CHAPTER VIII.

DOMESTIC QUESTIONS.

The treatment in the Protocol of so-called domestic questions aroused a

great deal of discussion not only at the Assembly, last September, but

since the adoption there of the text.

It may be remembered that there was a similar public discussion at the

time of the drafting of the Covenant; in that document[1] a domestic

question is defined as "a matter which by international law is solely

within the domestic jurisdiction" of a State.

Among instances of domestic questions which have been mentioned from

time to time, perhaps the two most commonly referred to in this country

are the tariff and immigration. Of course it has been pointed out very

often that even such questions as these, however inherently domestic,

may become international as soon as they are made the subject of a

treaty, as they so frequently are. It should be added that almost any

question, no matter how "domestic" in its nature originally, _may_

become the subject of international cognizance by virtue of a treaty.

There are many treaties of the United States which have related to such

questions as the inheritance of land, the right to administer the

estates of decedents, etc.; a very recent instance is a treaty between

this country and Canada regarding the protection of migratory birds, a

treaty which has been upheld as valid by the Supreme Court.[2]

None the less, the absolute right of a country to regulate these

matters in its own discretion must be recognized as a matter of strict

law. Any country, in the absence of treaty, may, at its pleasure,

exclude foreigners from entering into its territory, for example. I

think no one questions this.[3]

However, as a matter of fact and as a result of the development of the

world's commerce, there is hardly any such question which remains

exclusively domestic. For example, even in our {47} drastic

Immigration Law of 1924,[4] there are various treaty rights of entry

into the country for the purposes of commerce and so on which are

expressly and in terms saved by the statute. Furthermore, there is, I

suppose, hardly a country in the world which does not have various

most-favored-nation treaties which directly affect tariffs.

Again, modern developments necessitate the extension of international

discussions and agreements to matters previously undreamed of; the

erection of wireless stations near frontiers is a very practical

instance; there must be some kind of agreement to prevent jamming in

the air. The negotiations about the opium traffic have gone to the

length of discussions as to what areas in certain regions should be

planted with the poppy; a more essentially domestic question than the

crops to be grown within a country could hardly be imagined.

In my opinion, the Protocol follows the Covenant in its treatment of

these domestic questions and goes no farther. The Covenant provides

that if, upon reference to the Council, it is found that a dispute

arises "out of a matter which by international law is solely within the

domestic jurisdiction," the Council shall report to that effect and

shall not even make a recommendation as to its settlement (Article 15,

paragraph 8). In practice the Council will doubtless refer this

question of law to the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion.[5]

The Protocol (Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2) continues this provision

and applies it also to any arbitration which takes place by its terms.

It is provided that if one of the parties to the dispute claims that

the dispute "or part thereof" arises out of a domestic question, the

arbitrators must take the advice of the Permanent Court on the point.

The opinion of the Permanent Court is binding on the arbitrators and if

the Court holds that the matter is "domestic," the power of the

arbitrators to decide {48} the question is at an end and they are

confined merely to recording the Court's opinion.

The further provision of Article 5 on this question is the last

paragraph of that Article, which reads as follows:[6]

"If the question is held by the Court or by the Council

to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of

the State, this decision shall not prevent consideration of

the situation by the Council or by the Assembly under

Article 11 of the Covenant."

So far as this provision goes, I do not think that it adds anything to

the effect of Article 11 of the Covenant. The matter would stand

precisely where it does now, even if this last paragraph of Article 5

of the Protocol had been omitted.

Under Article 11 of the Covenant, both the Council and the Assembly

have the right to consider any circumstance which threatens to disturb

international peace. This does not mean any right of decision or even

recommendation in any binding sense. What it does is to give to the

Council or to the Assembly the privilege of attempting, by friendly

offices, to avert war.

To my mind there is nothing very new in this; indeed, it is rather

inherent in the idea of any international association for the

prevention of war. After all, there is no doubt that these so-called

domestic questions have their international repercussions. The case

that was put by way of argument at Geneva was the control of the

quinine of the world by the Dutch, which is said to be practically

absolute. What would happen if the Dutch put an embargo upon the

exportation of this drug? It would be idle to say that such an act,

legal as it would be in the strict sense, would not have a profound

effect upon civilization generally. Under Article 11,[7] such an act

could be discussed before the Council with a representative of the

Dutch Government present, in an effort to obtain some adjustment, some

change in what had been done; but that would be all.

In 1898, the United States went to war with Spain over what {49} was,

technically at least, from the point of view of Spain, a domestic

question, namely, the internal situation in Cuba. Shortly before

hostilities broke out, the six then Great Powers of Europe addressed to

the United States a friendly note in the matter, to which this

Government replied.[8] In principle, I cannot see any difference

between such diplomatic correspondence and the discussion of the matter

by the Council of the League, a discussion to which presumably Spain

and not the United States would have been the party to object, for the

question was a Spanish domestic question of which we were complaining.

There are other aspects of the treatment by the Protocol of domestic

questions, in connection with the Covenants against War, and with

Aggression, under which headings it will be discussed.[9]

[1] Article 15, paragraph 8.

[2] Missouri _v._ Holland, 252 U. S., 416.

[3] See Moore's Digest, Vol. IV, p. 67, _et seq._, also p. 151, _et

seq._

[4] Act of May 26, 1924.

[5] As in the case of the Tunis and Morocco nationality decrees,

Advisory Opinion No. 4, February 7, 1923.

[6] This is one part of the so-called Japanese Amendment, as to which

see _infra_, p. 64, _et seq._

[7] of the Covenant.

[8] Foreign Relations (U. S.), 1898, pp. 740-741.

[9] See _infra_, p. 50 and p. 54. Also "The Japanese Amendment," p. 64.

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