2597. Vocation to the Clerical State.--(_Moral theology

should enter the religious or clerical state unless called thereto by

God (John, xv. 16; Acts, xiii. 2; Heb., v. 4, 5; I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.).

The foundation of the entire religious, priestly and apostolic life,

namely divine vocation, consists of two essential elements, the one

divine, the other ecclesiastical. As to the first element, God’s call

to embrace the priestly or religious life must be considered so

necessary that in its absence the foundation upon which the whole

structure is to rest is absent (Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_). The

signs of a divine call do not necessarily or even ordinarily include a

feeling of inspiration or invitation from the Holy Spirit, but it

suffices that one may have a liking, a right intention, and fitness

(physical, mental, moral) for the life; for, where God gives a call, He

gives the means to fulfill the duties. Thus, those who will not be able

to say Mass, or who cannot master Latin or theology, or who cannot

observe celibacy, or who are vicious (e.g., mischief-makers, drunkards)

or unspiritual (e.g., the lazy, those who dislike exercises of piety),

do not show the signs of a priestly vocation.

(b) External Vocation.--No one should be admitted to the religious life

or to Orders unless he has given sufficient signs of a call from God.

Thus, a Bishop would sin most gravely and be a sharer in the sins of

others if he conferred Major Orders on anyone about whose unworthiness

he was morally certain on positive grounds (Canon 973); nor may a

Religious Superior receive to profession any novice about whom he is

doubtful (Canon 571). Scarcity of vocations is no excuse for laxity,

since it is better to have a few creditable clerics than a multitude of

unworthy ones (Benedict XIV). What St. Paul said of deacons (“Let these

first be proved, and so let them minister, having no crime,” I Tim.,

iii. 10), is therefore to be applied to all candidates for the clerical

life. A vocation is tested by the years of probation which the church

law provides for seminarians, novices and other aspirants to the

ecclesiastical state. No cleric has a right to ordination before he

receives the free call from a bishop, but on the other hand it is

criminal to prevent a suitable candidate from embracing the clerical

state (Canon 971). “By a divine vocation to the religious and clerical

state a person undertakes publicly to lead a life of holiness in the

Church, a visible and hierarchical society, and to exercise this

hierarchical ministry. Such a person, therefore, ought to be

authoritatively tested, approved and directed by the hierarchical

rulers to whom God has entrusted the administration of the Church”

(Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_).

2598. Sinfulness of Disregarding Vocation.--(a) He who enters the

clerical state, not knowing that he has a vocation, is guilty of sin,

as is clear from the previous paragraph. According to some, anyone who

receives Major Orders, even with serious doubt about his vocation,

commits a mortal sin, since he inflicts a serious injury on the rights

of God, the Church, himself and his neighbor. According to others, the

sin is only venial when one enters the clerical state conscious of the

absence of vocation, but determined with the help of God to live up to

all the duties; for, though the act is rash, there is good will and

good intention, and grace will not be wanting.

(b) He who refuses to enter the clerical state, though knowing for

certain that he has a vocation, is also guilty of sin, for only

negligence or improper motives such as laziness, sensuality, or too

great love of liberty can produce such reluctance. The sin is grave or

light according to the circumstances. There is grave sin, if the

resistance to the call constitutes serious disobedience, pride or

uncharitableness (e.g., if there were a great scarcity of priests and

the bishop commanded a worthy layman to take Orders); there is venial

sin in other cases when the rejection is only dissent to an invitation

and exposes neither self nor other to grave peril of losing salvation.

Finally, if the signs of vocation do not produce certainty, there may

be no sin at all, but rather virtue, in refusal to ascend to the

clerical state, for no one is bound to take up grave obligations when

uncertain of his duties, and many holy persons from humility or fear of

unworthiness have decided, against the advice or invitation of others,

not to become clerics.

2599. The Positive Duties of Clerics.--(a) Duties to God.--All clerics

are held to frequent reception of the Sacrament of Penance, to daily

devotions (i.e., mental prayer, visit to the Blessed Sacrament, a third

part of the Rosary, examen), and to triennial spiritual retreats

(Canons 125, 126). Moreover, clerics in Sacred Orders, benefice

holders, and solemnly professed religious bound to the choir are

obliged to the daily recitation of the Canonical Hours, each one

according to his own rite and calendar (Canons 135, 213 sqq., 1475,

610). This obligation is grave, because its purpose is the important

one of consecrating each hour of the day by the public prayer of the

Church according to the usage that goes back to the earliest centuries.

But the choral obligation of simply professed religious is light,

unless the choir is impossible without their presence.

(b) Duties to Superiors.--Clerics are especially obliged to show

respect to their Ordinaries and to give them the obedience promised in

ordination (Canon 127).

their minds by sacred and sound studies, and to this end examinations

and conferences are also prescribed (Canons 129-131); to keep

themselves pure in soul and body by the observance of celibate chastity

(Canons 132, 133); to conduct themselves in externals (dwelling, dress,

etc.) in a manner befitting their position (Canons 134, 136). The

clerical garb in this country is the cassock or habit in the house and

church, and dark clothes and the Roman collar, or other distinctive

sign for priests and brothers elsewhere. The dress of the clergy should

avoid the extremes of dudishness and slovenliness (Second Council of

Baltimore, 148; Third Council, 77). The duty of wearing clerical dress

at least away from home and regularly is of serious importance, since

its purpose is the honor of the clerical state and the protection of

its members. It is also forbidden to clerics to cultivate their hair

(e.g., to grow long locks, to use curling irons, to oil or perfume

their head in dandyish fashion), since this is unbecoming in the

followers of a thorn-crowned Leader. The use of the beard is a thing

indifferent in itself, and hence it is forbidden in some places

(generally in the Latin Church) and required in others (as in the

Orient), according to tradition and local usage.

2600. The Obligation of the Divine Office.--(a) Matter.--A cleric is

gravely obliged to recite the Office according to his own rite and in

the language of his rite, and not to make any notable change in the

Office prescribed by the Ordo, either as to quantity (e.g., by omission

of a Little Hour or of parts equally long) or as to quality (e.g., by

substitution of a minor office for that of one of the great

solemnities.) The omission of the Vespers of Holy Saturday, of

Pretiosa, or of the Rogation Litanies seems to be only a venial sin,

because in the first two cases the prayer is short, while in the third

case the precept seems to be _sub levi_. There is also lightness of

matter in the omission of an inconsiderable part of the day’s Office,

or in the substitution without good reason of an equal part for a

prescribed part.

(b) Manner.--Since the Office is a prayer, of a public and daily kind,

it must be said: mentally, that is, there must be at least virtual

intention (which is present from the fact that one takes up the

Breviary to fulfill the obligation) and at least external attention

(see 2166 sqq.); vocally, that is, the words must be consciously formed

by the lips, mouth, or tongue, but it is not necessary that they be

audible, unless two or more are saying the Office together; within the

limits of the day, that is, Matins and Lauds may be anticipated from 2

p.m. of the previous day, but the whole Office must be finished before

midnight of the current day. These are substantial requisites and bind

_sub gravi_, but there may be only venial sin when they are deviated

from inconsiderably. Next, since the Office has a continuity of

thought, an order of precedence among its hours and their subdivisions,

and a special dignity, it must be said uninterruptedly (i.e., without

break between the parts of an hour), in order (i.e., according to the

succession of Matins, Lauds, Prime, etc.), with external respect as to

place and posture (i.e., he who is bound to choral Office should say it

in choir and with the rubrical postures, while he who is bound only to

private Office should say it in church or some other becoming place,

and should observe the rubrical or at least a respectful posture).

These are accidental requisites and bind _sub levi_. For a good reason

one may interrupt the Office even for a notable part of the day (e.g.,

one may discontinue in the midst of a Psalm to pay a duty of politeness

or to attend to business), and for convenience one may invert the order

of hours or of parts of hours, or may say the evening hours in the

morning.

2601. Excuses from the Obligation of the Divine Office.--(a) For

Substitution.--A sufficient reason makes it permissible to substitute

another office not notably different in quantity or quality, as when

one lacks a new office, or has greater devotion for another office.

When substitution has been made unintentionally, the following rules

may be observed, though the last two are not admitted by all: office

counts for office, (e.g., he who through mistake has said the office of

another day may let that office stand for today’s office, but should

add enough to make up for any notable shortness in the office said);

hour does not count for hour (e.g., he who through mistake said Tierce

twice cannot count the second Tierce for Sext); an error should be

corrected when noticed (e.g., he who notices at Sext that he is not

saying the right office should change from Sext); an error is not

corrected by another error (e.g., he who said today’s office yesterday

should not say yesterday’s office today).

(b) For Omission.--The causes that excuse, in whole or in part, from

recitation of the Office are physical inability (e.g., loss of the

breviary, blindness of one who does not know the hours by heart,

sickness or convalescence which makes the recitation a grave hardship),

moral impossibility (e.g., when an urgent duty of charity or justice so

takes up one’s time that one cannot get in all the Office), just

dispensation or commutation given by the Pope or, for temporary

release, by the Ordinary.

2602. The Precept of Clerical Celibacy.--(a) Origin.--This law is not

divine but ecclesiastical, since it arose, not from any command of

Christ, but from a custom of the Church that goes back to the first

centuries. Nevertheless, celibacy of the clergy is an imitation of

Christ and the Apostles, a following of the counsel given by the Lord,

an honor to the sacrifice of the altar, and an example that single

chastity is possible. Moreover, by means of it the priest is freed from

domestic relations and better enabled to minister as the father,

pastor, confessor and counsellor of his people. The celibate is

unencumbered by family responsibilities and expenses, and is therefore

better able to respond to difficult and dangerous tasks, such as

mission work in pagan lands and ministrations to the dying in fire,

wreck, or plague, The Church does not denounce or condemn the married

clergy of non-Catholic bodies; on the contrary, she permits to some

extent a married clergy among the Oriental Catholics, who for many

centuries have been accustomed to a married priesthood. But the law of

celibacy for the Catholic clergy has not only proved itself more

suitable for their work, but it has also justified itself by the

general fidelity with which it has been observed and the attachment to

it of clergy and laity alike.

(b) Obligation.--The law commands chastity as a grave duty of religion

(Canon 132); it forbids the contract or use of marriage (Canon 1072).

It forbids, where there is danger to chastity or scandal, cohabitation

and companionship with women (Canon 133). Cohabitation refers to

dwelling in the same house, even though it be only during the day, and

the woman be a servant; companionship refers to visits, conversations,

signs of friendship, and the like. The danger to good name or virtue

depends on circumstances, such as age, beauty, levity, and privacy of

association; and the law presumes that a relationship is suspicious

unless a woman is a near relative by blood or by marriage (i.e., in the

first or second degree), or is mature in age (about forty years old)

and proved in virtue and of good repute.

2603. Negative Duties of Clerics.--The negative duties of clerics are

the avoidance of certain acts, occupations, or amusements forbidden as

worldly, undignified, dangerous, distracting or scandalous (I Thess.,

v. 22; II Tim., ii. 4).

(a) Forbidden Acts.--A cleric may not go surety without permission,

lest he or his church be involved in scandalous embarrassments (Canon

137); nor engage in trade, lest he be distracted from his spiritual

duties and exposed to the danger or suspicion of injustice or greed

(Canon 142; for penalty attached see Decree of the Sacred Congregation

of the Council, AAS, 42-33D).

(b) Forbidden Occupations.--These include, first, employments and

pursuits unbecoming to clerics (such as those of butcher, actor,

innkeeper); next, those that are incompatible with the ministry (such

as the practice for profit of the medical profession, public

magistracies, government jobs, civil court functions, legislative

offices, Canon 139); finally, those that are contrary to the mildness

that should distinguish clerics (viz, the occupation of fighting man or

soldier, Canon 141; see also Canon 984 on executioners). But exceptions

may be made for a just cause.

diversions or cruel sports, such as the hunting of big game with great

uproar of dogs and guns (Canon 138) or in gambling, and they should not

enter saloons or similar places (Canon 138). Clerics are also forbidden

to assist at unbecoming shows, performances, dances, or at any

theatrical entertainment where their presence gives scandal (Canon

140). To gamble much (say, several times a week and for a considerable

time at each game) is considered a serious matter; but it is not sinful

to indulge in a game of chance now and then, if the stakes are moderate

and there is no scandal.

2604. The Prohibition against Trading.--(a) Meaning.--Trading as here

understood is purely gainful merchandizing (i.e., buying an article at

a lower price in order to sell it unchanged at a higher price) or

industrial merchandizing (i.e., buying an article in order to sell it

at a profit after it has been changed by hired labor). Hence, there is

no canonical trading in commerce which lacks one of the conditions

mentioned, for example, if one buys goods for one’s household or

community and, on discovering that a superfluity has been purchased,

sells at a profit what is left over (see 2134, 2135). Trading includes

not only a business conducted personally or for personal profit, but

also one conducted through agents or for the benefit of others, such as

the poor or pious causes.

(b) Obligation.--The violation of this law is grave in itself, but a

serious sin demands on the part of the subject that there be real

trading (i.e., a number of acts morally united and proceeding from a

purpose to continue in lucrative merchandizing), and on the side of the

object that there be a large amount involved. Hence, it would be venial

to engage in lucrative trading with a large profit once, and with a

small profit twice or thrice.

to maintain his state, or if a business has fallen to him by

inheritance and cannot be given up without loss) justifies trading, if

there is permission.

2605. Is It Lawful for Clerics to Purchase and Sell Stocks and

Bonds?--(a) If this conduct has the character of gambling or trading

for profit, it is forbidden by Canon 138 or 142, as the case may be,

and is gravely or venially sinful according to the circumstances. Thus,

pure speculation or mere betting on the market is a game of chance, and

the frequent purchase of stocks with the thought of quick sales and

huge profits from sudden changes of the market is lucrative trading.

(b) If the gambling or trading element is absent, the conduct in

question is not forbidden by Canon Law. It is generally admitted that

bond investments are permissible, since they are only a loan of one’s

money at interest. There are two views about stock dealings: the

stricter view regards them as always containing the character of

forbidden trading (since all the notes of strict negotiation are found

in them), or at least as being a game of chance; the milder view, which

is common, holds that they are no more an affair of chance than many

other business undertakings, and that there is no strict negotiation,

if the stockholder is not a member or director of the corporation,

since the buying and selling is done neither directly nor indirectly by

him. Buying of stocks, then, may be nothing more than a prudent

investment of money in a deserving enterprise with the hope of a

reasonable return, and selling out the stocks at a large profit may be

nothing more than the disposal of superfluous goods which it would be

inconvenient to retain. It must be remembered, though, that it is

unlawful to cooperate with a company whose purpose is evil or suspect,

or to have part in frauds, or to give disedification.

2606. Special Duties of Clerical Superiors from Divine Law.--(a) As

individuals, they should strive to be personally more perfect than

their subjects, for they are supposed to give an example in faith,

religion, zeal, labor, and self-denial, “being made a pattern of the

flock from the heart” (I Peter, v. 3).

(b) As rulers, they must have the virtues of good superiors, such as

legal justice or firm devotion to the common good, distributive justice

or avoidance of partiality and prejudice, prudence or knowledge of how

to direct men and means successfully to the glory of God and the

salvation of souls, and commutative justice or respect for the rights

of subjects.

hireling, and cultivate those of the good shepherd, being kind and

amiable to Catholic and non-Catholic, and practising the spiritual and

corporal works of mercy.

2607. Special Duties from Canon Law of Those Who Have Care of

Souls.--(a) Bishops have grave obligations of residing in their see or

diocese (Canon 338), of attending to the instruction of their flock

(Canons 1327, 336), of applying the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 339), of

making a diocesan report (Canon 340), of confirming and of ordaining

worthy candidates (Canon 785), of visiting their dioceses (Canon 343),

of making the _ad limina_ visit (Canons 340, 342), and of calling a

diocesan synod at least every tenth year (Canon 356).

(b) Pastors must reside generally in their parish (Canon 465), and, if

lawfully absent, they must make provision for the sick calls and other

spiritual necessities of their flocks. They must preach the word of God

on Sundays and holydays, and it would be a serious matter to neglect

this duty for a considerable time (e.g., a whole month) without good

reason (Canon 1344). It is also a serious obligation to attend to the

necessary catechetical instruction of young and old (Canons 1330,

1332), to apply the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 466), and to administer

the Sacraments (at least Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction) to those in

grave spiritual need (see 1167). Pastors are also obliged to know their

flock, to visit the sick and dying, to correct abuses, to see that the

customary administration of the Sacraments and the usual church

functions are attended to, to watch over the schooling of the children,

and to direct the temporalities and attend to the reports and records

of the parish. The duties of chaplains of hospitals, institutions,

soldiers, etc., are similar to those of pastors, but in particular

cases the former are subject to special prescriptions or to local usage

or to rules made by the Ordinary.

instruction and direction of the parish-priest. Their particular duties

are known from the diocesan statutes, the letters of the Ordinary, and

the commission of the pastor. Regularly, they are bound to reside in

the parish rectory and to assist the pastor or supply for him in all

the parish work, the Mass _pro populo_ excepted (Canon 476).

2608. The Duty of Charity to the Poor.--(a) According to Canon Law all

beneficed clergy (Cardinals excepted) must give all the superfluous

fruits of their benefice to charitable or pious causes (Canon 1473).

But it is an extremely strict view which holds that all the secular

clergy are beneficed.

(b) According to the divine law of charity (see 1226, 1252) even the

unbeneficed clergy have the duty of giving alms from their surplus

wealth. Thus, it would be unmerciful if a clergyman spent on himself

all the fortune he had inherited from his relatives without thought of

the poor; it would be often a source of scandal if a priest enriched

his relatives with money received in ministerial ways, but left nothing

to pious causes.

2609. Canon 1473 on the Disposition of Superfluous Wealth by Beneficed

Clergy.--(a) The Money to be Spent.--The Canon does not refer to the

property of the Church (i.e., the foundation or endowment of the

benefice), for of this the beneficed clergyman is only the

administrator, and he would be unjust if he alienated its funds to

other purposes; nor does it refer to the clergyman’s own property, such

as goods received by inheritance or other profane title

(_patrimonialia_), or by title of personal ministerial service, such as

stipends and fees (_quasi-patrimonialia_). It refers, then, to the

revenues of the benefice (e.g., the bishop’s or pastor’s salary) and to

the amount that is left over after the deduction of all reasonable and

customary expenses that have been made, or could have been made for

decent personal support.

(b) The Use of Surplus Money.--The alms should be given to any pious or

charitable cause, such as the promotion of divine worship, the

assistance of needy missions, the spiritual or corporal works of mercy.

The cleric is free to bestow his gift either during his lifetime (which

is better) or to leave it in his will.

2610. The Obligation of Canon 1473.--(a) The obligation is most

probably not one of justice, since the holder of the benefice owns the

superfluous fruits, but one of obedience to the Church. Some authors

also consider this precept as binding in virtue of religion and

charity, and regard its violation as a sacrilege or sin against

charity. The holder of the benefice is not held to restitution,

however, since neglect of the precept is not an injustice. As to his

successors through gift inter vivos or testament, they are not bound to

give the superfluities as an alms, since the church precept was for the

cleric himself. Successors to an intestate should observe the wishes of

the deceased, but, if the character of the goods they inherit is

doubtful, they may usually be left in good faith.

(b) The obligation is grave, since it is commanded as an act of

religion, or at least as an act of obedience in a very important

matter. From the time of the Apostles it was customary to distribute to

the poor what was left over of the goods of the Church, and the clergy

were regarded as the fathers and protectors of the needy. Again, since

the goods of a benefice originated in gifts offered to God Himself, it

is most becoming that their superfluities be devoted to the causes most

pleasing to God. Grave matter would be three times the amount required

in theft, because a violation of this precept is not the taking of what

is not one’s own, but the using in a forbidden way of what is one’s own.

2611. The Special Duties of Religious.--The particular obligations of

religious are declared in the proper rules of the various institutes,

just as the particular obligations of the secular clergy are set forth

in the statutes of local synods and councils. We shall outline here

only the general obligations of religious, to which they are held by

the common law of the Church.

(a) By reason of his profession, a religious is obliged to strive after

the perfection of charity (see 1560, 367) through the religious life,

that is, by means of the rules and constitutions of his own institute

(Canon 593). All religious, superiors and subjects, are bound to

observe their laws, but _per se_ these laws oblige under penalty, not

under sin (see 570). _Per accidens_, however, the transgression of rule

or constitutions may be sinful, as when the matter belongs also to

divine or church law or to the observance of a vow, or when the

transgression includes contempt, scandal, or demoralization of

discipline.

(b) By reason of the vows, a religious is obliged to follow the three

evangelical counsels (see 2191 sqq.) and any other vows of his

institute according to his rule (e.g., poverty is a renunciation of

even community possession in some rules and of individual possession in

others). The vows oblige _per se_ under grave sin, on account of the

duty of religion (see 2209) and the intention of the religious to bind

himself gravely; but there may be venial sin on account of imperfection

of act or lightness of matter.

2612. The Obligation of the Three Principal Vows.--(a) Poverty is a

renunciation of the independent use of external corporal goods, such as

money and lands and chattels (simple vow), or also of the radical

dominion (see 1697) or right of ownership of such goods (solemn vow).

Grave matter in the unjust violation of poverty seems to be the same as

in other acts of unjust damage or acquisition, and hence in thefts from

outsiders a less amount is grave matter, in domestic thefts from the

monastery a greater sum is required (see 1900, 1903). Grave matter in

the violation of poverty that is not unjust (e.g., in use of money

without permission) seems to be the same as absolutely grave matter for

thefts, unless the constitutions rule otherwise; but grave matter here

does not coalesce from many small violations. The virtue, but not the

vow, of poverty is offended by purely internal acts (e.g., attachment

to wealth), and there is no offense at all in dominion over spirituals

(such as fame, good reputation) which are not renounced by the vow of

poverty, and in certain acts of disposition (e.,g., acceptance of

deposit, distribution of alms) or proprietorship (e.g., of manuscripts)

permitted by rule.

(b) Chastity is a renunciation of all venereal pleasure, internal and

external, lawful and unlawful. Grave matter is the same as for the

virtue of chastity, but the vow could be violated without the violation

of the virtue (e.g., in the use of marriage by one simply professed).

For the protection of this vow the Church has made the law of cloister,

which forbids under certain conditions the entrance of outsiders into a

religious house or the egress of the religious (Canons 547, 598,

600-604, 679, 2342).

submission to commands of a Superior given according to the rules and

constitutions. There is grave matter against the vow if one disobeys in

an important matter imposed by the Superior in the name of obedience

and according to the rite prescribed by the rule or constitutions (see

2364). The virtue, but not the vow, is offended by internal

insubordination (see 2357); neither virtue nor vow is offended when a

Superior commands what is above the rule (e.g., the accomplishment of

the impossible, heroic acts that do not pertain to the nature of the

institute), or against the rule, unless he has power to dispense, or

probably what is beneath the rule (such as things manifestly ridiculous

and useless). Since obedience is vowed to the precepts of the Superior,

the vow is not broken by transgression of points of the rule not

expressly included under the vow, nor by transgressions of the general

precepts of God and the Church.

Art. 2: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY

2613. The Duties of Husbands and Wives.--Conjugal obligations may be

classed under three heads according to the three ends of marriage.

(a) Thus, the first blessing of marriage is offspring, and this imposes

upon parents the obligation of providing for their children and of

training them in mind and will (see 2630 sqq.).

(b) The second blessing of marriage is fidelity to the engagement made

by husband and wife to deliver to each other exclusive power over their

bodies for procreation (conjugal debt) and to love each other with a

special but pure affection: “The wife hath not power of her own body,

but the husband; and in like manner the husband hath not power of his

own body but the wife” (I Cor., vii. 4); “Husbands, love your wives as

Christ also loved the Church” (Eph., v. 25). Conjugal love admits no

rivals; the husband must prefer his wife to every other woman, and the

wife likewise must think more of her husband than of any other man (see

1179).

bond of marriage: “The Lord commanded that the wife depart not from the

husband, and if she depart that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled

to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife” (I Cor.,

vii. 10). This imposes the duties of a permanent domestic society in

which the spouses dwell together permanently and each has certain

special functions of assistance to the other.

2614. The Obligation of Paying the Conjugal Debt.--(a) The duty is one

of justice, since it arises from the contract of marriage, in which the

parties freely and solemnly bind themselves to it as the subject-matter

of their pact.

(b) The obligation is grave, since the marriage contract is one of the

most momentous of human agreements, its direct end being the

propagation of the race, while the denial of its essential right is

productive of most serious evils, such as incontinence, scandals and

the disruption of families. There is light matter, however, as when the

request is not imperative, or the denial is infrequent and without

danger of incontinence.

2615. Absence of Obligation.--The obligation of paying the conjugal

debt does not exist, however, when the right to make the request has

been lost or when the request is unreasonable.

(a) Thus, the right to make the request is lost when one party has

broken faith by committing adultery and has not been forgiven by the

innocent party, and also when one party is incapable (e.g., on account

of insanity or drunkenness) of asking in a rational manner.

(b) The request is unreasonable, first, when it is immoderate (e.g.,

when it cannot be granted without serious and unusual detriment to

health, or without danger of death, or without likelihood of abortion

or other great harm to a child conceived or to be conceived); secondly,

when it is seductive (e.g., when it is an invitation to commit onanism).

2616. Suspension of Obligation.--The obligation of granting and the

right of requesting conjugal relations are suspended when the marriage

is discovered to be null or uncertain.

(a) Thus, if the marriage is certainly null, abstinence is necessary

until the marriage is made valid; otherwise the parties are guilty of

fornication. But if nullity is due to a merely ecclesiastical

impediment, the impediment probably ceases in cases of most grave

inconvenience when the nullity is known to only one spouse and the

dispensation cannot be obtained at once.

(b) If the marriage is only doubtfully null, abstinence is not

necessary unless both parties have a serious doubt and no examination

has yet been made. Light doubts should not be considered, nor doubts

that have not been corroborated by investigation; while, if only one

party doubts, he or she cannot refuse the debt lest injustice be done

the other.

2617. Is There an Obligation of Requesting Conjugal Intercourse?--(a)

_Per se_, there is no obligation, since one may lawfully decide not to

enjoy one’s right, and not to use what belongs to one. As man and wife

were free to marry or not to marry, so are they free to agree either to

consummate or not consummate marriage. It is even lawful for married

people to contract together to abstain temporarily or permanently from

marriage relations (e.g., for the sake of health, or of economy, or of

mortification). By mutual consent one or both may make a vow of

chastity, as was done by St. Joseph and the Blessed Virgin, or the

husband may enter the priesthood and the wife become a nun.

(b) _Per accidens_, there is often an obligation of requesting

intercourse, for experience shows that continual non-use of marriage

often leads to incontinence or to loss of affection (see 2228).

2618. The Morality of Venereal Acts of Marriage.--(a) Non-consummated

Acts.--These acts, whether internal or external, are lawful _per se_

when they are used only as accessories to the act of marriage or as

means to foster or preserve conjugal love, for the acts are meant by

God to serve the purposes mentioned (2510). But _per accidens_ there

may be venial sin, on account of inordinateness in the motive (i.e.,

when only pleasure is intended), or in the manner (i.e., when due

decency is not observed). There is mortal sin when these acts are not

referred to the lawful conjugal act, but either directly or indirectly

to pollution, namely, when there is foreseen proximate danger of

pollution and the acts are either solitary or cooperative but performed

without sufficient reason (such as expressions of special affection),

for pollution is gravely sinful in the married, as well as in the

single state (see 2539 sqq.).

(b) Natural Consummated Act.--This act in itself is not only lawful,

but meritorious, because it exercises such virtues as obedience (Gen.,

i. 28), justice (I Cor., vii. 3 sqq.), and love of the common good and

religion (Tob., viii. 9). Since marriage intercourse has for its ends

not only reproduction, but also the expression of mutual love and the

allaying of concupiscence, it is lawful even when conception is

impossible or less probable, as when the parties are sterile, or the

woman is pregnant, or during the so-called agenesic period, or at the

time of lactation. It is a venial sin to exercise the conjugal act when

one excludes every motive except that of pleasure (Denziger, n. 1159);

and there may be even mortal sin on account of circumstances, such as

place (e.g., scandal to others present), manner (e.g., external

immoderation, internal desire of another person), evil consequences

(e.g., when one of the parties has a contagious or veneral disease,

when abortion will likely result, etc.).

sqq.), and is worse in married than in single persons, as being an

injury to the faith pledged in marriage; and hence it is not lawful to

practise it even for the purpose of artificial fecundation. Rectal

copulation is also gravely sinful, being unnatural lust (see 2534) and

a violation of conjugal faith. The usual forms of unnatural vaginal

coition, which are very much practised today, are contraceptive in

purpose, and are of two general kinds in the procedure--the

physiological or preventive, which uses instruments to keep the semen

from the uterus (such as sponges or pessaries for the female, condoms

or protectors for the male), or which employs douches or syringes to

remove semen from the vagina, or uses chemicals to devitalize it.

2619. Nota.--(a) Non habetur onanismus, nec peccatum, si copula

abrumpitur, ex necessitate (v.g., ad vitandum scandalum persona

inopinate supervenientis), vel ex utilitate, mutuo dato consensu et

periculo pollutionis excluso; nam seminatio extra vas, aut involuntaria

est, aut nulla.

(b) Non habetur contraceptio nec peccatum, sed potius actus honestus,

si, ob defectum physicum viri vel mulieris, naturae adjuvetur mediis

artificialibus ut copula fiat, vel ut semen introducatur in uterum; nam

fini matrimonii non obstat, sed obsecundat iste modus agendi.

the preceding paragraph is distinguished from several unlawful

practices considered by moralists under the heading of artificial

insemination. Pope Pius XII on several occasions has given a clear,

accurate and complete statement of Catholic teaching on the subject. We

append here his texts:

1) The practice of artificial insemination, when it refers to man,

cannot be considered, either exclusively or principally, from the

biological and medical point of view, ignoring the moral and legal one.

Artificial insemination, outside of marriage, must be condemned as

essentially and strictly immoral.

Natural law and divine positive law establish, in fact, that the

procreation of a new life cannot but be the fruit of marriage. Only

marriage safeguards the dignity of the spouses (principally of the wife

in the present case) and their personal good. It alone provides for the

well-being and education of the child.

It follows that no divergence of opinion among Catholics is admitted on

the condemnation of artificial insemination outside of marriage. The

child conceived in those conditions would be, by that very fact,

illegitimate.

Artificial insemination produced in a marriage by the active element of

a third party is equally immoral and consequently to be condemned

without appeal.

Only the spouses have a reciprocal right upon each other’s body to

generate a new life: an exclusive, inalienable right, which cannot be

ceded. And so it must be, even out of consideration for the child. On

whoever gives life to a small being, nature imposes, by the very

strength of that tie, the duty to keep and educate it. But no ties of

origin, no moral or legal bonds of conjugal procreation, exist between

the legitimate husband and the child who is the fruit of the active

element of a third party (even if the husband has given his consent).

As far as the legitimacy of artificial insemination in marriage is

concerned, it suffices, for the moment, to recall these principles of

natural law: the simple fact that the result desired is obtained by

this means does not justify the use of the means itself; nor does the

desire of the husband and wife, in itself perfectly legitimate, to have

a child, suffice to establish the legitimacy of resorting to the

artificial insemination which would satisfy this desire.

It would be erroneous, therefore, to think that the possibility of

resorting to this means might render valid a marriage between persons

unable to contract it because of the _impedimentum impotentiae_.

On the other hand, it is superfluous to mention that the active element

can never be obtained legitimately by means of acts against nature.

Although new methods cannot be ruled out a priori for the sole reason

of their novelty, nonetheless, as far as artificial impregnation is

concerned, extreme caution is not enough; it must be absolutely

excluded. Saying this does not necessarily proscribe the use of certain

artificial means destined only to facilitate the natural act, or to

assure the accomplishment of the end of the natural act regularly

performed.

Let it never be forgotten that only the procreation of a new life

according to the will and the designs of the Creator brings with it, to

a marvelous degree of perfection, the accomplishment of the proposed

ends. It is at the same time in conformity with corporeal and spiritual

nature and the dignity of the married couple, as well as with the

healthy, normal development of the child (Address to Physicians, Sept.

29, 1949, _Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi, pp. 221 ff).

2) We also believe that it is of capital importance for you, gentlemen,

not to neglect this perspective when you consider the methods of

artificial fecundation. The means by which one tends toward the

production of a new life take on an essential human significance

inseparable from the desired end and susceptible of causing grave harm

to this very end if these means are not conformable to reality and to

the laws inscribed in the nature of beings.

We have been asked to give some directives on this point also. On the

subject of the experiments in artificial human fecundation “in vitro,”

let it suffice for Us to observe that they must be rejected as immoral

and absolutely illicit. With regard to the various moral problems which

are posed by artificial fecundation, in the ordinary meaning of the

expression, or “artificial insemination,” We have already expressed Our

thought in a discourse addressed to physicians on September 29, 1949

(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi. pp. 221 ff.). For the details We

refer you to what We said then and We confine Ourself here to repeating

the concluding judgment given there: “With regard to artificial

fecundation, not only is there reason to be extremely reserved, but it

must be absolutely rejected. In speaking thus, one is not necessarily

forbidding the use of certain artificial means destined solely to

facilitate the natural act or to achieve the attainment of the natural

act normally performed.” But since artificial fecundation is being more

and more widely used, and in order to correct some erroneous opinions

which are being spread concerning what We have taught, We have the

following to add:

Artificial fecundation exceeds the limits of the right which spouses

have acquired by the matrimonial contract, namely, that of fully

exercising their natural sexual capacity in the natural accomplishment

of the marital act. The contract in question does not confer on them a

right to artificial fecundation, for such a right is not in any way

expressed in the right to the natural conjugal act and cannot be

deduced from it. Still less can one derive it from the right to the

“child,” the primary “end” of marriage. The matrimonial contract does

not give this right, because it has for its object not the “child,” but

the “natural acts” which are capable of engendering a new life and are

destined to this end. It must likewise be said that artificial

fecundation violates the natural law and is contrary to justice and

morality [1] (_Marriage and Parenthood_, May 19, 1956). See _The Pope

Speaks_, Vol, III, No. 2, Autumn of 1956, pp. 194 ff.

[1] The Holy Father here spoke for several minutes in Latin as follows:

Alia nunc occurrit quaestio, ad quam pertractandam magis addecet

latinam linguam adhibere.

Quemadmodum rationalis animus noster artificiali inseminationi

adversatur, ita eadem ethica ratio, a qua agendi normo sumenda est,

pariter vetat, quominus humanum semen, peritorum examini subiciendum,

masturbatiouis ope procuretur.

Hanc agendi rationem attigimus Nostra quoque allocutione coram

Urologiae doctoribus coetum participantibus, die VIII mensis Octobris

anno MDCCCCLIII prolata, in qua haec habuimus, verba: “Du reste le

St-Office a decide deja le 2 aout 1929 (_Acta Ap. Sedis_, vol. XXI a.

1929, p. 490, II) qu’une “‘masturbatio directe procurata ut obtineatur

sperma’ n’est pas licite, ceci quel que soit le but de l’examen”

(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_ vol. XV, pag. 378). Cum vero Nobis allatum

sit, pravam huiusmodi consuetudinem pluribus in locis invalescere,

opportunum ducimus nunc etiam, quae tunc monuimus, commemorare atque

iterum inculcare.

Si actus huiusmodi ad explendam libidinem ponantur, eos vel ipse

naturalis hominis sensus sua sponte respuit, ac multo magis mentis

iudicium, quotiescumque rem mature recteque considerat. Iidem actus

tamen tunc quoque respuendi sunt, cum graves rationes eos a culpa

eximere videntur, uti sunt: remedia iis praestanda qui nimia nervorum

intentione vel abnormibus animi spasmis laborant; medicis peragenda,

ope microscopii, spermatis inspectio, quod venerei vel alius generis

morbi bacteriis infectum sit; diversarum partium examen, ex quibus

semen ordinarie constat, ut vitalium spermatis elementorum praesentia,

numerus, quantitus, forma, vis, habitus aliaque id genus dignoscuntur.

Eiusmodi procuratio humani seminis, per masturbationem effecta, ad

nihil aliud directe spectat, nisi ad naturalem in homine generandi

facultatem plene exercendam; quod quidem plenum exercitium, extra

conjugalem copulam peractum, secum fert directum et indebite usurpatum

eiusdem facultatis usum. In hoc eiusmodi indebito facultatis usu

proprie sita est intrinseca regulae morum violatio. Haudquaquam enim

homo ius ullum exercendi facultatem sexualem iam inde habet, quod

facultatem eandem a natura recepit. Homini nempe (secus ac in ceteris

animantibus rationis expertibus contingit) ius et potestas utendi atque

exercendi eandem facultatem tantummodo in nuptiis valide initis

tribuitut, atque in iure matrimoniali continetur, quod ipsis nuptiis

traditur et acceptatur. Inde elucet hominem, ob solam hanc causam quod

facultatem sexualem a natura recepit, non habere nisi potentiam et ius

ad matrimonium ineundum. Hoc ius tamen, ad objectum et ambitum quod

attinet, naturae lege, non hominum voluntate discribitur; vi huius

legis naturae, homini non competit ius et potestas ad plenum facultatis

sexualis exercitium, directe intentum, nisi cum coniugalem copulam

exercet ad normam a natura ipsa imperatam atque definitam. Extra hunc

naturalem actum, ne in ipso quidem matrimonio ius datur ad sexuali hac

facultate plene fruendum. Hi sunt limites, quibus ius, de quo diximus,

eiusque exercitium a natura circumscribuntur. Ex eo quod plenum

sexualis facultatis exercitium hoc absolute copulae coniugalis limite

circumscribitur, eadem facultas intrinsece apta efficitur ad plenum

matrimonii naturalem finem assequendum (qui non modo est generatio, sed

etiam prolis educatio), atque eius exercitum cum dicto fine colligatur.

Quae cum ita sint, masturbatio omnino est extra memoratam pleni

facultatis sexualis exercitii naturalem habilitatem, ideoque etiam

extra eius colligationem cum fine a natura ordinato; quamobrem eadem

omni iuris titulo caret atque naturae et ethices legibus contraria est,

etiamsi inservire intendat utilitati per se iustae nec improbandae.

Quae hactenus dicta sunt de intrinseca malitia cuiuslibet pleni usus

potentiae generandi extra naturalem coniugalem copulam, valent eodem

modo cum agitur de matrimonio iunctis vel de matrimonio solutis, sive

plenum exercitium apparatus genitalis fit a viro sive a muliere, sive

ab utraque parte simul agente; sive fit tactibus manualibus sive

coniugalis copulae interruptione; haec enim semper est actus naturae

contrarius atque intrinsece malus.

2620. Contraception.--Contraception in all its forms (onanism,

condonism, vaginal irrigation, spermatocide) is a grave crime.

(a) It is an Injury to God.--Marriage was instituted by God to

propagate the human race (Gen., i. 27, 28) and to bless homes with

children (Ps., cxxvi, cxxvii), and He has made it a sacred institution

and a Sacrament. Contraception defeats the ends of marriage and

degrades it to the level of a mere instrument of carnal gratification.

The hatred of God for this sin appears in general from the horror with

which Scripture speaks of unnatural lust, and in particular from the

case of Onan, whose sin is called detestable and whom God slew in

punishment (Gen., xxxviii. 10).

(b) It is an Injury to Society.--The perpetuation of the human race is

endangered as soon as marriage is abused as to its natural end. Hence,

after the crime of homicide which destroys human life already in

existence, contraception seems to rank next in enormity, since it

prevents human life from coming into existence. This vice spreads moral

degeneracy and decay from the home itself, and is rightly called

race-suicide, since it depopulates and destroys the nation by the act

of its own people.

home depend chiefly on the respect which its members have one for the

other and on the cultivation of the sturdy virtues that strengthen

character. The husband and wife who practise onanism or other similar

carnal vices cannot have the mutual respect they should have; the wife

is deprived of the treasure of her modesty and is treated as a

prostitute rather than as an honored wife and mother, and the husband

is brutalized by the removal of the natural restraint to his sex

passion. Such self-indulgent persons will either selfishly neglect the

one or two children they may have, or will spoil them for life by the

luxury and laziness in which they are reared.

(d) It is an Injury to the Individual.--As concerns the body, there is

a perversion of the sex act from its definite use and specific end, and

hence contraception has been described as “reciprocal masturbation.” As

regards the soul, its higher goods of will and intellect are

subordinated by the contraceptionist to the delight of passion, the

lower impulses are greatly strengthened and self-control made more and

more difficult, and the spiritual objectives that should prompt a

rational creature are sacrificed for the passing gratification that

moves the beasts.

2621. Some Arguments of Neo-Malthusians and Other Advocates of

Contraception.--(a) Necessity for the Individual.--“This practice is

demanded by comfort (e.g., in order to have a good and easy time, to

have more opportunity for pleasures and occupations outside the home,

to preserve form and beauty, to escape the troubles of child-bearing

and child-rearing), or by utility (e.g., in order that suffering wives

be freed from the slavery of excessive child-bearing, in order that

children receive more attention and care than is possible in large

families).” This argument from comfort is unworthy of any but a pagan

or materialist, for the end of existence is something higher than

pleasure or escape from all hardship. But even if happiness alone be

considered, the childless home is not the most cheerful, and it often

happens that parents who have sinfully limited their parenthood will

lose an only child and be left sterile and desolate. The argument from

utility proves only that sometimes (not often) it is inadvisable for a

couple to have any or many children, but it does not prove that family

limitation through means forbidden by the laws of God and of nature is

permissible. The normal woman is not harmed but helped by

child-bearing, whereas onanism and other unnatural vices are fearfully

damaging both to mental and physical health. Experience too shows that

mothers of five or more children live longer, and that children from

large families are very often superior in qualities and achievements

and stand a better chance in life. Exceptions only emphasize the rule.

(b) Necessity for the Family.--“Large families are impossible to many

persons because the high cost of children today (expenses for clothing,

food, medical care, schooling, etc.) is beyond their means.” The

inability to support many children is often due to extravagance or to

insufficient wages, and the remedy lies in prudent economy or in

improvement of the economic condition of workers, not in the abuse of

marriage. The weakness of the objection is shown from the fact that

race-suicide is more common among the well-to-do than among the poorer

classes. However, in a genuine case of inability to maintain a large

family, limitation of children is a duty, but not by means of the sin

of contraception or onanism.

destitution, famine and war is the overpopulation of the world.

Moreover, if the poorer classes would practise contraception and the

better-to-do classes have larger families, the standard of living of

the former would be raised, the culture of the latter would be

preserved, and the quality of the whole race be greatly improved.” The

resources of the earth are easily adequate to support many times the

present population, and the misfortunes referred to are due, not to the

number of people who inhabit the earth, but to accident or to human

greed or imprudence. The eugenic argument is a vain dream, for the

history of nations and modern facts show that the ideal of race

improvement makes little appeal when the easier way of indulgence has

been learned. As said above, it is the wealthy and educated classes who

have the fewest children.

(d) Necessity of a Moral Kind.--“Contraception is a useful control of

nature similar to that employed by physicians, surgeons and other

scientists; it is not a contradiction of nature, since it preserves the

end of the sexual faculty in expressing physical love. The motives of

those who use it are not necessarily carnal, but may be of a very

Christian kind (e.g., the need of limitation of family in order the

better to practise one’s vocation, or in order to spare one’s wife, or

to keep her from abortion), and they may sincerely believe it to be

lawful.” Contraception does not control, but defeats nature, by

voluntarily frustrating the primary end which nature has in view, and,

if permitted, it logically leads to every kind of sensual indulgence.

The motives or conscience of those who use it cannot change its

character, for the end does not justify the means and a wrong

conscience does not change the law. Those who have not been spoiled or

misled by contraceptive propaganda or advice, instinctively regard

artificial birth-control as well as onanism with disgust.

2622. Is Birth-Control Ever Lawful?--(a) If this refers to an end

(viz., the limitation of the number of children or the spacing of their

arrival), it is not unlawful in itself (see 2617); and it is sometimes

a duty, as when the wife is in very poor health or the family is unable

to take care of more. But in view of the decline and deterioration in

populations today, it seems that couples who are able to bring up

children well should consider it a duty to the common welfare to have

at least four children, and it should be easy for many to have at least

a dozen children. The example of those married persons of means who are

unable to have a number of children of their own, but who adopt or

raise orphaned little ones, is very commendable.

(b) If birth control refers to a means of family limitation, it is

lawful when that means is continence or abstinence from marital

relations, not if it is onanism or the use of mechanical or chemical

means to prevent conception. The objection that husbands cannot

restrain themselves is really an insult to God’s grace and is

contradicted by numerous facts. A man of manly character should be

ashamed to admit that he is the slave of passion, and the fact that God

commands chastity and that millions obey Him both in the wedded and

single state is sufficient proof that, even though hard, sexual

abstinence is not impossible, if there is a real resolve and the right

means are employed, such as rooming apart and concentration on other

and higher things.

Continence or abstinence is counselled by the Church should conditions

make the conception of children inadvisable. It is counselled, not

commanded, since it involves heroic sacrifice which makes it all the

more meritorious and praiseworthy: “It is wronging men and women of our

times to deem them incapable of continuous heroism. Today, for many

reasons--perhaps with the goad of hard necessity and even sometimes in

the service of injustice--heroism is exercised to a degree and to an

extent which would have been thought impossible in days gone by. Why.

then, should this heroism, if the circumstances really demand it, stop

at the borders established by the passions and inclinations of nature?

The answer is clear. The man who does not want to dominate himself is

incapable of so doing. He who believes he can do so, counting merely on

his own strength without seeking sincerely and perseveringly help from

God, will remain miserably disillusioned” (Pope Pius XII, _Allocution

to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives_, Oct. 29, 1951).

Another lawful means of family limitation is “periodic continence” or

“rhythm,” the deliberate avoidance of conception by restricting

intercourse, temporarily or permanently, to the days of natural

sterility on the part of the wife. Many of the faithful are under the

impression that the system has received the unqualified approval of the

Church, that it constitutes a form of “Catholic Birth-Control.” This is

not completely true.

All theologians agree that the use of marriage during the sterile

period is not _per se_ illicit. The act is performed in the natural

way; nothing has been done positively to avoid conception; and the

secondary ends of matrimony, mutual love and the quieting of

temptation, have been fostered. “If the carrying out of this theory

means nothing more than that the couple can make use of their

matrimonial rights on the days of natural sterility, too, there is

nothing against it, for by so doing they neither hinder nor injure in

any way the consummation of the natural act and its further natural

consequences” (Pope Pius XII, ibid.).

“If, however, there is further question--that is, of permitting the

conjugal act on those days exclusively--then the conduct of the married

couple must be examined more closely” (ibid).

The following points summarize papal teaching on this aspect:

1) A premarital agreement to restrict the marital right and not merely

the use to sterile periods, implies an essential defect in matrimonial

consent and renders the marriage invalid. 2) The practice is not

morally justified simply because the nature of the marital act is not

violated and the couple are prepared to accept and rear children born

despite their precautions. 3) Serious motives, (medical, eugenic,

economic and social), must be present to justify this practice. When

present, they can exempt for a long time, perhaps even for the duration

of the marriage, from the positive obligations of the married state. 4)

The married state imposes on those who perform the marital act the

positive obligation of helping to conserve the human race. Accordingly,

to make use of the marital act continuously and without serious reason

to withdraw from its primary obligation would be a sin against the very

meaning of conjugal life (ibid.).

Pope Pius explicitly confirmed the common teaching of theologians: 1)

Rhythm, by mutual consent, for proportionate reasons, and with due

safeguards against dangers would be licit. 2) Without a good reason,

the practice would involve some degree of culpability. Not expressly

confirmed, but simply an expression of common moral principles is the

common agreement: 3) That the sin could be mortal by reason of

injustice, grave danger of incontinence, serious family discord, etc.

Since the Allocution, the more common opinion in this country asserts

that the Holy Father taught: 1) that married people who use their

marital right have a duty to procreate; 2) that this duty is binding

under pain of sin; 3) there are, however, reasons that excuse the

couples from this obligation and, should they exist for the whole of

married life, the obligation does not bind them at all; 4) the sin does

not consist in the exercise of marital rights during the sterile

periods; but in abstention from intercourse during the fertile periods

precisely to avoid conception, when the couple could have and should

have made its positive contribution to society. Sin is present when the

practice is unjustifiedly undertaken; 5) the formal malice of illicit

periodic continence is not against the sixth commandment; i.e., against

the procreation of children or the use of the generative faculty, but

against the seventh commandment, i.e., against social justice. The

couple is not making its contribution to the common good of society; 6)

from 4 and 5 above, it follows that the individual acts of intercourse

during a period of unjust practice of rhythm do not constitute

numerically distinct sins. Rather, granting the continuance of a single

will act to practice rhythm, there is one sin for the whole period of

illicit abstention during the fertile periods.

Since the Pope abstained from an explicit statement on the gravity of

the sin, the controversy of whether the practice intrinsically is a

mortal sin or not continued. The opinion in this country which holds

the greatest authority states that mortal sin is involved in the case

of continued practice with a total exclusion of children and frequent

use of marital rights during the sterile period.

Diversity of opinion has arisen as to the means of estimating when a

serious sin has been committed. Some have used a temporal norm, e.g.,

unjustified use of rhythm for five or six years would constitute a

serious matter. Undoubtedly most of the proponents of this norm would

not accuse a couple of certain mortal sin if they already have one or

more children; after that, indefinite use of the practice without

excusing causes would not be a mortal sin. (This is admitted by most

theologians.) Others have proposed a numerical norm as a basis to

determine whether or not a couple has made its contribution to the

conservation of the race. Concretely the proponents of this theory

regard four or five children as sufficient to satisfy the obligation in

such a way;

a) that the use of rhythm to limit the family to this number is licit

provided the couple is willing and morally able to practice it;

b) that the limitation through rhythm to less than four requires a

serious justifying cause. The intention involved to prevent conception

would be seriously sinful in itself, since it causes great harm to the

common good and involves in practice subordination of the primary to

the secondary end or ends of matrimony. At the present time this

opinion seems to be more favored in America than the first which places

the gravity of the sin in the unjustified practice of rhythm for five

years. (For a survey of recent opinion, see the _Conference Bulletin of

the Archdiocese of New York_, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, pp. 36 ff.)

On the other hand, some European theologians have denied that the

practice constitutes a mortal sin in itself, independently of

circumstances such as injustice and danger of incontinence.

The present state of opinion, then, is definitely undecided and calls

for caution both in dealing too severely with penitents or too readily

recommending the practice. The response of the Sacred Penitentiary of

June 16, 1880, affords a safe guide in practice: “Married couples who

use their marriage rights in the aforesaid manner are not to be

disturbed, and the confessor may suggest the opinion in question,

cautiously, however, to those married people whom he has tried in vain

to dissuade from the detestable crime of onanism.”

As to the theological censure to be attached to “rhythm,” it is not

approved, nor recommended, but seems to be tolerated for sufficiently

grave reasons. “Instead of being freely taught and commended, it is

rather to be tolerated as an extreme remedy or means of preventing sin”

(Official Monitum, Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Sept. 8, 1936, _Conference

Bulletin of Archdiocese of New York_, Volume XIV, No. 2, p. 78).

2623. Cooperatio Uxoris ad Onanismum vel Contraceptionem.--(a)

Cooperatio formalis graviter illicita est, quum includat approbationem

ipsius peccati. Unde graviter peccat uxor quae suis quaeremoniis de

molestiis graviditatis virum cogit ad congressum onanisticum, vel quae

nec interdum conatur eum avertere ab iniquo consilio onanistice

congrediendi, vel quae active adjuvat abruptionem copulae, vel quae

interne gaudet de ipso peccato (1513).

(b) Cooperatio materialis ad onanismum ex gravi causa (e.g., ex metu

fundato rixarum, molestae cohabitationis, adulterii viri) licet; nam

actio mulieris, scil. copulam habere naturalem, honesta est, atque

causa sufficiens adest permittendi abusum factum a comparte (1515

sqq.). Imo uxor debitum petere potest a suo viro onanistico, si secus

diu abstinere cogeretur ab omni usu conjugii cum periculo

incontinentiae, quia caritas erga virum non obligat ad abstinentiam cum

tanto incommodo.

possibilis; nam copula contraceptiva est intrinsece et ab initio mala

(1517, 1527). Unde uxori nec petere debitum licet, nec passive se

habere. Sed qualibet vice tenetur positive pro viribus resistere. Sin

autem gravissima causa sit actum permittendi, ut puta periculum mortis,

eam tantum resistentiam opponere debet ad quam obligatur virgo oppressa

(2497), consensu ut patet denegato (See _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_,

June, 1940, pp. 634 ff., and March, 1948, pp. 244 ff.)

2624. Recapitulatio de Licitis et Illicitis in Conjugio.--(a) Illicita

graviter sunt extra matrimonium facta, v.g., moechia, mollities

solitaria, alienae conjugis concupiscentia; sed probabiliter actus

imperfecti et solitarii in proprium corpus exerciti leve non excedunt,

citra periculum pollutionis, siquidem in delectationem veneream quae in

conjugio licita est natura sua ordinentur, sicque minus indecentes

fiant.

(b) Illicita graviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed contra finem,

i.e., naturae matrimonii seu generationi prolis repugnantia, ut sunt

pollutio mutua, onanismus, impudicitia quae non in copulam sed in

pollutionem tendit.

i.e., qum generationi nec prosunt, nec obsunt, sed in circumstantiis

aliquam prae se ferunt inordinationem (e.g., copula ob solam voluptatem

habita), imprudentiam (e.g., copula tempore parum apto habita),

immoderantiam (e.g., impudicitia pudori nociva, situs innaturalis, ut

si stent vel vir succubet, ex levitate electus).

(d) Licita sunt intra matrimonium facta, quae tum ex parte objecti

(scil., quia actus ordinatur ad finem matrimonii), tum ex parte

circumstantiarum (scil., quia debito tempore, loco, modo, etc., ut

prudentia exigit, exercentur) rationi rectae concordant. Unde non

peccant conjuges sibi licita concupiscendo vel de iis gaudendo. Immo

mulier onanistae licite cooperata non est peccati arguenda si gavisa

sit de ipsa copula vel de bonis ejus effectibus, vel (saltem quando

probabile videtur se semen excipisse) si ad completam voluptatem se

excitaverit.

2625. Regulae pro Confessariis.--(a) Interrogationes.--Si nulla ratio

est suspicandi copulam modo innaturali exerceri, praestat ut plurimum

de circumstantiis (v.g., de motivo copulae) non quaerere, ne conjuges

taedio afficiantur vel bona fide inutiliter priventur. Si tamen fundata

suspicio est abusum matrimonii celari, hac de re confessarius inquirere

debet, sed prudenter, ne scandalo sit poenitentibus verbis indiscretis.

(b) Monitiones.--Si deprehenditur poenitentem onanistam esse, per

se severe reprehendendus est (quod de viro praesertim dicitur) nec

absolvendus nisi signa contritionis prius dederit; per accidens autem,

si datur ignorantia invincibilis et monitio nullatenus profutura

praevidetur, poenitens in bona fide relinquatur.

2626. Marriage as a Sacrament.--The third benefit of marriage is that

of the Sacrament. The union of man and wife is not merely a physical

union, but also a social one, and it should be modelled on the union

of Christ and the Church: “This is a great sacrament; but I speak in

Christ and the Church” (Eph., v. 32).

(a) Christ abides with the Church, and so the husband should dwell with

his wife (Matt., xix. 5). The cohabitation of the parties is demanded

by the very nature of the promises made in marriage, and hence it is

wrong for the husband to be absent from the home for notable periods of

time, or, what is worse, to drive his wife from home--or vice versa.

Grave reasons and mutual consent justify long absences, as when the

husband is called away on distant business; but, if he goes away for a

considerable part of the year, he should, if possible, take his wife

with him, or visit or write to her frequently. Very grave reasons

suffice for obtaining a separation, either permanent, on account of

adultery, or during the continuance of the reason, as when there is

serious unhappiness (Canons 1128 sqq.).

(b) Christ is the head of the Church, and so also the husband is

superior to the wife in authority (Eph., v. 23). Ordinarily man

excels in the qualities suited for rule of the home (such as physical

strength, decision, courage), and hence as every society, no matter how

small, must have a head, the husband is the natural head of the home.

But obedience is due a husband in domestic matters in which he is head

of the house--for example, the choice of the place of residence, the

management of the family income, the discipline of the children, but

not in the wife’s personal affairs (e.g., her conscience, her politics,

her property)--and only in commands that do not exceed his authority,

for he has no power to command if he is irrational, and he has no

claim to obedience if he orders something sinful or foolish. Moreover,

since the wife is a partner and not a servant, and since she usually

excels as sympathetic and wise adviser and careful household manager

and is naturally more virtuous, the husband should consult with her on

important family questions and decide them as far as possible by mutual

consent, and should gladly leave to her sole control and direction the

many things in which she is more competent than himself.

the husband has the duty of providing for his wife, spiritually and

temporally. Usually the man should attend to the external affairs of

the family (such as its support and protection), while the wife should

take care of the internal affairs (such as the housekeeping and the

training of the children). It is to be regretted that the smallness

of the husband’s salary often compels the wife to work outside her

home. Women should not be compelled to take up occupations unsuited

to their sex, much less those that interfere with the supreme duty of

motherhood. Injury done the common personal goods of husband and wife

by one of them is unjust, if due to illegal action; it is at least

uncharitable, if due to carelessness. The family goods are usually

under the control of the head of the family. The wife has no right to

use the earnings of her husband without his consent, unless he fails to

provide suitably for his family, or uses his money extravagantly.

2627. The Duties of Persons Engaged to Marry.--We shall speak first of

the duty of entering into a nuptial engagement, and next of the duties

which engagement imposes.

(a) _Per se_, there is no obligation for an individual to marry, for

the need of marriage is not a personal but a social one, and social

duties do not all fall upon each particular person. Each person must

take necessary food, for without it the individual perishes, and eating

is thus an individual duty; but each person need not be a soldier,

or farmer, or builder, or merchant, or married; for it suffices that

these offices be fulfilled, one by one individual, another by another.

Indeed, if marriage is an impediment to a more urgent good of the

common welfare (e.g., perilous public service incompatible with married

life), or of private good (e.g., the duty of maintaining parents, the

wish to remain single because one feels oneself unsuited for marriage

or called to continence), marriage should not be chosen.

(b) _Per accidens_, there is sometimes a duty of marrying on account

of public or private necessity. Thus, if the community is depopulated

by race-suicide, the public good should move suitable persons to

marry in order to assist the birth rate; for, if those are considered

slackers who refuse their service or money in war time when the nation

is threatened with death from without, are not those also culpable who

will not assist a community threatened with extinction from within?

Marriage is also obligatory on those who feel that they are unable to

live continently, and will be lost unless they marry (I Cor., vii. 9).

In case of seduction, marriage is a form of restitution to the injured

girl, but since forced marriages are usually unhappy, the injury should

be atoned for in some other way if the seducer does not care for the

girl or is not desirable himself (see 1803).

2628. The Duties Imposed by Engagement to Marry.--(a) Before

Engagement.--Courtship is lawful for those who intend to marry, for

without it the mutual knowledge which is requisite for a prudent choice

is impossible. But courtship should be employed, not as a period of

pleasure and extravagance, but as an opportunity for learning the

suitability of the parties, one for the other, and their desirability

in virtue, religion, sanity, intelligence, health, wealth, position,

love of children, sobriety, steadiness, etc. Visits are lawful during

courtship, but not the same familiarity as is permissible after

engagement. The time of wooing should not be protracted, and as a rule

after a year the parties should either become engaged or decide they

are not well matched.

(b) At the Time of the Engagement.--The parties are gravely bound

to make known to each other all personal defects which cannot be

concealed without serious injustice, such as the lack of virginity or

other quality which one party makes a _conditio sine qua non_, or the

presence of a diriment impediment or of a very harmful or displeasing

characteristic (such as venereal disease, sterility, disgrace, race,

the fact that one is a widow, etc.). There is no duty of justice to

manifest defects whose concealment will not be detrimental (such as

poverty, lowly origin), but there may be a duty of charity to reveal

them, as when their concealment now will lead to an unhappy marriage.

As to fornication, the man is not obliged to confess it, unless

perhaps when he has an illegitimate child; nor the woman, unless she

is actually pregnant, or cannot keep the matter hidden afterwards and

can make it known without serious harm to herself (see Self-defamation,

1577; cfr. 1978, 2132). But those who have been guilty of these

mistakes should undergo a test on the question of physical health.

be true to the other party, avoid paying court to a third person

(see 2526), and give the signs of affection that are usual between

engaged persons. The relationship between the engaged parties does not

give them the right to what is intrinsically evil (e.g., voluntary

pollution, proximate danger of consent to sin, continuance in a

familiarity which is a proximate occasion of sin), or to what is lawful

only to married persons (e.g., intercourse and the liberties pertinent

to it). But it does give them the right to manifest their affection by

acts indifferent in themselves (e.g., visits which are not private,

too frequent, or too prolonged; the decent kisses usual between

betrothed lovers on meeting and parting), even though unintentionally

pollution may follow (2538). Persons who intend to marry soon should

acquaint themselves before marriage and from reliable sources with the

fundamental physiological facts of sex, so as to avoid the mistakes

which often wreck conjugal happiness, beginning with the honeymoon

itself; they should have some money or the prospect of being able to

support themselves, and the woman should know how to take care of a

home.

(d) At the End of the Engagement.--A formal promise to marry (Canon

1017) imposes the duty of marriage within a reasonable time (i.e.,

at the appointed date, or, if no date was fixed, at the time when

one of the parties reasonably requests it), unless the engagement

be broken (e.g., by mutual consent, by a circumstance that makes

marriage impossible, such as marriage to a third party or choice

of the clerical state; or unnecessary, such as the fulfillment of

a resolutory condition, supervening impediment, Papal dispensation

given for a just cause); or unless one of the parties has a right

not to keep the engagement on account of a notable change in the

circumstances, or a breach of faith, or opposition of parents that will

make the marriage inadvisable, etc. The obligation to marry is one of

justice, and is grave when the contract was bilateral; it is one of

fidelity or justice, and grave or light according to the intention of

the promisor, when the contract was unilateral (see 1888). There is

no action to enforce an engagement, for forced marriages are unwise

(Canon 1017, n. 3); and in practice confessors and pastors should not

insist on fulfillment of the promise. But damages can be sued for, and

the confessor should deny absolution to one who refuses to make just

restitution in a case of breach of promise (see 1803). An informal

promise to marry (i.e., one invalid naturally or positively) produces

no obligation to marry in either forum (see 454); but it does produce a

duty of restitution in breach of promise, if there was force, fraud, or

deceit.

2629. Conditions for the Signs of Affection between Engaged

Persons.--(a) Objectively, these signs must be suited to the condition

of merely engaged, not of married persons. Brief and modest kisses are

proper for lovers, but greater intimacy, such as long and lone

conversations in secluded spots, are wrong.

The chaster the relations between the betrothed, the less occasion for

future regrets and recriminations. “Petting” purchases a cheap physical

thrill or excitement at the cost of present moral danger for two

persons, of the degradation of love to its lowest expression, and of

loss of self-respect, with the probable risk of a future ill-fated

marital career ending speedily in disillusionment and divorce. It is

essentially selfish and unwise.

(b) Subjectively, the signs of affection must not be a proximate

occasion of sin; nor may they be accompanied by consent to sin, or be

used for the sake of venereal pleasure. Joy at the thought of future

marriage intercourse and sensual pleasure in present kisses (2514) are

in themselves not sinful, but in practice they are as a rule gravely

dangerous. _Motiones carnales, quales sunt erectiones, signa sunt

delectationis venereae quando conjuguntur eum pollutione vel proxime

praeviis ad eam; sunt signa delectationis mere sensualis, quando amorem

sensibilem sequuntur ex motu sanguinis, quin in resolutionem seminis ex

se tendant_ (2497 b).

2630. The Duties of Parents and Children.--In addition to the duties

that belong to all superiors and subjects (see 2635 sqq.) there are

special obligations incumbent on parents and children by reason of the

special relationship between them. The duties of the parents are of two

kinds.

(a) Duties of Charity.--Parents should give their children special love

and special signs of affection, as the order of charity requires (see

1158 sqq.). Hence, those parents sin grievously who hate or curse their

children, even the illegitimate or wayward, or who drive the children

from home by unkindness.

(b) Duties of Piety.--Parents should, as far as they are able, give

their children the honor and help that belongs to members of the family

(see 2346 sqq.), though illegitimate children have not the right to

dwell in the home of the legitimate children or to share in the family

inheritance (see 1803 b). The help owed to children is spiritual and

material, and the obligation, which is natural and divine, is most

grave (Canon 1113). Spiritual help includes religious and moral

training and example (see 867 sqq.); material help includes food,

clothing, lodging, medical care, means to learn a necessary trade, art

or profession or to enter marriage or take up a suitable state in life,

protection and defense. Parents are bound to help their children, at

least in necessities, as long as the latter are in need. Sins are

committed also against the unborn (e.g., when the pregnant mother does

not take care of her health, or when she is ill-treated by her husband)

and young infants (e.g., when the child is unnecessarily suckled by

strangers and thus exposed to danger, or is placed in a foundling

asylum or other institution because the parents are unwilling to be

bothered). On the other hand, those parents sin through excess who

spoil or “sissify” their children by luxury and idleness, or who are

too indulgent to give needed correction and even moderate chastisement.

2631. Compensation of Children.--A child, even though subject to

parental authority, seems to have a right to compensation for

extraordinary services given his parents, and also to at least a fair

commission for gains made in the course of extraordinary services for

which he is receiving no compensation. In their wills, after satisfying

just debts and expenses, parents should leave their offspring who need

it enough to maintain their state in life.

2632. Sex Education of Children.--(a) Necessity.--Some moralists

believe that sex education of the young should be indirect. They hold

that it is dangerous to speak of venereal matters to the young; that

silence itself is to them a lesson of modesty; that the practice of

piety and mortification, along with parental watchfulness, will keep

them pure; that sufficient knowledge will come at the proper time as

God will provide. Others reject this theory as opposed to the tradition

of the Church as well as to experience. The defenders of direct sexual

education point to the evil of silence: the bad habits contracted and

grown strong before their sinfulness is understood, or the scruples and

misery into which ignorance will plunge young people entering the

crisis of puberty, the false and corrupt ideas with which unavoidably

the minds of the innocent will be indoctrinated by immoral companions

or physicians, the loss of confidence in parents who have refused

important knowledge and advice, and the ruin of innocent lives by

seducers which a timely word of warning would have prevented. Hence,

there is an invincible ignorance which cannot be removed without direct

education, and which is more harmful at least to well-reared children

than any evil that may be caused by the education.

(b) Preparation for Direct Education.--Training for purity should be

directed both to will and intellect, for knowledge without character is

powerless against temptation. Children should be trained from the

beginning morally (i.e., they should be kept as far as possible from

sources of contamination; should be taught to have implicit confidence

in parents and to bring to them their questions and difficulties;

should be trained to practise continual mortification and restraint and

to struggle against evil tendencies until the habit of self-control

becomes a second nature) and religiously (i.e., to use prayer, the

Sacraments and other means of grace until they are well formed in

piety). This previous moral education and religious conviction will

stand on guard as a protection against the suggestions of indulgence

which initiation into sex matters may suggest.

instruction include such points as the diversity of sex, its origin

from God and its dignity, the beginning of life in plants and animals,

the organs of reproduction, the functions of maternity and paternity,

the grave reasons that demand sexual morality, respect for womankind,

the great sinfulness of masturbation and fornication, the meaning of

puberty and its accompaniments in male and female, the possibility and

healthfulness of continence, the moral dangers of the world and the

social diseases to be guarded against, and the hygienic aids to

chastity.

(d) The Method of Instruction.--It is clear that not all the details

just mentioned can be imparted at one time, for young children would

not understand or there would be scandal of little ones; but, while

fiction and exaggeration should be avoided, a strictly scientific and

technical instruction is not necessary or generally advisable. It is

clear also that parents, and especially mothers, are naturally suited

for the delicate task of early guardians of chastity, though the later

instruction should be supplemented in catechism class, sermon, school,

and an individual advice given in confession. It would be impossible in

brief space to outline sufficiently a program of sex instruction, but

parents and persons who are about to marry should read, study and apply

some of the excellent books prepared for their guidance.

2633. Duties of Children.--The duties of children to their parents can

also be classed under those of charity and piety.

(a) Duties of Charity.--Children owe their parents a special internal

and external love (see 1176 sqq.). Those children sin gravely who hate

their parents or wish them serious evil, or who treat them with great

unkindness or neglect, or bring them great sorrow or worry, or who

never visit or write to them.

(b) Duties of Piety.--Children must respect and assist their parents

(see 2347, 2348). It is a serious sin to have contempt for one’s

parents, or to show them serious dishonor in words (e.g., by injurious

or mocking names), in signs (e.g., by laughing at them, mimicking

them), in deeds (e.g., by striking them, speaking against them), in

omission (e.g., by refusing to acknowledge them or show them the usual

marks of courtesy). It is not disrespect, however, for a child to

dislike or protest against evils done by his parents. The assistance

owed to parents is both spiritual and corporal, and children sin when

they neglect the religious welfare of their parents (e.g., by not

respectfully admonishing them when the parents do not lead a good life,

by not obtaining for them the Sacraments, prayers and suffrages they

need), or deny them bodily aid (e.g., by refusing them help or comfort

when they are poor, persecuted, or suffering). Children who live at

home with their parents should contribute from their earnings or

individual property to the maintenance of the home, unless the parents

do not need this pay and do not wish it. See Catechism of the Council

of Trent, on the Fourth Commandment (pages 408 sqq.).

2634. Duties of Near Relatives.--There are similar duties of charity

and piety between other near relatives, for example, between brothers

and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren uncles and aunts and their

nephews and nieces, and between first cousins. The obligation seems, to

some authors, to be a grave one as far as the second degree of kinship,

but is light in the other degrees. The relationship and duty to kin by

marriage is not so strong.

2635. The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of

Superiors.--Superiors both in domestic and civil society need

especially prudence and justice in order to fulfill well their special

duties of ruling successfully and lawfully (Jerem., xxiii. 5).

(a) Prudence.--If every individual must use wise deliberation, decision

and direction to guide himself aright, much more does a ruler, whether

of the home or of the State, need these qualities; and hence it is the

prudent servant who is placed over his master’s household (Matt., xxiv.

45), whereas the imprudent ruler brings confusion upon his community

(Is., iii. 4 sqq). Parents, guardians, executives, lawmakers and

magistrates are, therefore, bound to fit themselves by competent

knowledge of their duties. At the minimum, they must know what

constitutes the welfare of their circle or community, and how it should

be promoted. For this, in positions of subordinate importance, common

sense with good will often suffices, but from those who are heads of

large organizations much more is expected. A chief who has to direct a

great multitude must have unusual ability and unusual knowledge or

unusual quickness to learn from study and conference what measures will

safeguard the interests of his body and promote the happiness and

prosperity of its members (see 1640 sqq.).

(b) Justice.--In their rule superiors must be lovers of the common

good; they must decree, judge and govern according to natural justice

and the law; in distributions of burdens and favors they must be guided

by fairness to all, avoiding partiality, bribery, peculation and every

form of political corruption; in discipline they must conscientiously

enforce the right; in personal life they must be a model to their

subjects, showing themselves moral, religious, truthful, dignified but

approachable and patient (not arrogant, stubborn, sensitive,

ill-humored or revengeful), given to work and duty rather than to

pleasure and display.

2636. Duties of Subjects.--The general duties of subjects to superiors

are chiefly honor and obedience (see 2351 sqq.).

(a) Honor.--Honor is owed to superiors on account of their position of

authority, which is derived from God, not on account of their personal

character, for personally they may be wicked. It is disrespectful even

in a democracy to deny them the honorable address, salutation or

courtesy which is customary, or to treat them insultingly by word,

manner or writing. But it is not disrespectful to disagree with the

personal views of a superior or to seek legitimately his removal from

office if he is unfit or less fit.

(b) Obedience.--Obedience is owed to superiors and their laws when they

strictly command what is not sinful or illegal or outside their

authority (see 375 sqq.). Unemancipated children are obliged to obey

their parents in all that falls under the parental authority, namely,

in what pertains to good morals (e.g., attendance at religious duties,

avoidance of bad companions) or the good order of the home (e.g., the

hours for meals, the time of retiring, the visitors to be received).

But parents have no authority to command fraud or other sin; nor are

children under subjection in the matter of taking up a state of life,

for this demands liking and fitness, and the command of a superior

cannot give liking and fitness. It is a serious sin for parents to

force a child to take up religious life or the priesthood, or to marry

a certain individual; but a child should yield when his parents are

reasonably opposed to his choice of a vocation, as when they need his

support, or wish him to test his vocation a little, or know that the

person selected for wife will disgrace the family.

2637. Taxes.--Citizens owe the government particularly the tribute of

taxation, and in war that of military service. Taxes are contributions

exacted by the public authority from subjects for the purpose of

defraying public expenses or promoting the public welfare.

(a) Thus, they are contributions, and hence a tax is not to be confused

with a payment (e.g., fares for passage on government railroads), or

with a fine (e.g., pecuniary penalty for evasion of customs).

(b) They are exacted from subjects (i.e., from citizens), who are

subject on account of their persons as being members of the State, and

from aliens, who are subject on account of their goods, as receiving

privileges of residence, commerce, passage, etc.

2638. Kinds of Taxes.--There are many kinds of taxes, but they can all

be reduced to two general categories.

(a) Direct taxes are those collected from the person on whom the burden

is ultimately to fall. Examples are poll or personal taxes and property

taxes (such as those on general property, incomes or inheritances), for

these charges remain an expense of the taxpayer himself.

(b) Indirect taxes are those collected from a person other than the one

on whom the burden is ultimately to fall. Examples are duties imposed

on outsiders (such as customs or tariffs, duties raised for revenues,

protection, etc.), external revenue taxes imposed on certain acts (such

as the manufacture or sale of commodities) or occupations (e.g.,

licenses for trades, sports, etc.). In these the charge falls

immediately on the taxpayer, but ultimately on a consumer.

2639. Just Taxes.--Tax laws, like other laws, must be just; that is,

they must be made by lawful authority and must promote the common good

(see 285). The common good requires that taxes be not imposed except

for just reasons, and that there be a fair distribution of the burden.

(a) Just reasons are those of public utility or necessity. A tax would

be unjust, if it were levied for unjust or unnecessary purposes.

(b) Fair distribution requires that citizens be assessed according to

their ability to pay (sacrifices for the public good, special benefits

from the use of a tax fund, etc.).

2640. Obligation to Pay Taxes.--The obligation in conscience of just

tax laws is admitted by all Catholic authorities.

(a) The teaching of Scripture is quite clear, since Our Lord, in answer

to the question whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Caesar,

replied: “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s” (Matt., xxii.

17-21); and St. Paul teaches: “Be subject of necessity, not only for

wrath, but also for conscience’ sake. Render therefore to all men their

due, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom” (Rom.,

xiii. 5, 6).

(b) Reason too shows the need of obligation in conscience, for, unless

these laws oblige thus, the common good will suffer through lack of

money needed for public purposes, and some individuals will be unjustly

burdened and others unjustly favored.

2641. Quality of the Obligation.--There are various opinions about the

quality of the obligation in conscience of taxation laws.

(a) Thus, according to one opinion they oblige in conscience and under

sin, that is, as preceptive laws (see 561 sqq.). For the natural law

and justice require that the members of society contribute the

necessaries to the social body organized for their benefit, or that the

people live up to their implicit contract with their government by

giving compensation for the services they receive.

(b) According to another opinion tax laws oblige in conscience only

under penalty, that is, as penal laws. The arguments for this view are,

first, the sufficiency of the penal obligation (i.e., the heavy fines

imposed) for the attainment of the laws’ purpose, and, secondly, the

common opinion of citizens that they commit no sin by merely evading

payment of taxes. Furthermore, it is added that, if these laws were

preceptive, conscientious citizens would be under a great disadvantage,

for they would be placed in the dilemma of either acting against their

conscience and committing sin or of paying more than their due on

account of the neglect of tax dues by citizens who are not

conscientious.

different cases. Thus, some held that laws on direct taxes are

preceptive and laws on indirect taxes merely penal, while others say

that the kind of obligation depends on the will of the lawgiver, and

that tax laws that are preceptive in one country may be only penal in

another. If tax laws are merely penal, there is no obligation of

restitution, but there is an obligation of payment and of penalty after

sentence.

2642. Obedience to Tax Laws.--Obedience to just laws is owed either

from legal justice alone, or also from commutative justice with the

burden of restitution. There are various opinions about the case of tax

laws.

(a) According to the traditional opinion, the obligation is one of

commutative justice, because there is an implicit contract between the

government and the people, in virtue of which the former is bound to

provide for the safety of the people at home and abroad and to secure

those things that are necessary for the common welfare (such as roads,

postal service, etc.), while the latter are bound in return to pay the

expenses of the government.

(b) According to a recent opinion, the obligation is one of legal

justice only, because the imposition of taxes is an exercise of

authority by the government, and taxes themselves have the character of

a tribute from the part to the whole rather than of a wage or payment.

Hence, though he who evades taxes is not held to restitution, he sins

against justice, and sins gravely if the matter is considerable.

sometimes from commutative justice. Thus, some admit that in feudal

times there was a contract between the governed and the ruler, and

therefore an obligation of commutative justice to give services and

taxes; but in modern times they say there is no such contract, and the

duties of ruler and subjects rest on natural law and legal justice, not

on any compact. Others again distinguish between the obligation before

the quota has been determined, which is the duty of legal justice to

declare properly the value of one’s property, and the obligation after

assessment, which is a duty of commutative justice to pay just tax

bills.

2643. The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.--(a) There is a

grave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in

public elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the

community and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals

depend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on

the ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote

cooperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at

least with public unconcern about public matters--for example, those

who neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote.

A grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution),

but not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble,

ridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has

exceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is

a mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.

(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either

a privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to

which the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The

obligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact

that the common weal is everybody’s business and responsibility,

especially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by

abstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound _ex

officio_ to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held

to restitution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and

perhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of

restitution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general

election the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence,

and citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of

their representatives.

2644. Manner of Voting.--(a) Object.--It is not necessary to vote for

the best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by

character, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives

indications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community

well. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath

beforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the

person whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In

minor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the

candidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as

President, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party

principles for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. _Per

accidens_, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is

necessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is

much worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy

candidates are included.

(b) Purpose.--The end which the voter should have in mind is the good

of the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely

or chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one’s own

race, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or

escape enmity.

natural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes)

or positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a

period of previous residence, but also other conditions such as

registration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The

opinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that

helps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for

ecclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.

2645. Obligation to Seek Office.--A worthy man should run for office in

the following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy

(e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and

there is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave

impediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private

affairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).

2646. Duties of Employers and Employees.--Between employers and their

domestic servants or workingmen there are general mutual duties as

between superiors and subjects, and special mutual duties as between

parties to an explicit and implicit contract. Of these latter duties we

shall now speak.

2647. Duties of Employers.--(a) Justice.--The labor assigned must not

be excessive (e.g., unduly perilous, exhausting, protracted) or

injurious (e.g., harmful to religion or morals, an unreasonable

impediment to marriage, to cultural opportunity or amusement); the wage

paid must be just (i.e., one that will enable the worker to support

himself and his family in reasonable comfort) and equitable (i.e., one

that rewards special merit and service by pensions or additional

compensation); the terms of the contract must be observed (e.g.,

arbitrary lowering of wages or dismissal are unjust).

(b) Charity.--Liberality should be shown by preference to employees,

since they have a special claim on the employ good will. The employer

should consider that he is responsible for the spiritual betterment and

material improvement of his workers, and should have them in mind when

making contributions to religious, educational or special causes, so

that his own employees will benefit in particular by his gifts to these

worthy causes. Trade schools and insurance against sickness and

unemployment are especially deserving of his assistance.

2648. Duties of Employees.--(a) Justice.--Workers are bound to give a

fair return in quantity and quality of labor for the pay they receive,

and to be loyal to their employer as regards his person, reputation,

and property. Hence, it is unjust to loaf or come late or leave early,

to turn out work too slowly or of an inferior grade, to damage

machinery or property, to waste food or provisions, to act as a

household spy or informer, to try to extort what is not due. (For a

consideration of the worker’s obligation to join unions see “Catholics

in Labor Unions” by Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., _American

Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXVI, no. 6 June, 1947, pp. 422 ff.)

(b) Charity.--Workers should be willing even at the expense of some

right or of some slight loss to help an employer who is in grave

necessity; for example, it would be uncharitable for farm hands to stop

work promptly on time when this will cause a serious damage to the

farmer’s crop, or for a cook to leave on her free day when her mistress

is very sick and will be left alone.

2649. Labor Disputes between Employers and Employees.--(a) In

themselves these disputes are indifferent, as they are a species of

industrial war (see 1380 sqq.) or of industrial self-defense (1826

sqq.). If the end, the means and the circumstances are not against

right reason, the disputes are lawful or even laudable.

(b) In the concrete, the strike is labor’s chief means for enforcing

demands. Since organized labor seeks to equalize the bargaining power

between employer and employee, the way to counteract refusal to pay

fairly is by a concerted refusal to work, i.e., a strike. A strike may

be defined as an organized cessation from work by a group of workers to

obtain advantages from an employer. Since an organized strike is a kind

of war, moral theologians apply the principles of a just war to

determine concretely the morality of a strike.

1) There must be a just reason for the strike. Too little pay, too long

hours, brutal treatment, unsafe or unsanitary conditions constitute

genuine grievances for what may be called a defensive strike, which

presupposes injustice in the part of the employer. On the other hand an

ameliorative strike does not presuppose an employer’s injustice, but

consists essentially in the worker’s attempt to better conditions,

e.g., a better salary, shorter working hours, etc. Such a strike seems

to be unlawful if it violates a just work contract in effect at the

time of the strike. If no such contract has been made, the ameliorative

strike can be lawful, granting a proportionately grave cause; but it is

never given unqualified approval owing to the fact that such a strike

involves many and grave losses both material and moral to the workers,

employer, and community. (See Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II,

n.556.)

2) The strike must be the last means. Owing to the fact that a strike

is a kind of warfare, all other peaceful means should be tried, e.g.,

arbitration, governmental inquiry boards, injunctions, fact-finding

boards etc. The moral principle involved is; if an evil is avoidable

but not avoided, it cannot be considered as merely incidental to a good

end.

3) The strike would be called by proper authority. The decision to

strike should be made by the men themselves freely and Without

intimidation. Organized labor must have the backing of a responsible

union in its strike, for this is the channel of bargaining or

arbitration that the employer must use, and it should be used by the

workers also. Accordingly, “wildcat” strikes are unlawful unless the

unions have ceased to represent the men and have been repudiated by

them.

4) The benefits expected from the strike must compensate for the evils

inseparable from it. In this matter not only the worker’s personal

gains are to be considered, but also the welfare of others, namely the

employers and the public. Thus, in a long-drawn-out strike the economic

advantage gained in a small salary increase for the worker can never be

proportionate to the financial losses inflicted on the workers

themselves in loss of income, on the employers, and particularly on a

community which suffers the loss of purchasing power of a number of its

members. Many strikes in which the products or services of the workers

are necessary to the public (transportation, food distribution, etc.)

seem to be more a strike against the community than against an

employer; and the harm inflicted on the innocent public is not

incidental as it must be in order to be justified. Only extraordinarily

grave reasons can justify such strikes.

5) The means employed must be just. The common means are work stoppage,

persuasion of other workers to keep the work stopped until the demands

are met, and picketing in a peaceful manner. Sabotage and violence

against an employer’s person or property constitute unjust means.

“Scabs,” or professional strike-breakers, may be prevented from

depriving the workers of their jobs to which the workers keep their

rights; but violence in defense of this right seems illicit, unless

violence is begun by the strike-breakers and the workers are forced to

defend themselves.

direct strike. Other kinds of strike demand special consideration.

1) Slow-down strike. Since it does not involve cessation from work, but

simply a reduction in production or services while the worker is

receiving full pay under contract, the strike seems to be immoral. The

striker is not giving the work paid for.

2) Sit-down strikes. Some authors justify these strikes by analogy with

an act of self-defense in which the person attacked seizes the weapon

from the attacker. The analogy seems defective since the place of work

is hardly a weapon. This strike seems to be immoral since it involves

an unjust invasion of property rights by way of excluding an owner from

the use of his property.

3) Sympathy strikes. There is a great diversity of opinion in this kind

of strike. A moderate view distinguishes between strikes of several

groups against the same employer and one or several groups against

different and unassociated employers. The first kind seems justified,

for it is directed against the same unjust employer, and the workers

are cooperators to defend the rights of one group against him. In the

second case of striking against different employers, the “sympathizers”

are striking against a just employer and are violating their work

contract which binds in commutative justice. Hence this type of strike

seems to be essentially unjust.

(d) The lockout is the employer’s strike. Unwilling to grant the

worker’s demand, the employer shuts down his plant, thus terminating

employment of both strikers and non-strikers. The same conditions and

restrictions that apply to the strike are applicable to lockouts. That

the lockout itself is not unjust, but at least morally indifferent,

appears to be evident in this, that as workers are not bound to submit

to injustice, neither is the employer. He cannot be expected to pay

wages when essential employers have quit or stalled production.

(e) A boycott is a mass refusal to patronize a certain business with

the effort to persuade others to join in the refusal. Historically it

has been used by labor to gain support from the public against an

employer or by elements of the public itself to protest some evil

practice of a business establishment, e.g., Legion of Decency boycotts

of indecent pictures, NODL boycotts of literature, etc. In itself, a

boycott is not immoral, since no one is obliged to trade in one place

in preference to another and may refuse to trade with persons who are

unjust or otherwise immoral. There seems to be no reason also to

prevent a person from lawfully persuading others to follow his cause.

The principles of a just strike are applicable to the justification of

boycotts, and the conditions of a sympathy strike are to be applied to

secondary boycotts, i.e., against other firms doing business with a

boycotted firm. These other firms are not themselves unjust and should

not be made to suffer for the injustice of another. Hence, a very grave

cause, co-operation in injustice, for example would be necessary to

bring pressure against them.

2650. Is There Any Obligation of Giving Employment?--(a) The State

certainly has an obligation in legal justice of offering opportunities

of work to those who cannot find it, if the public welfare is

compromised by widespread unemployment. Even if only one worker were

without work through no fault of his own, the duty of helping him would

seem to devolve on the State, since the laborer has a right to work and

the State has the duty of promoting the temporal welfare of its

subjects when they are unable to provide for themselves.

(b) Employers have a duty of commutative justice to give work to men

with whom they have made a contract of labor and not to keep work from

men unfairly; hence, arbitrary dismissal or blacklisting is a crime

against justice. They should also try to secure other employment for

good workers whom they are unable to keep, so as to tide over for the

men the slack seasons when some have to be laid off. Industry,

organized labor and individuals should interest themselves practically

in private movements and plans to remedy unemployment situations, for

these are matters that should not be left entirely to the State and

charity. Employment and honest wages are in the long run to the

advantage of employers as well as of employees, and are therefore good

business as well as good morals.

2651. Duties of Certain Professions.--(a) Judges and Lawyers.--The

duties of men of the law were discussed already in 1940 sqq. Clients on

their part owe their lawyers fair treatment and just compensation for

services, while those who have part in a judicial process must give

respect to the judge and other officials of the court and due obedience

to their directions.

(b) Teachers and Students.--Teachers must make themselves proficient in

their matter and in the art of pedagogy; must take care that their

teaching is accurate and beneficial; must be steady, punctual, orderly;

must give no example or advice but what is good; must be neither too

lenient nor too exacting; must preserve discipline in their classes by

correcting, punishing, or expelling as need requires; must be just,

neither petting nor bullying, and must award honors and averages

according to merit. There may be grave harm and sin in denying

important academic degrees (such as S.T.M., S.T.D., J.D.C., M.D.) to

the worthy or in conferring them on the unworthy. Students on their

part owe to their teachers respect and obedience in class matters, to

their parents and themselves diligence in study, and to their school

avoidance of cheating and of disorderly conduct. In athletics they

should not aim at winning for winning’s sake, or playing for playing’s

sake, but at the true goal of a sound mind in a sound body. In the

selection of preferred studies they should remember that nothing worth

while is won without hard work, and that the true objectives of

learning are not mere utility, or gain or diversion, but the culture of

mind and of spirit.

have sufficient knowledge and skill, and must keep up with the progress

of medical science; they must not deny their services or delay to come

when there is urgent need; they must give a case diligence

proportionate to its seriousness; they must consult in case of doubt,

follow the safer opinions, and use the more likely remedies. In his

relations with his patient a doctor must be chaste (e.g., avoiding

immoral advice or operations, unnecessary psychoanalytic conversations,

or bodily exposures); loyal to the confidences received; honest and

charitable, not prescribing useless remedies, or overcharging, or

refusing service to the poor; mindful of the religious needs of his

patients, being not too ready to exempt them from church duties nor

slow to remind them when they should send for the priest. Patients on

their part should honor the physician, call him in need, obey his

directions, and properly compensate him for his services. What is here

said of physicians and surgeons is true also of nurses in their duties

and capacities. Pharmacists are bound to exercise great care in filling

prescriptions; they should not cooperate with abortion or contraception

by selling medicines, instruments or appliances to be used for those

purposes; they should not sell drugs, dopes, poisons, liquors, etc.,

forbidden by law.

Question IV

THE SACRAMENTS

2652. In the three Questions that preceded we spoke of the means by

which man is sanctified and is enabled to secure supernatural rewards

through the merits of his own works; for the virtues make their

possessor as well as his acts morally righteous, while through God’s

grace the good deeds done for His sake entitle the doer to the crown of

eternal life. In the present Question we pass on to consider certain

means by which God is honored by man and man is sanctified through the

application to his soul of the merits and passion of Christ; for the

Sacraments were instituted by Christ both as external acts of religion

(2175, 2244) and as most powerful agencies to begin, restore, and

increase the life of holiness.

2653. It should be observed, first, that the present work is concerned

with Moral Theology; and, secondly, that it must be confined within the

limited number of pages which a two-volume production of convenient

size necessitates. Hence the reader will understand why in the Question

now beginning we speak only of man’s duties in reference to the

Sacraments, and omit other points that do not so strictly pertain to

Moral. (a) Thus, the nature, institution, number and effects of the

Sacraments belong to Dogma, which the authors hope to treat later in a

similar work. (b) The administration of the Sacraments, their rites,

rubrics, ceremonies are set forth in ritual books and works on liturgy.

registration, penal and processual legislation in reference to the

Sacraments, and like juridical questions are treated fully in

commentaries on pertinent sections of the Code.

Art. 1: THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL; THE SACRAMENTALS

(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 60-65.)

2654. Nature of a Sacrament.--In the New Law a Sacrament is an outward

sign instituted permanently by Christ to signify and convey grace.

(a) The internal cause or essence of a Sacrament is the outward sign,

which has two parts. The indeterminate part or matter is a visible

object (e.g., the water of Baptism, the chrism of Confirmation, the

bread and wine of the Eucharist, the oil of Extreme Unction, the

imposition of hands in Orders) or a perceptible act that looks to

another act for its perfectionment (e.g., the confession, etc., of the

penitent in penance; the giving of oneself as spouse in Matrimony).

The determining part, or form, is either the sacred formula spoken over

the material element (e.g., in Baptism the words “I baptize thee,

etc.”) or an act that completes another act (e.g., the acceptance of

another as spouse in Matrimony). As the matter must be visible or

otherwise sense-perceptible, so the form must be audible or at least

(in Matrimony) equivalently audible; for a Sacrament is a sensible

sign. The words are audible when they are heard or are capable of being

heard at least by the minister.

(b) The external efficient cause or instituter of the Sacraments is

Christ, the founder of the New Testament religion and the productive

and meritorious author of grace as our God and Saviour.

symbolize outwardly by their rite and to work inwardly by their

instrumental virtue the application of Christ’s redemption in the soul

of properly disposed recipients. It is the nature of Baptism and

Penance (Sacraments of the Dead) to produce first grace or forgiveness,

of the others to produce second grace or increase of holiness

(Sacraments of the Living). Furthermore, three of the Sacraments

(Baptism, Confirmation, Orders) have a second effect, since they sign

the soul with the indelible character of member or soldier or minister

of Christ, and hence these Sacraments cannot be repeated.

2655. Rules on the Invalid Use of the Matter and Form of the

Sacraments.--(a) Since the matter and form are essential constituents

without which the Sacraments are not had, it is sacrilegious to

invalidate a Sacrament by substantial changes in either of these parts.

The matter is changed substantially when it is so modified as currently

to be considered and called something different from the element

appointed by Christ. Thus, wine is unfit for the Eucharist if corrupted

into vinegar, or made unsuitable as a drink (e.g., probably as long as

it remains frozen), or notably adulterated (e.g., when it is mixed half

and half with water). The form is changed substantially when it is so

modified that to a listener it no longer conveys the sense intended by

Christ. This happens when the changed form does not express the chief

ideas of the correct form, as when it does not determine who is the

minister of Penance (e.g., “You are absolved”), or who is the subject

of Baptism (e.g., “Ego baptizo in nomine, etc.”), or what is the effect

of the Eucharist (e.g., “Hoc non est corpus meum,” “Hoc est corpus,”

“Hic meum est corpus”), or the action of the minister of Penance (e.g.,

“Ego abluo te a peccatis”), or the profession in Baptism of faith in

the Trinity (e.g., “Ego te baptizo, Amen”).

2597. Vocation to the Clerical State.--(a) Internal Vocation.--No one