1833. Self-defense must be moderate, for_Moral theology

being is a thing that should be avoided when possible. (a) Thus, the

person attacked must not reply with force at all, if this is possible.

He should escape, or call a policeman, or throw the weapon out of the

window, etc., if these means will suffice. Some authors excuse from

flight those who would suffer disgrace if they ran away from danger,

such as those who are pugilists or professional fighting men. (b) The

person attacked should use only such force as is necessary, if force

must be employed. Thus, if the aggressor can be made helpless by the

use of gas, permanent bodily harm should not be done him; if he can be

subdued with the fists, knife or pistol wounds should not be resorted

to; if wounds will suffice to hold him at bay (e.g., by blackjacking),

killing should not be resorted to. In the heat of a fight, however, the

person assailed sometimes unintentionally goes beyond what moderation

requires.

1834. The intention of the person who uses force to repel an unjust

aggressor must be good. (a) Thus, as his end he must intend only the

preservation of his own life and look upon the death of his neighbor as

a misfortune. (b) As the means to this end he must intend only to stop

the attack that is being made, not to bring on the death of the

aggrcssor. Those who are commissioned by public authority to put a

human being to death (e.g., the public executioner or soldiers in time

of war) may intend these homicides, since they are means to the common

good; but the death of one private person is not a means to the good of

another private person, and hence it should not be directly aimed at.

1835. The mind of the person who defends himself against the unjust

aggressor must also be free from sinful dispositions, such as hatred

and revenge; otherwise he sins against charity. Our Lord reprobated the

teaching of the Scribes that it is lawful to return injury for injury

in a revengeful spirit, and declared that one should prefer to receive

a second blow rather than return a blow for the sake of revenge (Matt.,

v. 38 sqq.; cfr. also Rom., xii. 19).

1836. When Self-Defense Is Obligatory.--Self-defense is sometimes an

obligation. (a) Thus, it is an obligation, if the only factors

considered are the life of the guilty aggressor and the life of the

innocent person who is assailed; for the life of the innocent should

not be sacrificed for the guilty, and charity indicates that the first

duty of the person attacked is to himself. (b) It is an obligation, if,

on account of circumstances, the person attacked owes it to others to

preserve his life--for example, if he is the father of a dependent

family, or a public official whose life is very necessary for the

welfare of the community, or whose office it is to resist those who

menace public security. This is true from the viewpoint of society

also, for the world needs the good men it has, while there are too many

wicked men already.

1837. Sometimes self-defense is not obligatory. (a) Thus, it is merely

optional, when no duty to others commands self-defense and a divine

counsel invites one to omit it (see 1169). Hence, if the assailant is

certainly in mortal sin, while the person assailed is certainly in the

state of grace, it would be very commendable to die rather than kill

the assailant, in order to grant him time for repentance. But a case of

this kind is rather theoretical than practical, for how could one be

sure that the assailant would profit by the opportunity allowed him of

doing penance? At any rate, the sacrifice is optional, for the

aggressor is either formally unjust, and hence not in extreme spiritual

need, or only materially unjust, and it will be uncertain whether he is

in spiritual need or whether, if he is in such need, the respite will

be used by him (see 1165 sqq.). (b) Self-defense is unlawful according

to some, if the life of the assailant is necessary for the common good,

and the life of the person assailed is not necessary. But this would be

a very rare case.

1838. Defense of Neighbor’s Life.--The principles on defense of one’s

own life against an unjust aggressor, even at cost of the latter’s

life, may be applied to the life of an innocent third party.

(a) Thus, it is necessary to defend the innocent person, even if the

aggressor has to be killed, when one is bound to give this protection

by natural duty (e.g., because the innocent person is one’s child or

father and the aggressor is not a relative), or by contract (e.g.,

because one is a hired bodyguard or policeman).

(b) It is lawful to defend the innocent person, even if the aggressor

has to be killed, and even though there is no duty of nature or

contract to give this protection (Exod., ii, 12). But it is disputed

whether it is also necessary to do this. The affirmative opinion calls

attention to the extreme bodily need of the innocent party, the

negative to the extreme spiritual need of the aggressor. It is not

necessary to risk one’s life in order to protect the life of the

innocent party, unless the public safety is in peril, or one has

undertaken this obligation (see 1169).

1839. A private individual may defend life at the cost of the life of

an unjust aggressor, because he is obliged or permitted to protect the

life that has more of a claim on him. He may also defend certain other

most important goods that belong to him or to his neighbor, even if

need be at the cost of the unjust aggressor’s life, because the common

good is more valuable than the life of the aggressor, and the defense

of those goods is bound up with the common good. Thus, if it were not

permissible to defend valuable property even to the extent of killing a

burglar, criminals would be encouraged, peaceful citizens would be at a

disadvantage, and the public security would greatly suffer. Among the

goods now spoken of are goods of fortune and goods of body. It is not

always obligatory, however, to exercise the right of extreme

self-defense (e.g., in case of violation, provided no consent is given

the deed).

1840. Defense of Goods of Fortune Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If

the attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., the aggressor

wishes to take the last loaf from a starving man or the plank from a

drowning man), or if it seems to be an attack on life (e.g., the

burglar enters a room as if he meant to kill), the killing of the

unjust aggressor is not unlawful, as is clear from the previous

paragraphs.

(b) If the attack is made on goods of fortune only, but they are of

great value and actually possessed, the question is disputed. According

to some, killing in this case is unlawful, because life is more

valuable than property; but the common opinion is that killing is

lawful, both because Scripture excuses the person who kills the

nocturnal robber (Exod., xxii. 2), and because the public safety is at

stake and therefore justifies extreme measures.

yet possessed (e.g., a legacy one hopes to obtain) or have only a small

value (e.g., one gold piece), killing is unlawful; for there is no

proportion between external goods that are only hoped for or that are

of minor importance and the life of a human being. Pope Innocent XI

condemned the teaching that one may use homicidal defense to protect a

coin or the prospect of receiving an office.

1841. Defense of Bodily Purity Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If the

attack is equivalent to an attack on life, or seems to be an attack on

life, self-defense even by killing is lawful, and hence it may be

permissible to kill one who is attempting rape.

(b) If the attack is on bodily purity only, but _per actum consummatum

luxuriae_, the question is controverted. One opinion is that killing may

not be resorted to, for the aggressor cannot take away purity of soul,

and the purity of body that he violates is less good than life. The

opposite opinion holds that killing may be employed in self-defense,

since bodily purity has a higher value than even notable goods of

fortune, especially as violation is usually accompanied by spiritual

damage or disgrace of family, etc.; and the public interest demands

that such outrages be sternly suppressed on account of the strong

inclination of many persons to commit them.

non-consummatum luxuriae_ (e.g., _per osculum vel amplexum_), killing is

not justified, but other means of defense, such as blows or wounds, may

be used.

1842. Defense of Bodily Integrity Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If

the attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., if the aggressor

intends to mutilate or wound, but there is danger that he will kill),

defense even with resultant killing is lawful.

(b) If the attack is not equivalent to an attack on life, but is very

notable (as when a principal member will be lost or the person horribly

disfigured), some authorities claim that defense which would cause the

aggressor’s death is unlawful, because death is too heavy a price to

pay for wounds. But against this it may be argued that the loss of

limbs or organs is more serious than the loss of money, and, in some

respects, is more damaging than violation. The civil law gives a person

the right to protect himself in body and limbs, even by killing the

assailant when absolutely necessary.

bloody nose), certainly killing is unjustified. But the person attacked

may hit harder and oftener than the assailant, if he is able, so that

the latter may beware of him another time.

1843. Defense of Honor or Reputation.--When honor or reputation is

unjustly attacked, the more perfect course is to bear the injury

patiently and to pardon the offense, according to the teaching of

Christ. But it is not sinful to defend honor and reputation, just as it

is not sinful to defend life, limbs and property. How far may one go in

defense of honor or reputation against an unjust aggressor?

(a) If the aggression is merely in words (as when the offender calls

the other party a liar, or says that he is illegitimate), it is not

lawful to use violence, at least such as would cause death; for there

are other and less drastic means of defense that suffice (e.g., to

answer the allegations, or even to retort the same epithets against the

aggressor), and, unless the violence of even justifiable resentment

were restrained, the world would be filled with disorder and homicidal

violence. Innocent XI and Alexander VII condemned the doctrine that one

may kill in order to prevent the spread of calumny.

(b) If the aggression is in deeds (as when the offender slaps the other

person or throws mud or rotten eggs at him), it is not lawful to kill;

for here also defense can be made in other ways (e.g., by bringing the

aggressor before the court for punishment, or, if this cannot be done,

by returning slap for slap, etc.). Innocent XI rejected the proposition

that it is lawful to kill the aggressor who gave one a blow and then

fled. It is only when the aggressor is continuing his attack, and

imperilling the innocent party in life or limb, that the latter may

repel the extreme force by extreme force.

1844. Killing of the Innocent.--So far we have spoken of the killing of

malefactors and unjust aggressors, which under certain conditions is

not sinful. The next subject is the killing of the innocent, that is,

of those who are neither malefactors nor unjust aggressors worthy of

death.

(a) The killing of the innocent by human authority, if it is done

directly and intentionally, is always sinful, whether the cause be a

private individual or society. But since God is the Master of life and

death, He could command the death of an innocent person, as was done

when he bade Abraham to sacrifice his son (Gen., xxii. 12).

(b) The killing of the innocent, if it is indirect and unintentional,

is not sinful when there is a serious reason for performing an act from

which the killing results; for it is lawful to perform an act from

which two effects follow, if the good is intended but the evil only

permitted, and there is a sufficient justifying reason (see 103 sqq.).

1845. Unlawful killing of the innocent is a most heinous crime.

(a) It is an injury to the rights of God over human life, and is

forbidden in the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue: “Thou shalt not

kill” (Exod., xx. 13). To judges the special command was given: “The

innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death” (Exod., xxiii.

7). The man-slayer destroys the image of God, a crime so detestable

that in Scripture God declares that He will revenge the blood of man,

even though shed by a beast (Gen., ix. 5; Exod., xxi. 28).

(b) It is a most grave sin against the individual, for it deprives him

of his chief natural good and the means of securing and enjoying many

great spiritual goods. If the person killed desired or asked for death,

no injustice is done to him, since he waived his right, but

uncharitableness is committed, since the neighbor’s life should be

loved, and the uncharitableness is greater according as the person is

more worthy of love. Scripture numbers murder among the sins that cry

to heaven for vengeance (Gen., iv. 10, ix. 5).

the community of one of its members, causes scandal and disturbs the

peace. Hence, the law has always inflicted the severest punishment on

slayers of the innocent.

1846. Since the end does not justify the means, the following ends do

not justify the direct and intentional killing of innocent persons:

(a) the public good does not excuse, for example, if an enemy were to

threaten destruction against a city unless it put to death an innocent

person who dwelt in its borders. The criminal on account of his

lawlessness is an obstacle to the common good, but the law-abiding

citizen promotes the common good and it would be harmful to the public

peace if he could be put to death without any fault of his own. The

State is for the citizen, not the citizen for the State. But if the

common safety depended on the sacrifice of one man’s life, charity and

patriotism would require this man to make the sacrifice spontaneously

(see 1169); that is, he should deliver himself to the enemy, and were

he to refuse, it seems the community would have the right to deliver

him. Similarly, it is not lawful to kill hostages, even though the

enemy has broken faith, or killed one’s subjects;

(b) the private good of other individuals does not excuse; for example,

it is not lawful to kill a maniac lest he do harm to those around him,

at least unless the conditions of unjust aggression are fulfilled.

Similarly, it is not lawful to kill a woman with child, in order to

baptize the child;

example, it is not lawful to shoot or poison those who are mortally

wounded or suffering from an incurable disease, or who are old and

helpless, in order to spare them suffering. But one may give a person

at the point of death a medicine that may hasten the end, if there is

good hope that it will cure him and other remedies are futile, for the

purpose is not to kill but to cure (see 2485). It is lawful also for

embalmers to puncture the heart or sever an artery of a person who

seems to be dead, if there are certain signs of his death, for the

purpose is not to kill this person, but to free his friends from fear

that he is buried alive.

1847. Indirect or Unintentional Killing of the Innocent.--Indirect and

unintentional killing of the innocent is lawful (1872) only when there

is a reason of sufficient gravity (i.e., one of a value proportionate

to the life of the innocent person).

(a) The public safety is such a sufficient reason. Thus, in time of war

it is lawful to attack a city, even though the death of many

non-combatants will result, or to charge the enemy, even though

innocent persons have been placed by the latter as a shield to his

front ranks.

(b) Private safety from death is not a sufficient reason, if it does

not compensate for the loss, or if it is secured unlawfully (see 104).

Thus, if Balbus cannot escape from an unjust aggressor without running

down and killing an unbaptized infant or a man whose life is very

necessary for the community, the temporal life of Balbus does not

compensate for eternal life lost by the infant in the first instance,

and the mere private good of Balbus does not compensate for the public

good sacrificed in the second instance. Again, if Caius cannot escape

from drowning without pushing a shipwrecked companion from the only

plank which is insufficient for both, or if Sempronius who has been

sentenced to death for crime cannot escape execution unless he kills

his guard, the means of securing safety are unlawful.

for the loss and is secured lawfully. Hence, if the life of the

innocent person is only of equal importance, self-defense against an

unjust aggressor by means of flight that will involve the innocent

person’s death does not make one guilty of homicide (e.g., Titus is

speeding in his car in order to escape a pursuer bent on murder and he

cannot avoid hitting and killing a cripple who crosses the road). If

self-defense is conducted by means of attack, one may use violence

against the aggressor (e.g., one may shoot at him, although an innocent

person whom he is using as a shield will be killed), but not against

the innocent person (e.g., one may not shoot at the innocent person in

order to deprive the aggressor of his shield, nor may one hold the

innocent person before one in order that he receive the assailant’s

bullet).

1848. Destruction of the Unborn.--(a) Direct and intentional

destruction of this kind is unlawful and is known as feticide, when the

fetus is killed within the womb, or abortion, when a non-viable fetus

is expelled from the womb. It is not abortion to hasten the birth of a

viable fetus (i.e., one which is about six or seven months old and can

live outside the womb), since the child can be kept alive, but grave

reasons are required to make it licit, since it presents a risk to the

child’s life. But to deliver or expel a non-viable fetus is abortion.

Every direct abortion is regarded by the Catholic Church as murder and

is penalized with the censure of excommuuication (Canon 2550, Sec. 1).

It might be argued that the direct killing of what is surely a human

being is murder, but when does the fetus become a human being? The

ancient theory of Aristotle, followed by St. Thomas and most medieval

authors, maintains that the embryo did not become human until some

time after conception, an opinion that still has great probability

physically. Others maintain that animation is simultaneous with

conception. Since we do not know the exact moment of animation, the

moment of conception must be accepted in practice as the beginning of

human life. Probabilism is ruled out in this instance, for there is no

doubt about the law and its application: we must not directly kill what

is probably a human being. Accordingly, abortion is considered to be

murder. Hence, even in the case of a girl who has been raped--although

it is a probable opinion that measures may be taken to remove the semen

from-her body--it would be gravely sinful to give any treatment which

would abort an impregnated ovum.

(b) Indirect and unintentional killing, or rather permission of death,

is not unlawful in such a case, when there is a proportionately grave

reason, such as the life of the mother. Thus, it is permissible to

give the mother a remedy necessary to cure a mortal disease (e.g.,

medicinal drugs, baths, injections, or operations on the uterus), even

though this will bring on abortion or the death of the fetus; for the

mother is not obliged to prefer the temporal life of the child to

her own life. But the baptism of the child must be attended to, for

its salvation depends on the Sacrament, and the eternal life of the

child is to be preferred to the temporal life of the mother, if the

conditions of 1166 are verified.

(ectopic gestation) the tube itself is in a pathological condition long

before rupture of the tube, as experts in obstetrics teach, and hence

can be excised as a diseased organ of the human body. As such, the

excision of such a tube would be in itself a morally indifferent act

and, granting verification of the other conditions for the principle

of double effect, could be licitly performed. (For a history of the

moral question, medical testimony and full argumentation see Chapter X

of _Medical Ethics_ by Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A.) Some theologians,

however, believe that the tube cannot be removed unless it can be

proved in each case that a pathological condition, placing the woman

in danger of death, exists. The first view is accepted as sufficiently

safe to be followed in practice. (See Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R.,

_Morals in Politics and Professions_, p. 118.)

1849. It is unlawful positively to kill the mother in order that the

unborn child may be saved or baptized. When a caesarean section offers

the sole chance of saving the mother’s life, it is permitted. It is

seriously doubtful whether a mother is morally obliged to undergo the

operation in situations where a threat to her life exists. In this

case, if baptism in the uterus is possible without increasing the

danger to the mother’s life, it should be attempted. When a caesarean

section does not offer any chance of saving the mother’s life, but will

directly contribute to her death, the operation should not be

performed. One must await the death of the mother and then observe the

norm of Canon 746; “Immediately after the death of a pregnant woman, a

caesarean section should be done in order that the fetus may be

baptized.” The procedure to be followed is outlined in medical-ethics

books. (See McFadden op. cit., pp. 244 ff.)

1850. Direction in Cases of Doubt, Ignorance, or Error.--(a) In case of

doubt, if there are positive and solid reasons for believing that an

operation performed to save a woman’s life will not be destructive of

the life of a fetus, the operation seems lawful; for in doubt, the

woman, as the certain possessor of life, has the presumption.

(b) In case of ignorance or error (e.g., when a penitent asks whether a

certain operation is permissible, or a surgeon in good faith performs

an operation that is not lawful), either a truthful answer should be

given to questions, or silence should be observed when an admonition

would only be harmful (e.g., if to require the Caesarean operation from

a dying mother would have no other result than to make her die in bad

faith instead of good faith).

1851. Canonical Penalties for Homicide and Abortion.--(a) Homicide, if

voluntary, produces irregularity (Canon 985, n. 4) and subjects the

guilty party to exclusion from legitimate ecclesiastical acts or to

degradation from the ecclesiastical state (Canon 2354). Moreover, a

church is violated by the crime of homicide (Canon 1172). (b) Abortion

of a human fetus, when the effect is produced, brings irregularity on

those who procure it and also on the cooperators (Canon 985, n. 4).

Moreover, those who procure abortion effectively, the mother not

excepted, incur excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the

Ordinary, and, if clerics, they are to be deposed (Canon 2350).

1852. Suicide.--Suicide, or the killing of oneself, is, like homicide

in general, of various kinds.

(a) Thus, in reference to the intention, it is voluntary or

involuntary, according as it proceeds from knowledge and choice, or as

it is committed without realization of what is done or without the

intention to produce death. Examples of involuntary suicide are a

person who is temporarily insane on account of impending calamity and

drowns himself, and a person who, attempting to frighten another by

pretending to hang himself, actually strangles to death. It would be a

mistake to say that no person who commits suicide is free, but no doubt

a large percentage of those who kill themselves are not responsible for

their act.

(b) In reference to the mode, suicide is direct, if that which is done

tends from its nature to the death of the person who does it (e.g.,

firing a pistol into one’s brain); it is indirect, if that which is

done tends from its nature to another end (e.g., to struggle with a

criminal who is firing a revolver). Direct suicide is committed in many

ways, all of which can be reduced to positive (e.g., the eating or

drinking of deadly poison) and negative (e.g., the refusal to eat or

drink anything).

1853. The difference between direct and indirect suicide is also

explained as follows: (a) direct suicide is an act or omission that has

but one effect, namely, death (e.g., taking deadly poison); (b)

indirect suicide is an act or omission that has two effects, one of

which is the peril of death. This peril of death is certain, if death

always follows (e.g., jumping from the roof of a skyscraper);

proximate, if death usually follows (e.g., jumping from a third- or

fourth-story window); remote, if death now and then follows (e.g.,

jumping from a second-story window).

1854. Sinfulness of Suicide.--Voluntary and direct suicide is always a

most grave sin, if committed without due authority (i.e., the command

of God).

(a) It is a grave injury against the rights of God, for it usurps His

authority, refuses Him the service He desires, spurns the gift He has

bestowed, dishonors the image of God (Gen., ix. 6), and destroys the

property of God: “Thou, O Lord, hast the power of life and death”

(Wis., xvi. 13).

(b) It is an offense against society, for the community has a right to

be benefited by the lives of its members, and to receive a return for

the protection and assistance it affords them. Moreover, death by

suicide is usually felt as a great sorrow and disgrace by the relatives

of the departed, and it has a demoralizing effect on many persons of

suggestible minds. The fact that the death of this or that man is not

felt as a loss by a family or the State, but rather as a relief, is no

argument; for if suicide were left to human decision, how many fatal

mistakes would be made (see 460)! Persons valuable to society would

rashly kill themselves, fearing in a mood of depression that they were

worthless; others who could contribute nothing in material ways would

destroy themselves and deprive their fellow-men of an example of

fortitude, or at least of the opportunity of showing charity and mercy

to the needy.

inclination, for self-preservation is called the first law of nature

(see 298), and also against that love of self which charity requires

(see 1136 sqq.). Since charity to self is more obligatory than charity

to the neighbor, suicide is a more serious sin than other forms of

homicide. Nor is it excused by the desire of some good for self. The

suicide does not better himself by his act, for, since he has not

fulfilled his trust in this life, what can he expect in the next life?

He escapes the lesser evils of physical miseries or moral temptations,

but he incurs the greater evils of physical death and of moral

cowardice and defeat, to say nothing of his punishment in the hereafter.

1855. Cooperation in Suicide.--Cooperation in suicide has the guilt of

unlawful homicide. (a) Thus, those who incite, advise, command, or

assist another to commit suicide are guilty of moral murder. (b) Those

who carry out together a suicide pact are guilty both of suicide and of

moral murder.

1856. Permission or Authorization to Commit Suicide.--(a) Divine

authority could command or permit suicide, since God has the power over

life and death. But whether God has ever done this is uncertain. Some

argue for the affirmative from the death of Sampson, who pulled down

the house upon himself saying: “Let me die with the Philistines”

(Judges, xvi. 30), and of Razias who killed himself to escape ill-usage

(II Mach., xiv. 37 sqq.), and from the acts of certain female martyrs

who from love of God or from the desire to preserve chastity rushed to

their deaths. But others think that invincible ignorance may explain

these cases. The act of Sampson may also be understood as indirect

suicide lawfully committed for the public good of his country.

(b) Human authority, according to some authors, could authorize a

condemned malefactor really guilty of a capital crime to execute

himself; for, they argue, there is little difference between opening

one’s mouth to swallow poison administered by an executioner and taking

it with one’s own hands, as was done by Socrates. Others deny that God

has given the State the authority to order suicide, and they declare

that it is both unnecessary and inhuman to force a condemned man to be

his own executioner. Still others believe that the State could command

self-execution, at least in necessity, but that such a punishment is so

strange, cruel and unnatural that it should be avoided; for, if it is

shocking to ask a father to execute his child, much more shocking would

it be to ask a man to kill himself. The argument is inconclusive which

says that because it is lawful to perform an act preparatory for death,

but which is indifferent and would never cause death (such as opening

the mouth for poison), it is also lawful to perform the act which

inflicts death (such as taking the poison).

1857. Indirect Suicide.--Indirect suicide is committed when one is the

cause of an act or omission, indifferent in itself, but from which one

foresees as a result that one’s life will be lost or notably shortened,

This kind of “suicide” is lawful when and if the conditions for a case

of double effect are present--in other words, if there is a

proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect (see 103

sqq.). The following reasons are considered sufficient:

(a) the public good, for the welfare of society is a greater good than

the life of an individual. Eleazar is praised because he exposed

himself to death in order to deliver his people (I Mach., vi. 43 sqq.).

It is not sinful, then, but rather obligatory for a soldier to advance

against the enemy or to blow up an enemy fortification, though it be

certain that his own death will result; nor is it wrong for a pastor to

go about ministering to his flock during a pestilence, though it be

certain that he will fall a victim to the plague. Explorers and

experimenters may also risk their lives for the advancement of science;

(b) the good of another suffices for indirect suicide, when he is in

extreme spiritual need. Indeed, there may be an obligation of charity

to risk one’s life for the salvation of a soul (see 1166). Hence, it is

lawful to go as a missionary to a country whose climate is so trying

that strangers die there after a few years;

indirect suicide, when there is an urgent reason for exercising a

virtue in spite of the peril of death. Thus, for the sake of charity a

shipwrecked passenger may yield his place in the life-boat to his

parent, wife, friend, or neighbor; for the sake of faith, one may

refuse to flee in time of persecution (see 1006), or may refuse and

should refuse to take food or drink offered as a mark of idolatry; for

the sake of chastity a virgin, at the peril of her life, may jump from

a high window or resist the assailant, although it does not seem that

this is obligatory if no internal consent will be given to the rape;

for the sake of justice, a criminal in the death house who has an

opportunity to escape from prison, may decide to remain and be

executed, or a malefactor condemned to die by starvation may refuse to

take food secretly brought him; for the sake of mortification, one may

practise moderate austerities, as by fastings, watchings, scourgings,

hair-shirts, etc., which sometimes shorten life, though generally they

lengthen it;

(d) the preferable temporal good of self suffices, that is, one may

risk the danger of death to escape another danger that is more likely

to happen or more terrible. Thus, a man in a burning building may leap

from a high window, even though death from the fall is almost certain,

for death by burning is more terrible; a prisoner who is about to be

tortured to death may make a break for liberty if he sees a chance of

escape, for death is more certain if he remains. On the same principle,

one may engage in hazardous but useful occupations, such as working on

high buildings, or as a diver or miner, for it is better to live a

shorter time with employment and the necessities of life, and to be of

service to the public, than to live a longer time without these

advantages. But a worker should not undertake dangerous tasks for which

he is unfitted or unprepared, and the employer is bound to safeguard

the lives of the workers.

1858. The same reasons are not sufficient in all cases. (a) Thus, the

greater the risk of death, the more serious the reason required. Hence,

to save the money one has it might be lawful to jump from a

second-story window, but not from a higher window when the fall would

most likely kill one. (b) The more immediate the danger of death, the

more serious the reason required. Thus, to save money one might

lawfully enter a quarantined house, but the risk would not be permitted

if the house were tottering in an earthquake. (c) The more notable the

shortening of life, the greater the reason needed to permit it. Thus,

if the practice of a certain mortification or labor reduces the

expectancy of life for a few years, a lesser reason suffices than if it

reduces the expectancy for ten or more years.

1859. Indirect suicide is unlawful and has the guilt of self-murder

when the reason for risking death is frivolous or insufficient or

sinful.

(a) Examples of insufficient reasons are found in the cases of persons

who engage in occupations or actions that are very dangerous to life or

limb but of little public or private value, as when for the sake of

performing a feat a man walks a tight-rope, pricks himself with pins

and needles, or puts his head into a lion’s mouth. But if the performer

is very skillful and has no other means of livelihood, it seems that he

may exercise his art for the sake of entertainment.

(b) Examples of sinful reasons for risking death are found in persons

who abbreviate their lives by over-eating, drunkenness, habitual

indulgence in strong spirits, or immoderate passion of any kind; and

also in those who refuse to make use of the ordinary means for the

preservation of health (see 1566 sqq.) or of the ordinary remedies

against disease (see 1571). It is not necessary that one be anxious to

live long (see 1063), but it is obligatory to use the normal means for

the preservation of life, and those who notably neglect these means are

guilty of indirect suicide.

1860. Is it suicidal to refuse a surgical operation pronounced

necessary for life?

(a) If the operation is likely to be successful and there is no good

reason for refusing it, it seems that one may not refuse it without the

guilt of indirect suicide, although one might be excused on account of

good faith.

(b) If the success of the operation is doubtful, or if there is a good

reason for refusing, one who refuses is not guilty of suicide. Among

the good reasons are spiritual ones (e.g., modesty, the fear of falling

into blasphemy or despair under the pain are given by some writers)

and temporal ones (e.g., the poverty that would be brought upon the

patient’s family or the hardship that would result for the patient

himself).

1861. Canonical Penalties for Suicide.--(a) Those who attempt suicide

are irregular _ex delicto_ (Canon 985, n. 5). (b) If they die, they are

not given ecclesiastical burial unless they gave signs of repentance

before death (Canon 1240, n, 3), and, if they recover, they are subject

to various penalties (Canon 2350, Sec. 2). (c) If it is doubtful

whether a person committed suicide, or was responsible, the doubt is

decided in his favor, provided no scandal is likely.

1862. Accidental Homicide.--Accidental homicide is that which happens

without any direct purpose to kill. But the following cases should be

distinguished:

(a) when the homicide is not voluntary, either in itself or in its

cause (see 35, 94), that is, when the slayer had no intention to kill

and could not foresee that death would result from his act or omission;

(b) when the homicide is voluntary only in its cause, inasmuch as the

person who kills is guilty of negligence in a lawful thing, or of

something unlawful, and death results from the negligence or from that

which is unlawful, although there was no direct wish to kill.

1863. The Case of One From Whose Lawful Act or Omission Homicide

Accidentally Results.--(a) If this person was not guilty of negligence,

he is not responsible for the resultant homicide, since it was not

voluntary, either directly or indirectly. Thus, if a man who was said

to be dead, but who knows nothing about the report, calls at his home

and his wife drops dead on seeing him, he is not responsible for her

death.

(b) If the person in question was negligent, he is guilty of homicide

in a greater or less degree according to the seriousness of his

neglect. Thus, a sane man who flourishes a loaded revolver in a crowded

room is responsible if the revolver goes off and kills someone present;

but a nurse who leaves a sick room for just a moment with the result

that her patient falls out of bed and is killed, is only slightly

responsible at the most, if there was little reason to expect what

happened.

1864. The Case of One From Whose Unlawful Act or Omission Homicide

Accidentally Results.--(a) If this person was not negligent and his

conduct was not dangerous to the lives of others, he is not guilty of

homicide; for the death that ensued was not voluntary, either directly

or indirectly. Thus, if a thief is driving away carefully with a stolen

automobile and a reckless pedestrian gets in front of the car and is

killed, the driver is guilty of theft, but not of homicide.

(b) If the person in question was not negligent but his conduct was

nevertheless dangerous to the lives of others, he is guilty of

homicide; for the death that followed was voluntary indirectly, since

he could have foreseen the homicide and should have avoided the

conduct. Thus, if a person strikes lightly a pregnant woman and she

suffers an abortion, or if one who is not a surgeon tries to mutilate

an innocent person and kills him, he is responsible for the death,

since the acts committed remained dangerous to life, no matter how

careful the offender may have been to avoid killing.

1865. Moral and Legal Guilt.--The law may hold one responsible for

homicide, even though there is no theological guilt (see 1766 sqq.).

(a) Thus, one may be held responsible for the consequence of acts only

juridically negligent, as when an automobilist while driving at a speed

unreasonable in law, but not in fact, kills a pedestrian. (b) One may

be held responsible for acts committed by those subject to one’s care

or control, as when a man keeps a dog loose not knowing that it is

vicious and it kills a neighbor’s child, or when he illegally lends his

car to a minor, thinking the latter is a good driver, and the minor

carelessly runs down a person in the road.

1866. Bodily Injuries.-Injustice is done not only by destroying the

life of a human being, but also by harming him in his rights to bodily

integrity or well-being. The chief bodily injuries are the following:

(a) mutilation, which deprives a person of limbs or members, without

inflicting death;

(b) wounding, which by an act of violence (such as a stab or blow)

breaks the continuity of the body, or impairs its strength or beauty;

comfort of the body in unlawful ways (e.g., by deprivation of necessary

food, sleep, fresh air, by communication of infection, by beating,

hazing, etc.);

(d) restraint, which hinders the lawful exercise of the bodily powers

(e.g., by holding a person against his will, by chaining him to a post,

by locking him in a room).

1867. Mutilation. In general, any kind of act which injures or impairs

bodily integrity is called mutilation. In the strict sense, mutilation

is any cutting off, or some equivalent action, through which an organic

function or a distinct use of a member is suppressed or directly

diminished. Accordingly, three distinct types of mutilation are

possible: (a) when a part of the body with a distinct function is

excised; (b) when a distinct organic function is totally suppressed,

without excision of the organ; (c) when the function is directly

lessened or partially suppressed.

1868. Morality. (a) Liceity. The basic principle governing the morality

of mutilation is: Man is not the master of his own life, but only the

custodian. Accordingly, neither is he master of his own body. Thus,

Pope Pius XII, speaking of the “Surgeon’s Noble Vocation” (_The

Catholic Mind_, Aug. 1948, pp. 490 ff.), declared: “God alone is Lord

of the life and integrity of man, Lord of his members, his organs, his

potencies, particularly of those which make him an associate in the

work of creation. Neither parents, nor spouse, nor the individual in

question may dispose of them at will.”

As steward, man has duties toward his body, its health and welfare,

according to the norms of reason and the divine law, so that it may be

a means of his attaining life with God. Acting in accord with these

norms and the end of life, it may become necessary and licit for man to

mutilate his body in order to safeguard health or to save his life. The

principle expressing the morality of mutilation, known as the principle

of totality (Pius XII, _Nous vous saluons_, AAS 45-674), may be

formulated: Man may licitly mutilate his body only insofar as this is

expedient for the good of the whole. In fact, such mutilation is often

obligatory, since one must use ordinary means to protect his life and

health, and since the part is for the whole. Thus, one would be bound

to undergo an operation for appendicitis in order to save one’s life.

Although an organ be not diseased, it may under certain circumstances

be removed. Thus, a surgeon operating for hernia may remove a healthy

appendix, should the danger of adhesions be foreseen that would require

a later operation. Nor is it necessary that there be a “present”

danger. The words of Pope Pius XII, that mutilations are permissible

when required “to avoid ... serious and lasting damage” (AAS 44-782),

are suggestive of the liceity of prophylactic operations. (See

medical-ethics texts for special cases, such as lobotomy, thalamotomy,

experimentation, etc.)

The problem of mutilation involved in organic transplantation for the

benefit of a neighbor is highly controverted at the present time, Pope

Pius XII discussed the legality of corneal transplants from the dead to

the living (_The Pope Speaks_, Autumn, 1956, pp. 198 ff.), but he did

not touch the matter of transplants from living bodies. In this

controversial matter, the following principles seem to be clear:

1) Mutilation for the good of the neighbor cannot be justified by the

principle of totality, for the subordination implied in the principle

is characteristic of a physical, not a moral, not even the Mystical,

body.

2) Minor mutilations, such as skin grafts or blood transfusions, are

certainly permissible. The speculative basis is still a matter of

dispute.

3) It is solidly probable extrinsically that organic transplantations

may be permitted, possibly out of charity and for a proportionate

reason. Some contend, however, that the act of mutilation involved is

intrinsically evil and can not be justified by the extrinsic motive of

charity.

Mutilation is lawful by public authority in punishment of a criminal;

for if the state has the right to inflict death for serious crime, much

more has it the right to indict the lesser punishment of mutilation.

The expediency, however, of exercising the right must be judged in

terms not only of punishment, but also of prevention of crime.

Mutilation has no necessary connection (apart from special

circumstances) with deterring criminals from further crime.

(b) In other cases mutilation is unlawful; for just as man is not the

master of his life, neither is he the master of his limbs, and he

commits a wrong against God, society, and the individual if he destroys

parts of his body when neither public good nor private safety demands

that this can be done. Thus, mutilation of a criminal performed by

private authority is unlawful. Hence, a husband may not mutilate a man

who has broken up his home.

Mutilation of an innocent person that it not necessary for his bodily

safety is unlawful. Even spiritual good is not a sufficient reason; for

example, one may not castrate oneself in order to escape temptation,

for this operation does not take away passion, and, moreover, there are

spiritual means which suffice against temptation. When Our Lord says

that one should cut off a hand or foot that causes scandal (Matt.,

xviii. 8), He is speaking metaphorically of the avoidance of the

occasions of sin. Much less is temporal good a sufficient reason for

mutilation. Hence, a youth may not have his teeth pulled in order to

escape military service; a pauper may not have his arm amputated in

order to get larger alms; a boy may not be castrated in order to give

him a better singing voice; a woman may not have the hysterectomy or

other similar operations performed merely to prevent conception; a man

may not have the operation of vasectomy performed on him in order to

prevent generation.

1869. Morality of Sterilization. Mutilations which frustrate the power

of procreation in men and women are called sterilization. Two kinds are

distinguished; indirect, to remove diseased organs; direct, to prevent

conception.

(a) Indirect sterilization (also called by many therapeutic) is lawful

when it is necessary to save life or health. The ethical principle

involved is the indirect voluntary or the principle of double effect.

Hence, vasectomy may be used to prevent idiocy or death, or to remove

or allay physiological abnormalities that bring on certain sexual

perversities or disturbances, if it is likely that these evils are

imminent or present and that the operation will be beneficial.

(b) Direct sterilization by public authority includes both punitive and

eugenical sterilization. The latter was condemned by Pope Pius XI in

_Casti Connubii_. In context the Holy Father was dealing with the false

claims made in the name of eugenics that the State might legitimately

sterilize those who by reason of hereditary defect might be considered

likely to generate defective offspring. This position is vehemently

rejected: “Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of

their subjects. Therefore where no crime has taken place and there is

no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or

tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of

eugenics or for any other reason. St. Thomas teaches this when,

inquiring whether human judges for the sake of preventing future evils

can inflict punishment, he admits that the power indeed exists as

regards certain other forms of punishment, but justly and properly

denies it as regards the maiming of the body.”

In the same context, punitive sterilization, whether as punishment for

crime or as deterrent, was also declared to be unlawful. However,

fasciole 14 of the AAS for 1930 emended the text and seems to have

withdrawn the formal condemnation of punitive sterilization. a subject

of theological discussion at the time. The matter had not been closed

and the emendation had the force of reopening the question.

Theological opinion is still divided as to the liceity of punitive

sterilization. Some still maintain that since the state can inflict the

superior penalty of death for serious crime, _a fortiori_ also the

lesser punishment of sterilization. Others deny the liceity, for

sterilization does not achieve the essential purposes of punishment; it

is not corrective, preventive, retributive, or emendatory. Accordingly

punitive sterilization is unreasonable and inconvenient. This latter

view prevails among most modern moral theologians. Confirmation for the

view is sought in the response of the Holy Office (AAS 32-73) that

direct sterilization is prohibited by the law of nature. Since punitive

sterilization has as its immediate effect, whether as an end or as a

means, sterility of the generative potency, it may well fall under the

category of direct and hence also under condemnation of the Holy Office.

1870. Other Bodily Punishments.--Other bodily harms (wounds, blows,

restraint) may not be inflicted except under the following conditions:

(a) there must be sufficient authority. The State, being a perfect

society, has greater coercive power, and may inflict penalties that are

of a permanent character, such as death or mutilation or wounds (e.g.,

by branding); and it may impose restraint, not only from unlawful, but

also from lawful acts. The family, being an imperfect society, has a

limited coercive power, and hence the father, or those who hold his

place (e.g., teachers), may administer corporal chastisements that are

not of an irreparable kind to his children (such as beatings,

whippings). Other persons may punish or restrain only in case of urgent

necessity (e.g., one may hold a stranger who is about to commit murder;

one may chastize a neighboring boy who cannot be kept from depredations

on one’s property in any other way). It is not wrong, however, to

inflict moderate bodily hurts, if the other person is not unwilling and

there is a reasonable purpose, such as exercise, training in the art of

boxing or wrestling, recreation, or mortification;

(b) there must be a sufficient reason for the harm done. The good of

the public is a sufficient reason; for example, when a criminal is

incorrigible and it is dangerous for him to be at large, it is not

unreasonable to give him a life sentence. The good of the individual is

also sufficient; for example, when a surgeon has to wound in order to

cure, when a father has to use the rod in order to improve the child or

to uphold discipline (Prov., xiii. 24, xxiii. 13);

children should not be spoiled, nor prisoners pampered, the other

extreme of maltreatment or torture must be avoided. It is cruel to box

children soundly on the ears, or to push them roughly about, or to tie

them up in the dark, as they may suffer permanent injury from such

methods. Likewise, it is barbarous to send convicts to a place or

prison so horrible that they lose their minds or fall victims to

lingering disease, or to inflict excruciating punishments by rack,

thumb-screw, prolonged scourgings, etc.

1871. Injury to Health.--Harm unjustly done to the health of others is

sinful, and, if the harm is great, the sin is mortal. Examples: (a)

Harm to health is done negatively by omission of duty, as when a

medical man or physical director does not use sufficient care and a

patient thereby suffers detriment to health, or an employer does not

see that his factory or place of business is sanitary, or that the work

is not too exhausting with the result that employees lose their vigor.

(b) Harm to health is done positively by acts or objects that tend to

deprive another of the means to physical well-being (e.g., annoyances,

noises that prevent sleep, adulterated food, maintenance of a nuisance

which creates suffocating smells or harmful vapors, etc.), or that

bring to another the infection of disease (e.g., when a well person is

made to live or room with one who has tuberculosis).

1872. Theft and Robbery.--Having considered the injuries to person

committed by homicide, mutilation, imprisonment, etc., we shall now

take up the injuries to property committed by theft and robbery.

Private ownership of property is allowed by natural and divine law, and

it is necessary when, as at present, human affairs cannot be well

managed under another system. It has its limits, however, since it is

subordinate to the public good, and charity requires that those who

have the goods of this world share them with those who are in need (see

1210 sqq.). The chief titles to private ownership are the following:

(a) original titles, which are those by which one takes possession and

dominion of goods that have never had or have not now an owner, and

these are reduced to two, namely, occupation (i.e., the taking

possession of a material thing) and accession (i.e., the union of a

material thing with one’s property);

(b) derivative titles, which are those by which one obtains dominion,

through transfer of right, of the goods that belong to another. These

titles are produced by the law itself (as in prescription), or by the

law and the free will of man (as in inheritance from testament or from

intestate), or by the free will of man (as in contracts).

1873. The Chief Kinds or Ways of Occupation.--(a) Animals.--Domestic

animals (e.g., dogs, cats) may not be occupied, even though they have

strayed from their owner; tamed animals (e.g., bees, pigeons,

songbirds) may be occupied only when they have recovered their liberty;

wild animals (e.g., birds, foxes, fishes, hares, etc., at large) may

not be occupied, unless they are kept in a small enclosure from which

they cannot escape.

(b) Land and Plants. These may be occupied only when they have no

present owner.

so long ago that it is impossible to discover the owner. According to

natural law it may be occupied by the finder, but the civil law

sometimes decides that the find must be divided with the owner of the

place or with the government.

(d) Lost Property.--This embraces those movables which an owner has

recently parted with, through accident or forgetfulness, without any

intention of giving up his ownership of them, and which are now easily

findable, although their owner is not known. The finder is obliged to

make reasonable efforts to find the owner. If he neglects to make these

efforts, proportionate to the worth of the found article, and is

convinced that he might have found the owner, he is considered by some

theologians to be a possessor in bad faith and bound to reserve the

article for the owner or turn it over to the poor or to pious causes.

Having made the effort unsuccessfully, according to natural law, he may

use the article as his own. The prescriptions of civil law as to the

time interval before he may begin to use the article must be observed.

(e) Abandoned Goods.--According to natural law one may occupy goods

voluntarily relinquished by the owner (e.g., an old automobile left by

the roadside), but the civil law sometimes awards certain classes of

goods (e.g., immovables) to the State.

(f) Vacant Goods.--According to natural law the goods of one who died

without heirs may be occupied; but under the civil law they usually

devolve to the State, whether they be movables or immovables.

1874. Principles on Accession.--(a) According to natural law, if the

two things united are separable, then each owner should be given his

own property; but if the things are inseparable and one is more

valuable, the owner of the more valuable part keeps all, but

compensates the owner of the less valuable part; if the things are

inseparable and of equal value, there is joint ownership.

(b) According to positive law, these natural principles are applied to

various cases of accession, whether it be natural (as through growth of

plants or deposit of land by rivers) or artificial (as through change

made in a material by labor, or addition of one substance to another).

These details are treated in books on law.

1875. Prescription.--Prescription laws (see 1798) are valid in

conscience, since they are determinations about property rights made in

the interest of the common welfare. But the following conditions are

required for acquisition of property through prescription:

(a) the object of prescription must be a thing prescriptible according

to natural and positive law. Thus, natural rights and public property

may not be prescribed against;

(b) the subject of prescription must be a person capable of possessing,

and he must be honestly convinced that he has a right to what he

possesses;

apparent title to the property, and on the lapse of the legal time

during which possession has been held or ownership has remained

undisputed.

1876. Wills.--A will is a declaration made in legal form (i.e., with

the solemnities required by law) of the disposal to be made of one’s

property after one’s death. Defects in a will or legacy sometimes

operate to take away the moral obligations of observing it.

(a) Thus, if the defect is one of natural law (e.g., a will made under

duress), there is no moral right or obligation produced by reason of

the gift.

(b) If the defect is of positive law only and makes the will

rescindable (e.g., a will not subscribed, as by law required, in

presence of the testator), the gift is good in conscience until adverse

decision of court.

facto_ invalid (e.g., a legatee acts as witness to a will), the gift is

good in conscience, if there is question of pious causes, since

property donated to God may not be alienated by human laws. But the

Church desires civil formalities to be observed in the making of wills

(Canon 1513).

(d) If the defect is positive and _ipso facto_ invalidating, and there

is question of profane causes, the will is not good in conscience, even

before declaration of court.

1877. Contracts.--A contract may be deined as a mutual agreement

concerning the transfer of a right.

1. A contract is a mutual agreement, i.e., there must be consent of at

least two parties to the same object. An offer made but not accepted is

not a contract, for only one party consents.

2. The contractants transfer a right which produces in most instances

under justice a corresponding obligation of doing or omitting

something. Promises, pledges, pacts, etc., while they impose

obligations based on truthfulness, loyalty, etc., are not contracts.

See 1888 (a).

3. The obligation in justice may be on both sides (bilateral) or only

on one side (unilateral), but consent must be on both sides.

The elements of a contract are made up of essentials and accidentals.

(a) The essentials include the subject-matter, the parties contractant,

their agreement, and the external form that manifests the agreement.

(b) The accidentals include bonds, oaths, conditions and modes.

1878. The subject-matter of a contract--that is, the thing or action or

forbearance with which the agreement is concerned--must have the

following qualities:

(a) it must be something possible, for one may not undertake what one

cannot perform. Thus, one cannot bind oneself by an accessory contract

(such as suretyship), if the principal contract itself is _ipso facto_

invalid. But if the impossibility is only moral (i.e., great

difficulty), one who knowingly undertakes the arduous is bound to

fulfill his promise; if it is only partial, one is held to the part

that is possible; if it is culpable, one is bound to repair damage

caused the other party through non-fulfillment;

(b) it must be something disposable, for one may not transfer that over

which one has no right of control or transfer. Thus, one may not

contract to sell public property that is _extra commercium_, or

property of which one has only the possession, or goods over which

others have a claim (e.g., a debtor may not bestow gifts to the

detriment of creditors’ rights), or goods not transferable for pay

(e.g., payment for a favorable decision by a judge, or property owed to

a third party) or for money (e.g., academic degrees, public offices,

Sacraments, indulgences);

to contract for a right that is valueless and illusory. Thus, one may

not sell shares of a stock company that has no assets, or an indefinite

house or lot or chattel;

(d) it must be something good and lawful, for one may not bind oneself

to iniquity. If it is sinful (e.g., a contract to sell a house in order

to spite a third party), the agreement is _per se_ valid. But if the

substance is evil (e.g., a contract for fornication made with a

prostitute), the agreement is null before the performance of the

promised sin; but it seems to many that after performance of the sin

the promisor is obliged to pay the money promised, unless the law makes

the contract void (see 1886 c). If the law merely denies protection to

a sinful engagement, or forbids it under penalty, it would seem that

after performance of the sin one may follow, as far as strict justice

is concerned, the rule that right is with the possessor. In the United

States immoral and illegal contracts and those that are opposed to

public policy are generally regarded as null, but in some cases the law

declares immoral conditions _de futuro_ non-existent and considers the

agreement to which they are added as valid (e.g., wills and gifts

_inter vivos_ in some codes).

1879. Sinful Contracts.--There is no form of contract that may not be

made sinful as to its substance on account of the wicked offer or

consideration (e.g., sale may deal with immoral objects, labor may be

given to criminal projects), but there are certain forms of contract

that are particularly open to abuse and hence are frequently associated

with evil circumstances or results. Some contracts are often illicit

according to natural law.

(a) Thus, a gift is sinful, on the part of the donor, when it is made

by an employer for the purpose of seducing a servant, and on the part

of the servant, when it is accepted for the purpose of encouraging the

unlawful attentions of the employer; but if the gift is unconditional,

there is no obligation in justice to return it.

(b) Borrowing is sinful, when the lender is in greater need, or when

one becomes unduly obligated to the lender; lending is sinful when the

lender cannot afford to part with the thing loaned, or when the

borrower is encouraged in thriftlessness, or when he will make evil use

of the thing borrowed, etc.

sin (e.g., a bet that another is afraid to get drunk), or results of

sinful motives (e.g., bets made in order to deceive, or to satisfy

avarice, or to live without work), or causes of great evils (e.g.,

destitution of families, frauds, scandal, and corruption).

(d) Gaming is sinful when the form of the sport is objectionable (e.g.,

the ancient gladiatorial fights in which the combatants killed each

other), or when the motives or circumstances are wrong (e.g., to play

as a professional gambler so as to avoid work, to play cards all day

Sunday, to play for higher stakes than one can afford, to spend time in

“gambling hells”).

(e) Lottery is sinful when the object is bad (e.g., the raffle of an

important office with the risk that incompetent persons may be chosen),

or when the circumstances are bad (e.g., if persons are led into

superstition or idleness and prodigality).

(f) Speculation is sinful in many instances, since it often brings on a

gambling fever that makes the speculator useless to himself and his

dependents, and causes poverty and crime.

(g) Pawning of property is often unjustifiable, since it makes persons

deprive themselves of necessary property in order to indulge in some

useless or extravagant whim with borrowed money.

1880. Illegal Contracts.--For reasons of public policy the positive law

puts its disapproval on many of the above-mentioned contracts, at least

in certain instances.

(a) Thus, sometimes the law makes a contract unenforceable in court,

though the natural obligation is not affected. Hence, if a wager is

only denied a hearing before a judge, the winner may keep his gains,

and the loser should pay.

(b) If the law merely declares that a contract is illegal, the effect

seems to be that the contract retains its natural validity unless the

party who has suffered by it wishes to disavow it. As to the sinfulness

of such a contract, that depends on whether or not the law is penal or

preceptive in intent. Thus, many regard laws that make betting illegal

as preceptive under venial sin, while others regard them as punitive

only. Other examples of illegal contracts are: gifts made to a judge in

connection with a trial; lottery, in Great Britain and the United

States; certain games of chance, in some States; and in Canon Law, as

regards the clergy, alcatory games for money, speculation and trading

(Canons 138, 142).

contract possesses its natural force until adverse decision is given by

court. Hence, if a wager is voidable in law, the winner may keep his

gains until obliged by a judge to give them up, but the loser is not

bound to pay, unless he confirms the wager.

(d) If the law makes the contract ipso facto void, the agreement loses

its natural force (see 558-560). In most of our States, wagering

contracts are illegal and void whether by statute or by judicial

decision. In many of these States the statute permits the recovery of

the money from the winner or the stakeholder. Gifts offered as bribes

are invalid, and those who give or take such gifts are guilty of

serious sin and of a criminal offense. In some of our States, certain

gaming contracts are also null.

1881. Qualities Necessary in the Parties Contractant.--The parties

contractant must have the following qualities:

(a) from natural law it is necessary that they have the use of reason

sufficient to understand what they are doing. Incompetent are babies

and the insane, and also those who are totally drunk or otherwise

temporarily deranged. Less competent are the half-witted and those who

need a guardian in important matters;

(b) from positive law it is necessary that they be not legally

excluded. In Canon Law administrators of church property and solemnly

professed religious are unable to make certain contracts (Canons 1527,

536). In civil law there are restrictions on the contractual powers of

minors, wives, aliens, guardians and corporations. Persons not yet

conceived are not capable in civil law of receiving a donation, and

there are many prohibitions against the tender or acceptance of gifts

by those who can reasonably be suspected of exercising undue influence

or of being subject to undue influence.

1882. Legal Privileges of Minors.--The law grants certain benefits to

minors and the like; for example, in some cases they are not bound by a

non-executed agreement, while the other party is bound, or in an

executed contract they may recover property without restoring or

offering to restore the consideration, if they have nothing with which

to replace it.

(a) Minors and other persons who are legally incompetent to contract,

may avail themselves of the benefits of the law with a good conscience,

if they are in good faith; for it is just that the law should protect

those who are unable to protect themselves, and those who make

contracts with such persons should know that they (the competent

parties) act at their own risk.

(b) Minors and other persons legally incompetent may not avail

themselves of the benefit of the law if they have acted in bad faith

(e.g., if a minor by deceit induced the other party to sell to him).

1883. Qualities Necessary for Valid Consent.--The agreement or consent

of the contracting parties must have the following qualities:

(a) it must be internal, that is, one must accept in will and not

merely in words the proposal or consideration offered by the other

party. If one consents only to the form of the contract, the contract

is null, and the same is probably true if one does not accept

internally the obligations of the contract; if one consents to the

obligations, but does not intend to fulfill them, the contract is

valid, but unlawful. One who contracts invalidly sins, and is bound in

the external forum to keep the contract seriously made, and in the

internal forum to repair the damage to the other party by giving true

consent or making restitution. One who contracts unlawfully also sins,

and is bound to the engagement;

(b) it must be external, that is, one must manifest in some sensible

way one’s agreement to the proposition contained in an offered

contract. Silence gives consent only when the contract is favorable to

the party who is silent, or when that party should and easily could

manifest his lack of consent, if the proposal did not please him. In

the case of contracts between parties who are not in each other’s

presence, the intimation to the offerer of the offeree’s acceptance

is not necessary for validity, if the contract is gratuitous; but

the contrary seems to be true, at least _per se_, if the contract is

onerous. We shall speak later (1885) on the legal formalities required

in contracts;

same sense, or agreement of both parties to the same thing. Mutuality

requires that consent be contemporaneous, that is, that the acceptance

of one be given while the offer of the other still holds good. But

it does not require that the parties be in each other’s presence, or

that they contract through direct personal communication, or (at least

according to natural law) that the knowledge of the accomplishment

of mutual agreement be known to the offerer. The law in the United

States generally is that an offer may be withdrawn immediately or after

a reasonable time, unless it was made on time for a consideration;

and that a contract between the absent begins only on receipt by the

offerer of the acceptance of the offeree, if the former stipulated for

this, or if the offerer uses one means of communication as his agency

and the offeree another. In other cases it begins the moment that

acceptance is entrusted to the agent of the offerer;

(d) it must be free, that is, it must have the advertence and

voluntariness necessary for a human act. If the contract is of grave

import, there should be the same kind of deliberation as is necessary

for commission of a mortal sin (see 173 sqq.); if it is of lesser

import, the deliberation should correspond with the seriousness of

the case. But some authors think there should be perfect deliberation

in every contract, since the contractants are assuming obligations of

justice.

1884. Defects that Invalidate Consent.--The defects that vitiate

consent by taking away knowledge or choice render contracts either void

or voidable (see 40-55). These impediments are the following:

(a) error, which is a judgment of fact or of law in reference to the

contract, not in harmony with the truth, but not maliciously caused

by other persons. If error is substantial (that is, about the nature

of the contract or the nature of the subject-matter of the contract),

the agreement is naturally void; if error is only accidental (that is,

about features of the contract, subject-matter or co-contractant, that

are only incidentally intended), an onerous agreement is naturally

valid, but positive law in the interest of freedom will often grant the

privilege of rescindment (see Canon 1684, n. 2). But if error cannot be

proved, courts will stand for the validity of a contract;

(b) fraud, which is error or mistake about a contract caused in one

of the parties by the dishonest representations of the other party or

of a third person (e.g., when an insurance agent deceives about the

benefits, or a policy-taker deceives about his age or health). Fraud

exists, then, when there is intention, at least indirect, to mislead,

and statements, acts or omissions calculated to mislead; but the usual

boasts of vendors and advertisers about the wonderful excellence of

their wares are not fraudulent, since the public understands that such

talk must be taken _cum grano salis_. The effects of fraud on the value

of contracts are the same as those produced by error; but it should be

noted that the person guilty of the fraud is bound to make good the

losses of the injured party, even though the contract be valid and not

rescindable, or though the guilty person be not a party to the contract;

danger is impending on oneself or others (see 41 sqq.). It makes a

contract invalid in natural law, when it takes away all consent (e.g.,

when it overpowers the reason, or makes one dissent internally from

what is agreed to externally), and probably also when it takes away

perfect freedom in a gratuitous contract, or makes one enter into a

contract for immunity from an unjust vexation; it renders an act or

engagement invalid according to positive law in many special cases

(e.g., the Canons declare null elections, resignations, marriages,

vows, etc., which are made under the influence of fear). Contracts are

considered naturally voidable if one of the parties unjustly extorts

the consent of the other by grave fear, or if a third party intimidates

a person into bestowing something through gratuitous contract; and the

positive law generally treats agreements entered into under grave fear

as rescindible (see Canon 103, n. 2). Fear unjustly caused, even though

it does not make a contract void or voidable, is at times a reason for

the duty of restitution, as when a third party by his unjust threats

forces an innocent person to make expensive contracts as a measure of

protection, and probably also when a third party directly constrains

one to make an onerous contract with a person who knows nothing about

the coercion. Fear, no matter how great, does not in any way weaken

a contract, if there is consent and the fear is induced by a natural

cause (e.g., a storm), or by a human cause acting justly (e.g., an

injured man threatening a lawsuit);

(d) violence or coercion, which is like to fear, the latter being moral

force and the former physical force (see 52). According to natural

law, violence invalidates a contract, unless we suppose that it is

only concomitant, as when Sempronius uses coercion to make Balbus sign

a contract which Balbus is really willing to sign. Positive law does

not recognize, or will set aside, agreements made under overpowering

constraint (see Canon 103, n. 1).

1885. Form of Contract.--The form of a contract is the external manner

in which, according to the positive law, the internal consent of the

parties must be expressed and manifested.

(a) Thus, Canon Law in certain contracts (e.g., engagement of marriage,

marriage, alienation of church property) requires specified solemnities

under pain of nullity of act.

(b) Civil law in the United States designates various formalities to

be used in transfers of property (e.g., that a deed for real estate be

written, signed, sealed and attested; that a gift be made by delivery

or equivalent act; that certain contracts be in writing; that no

contract be of worth unless it be for a consideration, or else be on

paper with seal attached). The law has the right to annul informal

contracts _ipso facto_, but whether this is the intention in modern

codes is a matter of dispute. The practical rule to be followed,

then, is that the possessor is to be favored, unless there has been a

court decision against his claim. It should be noted, too, that some

legal conditions, such as valuable consideration in simple contracts,

are required for enforceability, not for validity, and hence a good

contract wanting some such condition, though indefensible before the

courts, is obligatory in conscience.

1886. The Accidentals of a Contract.--(a) Bond is the agreement by the

obligor of a contract to pay a certain forfeit to the obligee, if the

former does not perform his contract or does not perform it before a

certain date. This agreement obliges in conscience, if the promise was

seriously made, if the penalty is not excessive, and if the breach of

agreement is culpable.

(b) Oaths added to contracts have moral effects on the contracts

themselves and also on acts contrary to them. As regards the contract,

an oath adds the obligation of religion to that of justice, if the

contract is valid and irrescindable; and the common opinion is that

it strengthens a contract extrinsically, that is, it induces an

obligation of religion to keep the promise, if the oath is invalid or

rescindable by positive law only and in favor of a private privilege;

but an oath in no way strengthens a contract that is naturally invalid

or rescindable positively on account of the public good. As regards

acts that are contrary to an invalid or rescindable contract that was

confirmed by a valid oath, they are sinful, as being irreligious, but

not invalid nor unjust (see 2260).

that the consent or dissent is made dependent upon their existence

or fulfillment. An immoral condition, if unfulfilled, takes from the

contract all obligation, exception being made for separable parts that

are not affected by the immoral clause; but if it has been fulfilled,

it seems that there is a moral obligation to pay the consideration

promised (see 1878 d).

(d) Modes are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract as

to qualify the rights or duties of the contractants, or the purpose,

matter or time of the contract, but not so as to make the consent

dependent on the fulfillment of the thing designated. Thus, if Titus

leaves money to Balbus, chiefly because Balbus is his nephew, and

secondarily because he imposes on Balbus the obligation of using the

money for his education, Balbus in accepting the money accepts also

the obligation, but the gift does not lapse if the obligation is not

complied with. If a donor adds an immoral mode to his gift (e.g.,

that the donee use in immoral ways the money left him), this purpose

is regarded as non-existent and the gift stands in spite of it. If an

agent violates a mode (e.g., he pays $1001 when he was directed to

pay $1000) but not a condition (e.g., that he purchase land and not a

house), the contract stands.

1887. The Moral Obligation of Entering into a Contract.--(a) There is

a duty of justice when one is under public or private engagement to

make a contract. Examples are a merchant who opens a store for public

patronage, or an auctioneer who holds a sale before invited patrons, or

an owner who makes with another person a contract to sell, or a man and

woman who make solemn espousals.

(b) There is a duty of charity when a neighbor is in such need that he

deserves to be helped, for example, by a loan or by assistance to make

a loan: “From him that would borrow of thee turn not away” (Matt., v.

42); “A good man is surety for his neighbor” (Ecclus., xxix. 18).

1888. Every valid contract obliges to faithful performance as a duty

of conscience, even though it be unenforceable and without civil

obligation. We shall discuss the properties of this obligation.

(a) Quality of the Obligation.--Onerous contracts oblige in virtue of

commutative justice and under pain of restitution; gratuitous contracts

oblige according to some from justice, according to others from

fidelity, according to others from fidelity or justice as the obligor

intends (see 1692, 1753). In practice one may follow the rule that a

liberal promise or wager or other gratuitous contract obliges only

from fidelity with no duty of restitution, unless it be certain that

the promisor intended to bind himself in justice. One is responsible,

however, for damages resultant on breach of promise. The obligation

seems to be one of legal justice only when the thing promised is

something on which a pecuniary value cannot be set and consists in

compliance with law (e.g., in suretyship or bail for keeping the peace

or appearing in court).

(b) Quantity of Obligation.--In onerous contracts the degree of

obligation depends on the importance of the subject matter, and hence

it is a mortal sin to violate a contract in which a grave right is

concerned; in gratuitous contracts the degree of obligation depends

entirely, according to some, on the will of the person who liberally

binds himself, but others hold that it depends on the importance of the

subject-matter.

who take their place (e.g., heirs, executors) or who are responsible

for the contract (e.g., those who commanded the agreement) are morally

bound to fulfill the agreement, while others are bound not to interfere

with the fulfillment.

(d) Objects of Obligation.--Directly, there is the duty of observing

what is contained explicitly or implicitly in the agreement, and

indirectly of making good any losses caused by breach of contract. A

rescindable contract obliges until it is lawfully disaffirmed by the

party who has the right to break it; a quasi-contract imposes on the

party who has benefited by the services or expenses of another a moral

obligation of making compensation. If a contract transfers ownership

(e.g., contract of sale passing title to buyer, _mutuum_), the

transferee must bear the risks and expenses of the thing transferred;

but if it does not transfer ownership (e.g., contract to sell,

_commodatum_) or has not yet done so (e.g., contract of sale in which

title will pass later, on delivery or payment), the transferer has the

risk and expense (see 1796).

1889. Cessation of Obligation.--The obligation of a contract ceases in

various ways: (a) by action of the contractants, as when a promisee

renounces his right, or each of the parties to a promise has made a

gratuitous promise in favor of the other and one refuses to keep his

word; (b) by action of law, for example, by prescription, by annulment;

unlawful or useless, or when the donee of a gift _mortis causae_ dies

before the donor.

1890. Theft.--Theft is the secret taking of what belongs to another,

with the intention of appropriating it to oneself, against the

reasonable wishes of the owner.

(a) It is a taking, that is, a carrying away of goods. But theft also

includes the receiving or keeping of property, since the harm done is

the same as when the goods are carried away. Hence, he who does not

restore borrowed or deposited or found objects, or who does not pay

back a loan, when he could and should, is a thief.

(b) It is a secret taking, that is, the property is taken away without

the knowledge of the owner or lawful possessor, even though he be

present. In this respect theft differs from robbery.

things (e.g., books, money, jewelry, clothing), but also incorporeal

things (e.g., patents, trademarks, copyrights), and even persons if

they are looked on as possessions. Hence, plagiarism or infringement

of copyright or man-stealing or kidnapping (i.e., the carrying off of

another’s slave or child) are forms of theft.

(d) It is the taking of property that belongs to another, that is, of

goods of which another person is the owner, or lawful possessor as

usufructuary, guardian, depositary, etc. Hence, one can steal from

oneself by taking one’s goods by stealth from the bailee with the

design of charging him for their value or of depriving him of their use

to which he has a right.

(e) It is the taking away of goods with the intention of appropriating

them to one’s own possession, use or enjoyment to the exclusion of the

rightful owner. Hence, strictly speaking, it is not theft to carry away

property with the intention of borrowing it for a time or of destroying

it; but these are acts of unlawful possession or of unlawful damage. It

is obligatory to take an object from another, if this is necessary to

prevent the commission of a crime (e.g., to take away and hide the gun

with which another intends to kill).

(f) It is against the wishes of the owner. This refers to the substance

(that is, the conversion of the property to one’s use), not to the

mode (that is, secrecy with which it is done). Hence, if the owner is

unwilling that the property be taken, he who takes it is guilty of

theft; if the owner is not unwilling that it be taken, but is unwilling

that it be taken without his knowledge, he who takes it in this way

sins at least venially, but is not guilty of theft in the strict sense.

(g) It is against the reasonable wishes of the owner or possessor; for

no injury is done if he does or should consent to the loss. The owner

does consent if the person who takes the goods is acting according to a

general and recognized custom (e.g., when a servant takes things left

over from her employer’s table, which it is certain the latter does

not wish to keep); the owner should consent, if justice forbids that

he prevent the taking (e.g., when a starving man is taking food from

one who has plenty), or if domestic duty commands that he should give

the thing taken (e.g., when a wife takes from her husband’s pockets

the needed money he denies his family, for a wife and family have

the right to receive from the head of the house support according to

their station and means). But the owner is not bound to consent to the

loss of his goods from the mere fact that he misuses them to his own

spiritual disadvantage, or owes them in charity to the taker. Hence, it

is theft to take a flask from the pocket of one who drinks too much, or

to steal a book from one who is harmed by reading it, or to filch money

from a rich man because one is poor and he will not give an alms.

1891. Unauthorized Use of Another’s Funds.--What is the guilt of one

who uses for his own purposes the money of another entrusted to him for

other purposes?

(a) There is no theft, for it is supposed that the purpose of the user

is to make only a temporary loan of the money.

(b) There is an act of injustice, if the permission of the owner cannot

be presumed; for the rights of an owner are violated when one converts

his property to uses displeasing to him. Thus, if the prospect is that

the owner may never get his money back or that he will lose profits by

the use made of it, the guilt of unjust damage is incurred, at least in

intention (e.g., a depositary uses a deposit to buy stocks on margin,

or a company official makes an unauthorized loan instead of investing

the amount for the company’s benefit).

presumed; for to him who willingly consents no injury is done. Thus,

if one who is managing the funds of another has the chance to make a

large amount of money today by using those funds for himself but cannot

get in touch with the owner, the latter’s consent can be presumed, if

he will suffer no present loss and it is absolutely certain that his

funds will be returned tomorrow. But on account of the risk that is

ordinarily present, this case would be rare.

1892. Comparison of Theft and Robbery.--(a) They differ in species,

for theft contains injustice to an owner in his property, but robbery,

which is an unjust and violent taking of what belongs to another,

contains injustice both to property and to person. The unwillingness of

the owner in the case of theft is due to his ignorance of his loss; in

the case of robbery it is due to intimidation or force. (b) They differ

in gravity, robbery being according to its nature the more serious kind

of stealing; for the robber does a twofold injury, and the owner’s

unwillingness to be robbed is greater.

1893. Kinds of Theft and Robbery.--(a) There are many varieties of

theft, the differences arising from the circumstances in which the

stealing is done. Thus, he who steals from the Church is guilty of

sacrilegious theft; he who uses the public goods for his private ends

commits peculation; he who takes from his parents practises domestic

thievery.

(b) There are also many ways in which robbery or rapine is committed.

The following persons are guilty of robbery: pirates, bandits,

highwaymen, burglars, usurers, profiteers, venal judges, unmerciful

creditors who deprive debtors of necessaries, debtors who escape

payment by fraudulent bankruptcy, profiteers, laborers who extort

unjust wages, those who force subordinates to contribute graft, and

blackmailers. Two forms of robbery are described in Scripture as

sins that cry to heaven for justice, namely, defrauding laborers of

their wages (James, v. 4) and oppression of the poor, which happens

especially when one denies their rights to those who are unable to

defend them. The following persons are also classed as thieves:

pickpockets, spongers, smugglers, forgers, counterfeiters, embezzlers,

and those who misappropriate funds entrusted to them.

In the civil law theft is also known as larceny, and is defined as the

unlawful severance of personal property from the possession of its

owner. The following kinds of larceny are distinguished:

(a) in respect to the manner of perpetration, a theft is larceny when

the property is taken from the possession of the owner by one who had

no possession, whether the latter be a stranger or a custodian; it is

embezzlement when committed by one upon whom the owner had conferred

temporary possession on account of a fiduciary relationship between

them; it is false pretence when committed by one who procures permanent

possession or ownership through fraudulent representations;

(b) In respect to the matter or quantity stolen, theft is called petit

larceny when it falls below a certain sum fixed by the law, grand

larceny when it exceeds that sum.

1894. The Sinfulness of Theft.--(a) From its nature theft--and, much

more, robbery--is a grave sin; for it is opposed to the virtues

of charity and justice, it is expressly forbidden in the Seventh

Commandment (“Thou shalt not steal,” Exod., xx. 15), and it excludes

from eternal life (“Neither thieves nor extortioners shall possess the

kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10). The thief attacks the sacred right of

the individual to his property, and imperils the peace and stability

of society itself. Theft is a grave sin, even when it is committed

by little and little, as happens when a merchant gives underweight

habitually: “A deceitful balance is an abomination to the Lord” (Prov.,

xi. 1). The proposition that restitution for a large sum taken in parts

at different times is not a grave duty was condemned by Innocent XI

(Denzinger, 1188). Canonical penalties for theft include exclusion from

acts and offices, censures, and deposition (Canon 2354).

(b) From the imperfection of the act theft may be only a venial sin,

for example, when the thief is a kleptomaniac and steals without

advertence, or when he is invincibly ignorant that the thing taken is

not his own or is of great value, or from the smallness of the matter

involved (e.g., when the thing taken has little value, or the owner is

opposed rather to the stealthy manner of taking than to the taking, or

is only slightly unwilling to lose the goods).

1895. Theft of a small amount may be a mortal sin (see 187). This may

happen: (a) on account of the internal or subjective circumstances, as

when the thief intends to steal as much as he can or a large amount

here and now, or when he intends to steal a small amount here and

new but to keep this up every day until he has stolen a considerable

amount, or when a child steals a small sum from its parents and falsely

thinks that the theft is gravely sinful in itself; (b) on account of

external or objective circumstances, as when the amount taken today is

small but constitutes, with amounts previously taken, a large sum, or

when the thief foresees serious consequences from his act (e.g., that

the person from whom the goods are taken will fall under suspicion

and be discharged or arrested). It should be noted, however, that

the consequences of the theft do not necessarily make the sin grave

precisely as it is a sin of theft (e.g., in the case just given the

theft was a venial sin, but the unjust damage was a mortal sin), or

even precisely as it is a sin of injustice (e.g., if one steals a

picture of small value, foreseeing that the owner will be afflicted

beyond measure at the loss, the sin against justice is small, but the

sin against charity is mortal).

1896. The determination of the amount that constitutes grave matter

in theft or robbery (or in unjust damage) is a very difficult task,

because the factors upon which the injury depends are to some extent

doubtful and vary in particular cases. Hence, there is a great

diversity of opinion among moralists on this subject, and it will

frequently be uncertain in an individual case whether a theft is

mortally or only venially sinful in itself. But on account of the

spiritual and temporal interests that are concerned it is necessary

to give at least general rules for direction that will enable one to

distinguish between grave and venial theft, and to know when the duty

of restitution is serious, when light.

1897. Moralists are in agreement on the following points:

(a) the standard for measuring gravity of matter is not an invariable

one, but will differ according to circumstances of times and places.

Thus, money has much less purchasing power today than it had before the

Civil War, and the same amount will not go so far nor last so long in

the United States as in some countries of Europe. Hence, other things

being equal, it is less harmful to steal the sum of $10 in 1958 than it

was to steal the same sum in 1858, less harmful to steal that amount

from an American than to steal its equivalent from a European;

(b) the standard for a particular country and period is to be

interpreted morally, not mathematically; for it depends on the opinions

or estimates of the prudent, which after all are only approximations

and subject to revisions. Hence, it would be absurd to draw such a hard

and fast distinction between grave and venial theft--for example, to

decide from the amounts alone that he who stole $50 is certainly guilty

of mortal sin and fit for hell, while he who stole $49.99 is guilty of

venial sin only and not fit for hell. The figures given by moralists

for grave matter are averages, and hence they cannot be expected to

suit each individual locality or moment or injured person. But, being

based on actual conditions, they are serviceable. If a sum stolen is

much above or below them, they indicate truly the theological species

of the sin; if it is only a little above or below them, they afford a

basis for probability, or at least show that there is room for doubt.

1898. Moralists are also at one in measuring the injury of theft by the

following considerations:

(a) it should be estimated by the property loss, that is, that theft

should be deemed a grave sin which in view of all the circumstances and

the common opinion indicts a notable loss on the owner in his property

rights. This is a matter of common sense, for every one can see that it

is a very different thing to steal a cent and to steal $100.

(b) it should be estimated by the personal injury, that is, by the

unwillingness of the proprietor to suffer the loss. This is also clear,

since the unwillingness of the proprietor is one of the ingredients

of theft, as was explained above in the definition, and everyone will

readily grant that an amount which would be notable if stolen from a

stranger, would not be notable if stolen from an indulgent parent.

1899. There are two opinions about the estimation of the property loss.

(a) Thus, an older opinion held that the standard should be an absolute

one, that is, that the loss should be determined independently of the

wealth or poverty of the person injured, since the financial situation

of this person is a purely extrinsic circumstance of the theft. The

rich man has just as much right to his $10 as the poor man has to his

$10, and it is therefore just as injurious to deprive the former of the

sum as it is to deprive the latter. What is a mortal theft in one case

is a mortal theft in every case.

(b) A later opinion, which seems to be the common one today,

distinguishes two standards: an absolute one, which fixes one highest

amount that is always grave matter on account of its magnitude, however

wealthy the loser may be, and a relative one, which proposes a scale

of lower amounts that are grave matter on account of the economic

condition of the persons stolen from. It is argued that a relative

standard should be set up, since the injury of theft is certainly felt

more by those who have less means to fall back on; and that an absolute

standard is also necessary, since without it the property of the rich

would not be sufficiently safeguarded and the peace and order of

society would be endangered.

1900. Opinions on the Amounts that Are Grave Matter.--(a) The older

opinion, according to which there is only one invariable standard

for all classes and conditions, regards as grave matter the amount

necessary to support for a day, according to his state and obligations,

a man whose financial condition is midway between wealth and poverty;

for the loss of a day’s support is usually looked on as a serious

loss, and a standard for all should be taken from the average. This

daily support amount may be reckoned from the amount of daily wages

or income. In the United States in 1955 the average daily wage was

between $14 and $15, but, if only skilled laborers or those who are in

moderately prosperous circumstances are considered, the average would

be considerable higher. Perhaps it would range between $25 and $30. Or

if we strike a medium between the highest and the lowest figures given

by the advocates of two standards, we should arrive at approximately

$30 or $35.

(b) The common opinion today fixes the absolute amount, which is grave

matter even when theft is from the wealthiest person or society as the

equivalent of a week’s wages for the head of a family living in fairly

good circumstances but dependent upon his work for its support. As

to the actual amount, authors differ. Thus, Father Francis Connell,

C.SS.R., wrote in 1945 in _American Ecclesiastical Review_ (p. 69):

“To lay down a general norm in view of actual conditions and value of

money, it would seem that the actual sum for grave theft would be about

$40.” In 1946, writing in the _Homiletic and Pastoral Review_ (p. 694),

Father Joseph Donovan, C.M., stated: “It is hard to see how less than

$100 could be absolutely grave with the chances of a higher amount

being probably so.”[*] This sum was criticized as being excessive and

did not meet with ready acceptance by all moral theologians. On page

127 of the third printing of his _Outlines of Moral Theology_ (1955),

Father Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., suggested $75 as a reasonable

absolute sum considering the value of money at the time, and, as a

practical norm, the sum has been acceptable to most confessors and

authors. Relatively grave matter corresponds with the amount needed to

support a worker and his family for a day or, according to some, the

amount required for the support of the worker alone. Relatively grave

matter would range from about $5 from a poor person on relief, through

$20-$35 from skilled laborers and persons in comfortable circumstances,

to $75 from the wealthy. The latter sum constitutes the absolute

standard. For a general norm to establish relatively grave matter,

then, an acceptable procedure is to take the daily earning power or

expenses of those who do not belong to the wealthiest classes, but who

just barely make a living by reason of their work or charity.

[*] This is not to suggest that the authors cited hold to the “week’s

pay norm” as the standard. Father Connell, for example, defines the

absolute as “a sum which is so large that society would suffer much if

it could be stolen without grave sin even from the richest or from a

wealthy corporation” (op. cit., pp. 127-128). The interest in citing

the authors is to show the precise sums suggested by them at various

times regardless of the norm used in arriving at the particular amount

suggested.

1901. What is grave matter in theft of sacred objects? (a) If these

objects have a value that may be measured by money (e.g., the gold or

jewels that enter into a reliquary), grave matter is estimated by the

material value, just as in profane objects. (b) If these objects have

no monetary value (e.g., sacred relics), grave matter is judged from

the dignity or rarity of the object. Thus, it would be a serious sin to

steal even the smallest splinter from the True Cross.

1902. It was said above (1898) that the gravity of theft is estimated,

not only by the property loss, but also by the personal loss, that is,

the reluctance, unwillingness or sorrow of the owner at the deprivation

of his goods. This does not mean that a greater unwillingness on the

part of the owner increases the gravity of the theft, if the owner’s

unwillingness is excessive or unreasonable (e.g., it is not a mortal

sin of theft to steal a dollar from a miser, if the miser on account

of his love of money feels the loss as keenly as another person in his

place would feel the loss of $40). But a less unwillingness of the

owner diminishes the injury, and hence increases the amount necessary

for grave matter. There are three reasons especially that diminish the

unwillingess of the owner at the loss of his property.

(a) Thus, by reason of the persons who steal, the owner is less

unwilling when these persons have a greater claim on his affection

(e.g., his children or wife), or when custom permits them to some

extent a greater freedom than is granted to others (e.g., servants,

employees).

(b) By reason of the things stolen, the owner is less unwilling when

these are things of less value, like crops, that are produced mostly by

nature and are left exposed, such as fruits growing by the wayside,

branches and pieces of fallen timber lying on uncultivated land.

unwilling when goods are taken gradually and on several occasions, or

piecemeal, than when they are taken all at once.

1903. The Common Opinion on Domestic Thefts and Grave Matter.--(a) In

theft from one’s parents about double the usual quantity is required.

But in an individual case the parents may be just as unwilling, and

with good reason, to be despoiled by members of the family as by

outsiders, and in such a case the rule would not apply. Hence, in

considering thefts by children one must bear in mind the ability of the

family to suffer the loss, the number of the children, the uses to

which the stolen goods are put, the liberality or thrift of the

parents, the affection or dislike which the parents have for the child

who steals, etc. Thus, if poor parents are denying themselves in every

way in order to rear and educate a large family, thefts from them are a

serious matter.

(b) In theft from one’s husband even a greater amount is required. But

there are exceptions, as when the husband is especially unwilling to

have his property stolen by his wife, for example, when the money she

takes is devoted, not to the benefit of the family or other useful

purposes, but to vanity or sin, or to the great detriment of the

husband or family (see 1799).

1904. Theft from One’s Wife or Minor Child.--(a) According to the

law in the United States, a wife cannot steal from her husband nor

the husband from the wife, but this principle has reference to the

common property of which husband and wife are joint tenants (Robinson,

_Elementary Law_, Sec. 563). Both husband and wife may have also their

own separate property, and in that case either of them is guilty of

injustice if he or she damages or takes without leave the goods of the

other.

(b) According to American law, the father has the right to the earnings

of his minor children who live with him and receive their maintenance

from him; but the law gives the father no right over the separate real

or personal estate of these children. Hence, a parent would be guilty

of theft if he unlawfully took or used the individual property of his

child.

1905. The Common Opinion on Thefts Committed by Employees.--(a) If

the things stolen are small articles which the employer customarily

supplies for his help (e.g., food and drink for domestic servants,

pencils and paper for his clerks), the theft is not serious as a rule.

But there are exceptions, as when the employee gives or sells to others

these articles, or when he uses or wastes them to such a degree that

the employer suffers a considerable loss. And one should also consider

such circumstances as the great or small value of the services given by

the employee, his good or bad standing with the employer, etc.

(b) If the thing stolen is not meant for consumption (e.g., furnishings

of the home or office, merchandise of the store, tools or machinery

of the factory) or is of a very precious kind (e.g., rare wines or

expensive brands of tobacco), grave matter is of the same amount as

when an outside person does the stealing. In fact, the guilt of the

employee is more serious on account of his abuse of confidence or

violation of contract. The property of employers would be subject to

constant risk, if employees were permitted greater liberties than

outsiders.

1906. Theft of Things about Whose Loss the Owner Is Less

Concerned.--(a) Vegetation that Belongs to the Public and Is Left

Unprotected.--If these things are of minor importance (e.g., wild

fruits or berries, broken twigs, branches, etc., in public lands),

it seems that it is not theft to take them, at least when one is

poor and a member of the community; for laws against such acts are

generally regarded as penal. But one sins, and may even sin gravely,

when extensive damage is done to public property (e.g., by cutting down

trees, carrying away flowers and plants, injuring shrubs, etc.).

(b) Vegetation that Belongs to Private Parties and Is Left

Unprotected.--If only a small quantity is taken (e.g., an apple or a

bunch of grapes hanging over a public highway taken by a passerby), it

seems no theft is done, unless the owner or law expressly forbids. But

it seems to be a venial sin to take more (e.g., as much as a hungry

person can eat), and a mortal sin to take a quantity whose market value

is equal to grave matter.

1907. Travelling Without Paying Fare.--Is it theft to ride in public

conveyances without paying the fare?

(a) If one rides without payment or ticket, it seems that theft is

committed, unless the company is willing to give a free ride. It may be

said that the company suffers no loss on account of one passenger who

has not paid for his transportation, since the same number of cars and

the same expenses would be required even without that passenger. But

since the owners are unwilling to furnish their service gratis, he who

takes it without pay is guilty of theft.

(b) If one rides without payment, but uses the ticket of another, there

is no injustice if the rules of the company permit this (e.g., A buys

a round-trip ticket, but gives the return ticket to B), but there is

fraud if the rules of the company and the agreement of the purchaser

make the ticket non-transferable (e.g., B uses the half-rate ticket

which A had received as a personal privilege from the railroad company).

1908. Small Thefts Which Amount to a Large Sum.--Small amounts stolen

may accumulate into a large amount. This happens in the following

ways: (a) the thief takes small sums on different occasions from the

same person or from different persons, and continues at this until he

has stolen a considerable amount; (b) the thief conspires with other

thieves to steal on the same occasion from one person or several

persons, and, though the sum he steals is small, the sum taken by the

whole group is considerable. Similarly, petty damages or vexations

may accumulate into a mortal injustice. Thus, if Claudius, aiming to

break down the health, sanity, success, reputation, business, etc., of

Balbus, plans and carries out a systematic campaign of small injuries

daily repeated for years, Claudius is guilty at least in purpose of

serious damage.

1909. Small thefts that grow into a large theft are mortally sinful in

the following cases:

(a) they are mortally sinful by reason of the previous intention when

one steals a little now and a little again, but has it in mind from

the outset to steal a total sum that will be grave matter, or when one

conspires with others to steal a notable sum although one’s own share

will not be a notable amount. In these cases the purpose is to commit

a grave injustice, either against an individual (if all is taken from

one person) or against society (if portions are taken from various

persons), and hence one is internally guilty of grave sin, even though

one has not yet performed it externally. Examples are merchants who use

false weights and measures, or who adulterate their commodities with

small portions of water, etc., and thus make large profits by minute

cheating;

(b) they are mortally sinful by reason of the subsequent intention when

one had no purpose to steal a large amount, but adverts to the fact

that a small theft here and now committed will constitute grave matter

if added to previous petty thefts, or that the amount of stolen goods

now possessed is large, and nevertheless resolves to go ahead with the

theft or to retain the stolen goods. This does not mean that a number

of venial sins coalesce into a mortal sin (see 189), but only that the

object of a sin which is slight in itself becomes serious on account

of the circumstance that it is morally connected with previous sins.

The last act in a connected series must not be taken singly, but in

connection with the acts that precede, as is seen in the violation of a

fast or in omission of parts of an hour. In the cases now considered,

therefore, grave injustice is actually and purposely done, and mortal

sin is committed, even though there was no thought of this in advance.

1910. The case of young men who are educated free of charge in the

expectation that they will go on to the priesthood and who do not

persevere.--(a) If they act in bad faith (i.e., if they enter the

college or seminary merely to get their education, or to avoid work,

or if they remain after they have abandoned thought of the clerical

state), they are guilty of theft and bound to restitution.

(b) If they are not in bad faith (i.e., if they wish to try out their

vocation, or if they begin with the intention to persevere), they are

not guilty of injustice. This is true, even though they are rejected on

account of idleness or other faults, provided there was no intention to

defraud.

1911. In the following cases small thefts which added to others make

a large sum seem not to be the cause of grave loss, and hence not

mortally sinful:

(a) the small theft of one person following on the small thefts of

others, when there is no bond of example, advice, conspiracy, etc.,

to unite the various thefts; for none of the thieves can be held

responsible for the part of the loss caused by the others. Example:

Titus, knowing that Balbus has been cheated by various persons to the

amount of $9 and that $10 will be a serious loss to Balbus, proceeds to

steal $1 from Balbus:

(b) the small thefts of several persons who steal together, and who

influence one another only by example; for example is an occasion,

not a true cause of the imitator’s act (see 1447, 1763). Example:

Sempronius and Claudius go into a store together and find that there

is no one around. Sempronius thereupon steals a number of articles and

leaves. Claudius notices this and steals other things, which will make

the total loss serious.

1912. Moral Connection between Repeated Acts of Theft.--The moral

connection between repeated acts of theft by one person is necessary,

as was said, in order that these acts unite into one grave sin. This

moral connection does not exist, however, if the series is broken by

interruption or revocation.

(a) Thus, the connection is broken by interruption when there is a

long interval between small thefts, because thefts that are small and

infrequent do not inflict severe loss on individuals or society. This

supposes, of course, that there is no intention to practise small

thievery habitually in order to become enriched by it, but that one

steals now and then as opportunity or necessity occurs, or (according

to some) that one intends to steal only small amounts and at long

intervals.

(b) The connection is also broken by restitution or revocation. It is

clear that, if the thief has given back his former thefts, they should

not be computed with later thefts; and it seems also--though some do

not admit this--that, if he has sincerely resolved to give back things

taken before (e.g., things which are useless for him), there is no

moral connection between the past thefts and a theft he is committing

now.

1913. Interval of Time between Acts of Theft.--The interval of time

that breaks the connection between small thefts cannot be determined

with mathematical exactness, but the following rule seems to be

accurate enough: thefts combine to form a great theft only when

considerable property is taken by degrees, but within such a brief

period of time as to be of notable advantage to the thief and of

notable disadvantage to the loser. Some moralists think that six

months is a long space, sufficient to prevent union between thefts,

but that two months is too short a space to prevent the union; others,

on the contrary, believe that the amounts stolen should be taken into

consideration; and hence that the following intervals between thefts

separate them into distinct venial sins without coalescence:

(a) a period of one year between thefts, each of which almost amounts

to grave matter, when the property is kept (e.g., when a dressmaker who

has kept not a little of her patron’s material of a twelvemonth ago

does the same thing again this year);

(b) a period of two months, when the matters are almost grave, but the

property is not kept (e.g., when a thief who beat a restaurant out of

the price of a very elaborate meal at the beginning of January does the

same thing at the beginning of March). But it is hard to see how one

could have the habit of stealing in this way and not have the intention

of stealing a large amount, for a person who steals what is almost

grave matter every two months or so must realize that he will shortly

be enriched to a considerable extent by his dishonesty. Moreover,

the interval of two months might be needed by the thief for avoiding

suspicion;

grave matter (e.g., a meal of simple fare plainly cooked and served);

(d) a period of about two weeks, when the matters are very small (e.g.,

when a thief takes a few secret sips from a wine bottle on each of his

fortnightly visits to a certain house, or carries away some trifling

object as a souvenir). These thefts would not surpass five or ten cents

a month;

(e) some authors think that one week or perhaps even one day will

prevent coalescence between extremely small thefts; and surely there

are some paltry objects (e.g., a pin or needle, a match, a small lump

of coal, a piece of string) which would not total a large value even

after many years have passed.

1914. Species and Number of Petty Thefts that Coalesce into Grave

Matter.--(a) If the thefts proceed from a previously formed purpose of

stealing by installments a large sum, each of them is a mortal sin,

but they do not form numerically distinct sins, unless there was a

revocation of the intent (see 214, 215).

(b) If the thefts did not proceed from a previously formed plan, those

that preceded the culminating theft (i.e., the one whose addition makes

the quantity grave) are so many separate venial sins of theft. The

culminating theft is a mortal sin, if the thief adverts to the fact

that he has now stolen a notable sum; otherwise it is a venial sin. The

act, after the gravity of the matter has been noticed, is the initial

mortal sin, if it means consent to the grave injustice done (e.g.,

retention of the ill-gotten goods, intention not to make restitution);

it is an additional mortal sin, if it means a renewal of consent to the

grave injustice previously done (e.g., the theft of a new small amount

with the purpose of keeping it as well as the rest).

1915. Sum Required for Grave Matter in Petty Thefts that Coalesce.--(a)

According to one opinion, it is always larger than the sum required for

grave matter in a theft of the same amount on a single occasion; for

the owner does not feel the loss so much when his goods are stolen in

small amounts and at different times. Thus, a man is less unwilling to

have $100 stolen from him through pilferings of cents and dollars over

a period of a year or two than to have it all stolen from him on one

day.

(b) According to another opinion, grave matter for petty thefts is not

larger than grave matter for large thefts of the same amount, if the

petty thief had the intention all along to accumulate a notable sum.

But some who are of this opinion make an exception for the case when

the petty thief steals not from one but from several owners, for in

this way the loss is distributed and less harm done. Grave matter in

this case, they say, is the same as absolutely grave matter.

1833. Self-defense must be moderate, for injury or the death of a human