GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST HUERTA
To get a clear conception of the strategic work achieved by the three
divisions of the East, North and West, it is advisable to look at the
map of Mexico.
Mexico is broadest at the American border and tapers exactly like a
cornucopia at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Mexico City lies in a valley
7,400 feet high, within twelve hours’ ride from Vera Cruz, and being
the centre of all the railroads of Mexico, is therefore of the utmost
strategical importance.
Huerta, from Mexico City, could reach all his troops anywhere in
Mexico, either by rail or water. The Constitutionalists in Sonora were
separated from the Northern division by a high range of mountains,
and the Northern division from the Eastern division by another range.
Zapata could not communicate very easily with the three northern
divisions, and was not able to assist them directly.
[Illustration: WAR MAP OF MEXICO.
STRATEGIC R.R. LINES.]
Huerta’s strategy consisted in keeping his soldiers in the large
cities, at the border towns, always hugging the railroad lines. The
federals very seldom attacked in the open, as the lack of horses
detracted from their mobility.
The Western division had for its object the control of the railroad,
starting from Nogales, through Hermosillo to Guaymas in Sonora, then to
Culiacán, Mazatlán in Sinaloa, through San Blas, Tepic into the State
of Jalisco, to the capital Guadalajara. Once Guadalajara was captured,
the aim of the campaign was achieved, and Obregon had only to wait for
the arrival and junction of the Northern and Eastern division near
Celaya, to march to Mexico City. The difficulties encountered by the
Western and Eastern divisions were trebled by a condition which did not
exist in the case of the Northern division under Villa, the fact that
the seaports on the Pacific and Atlantic which were always at the mercy
of the federals, could feed and supply and augment the contingent of
soldiers in the ports.
On the Pacific side, the Federals controlled Guaymas, Topolobampo,
Altata, Mazatlán, San Blas and Manzanillo,--and on the Atlantic side
they controlled Matamoros, Tampico, Tuxpan, Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico.
The Western division, under Obregon, captured one by one all the border
towns, and later most of the seaports,--and in spite of the fact that
Guaymas stuck to the last, the Western division had so effectively
cooped up the Federals in that port, that they were not interfering
with their downward course towards Guadalajara. General Gonzalez
acted on the same principle. He first captured the border towns, and
then Victoria the capital of Tamaulipas. With the fall of Tampico, the
Federals in San Luis Potosí were outflanked.
General Villa did the same. After he controlled the border cities, he
concentrated all his energies on the capture of Torreon.
The three chiefs of divisions, East, North and West, co-operated with
one another under the direction of Carranza. They were supplied with
money, arms and ammunition by the organization created by Carranza in
the different States, and directed by the efforts of the members of the
provisional cabinet.
Zapata by his activity, aided by that of Genovevo de la O and several
other chiefs in the South, forced Huerta to keep about forty thousand
soldiers in the South.
The railroads created new strategic lines--
1st. From Nogales at the border, the railroad goes almost
uninterruptedly through Sonora, Sinaloa and Tepic, with the exception
of a gap between Tepic and Guadalajara.
2d. From Juarez the railroad runs through Chihuahua, Durango and
Zacatecas into Aguascalientes.
3d. From Ciudad Porfirio Diaz through Coahuila into Nuevo Leon, and to
San Luis Potosí, and from Monterrey to Tampico.
They represent the lines which had to be controlled by the three
divisions. Then there were lines connecting Torreon with Saltillo and
Monterrey,--and Aguascalientes with San Luis Potosí.
The assertion that either one of the three chiefs of the divisions was
solely responsible for the success of the revolution is absurd and
inexact.
Let us admit for instance, that Obregon had reached Guadalajara, and
tried to march through Celaya to Mexico City alone, before Villa had
taken Aguascalientes, or General Gutierrez taken San Luis Potosí. He
would then have been attacked in the rear by the Federals.
In Villa’s case, if he had captured Aguascalientes and tried to march
south to Mexico City, without waiting for Obregon to take Guadalajara,
or General Gutierrez, San Luis Potosí, he would have also been attacked
in the rear.
General Gonzalez in his turn, could not march south as long as San Luis
Potosí was in the possession of Federals.
The three chiefs had to work together, and the utter defeat of either
of the three separately, spelled disaster for the rest. It is fortunate
for Mexico that this campaign should have created four strong soldiers
“on horseback” for the danger to Mexico’s liberties always appeared
with one man as the hero, who subsequently turned to be the “villain.”
When there is more than one savior or liberator, they are apt to be so
busy watching one another, that Mexico’s liberties are more likely to
be respected.