed vengeance, but he left Cuernavaca in great haste under
the pretext of going North to fight the Constitutionalists, where
he was defeated at every encounter. Any one who had read Mexican
newspapers would have known how discredited Orozco’s personality was,
but Zapata’s secretaries wanted a continuation of conditions wherein
they would run the Morelian chief for their own benefit.
When Carranza arrived in Mexico City with the constitutionalist
government, he sent two agents to Zapata, with power to settle the
agrarian question in Morelos, once for all. The following letter by
Gen. A. I. Villareal will show how Zapata’s secretaries spoiled the
settlement.
MEXICO, Sept. 5th, 1914.
GENERAL EMILIANO ZAPATA:
Cuernavaca, Mor.
_Esteemed General_:
I had the pleasure of receiving the last letter, which you were kind
enough to send through Mr. Reyes and in which you express the fact
that you were to blame for the incident at Huitzilac. I must advise
you that this matter was not one of much importance, and it seems
that they gave you exaggerated reports of the same. What we consider
a grave affair, and was really a sad one regarding which we went to
consult you with the object of arriving at an agreement between the
revolutionary elements of the North and the South, was the unjustified
conduct and belligerent attitude of your secretary, Mr. Manuel
Palafox, in respect to whom I intend to speak in this letter with the
most absolute and honest frankness; believing in this way that I may
do you a good turn, not alone yourself personally but also the cause
of the well-being of the public which we must all defend and also the
peace of the nation.
If you critically analyze the happenings which occurred during our
visit in this city, and to which I beg to call your attention, you
will discover in a moment that all the difficulties, all the petty
misunderstandings, all the threats of war, emanated principally from
Mr. Palafox supported by Mr. Serratos, who also in our opinion is
carrying on work right in your office that is very far from being
patriotic and loyal.
It is always the case that when various people come together to
settle great or small differences which may exist between them, it
is understood if they work in good faith and the matters treated
of are thoroughly talked over, that some points are ceded by one
party and some by the other party; there must be reciprocity in
the arrangements, and a definite conclusion reached regarding the
subject under discussion. To continue, conferences held with regard
to any matter must not be reduced to the party on one side imposing
a settlement and the parties on the other side accepting the same
without discussing the propositions for and against and coming to a
mutual agreement.
Unfortunately, in our case this which was the rational and just
method of procedure did not take place, because as you will remember
Mr. Palafox, who was the spokesman during the discussions almost
prevented us from setting forth our side of the subject, and attempted
to impose upon us certain conditions which would have to be accepted
unconditionally as preliminaries before arriving at a resolution.
You will recollect that Mr. Palafox demanded as a first condition
that as revolutionaries of the North we should accept without
discussion the Plan of Ayala as the Supreme Law of the Republic,
declaring that otherwise it would be impossible to treat of other
matters.
This is in direct contradiction to your declarations, that you had no
ambition for power; for in one of the clauses of the Plan of Ayala
it states that General Pascual Orozco is recognized as leader of
the revolution, and in case he is not able to discharge that task,
you will be eligible; and as our complete submission to the Plan of
Ayala is demanded it would intimate that we ought to place you in the
position of the Supreme Chief of the Nation and in a more or less
covert manner, you would be Provisional President of the Republic.
I believe in the sincerity of your words when you say that you have
no ambition to command, that all you want is the settlement of the
agrarian question and the economic betterment of the lower classes for
which you have struggled so bravely. But back of this is Mr. Palafox,
who has the ambition to rule, and who is desirous to see you raised
to supreme power so that he may enjoy a privileged position in your
office in his character of Secretary and Councillor. The same object
animated Mr. Serratos more or less who also enjoys a certain amount of
influence regarding your affairs, and doubtless awaits the auspicious
moment of utilizing the same for his own benefit.
You will remember that Don Luis Cabrera and I set forth very clearly
that we were authorized to accept essentially the Plan of Ayala; that
is, the land question, the satisfaction of the popular needs, the
betterment of the poor. We hereby declare that we agree fully with the
principles set forth in the Plan of Ayala, and only desire that its
form may be modified, and that there may be added to the gubernatorial
programme which we might draw up some clauses relative to the
needs of the Northern States and the States in the centre of the
Republic, which are not in the same condition as those of the south.
Messrs. Palafox and Serratos refused to accept our cordial and just
propositions, and insisted in a blind, unquestionable, despotic manner
that the Plan of Ayala be accepted, without the change of a word or a
comma.
Convinced that the influence of Messrs. Palafox and Serratos over
you would make sterile all our efforts for coming to an agreement
in the form which we proposed, we declined to start a discussion
which only might have served to embitter our souls and to give rise
to more ill-feeling than what we suffered in the course of our
conversation with you. For our part we found ourselves in a visibly
hostile atmosphere, and we lacked the liberty necessary for the free
expression of our opinions.
When Mr. Sarabia spoke with you for the first time, he wrote me
stating that your attitude was cordial and that he saw that your
propositions of peace were sincere. On the occasion of our meeting
with you our surprise was great to find you different from what Mr.
Sarabia had represented. This may be easily explained that the first
time you spoke with Mr. Sarabia you were guided by your own impulses
and by your good intentions, and the second time you were under the
influence of the unhealthy machinations of Mr. Palafox.
The question then is reduced to the following facts: On our part the
greatest and most sincere cordiality, the recognition of the justice
of your cause, the acceptance of the principles of the plan of Ayala
relating to the division of lands and the social betterment; on your
part, good impulses, no ambition for power, and the exclusive desire
for the welfare of the public; and on the part of Mr. Palafox and
Mr. Serratos a spirit of intrigue that distorts the best intentions,
ambitions for power in your hands with a view to thriving in your
shadow, and a decided object of provoking war if their ambitions
should not be satisfied.
Is not this sad, General Zapata? Is it not deeply to be lamented that
all the patriotic efforts of honorable men shall go to pieces before
the caprices of two intriguers? Is it not bitter and even shameful
that a movement as great and unselfish as yours after four years of
struggle should degenerate by reason of an instrument of vile ambition
and in an ignoble weapon for bringing war a second time on a country
already exhausted in its struggle for independence?
I make a supreme appeal to your honor, to your patriotism, to your
love of the people, who would be in the last analysis those who would
suffer most from a war, that you take into consideration what we said
when we were with you, and which I again repeat in this letter, that
we may arrive at a good understanding with the revolutionaries of the
north and the south, who in reality are brothers.
We know that we have done all in our power to arrive at a peaceful
solution, and if at length it might be found impossible to reach it,
it will not be through our fault.
God grant that to-morrow I may not have to tell you that through
attending to the intrigues of an ambitious party more than to the
dictates of patriotism, you may be to blame for the beginning of a war
which would be thoroughly unjustifiable, which no one wants and which
would do no one any good!
I believe that after what I have said it is only necessary to add
the following: That while Palafox continues at your side enjoying the
influence that he does, it will be impossible for us to return to see
you at Cuernavaca, nor for us to send other representatives, for we
consider that we would not have, as we did not, the necessary liberty
to treat with frankness and amplitude the transcendental subject which
is under our discussion.
We would be very thankful to know that you had resolved to act
independently of your harmful counsellor; and in such a case we
consider that it would be easy enough to arrive at a settlement.
In place of Mr. Palafox you should be able to consult your principal
chiefs, who have struggled faithfully for the cause, and you will
surely find among them better standards and better counsel than from
your ancient secretary.
I know that the majority of your chieftains hold Mr. Palafox in scant
esteem and do not care for him; and if they have not so expressed
themselves to you it has been perhaps through lack of opportunity or
excess of discipline. Now it would be convenient that you consult them
regarding this matter.
I trust, Mr. General, in your good judgment and sense of right, to
kindly bear in mind with a spirit of serenity and justice what we
have set before you, and unite your efforts to ours with a view
to realizing the peace which our Republic needs so much, without
lessening the agrarian ideals for which you have struggled for so long
a time.
I am happy to sign myself,
Yours affectionate and loyal friend,
ANTONIO I. VILLARREAL.