182. The matter of a sin is light in two ways. (a) From the character

of the act, the matter is light when the good which is injured is

finite and of minor importance. Thus, truth about trivial things is of

less importance among finite goods, and consequently a small lie about

some unimportant matter, which helps and does not harm the neighbor, is

light matter. (b) From the quantity of the matter, the matter is light

when the good injured is of major importance but divisible. An example

here is a theft that works only small harm (see above, 172).

183. The second condition for a venial sin is that there be some

advertence to the malice of the act. (a) The advertence is not full

when the matter is grave, and the act done without compulsion, for else

the sin would not be venial but mortal. (b) The advertence may be full

or partial when the matter is light.

184. The third condition for a venial sin is that there be some consent

of the will to the malice of the act. (a) The consent is not full when

the matter is grave, for else the sin would be mortal. (b) The consent

may be either full or partial when the matter is light.

185. Imperfections.--The description of venial sin just given indicates

that it is a voluntary transgression of the law of God in matters of

lighter importance, and is thus distinguished from the various classes

of moral imperfections. These latter imperfections are:

(a) natural imperfections, which are the falling short on the part of

good acts of the higher degree of goodness they might have possessed.

Since man is finite by nature, it is inevitable that he be limited in

the good he does; and hence this kind of imperfection is not a

transgression or a sin;

(b) personal imperfections which are voluntary but not transgressions,

are acts or omissions whose motive is reasonable, but which are

contrary to that which is of counsel. Example: to omit hearing a Mass

that is not obligatory, when one is able to assist at it, but has a

good reason for staying away;

(c) personal imperfections which are transgressions but not voluntary,

are acts or omissions done without deliberation, but which are opposed

to some law of less importance. Example: To pray with involuntary

distractions.

186. Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects.-An imperfection becomes a

sin: (a) if the motive for omitting what is of counsel only is sinful

(e.g., to neglect a Mass that is not of obligation out of contempt);

(b) if a slight indeliberate transgression has a cause that was

voluntary (e.g., involuntary distractions caused by previous neglect).

187. Venial sins become mortal when that which in itself is a slight

offense, becomes in the individual agent a grave offense by reason of

some change in the object or of some grave malice in the purpose,

circumstances, or the foreseen results (see above 97 sqq.).

188. A change in the object makes venial sin mortal: (a) when that

which is light matter objectively is apprehended subjectively as grave

matter (e.g., a person tells a small lie or commits a trifling theft,

thinking these to be mortal sins); (b) when that which is light matter

by itself becomes knowingly grave matter through the additions that are

made to it (e.g., a thief steals small amounts frequently with the

intention of having a great amount of ill-gotten money after a time).

189. It should be noted that, while the matter of venial sins may

coalesce so as to form grave matter and constitute a mortal sin, as

just explained, venial sins themselves do not, from mere

multiplication, ever become mortal, since the difference between mortal

and venial sin is not one of quantity, but of kind. Hence, when acts

are slightly sinful but do not coalesce, they multiply venial sins, but

do not form mortal sin. Example: Coming a few minutes late for Mass

every Sunday.

190. The multiplication of venial sins, especially when they are held

as of no importance, disposes for the commission of mortal sin: (a)

directly, by forming a habit that calls for ever greater indulgence

(e.g., petty thefts lead to dishonesty on a large scale); (b)

indirectly, by familiarizing one with wrongdoing and chilling the love

for virtue.

191. The wrong purpose of the agent makes an act that is only venially

sinful (as far as the object is concerned) to become mortally sinful,

when the purpose contains a grave malice in itself, for the act is then

intended only as a means to what is seriously wrong (see above 80).

Example: To tell a small lie in order to break up friendships and sow

hatreds.

192. The circumstances of an act that is only venially sinful in itself

also make the act mortally sinful, when there is grave malice in such

circumstances. Cases of this kind are the following:

(a) The circumstance of the person committing the sin sometimes changes

the malice from light to grave. Example: Unbecoming levity in one in

authority may cause serious disrespect for his office and thus be

gravely sinful;

(b) The circumstance of the manner in which an act is performed may

change it from a venial to a mortal sin, as when the sin is committed

out of contempt, or is so coveted that it would be preferred to a grave

obligation. Examples: One who violates a law of lesser moment, not

because he regards it as bad, but because he wishes to show his

disregard of all law and authority; or one who is so attached to games

of chance that he is prepared to steal a large sum rather than give

them up.

193. The serious harm that is foreseen as a result of venial sin also

changes the malice from slight to serious. Examples: One who jokingly

annoys another, knowing that this will provoke grave dissensions; or

one who tells small lies to persons who are known for their

uncharitable distortions and exaggerations; or one who agrees to take

too much strong drink knowing from experience that this invariably

leads to serious excess.

194. Mortal sins become venial when that which in itself is a grave

offense, becomes light by reason of some change in he object or lack of

full consent in the subject.

195. A change in the object makes a mortal sin venial: (a) when that

which is grave matter objectively, is apprehended through inculpable,

or only venially culpable ignorance as light matter (e.g., when an

uninstructed child thinks that a serious calumny is only a venial sin);

(b) when a sin whose character is serious but whose matter is divisible

is small as to matter (e.g,, to be absent from a small part of the Mass

on Sunday); (e) when a law whose obligation is grave will cause more

than slight inconvenience in a particular case, and thus becomes of

light obligation for that case (e.g., to miss Mass on Sunday because of

a difficulty that was not unsurmountable, but yet considerable).

196. Lack of sufficient advertence or of full consent makes a mortal

sin venial; (a) when without serious fault one does not advert to a

gravely sinful act (e.g., a desire of revenge); (b) when without

serious fault one does not know or does not think about the grave

malice of what one is doing (e.g., to repeat a story, not knowing or

not remembering at the time that it is a serious calumny); (c) when on

account of considerable excitement, fear or other disturbance, one

gives only partial consent to an act that is mortally sinful (e.g.,

when one, on being suddenly insulted, replies with a serious

imprecation).

197. The Distinction of Sins.--There are three kinds of distinction of

sins: (a) sins that differ according to theological species, that is,

according as they turn or do not turn the sinner away from God as his

Last End. There are only two theological species of sin, viz., mortal

and venial; (b) sins that differ according to moral species, that is,

according to their essences, or the various kinds of finite good to

which they turn the sinner. There are many moral species of sins, for

example, infidelity, uncharitableness, etc.; (c) sins that differ

according to number, but agree according to moral species (e.g., two

distinct acts of uncharitable hatred).

198. The criteria for the specific distinction of sins are two:

(a) that which makes sins to differ specifically is the difference of

the objects to which they tend, inasmuch as these created goods are out

of harmony in specifically different ways with the standards of

morality (e.g., pride and gluttony); (b) that by which we recognize the

specific difference of sins is the opposition they have to virtues or

laws that are specifically different. Thus, pride is opposed to

humility, gluttony to temperance--two different virtues.

199. The following rules assist us in recognizing specific distinctions

of sins. (a) Those sins are specifically different which are opposed to

virtues that are specifically distinct. Thus, infidelity and despair

are different in species, because opposed to faith and hope, which are

two distinct species of virtue. (b) Those sins are specifically

different that are opposed to specifically different objects of one and

the same virtue--that is, to functions of the virtue, or to laws

concerning it that have intrinsically different motives. Thus, sins of

murder, theft, and false testimony, though opposed to the same virtue

of justice, are specifically distinct, since they contravene

obligations of that virtue whose purposes are morally distinct. (c)

Those sins are specifically different that are opposed in specifically

different ways to the same object of the same virtue, one opposing that

object by way of excess and the other by way of defect. Thus,

miserliness and extravagance are specifically distinct sins, because

one falls short of, while the other goes beyond, the golden mean that

is found in liberality.

200. Sins are not specifically distinct: (a) when they are opposed to

the same virtue in ways that are physically, but not morally, contrary.

Thus, sins of omission and sins of commission are physically opposites,

but they are not morally so, unless they offend against different moral

objects in the ways explained in the preceding paragraph. Hence, to

steal and to refuse to pay debts, to take and to keep what belongs to

another, are not specifically different sins; whereas to violate two

distinct precepts about the same virtue, one a command and the other a

prohibition, is to commit two species of sin, one by omission, and the

other by commission;

(b) when they are opposed to the same virtue with reference to commands

that differ in their lawgivers, but not in their motives. Thus, God,

the Church, and the State all forbid theft; but he who steals is not

therefore guilty of three sins, for each lawgiver forbids theft from

the same intrinsic motive, viz., because it is an injury.

201. One and the same act contains in itself many sins, when it has

many malices specifically different. Thus, he who kills his parents

violates two commandments relative to the virtue of justice; he who

steals from a church is guilty of theft and of sacrilege.

202. Sins that are multiplied numerically within the same species are

committed in three ways: (a) by purely internal acts, that is, acts

that are completed within the powers of the soul and do not tend to

execution in some external act (e.g., unbelief, envy, pride, delight in

the thought of sin, etc.); (b) by internal acts that are not completed

in the will, but tend to execution in some external act (e.g., the

purpose or desire to injure another, to lie, etc.); (c) by external

acts that are performed or neglected by the bodily faculties under

command of the will (e.g., theft, quarrels, lies, omissions of duty,

etc.).

203. Acts may be numerically one or many in two ways.

(a) Physically, there is one act when the agent moves or puts into

action a power of the soul or body only once (e.g., to steal from a

church). Physically, there are many acts when the agent exercises

different operative faculties, or the same one different times (e.g.,

to put one’s hand many times into a money box in order to steal the

entire contents).

(b) Morally, there is one act when a single physical act does not

contain more than one species of morality, or when several physical

acts are united as parts of one whole by reason of the intention of the

agent, or the nature of the acts themselves. For example, the wish to

steal is morally one act. The intention to steal, the decision to use

certain means to accomplish this intention, the various attempts made,

and finally the carrying out of the plan--all these form morally but

one act, since the acts that follow are only the development of the

original intention. Similarly, several curses hurled at another form

morally one act, if all are uttered under the influence of the same

passion of anger. Finally, acts of spying on another, of entering his

house without permission, and of taking his property unlawfully, are

morally one act, because the first acts are naturally the preparation

for what follows.

204. Morally, there are several acts when a single physical act

contains several species of malice (as when one steals from a church),

or when there are several physical acts not united by any bond of

common purpose or natural subordination (as when one steals on

different occasions because an opportunity suddenly presented itself,

or as when one misses Mass on different Sundays).

205. Objects of acts may also be numerically one or many in two ways.

(a) Physically, an object is one when it has its own proper

individuality different from that of others. Thus, each coin in a

pocket-book is physically one thing, each member of a family is

physically one person. Objects are physically many, when they include

more than one distinct thing or person. Thus, physically a pocket-book

contains many objects, as does also a family.

(b) Morally, objects that are physically many become one, if they are

not such as to require morally distinct acts in their regard, and if

they form according to prudent judgment parts of an integral or

collective whole. Otherwise, these objects are morally many. Example:

Missing Mass for a whole year constitutes, morally speaking, many

objects, since it implies many independent external omissions, or

morally distinct acts. A box of ordinary coins, though it contains many

individual pieces of money, is commonly regarded as one integral

object; and likewise religious, civil, domestic, and financial bodies,

though each is made up of many members, are each, morally speaking, but

one person. The possessions of different proprietors, however, are not

one moral object; neither do the individual, personal rights of the

members of one group constitute a single object.

206. It is clear that two sins specifically different in malice are also

numerically different (e.g., a sin of theft and a sin of calumny). The

rules that follow will pertain only to sins that are of the same

species, but that differ numerically within the species (e.g., two

distinct sins of theft, two distinct sins of calumny).

207. The rules for the numerical distinction of sins within the same

species suppose: (a) that the distinction be not taken from the object,

which gives the specific difference, but from the repetition of acts

with regard to one object, made either actually (by different acts) or

equivalently (by what is equal to different acts); (b) that the

distinction be not taken from a physical but from a moral consideration

of the acts.

208. Three rules of numerical distinction will be given, one for each

of the three following hypotheses: (a) many distinct acts are concerned

with morally distinct objects of the same species; (b) many distinct

acts are concerned with what is morally one object; (c) one act is

concerned with what are physically many, but morally one object.

209. First Rule of Numerical Distinction.--Many sinful acts, each of

which is concerned with an object that is distinct in number (morally

speaking) from the objects of the other acts, make as many numerically

distinct sins as there are acts and objects numerically distinct.

Example: He who fires distinct shots and unjustly kills three persons

is guilty of three murders.

210. Second Rule of Numerical Distinction.--Many sinful acts, all of

which are concerned with an object that is (morally speaking) one and

the same in number, make as many numerically distinct sins as there are

acts numerically distinct according to moral estimation.

211. When the acts concerned with the same object are purely internal,

they are multiplied numerically, according to moral estimation, in the

following cases:

(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced by an act of the

will. Example: He who hates in the morning, repents at noon, and

returns to his hate in the afternoon, commits two sins of hatred;

(b) when they are repeated after having been voluntarily discontinued,

if the interval between the two acts is so considerable that the second

act is not a mere continuation of the first. Example: He who in his

mind reviles an enemy passing by, then turns his attention to his work

and thinks no more about his anger, and later, seeing his enemy again,

reviles him mentally a second time, commits two sins;

(c) when they are repeated after having been involuntarily

discontinued, if a notable period (say, three hours) intervenes between

the two acts. Example: He who thinks thoughts of hatred until he falls

asleep, or until he is distracted from them by something unusual going

on about him, or by the entrance of a visitor, commits a second sin of

hatred, when he returns to the same thoughts, if the interruption was

so long that there is no moral connection between the two acts.

212. When acts tending to the same object are internal, but directed

towards completion in some external act, they are multiplied

numerically, in moral estimation, in the following cases:

(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced. Example: He who

decides to steal, but repents for his sin, and then again decides to

steal, commits two sins;

(b) when they are repeated after voluntary discontinuance, if the

interval is not merely momentary. Example: He who thinks over a plan to

acquire money unjustly, and then deliberately turns his thought away

and gives all his attention to lawful affairs, but later resumes the

dishonest planning, commits a new sin;

(c) when they are repeated after involuntary discontinuance, if the

interval is notable in view of the external act desired, and nothing

external was done that could serve as a link to unify the two acts.

Example: A burglar plans a robbery that could easily be carried out at

once, but he takes no steps to execute his plan, and soon forgets about

it. A month later, passing the house he had intended to rob, he

remembers his plan and carries it out. Two distinct sins were here

committed.

213. Involuntary discontinuance does not, however, separate the acts

into two distinct sins: (a) if the interval was brief in view of the

external act that was desired (e.g., if the burglar above mentioned had

forgotten his plan for a few days only before he renewed it and carried

it out); (b) if something had already been done by reason of the first

act (e.g., if the burglar, after resolving to rob the house, had

procured keys or tools for the purpose, and had kept them with this in

mind, although he allowed months and years to pass without making any

attempt to fulfill his design).

214. When the acts tending to the same object are external, they are

multiplied numerically in moral estimation, and make distinct sins as

follows: (a) if the internal acts from which they proceed are

numerically distinct sins (e.g., if a burglar attempts to rob a house,

but leaves his work unfinished because he becomes conscience-stricken

or is interrupted, and later makes another plan and another attempt,

there are two sins); (b) if the external acts are of such a kind that

no internal intention can make them morally one act, even when one

follows directly upon the other (e.g., missing Mass on Sunday and again

on the following day, a holyday, makes one guilty of two distinct

violations of the law).

215. In the following cases, however, distinct external acts with

reference to the same object do not multiply the number of sins: (a)

when these acts form a part of one moral whole, and are intended as

such by the agent (e.g., one who reads a forbidden book, but divides it

into parts, reading only so many pages a day); (b) when these acts have

to one another the relation of means to a common end, and they are

intended as such by the agent (e.g., various preparations made for

robbery).

216. Third Rule of Numerical Distinction.--One sinful act, internal or

external, that is concerned with objects that are physically many, but

morally one, makes but one sin in number. Example: He who steals a

purse that contains ten bills commits one sin; he who calumniates a

family of ten persons commits one sin; he who steals what is the common

property of three proprietors commits one sin.

217. When the objects are not morally one of themselves, they may

become so through the belief of the one who acts, since distinct

malices are not incurred except as apprehended (see 588-592). Example:

He who tells three different lies against a neighbor (e.g., that he is

a thief, a drunkard and a liar), commits one sin of calumny, if he has

in mind general injury to reputation, but does not think at the time of

the special injuries contained in his calumny. Likewise, he who

calumniates before ten persons commits but one sin of calumny, if,

being in a passion, he thinks only of the harm he wishes to cause and

not of the number of persons who are present.

218. When the objects are morally one, they may become many through the

intention of the one who acts. Example: He who calumniates a family of

three persons by saying they are all dishonest, commits three sins, if

he intends three distinct injuries (e.g., against the business of one,

the religious reputation of another, and the friendship of the third).

So also he who steals part of the money in a purse, and later on,

having another opportunity, decides to steal the rest, commits two sins.

219. When the objects are not morally one in themselves and cannot be

apprehended as such, distinct sins are committed. Example: He who

intends to miss Mass all year, foresees at least in a confused way many

distinct violations of the law; he who purposes to rob various

proprietors foresees at least in a vague way many separate and complete

external acts of robbery.

220. Comparison of Sins.--Sins that differ in species differ also in

gravity, those being more serious that depart further from the norms of

reason and the law of God.

221. Other things being equal, those sins are worse that offend against

a more noble object or a more noble virtue. Hence, sins that are

directly against God (such as infidelity, despair, and hatred of God)

are the most serious of all; while sins against human personality (such

as murder) are more serious than those against human rights (such as

theft).

222. Of those sins that are opposed to the same virtue, that one is

worse which is opposed to the principal inclination of the virtue.

Thus, avarice is more foreign to the virtue of liberality than the

opposite vice of prodigality; timidity is more contrary to bravery than

its opposite rashness.

223. The gravity of a sin is increased in the following ways:

(a) by the circumstances, in so far as they give it a new species of

malice (e.g., theft from a church) or increase its malice within the

species (e.g., money given prodigally and to those who do not deserve

it, or money stolen in a large quantity);

(b) by the greater willingness with which the sin is committed. Hence,

those who sin through ignorance or under the excitement of passion are

less guilty than those who sin in cold blood;

(c) by the condition of the person offended. Thus, a sin is made worse

according as the person offended is nearer to God by reason of his

personal holiness or the sacredness of his state or the dignity of his

office, or is nearer to the offender himself. Hence, an injury is

greater if done to a priest, a public official or one’s own family,

than if done to another who has not the same claim to honor or justice;

(d) by the condition of the person who sins. Those who are better

instructed or otherwise better advantaged, or who are supposed to give

good example to others, sin more grievously by reason of their greater

ingratitude and of the greater scandal they give, whenever they sin

deliberately;

(e) by the evil results that follow from the sin, when these are

willed, even indirectly or implicitly, as when one spreads stories that

are bound to cause enmities, strifes, and a lowering of ideals (see 96).

224. Spiritual and carnal sins, considered precisely as such, and other

things being equal, may be compared from two viewpoints, viz., of

malice and of reputation. (a) From the viewpoint of malice, spiritual

sins are worse, since, while a carnal sinner is carried away by strong

passion and offends directly only his own body, he who commits

spiritual sins acts with greater freedom and offends directly against

God and his neighbor. Hence, the Pharisees, though they despised the

fallen woman, were worse than she, since in the eyes of God their

pride, envy, detraction, hypocrisy, etc., were more hateful crimes.

(b) From the viewpoint of reputation, carnal sins are worse, since they

liken man more to the beast, and are thus more infamous.

225. In actual experience, carnal sins are frequently more grave than

non-carnal sins.

(a) Many carnal sins are not purely carnal, but also contain other

malice, and cause directly more injury to God or the neighbor than a

non-carnal sin of the same category. Example: Adultery combines both

lust and injustice, and is a greater injustice than the non-carnal sin

of theft. Rape combines lust and injury, and is more injurious than the

non-carnal sin of anger resulting in bodily blows. Lascivious

conversation combines impurity and spiritual damage to another, and is

more harmful than the non-carnal sin of detracting that other and

causing him some temporal injury.

(b) Many carnal sins are accompanied by greater malice or greater

scandal, or are followed by greater evils than purely spiritual sins.

Example: Sins of impurity or drunkenness, committed habitually and

deliberately or by adults, are more malicious than sins of pride or

anger committed rarely or without full deliberation, or by children.

Drunkenness or licentious language and suspicious intimacies, committed

by those from whom good example is expected, do more to undermine

religion than sins of impatience or uncharitableness in the same

persons. The results of a man’s pride (such as ambition, arrogance,

luxurious living and deceitfulness) are often less disastrous than the

results of his intemperance (such as detraction, immodesty, fights,

extravagance, disgrace of family, etc.).

226. Sins different in species rank in the order of gravity, as said

above, according to their objects. For, just as diseases are considered

more serious when they affect more important vital organs or functions,

so sins are more grave when they affect more radical principles of

human conduct. The greater the object or end of action that is injured,

therefore, the greater is the harm done and the greater the sin

committed. Hence: (a) sins committed directly against God are worse

than sins committed against creatures, for God is the end of all

creatures; (b) sins committed against persons are greater than sins

committed against things, for persons are the end of things.

227. Of the sins committed against God, the rank according to gravity

is: (a) sins against the personality of God--that is, against the

divine nature--such as hatred of God (the greatest of all sins),

infidelity, despair; (b) sins against the peculiar possessions of

God--that is, His external honor and glory, and those things that

belong to Him in a special way, such as the humanity of Christ

hypostatically united to the Word, the Sacraments, and things

consecrated to God. Such sins are idolatry, superstition, perjury, the

sins of those who had Christ crucified, simony, sacrilege, unworthy

reception of the Eucharist or other Sacrament, violation of vows, etc.

228. Sins committed against creatures, other things being equal, rank

in gravity as follows: (a) Sins against personality are greater than

sins against possessions. Example: The sin of murder, which is against

personality, is worse than the sin of theft, which is against

possessions. (b) Sins against being are greater than sins against

wellbeing. Examples: Murder is worse than mutilation, and scandal that

causes another to lose his soul is worse than scandal that only

diminishes another’s goodness; murder and the irreparable scandal take

away life, mutilation and the lesser scandal only diminish the

perfection of the life that is had. (c) Sins against those who have a

greater claim are greater than sins against those who have a less

claim. Examples: It is a greater sin to neglect one’s own salvation

than that of a neighbor; to murder a member of one’s own family, a

benefactor, or a person distinguished on account of his position or

virtue, is a greater crime than to murder a stranger, an enemy, a

private individual, or one of bad life. (d) Sins against possessions

that are dearer are graver offenses. Examples: It is worse to steal

away the peace of a household than to carry off its material treasures;

it is worse to rob a man of his good name than to defraud him of his

wages.

229. The above rating of sins is based on their natures considered in

the abstract, that is, according to the essential relations they have

to their own proper objects. It is impossible to consider any other

factor when drawing up general rules of comparison; for the

circumstances that enter into concrete cases of sin are innumerable,

and hence have to be left out of consideration. By reason of these

factors other than the object, however, the ranking of sins according

to gravity given above may be changed or reversed.

(a) In the act of a greater sin there may be extenuating circumstances,

or in the act of a lesser sin aggravating circumstances that change

their respective order. Example: Detraction is from its nature worse

than theft; but, if the detraction does only small harm and the theft

great harm, the theft is worse on account of the circumstances.

(b) In the persons who commit the sins there may be circumstances that

change the order of guilt, so that he who commits the greater sin is

less guilty. Examples: By his careless handling of a revolver, Balbus

unintentionally causes lasting injury to a bystander. Caius without

malice aforethought, but enraged by an unexpected insult, strikes a

blow that destroys the sight in one eye of his adversary. Titus, angry

because he has been dismissed from his employment, revenges himself by

defacing a precious work of art. The bodily injuries caused by the

first two men are more harmful than the injury to property done by

Titus; but they sinned, the one from ignorance and the other from

passion, whereas Titus sinned from malice. Hence, while the sins of

Balbus and Caius are objectively or materially greater, that of Titus

is greater subjectively or formally (i.e., as to guilt).

230. The Subjects of Sin.--By the subjects of sin we understand the

powers of the soul in which sin is found. These powers are sometimes

called the material causes of sin, just as the objects to which the

sins tend are called their formal causes.

231. Just as virtuous habits have their seats in the will (e.g.,

justice), in the reason (e.g., prudence), and in the sensitive

appetites (e.g., fortitude and temperance), so also contrary habits of

vice may be found in these same faculties. (a) From the sensitive

appetites proceed impulses caused by sense apprehension or bodily

states, which, when they are inordinate and voluntary, are sinful

(e.g., lust, envy; see 129, on Second Motions). (b) From the reason

proceed false judgments caused by vincible ignorance, wrong direction

deliberately given to the passions, pleasurable dwelling on inordinate

thoughts, etc. (c) From the will proceed consent given to sins of the

other powers, desires to commit sin, joy over sin already committed,

etc.

232. As was said above (89-93), the external acts of the members of the

body have no morality of their own, since they are completely subject

to the will. Consequently, there are only three classes of sins, if

classification is made according to the faculties from which the sins

proceed: (a) sins of sensuality, which were spoken of above when we

treated of the passions (177 sqq.); (b) sins of thought; (c) sins of

desire and reminiscent approval.

233. Pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts occurs when one

deliberately, even though it be only for a moment, turns over in his

mind some sinful object, delighting in it as if it were actually

present, but not desiring that it be actually done. Example; One who

imagines his neighbor’s house burned down, and rejoices at the mental

picture, though for interested reasons he does not wish any

conflagration in the vicinity.

234. The sinful thoughts just described are not to be confused with

thoughts in which the object of the delight is something else than a

sinful picture represented in the mind.

Thoughts of this latter kind are: (a) those in which one takes delight

in an external act of sin being committed, as when one destroys one’s

neighbor’s property with great internal satisfaction; here the thought

forms one sin with the outer act; (b) those in which one delights in

the mental image, not as it represents something morally wrong, but as

it contains some object of lawful delight. There is a distinction

between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad. Examples: A

moralist may think with pleasure about theft, not because he approves

of it, but because it is a subject he has to know. A person may read

detective stories with great interest, not because crime appeals to

him, but because the style of the author is good, the details of the

plot exciting, the manner of the crime mysterious, etc. There is danger

in thoughts of this kind, however, if one indulges in them from mere

curiosity, or immoderately, or if sin itself may take an attraction

through them.

235. The gravity and species of pleasurable dwelling on inordinate

thoughts vary according to the thing thought on (see on Objects, etc.,

70 sqq.). (a) If pleasure is taken only in the object represented, the

sin has the moral character of that object. Example: He who delights at

the thought of theft, is guilty of theft; and if he thinks of a great

theft, he is guilty of mortal sin. (b) If pleasure is also taken in the

circumstances imaged in the mind, the sin takes on the added malice

contained in the circumstances. Example: He who delights over the

thought of the robbery of a church, is guilty of mental theft and

sacrilege.

236. The following are signs that delight taken in a thought about

sinful things is about their sinfulness, and not about some other of

their properties: (a) if one thinks about them without any lawful

necessity (such as that of study), but through mere curiosity, or

without any good reason; (b) if at the same time one loves to think on

them frequently and lingeringly, or shown great satisfaction whenever

they are mentioned. Example: One who thinks about injustices for

pastime and admires them as great exploits, who idolizes criminals as

heroes or martyrs.

237. Sinful joy is an act of the will by which one takes delight in

sins already committed by oneself or by others. We must distinguish

between sinful joy and joy about things that are sinful.

(a) Sinful joy rejoices over the iniquity contained in past acts,

either because it loves that iniquity in itself, or because it loves it

as the cause of some gain. Examples: An unjust and revengeful man

rejoices when he thinks of the oppression he exercised against some

helpless person who had incurred his wrath. A criminal recalls with joy

the perjuries by which his helpers secured his escape from justice.

(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not

that what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were

good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a

dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner

in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to

witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and

remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that

a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is

confined to the second part of the news.

238. The moral gravity and species of evil rejoicing has the same

character as the past sins that are its object (see 70 sqq.). For to

rejoice over sin is to approve of it, and therefore to be guilty of it

in will. Example: A prisoner who, to overcome melancholy, thinks over

the times he became intoxicated in the past, is guilty again of those

sins, with their number and circumstances adverted to.

239. What has been said about evil rejoicing applies likewise: (a) to

boasting over sin committed, because this implies complacency in the

sin; (b) to sorrow over sin omitted, because this means that one

approves of sin rather than virtue.

240. To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is

not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive

of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry

that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he

injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves

over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by

his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it

leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.

241. Evil desires are acts of the will by which one deliberately

intends to commit sin in the future. They are of two kinds, viz.,

absolute and conditional: (a) absolute or efficacious desires are those

in which the mind is fully made up to carry out the evil design, come

what may; (b) conditional or inefficacious desires are those in which

the purpose to commit sin hinges upon the fulfillment of some event or

circumstance that is explicitly or implicitly willed.

242. Absolute evil desires have the same moral gravity and species as

that to which they tend (i.e., they take their character from the

object, end and circumstances). Example: He who plans to steal a large

sum from a benefactor in order to be able to live in idleness and

dissipation, sins gravely against justice, and is also guilty of

ingratitude and intemperance, for he has committed all these sins in

his heart.

243. Conditional evil desires, if they are indeliberate and express

rather the propensity of nature than the considered will of him who

makes them, are not formally sinful. Examples: A poor man who

unthinkingly wishes that stealing were lawful; a sufferer who under the

influence of pain wishes that the Almighty had not forbidden suicide.

244. Conditional desires, if made deliberately, are of two kinds. (a)

There are some desires in which the condition willed (e.g., if this

were not a sin, if this were lawful, if this were allowed by God, etc.)

takes away the malice of the act desired, since some laws may be

dispensed or changed. Examples: “Would that God had not pronounced

against taking the property of others!” “I would stay away from church,

if this were not Sunday.” Desires of this kind are not sinful on

account of their object, which is not really wished, but on account of

their end, or their lack of useful purpose, and of the danger that the

conditional may become absolute. (b) There are other desires in which

the condition does not take away the malice of what is desired, either

because the condition is not at all concerned with the malice, or

because it wishes something to become lawful which even God cannot make

lawful. Examples: “I would steal, if this could be done safely.” “I

would blaspheme, if God permitted.” These desires partake of the malice

of the things that are wished.

245. Just as we distinguished above between bad thoughts and thoughts

on things that are bad, so may we distinguish between bad desires and

desires of what is bad. For bad desires that are not mere velleities

are sinful, as we have just seen; whereas the desire of what is

physically evil is good, if the evil is wished, not for its own sake,

but for the sake of some greater good. Example: To desire out of hatred

that a neighbor lose his arm is a bad desire and sinful; but if one

wished this as a means to save the neighbor’s life, while he still

desires something evil, it is not the evil but the benefit that is

intended, and hence the desire itself is not bad.

246. The Causes of Sin.--The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e.,

those which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which

are without).

247. The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect;

(b) passion in the sensitive appetites; (c) malice in the will.

248. Since ignorance and passion may render an act involuntary (see 40

sqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material

and formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the

law that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults.

Examples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized;

breaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law;

imprecations pronounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b)

Formal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are

voluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the

law, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against

conscience.

249. Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision

as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only

after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is

said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every

sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, _Nich. Ethics_, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b

27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a

false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general).

else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against

the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is

culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the

pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence

violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not

see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative

ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable

and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child

shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots

a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will,

leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose

inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory

(I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is

formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of

reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every

sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here

understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding

ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the

sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious

habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or

presumption which he entertains.

250. Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see

40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished

according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent

concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the

voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is

especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this

kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and

vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second

Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the

Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free

will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is

especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this

class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One

whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the

friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the

offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is

so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins

habitually without fear or remorse.

251. Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of

weakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary,

more enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and

sins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously

wrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not

seriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is

venially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated

or moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.

252. The external causes of sin are: (a) the devil or other evil

spirits, who by acting on the imagination or other sensitive powers of

the soul attempt to draw mankind to destruction; (b) the world, that

is, the persons and things about us, which by their seductiveness, or

by their principles and examples, tend to draw away from the practice

of virtue.

253. Since free consent is implied in the concept of formal sin, none

of the internal or external causes of sin just mentioned, the choice of

the will alone excepted, can actually effect sin. Hence the distinction

between temptation and sin. The rebellion of the passions, the

suggestions of evil spirits, the seductions of the world, are

temptations; if the will does not yield to them, there is no sin, but

rather virtue and merit.

254. In the presence of temptation fully adverted to, it is not lawful

to remain indifferent (neither consenting nor dissenting), since this

without just cause exposes one to the danger (see 258 sqq.) of being

overcome by sin.

255. Resistance to temptation is made by the act of the will which

commands the other powers not to yield and withholds its own consent to

the sin suggested. This resistance may be:

(a) implicit or explicit, according as the dissent is expressed in what

contains it, or is expressed in itself. Examples: Contempt of a

temptation or displeasure over its presence is implicit resistance,

while the resolve never to yield to it is explicit resistance;

(b) internal or external, according as it remains in the will, or is

also exercised by the other powers. Examples: Displeasure over an

uncharitable thought is internal resistance, while the reading of a

book to divert the mind from the thought is external resistance;

(c) indirect or direct, according as the means employed to drive away a

temptation are flight or attack. Examples: One who is disturbed by

thoughts of hatred, resists them indirectly if he goes to the opera in

order to be calmed by music, while he resists them directly, if he

reads prayerfully I Cor. xiii, in order to become more charitable;

(d) virtual or actual, according as the act of dissent made, and not

retracted, is adverted to or not. Examples: If a man rejects a

temptation of envy as soon as he notices it, and repeats this act of

rejection until the temptation has disappeared, his resistance is

actual; if he rejects the temptation once for all as soon as it

appears, but is not able to think of this purpose at each instant, his

resistance was actual at the beginning, but virtual afterwards.

256. General rules regarding resistance to temptation: (a) it is a

grave sin not to resist temptation, when the sin suggested is grave,

the danger of consent serious, and the negligence considerable;

otherwise the sin is venial; (b) negligence is considerable when the

resistance used is not at all in proportion to the temptation. Example:

If a man were suddenly to advert to the fact that a shrewd plan he had

decided on was gravely unjust, he would be seriously negligent if he

put off recalling the decision till he had dwelt more fully on its

appealing features.

257. The kind of resistance to be opposed to temptation depends on the

character and urgency of the temptation and the disposition of the

person tempted. (a) Generally speaking, the more serious the

temptation, the stronger should be the resistance. Example: One who

knows from experience that temptations to hatred overcome him, if he

uses only internal resistance, should make use of external resistance

also. (b) In those cases in which the violence of the temptation

increases in proportion to the strength of the resistance, it is better

that the resistance be internal, indirect, etc. Examples: Temptations

against faith are often overcome more readily by turning the mind away

from the doubts suggested to other matters. Temptations that last a

long time may be conquered more easily by despising them than by

worrying about them and renewing protest after protest. The same is

true as regards temptations against purity.

258. Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in

certain circumstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a)

Danger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given

circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of

mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a

particular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples:

Associating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for

anyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil

associations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate

danger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger

of sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not

morally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded

probability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote

danger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times

relapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.

259. Possibility of sin is the conceivability but unlikelihood that it

will result from a certain set of circumstances. Example: Attention to

business sometimes makes a man avaricious, practices of piety may

degenerate into hypocrisy, etc., but there is no natural connection

between industry and devotion, on the one hand, and greed and

insincerity, on the other hand. Sin follows naturally from its danger,

but only accidentally from its possibility.

260. It is not lawful imprudently to expose oneself to the danger of

sin, since it is manifestly against reason to risk spiritual loss

without cause. The character of the sin of him who does this differs

according to circumstances. (a) He who rashly exposes himself to the

proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become

proximate danger, is guilty of grave sin and of the species of sin to

which he exposes himself--and this even though the sin does not

actually follow. For to love what is so closely related to the sin is

to love the sin itself. (b) He who rashly exposes himself to the remote

danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin is

venially guilty. For, while such action is unreasonable, it does not

imply affection for grave sin.

261. It is lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sin, if this can

be done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities

would follow (e.g., that urgent duties should not be performed, if one

feared they contained the danger of sin). The requirements of prudence

referred to are: (a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of

sin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to

avoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the

good he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves

the danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to

the gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be

employed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use

of the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has

confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.

262. It is lawful to expose oneself to the possibility of sin, for,

since almost every action may be perverted, one who wished to avoid the

possibility of sin would have to leave this world and become confirmed

in grace.

263. The Occasions of Sin are external circumstances--persons, places

or things--which tempt one to sin. Examples: Persons who invite others

to defraud and show how it can be accomplished, theatres where

irreligious plays are staged, books that aim to depreciate virtue, etc.

264. The occasions of sin are of various kinds. (a) They are proximate

or remote, according as it is morally certain, or only likely that they

will lead to sin. (b) Occasions are necessary or free, according as one

is able or not able to abandon them without difficulty. For example,

one who chooses dishonest persons as his associates is in a free

occasion of sin; one who is imprisoned with criminals is in a necessary

occasion of sin. An occasion of sin is also necessary when the

impossibility of leaving it is not physical, but moral. Examples: A

wife who is bound to a provoking husband; a person who cannot give up

an employment that offers many temptations, without suffering great

temporal or spiritual injury, or without incurring a worse condition.

(c) Occasions are present or absent, according as one has the occasion

with him or must go to seek it. Examples; Intoxicants kept in his home

are a present occasion of sin for a drunkard; atheistic lectures are an

absent occasion of sin for one who has to go out to hear them.

265. It is not lawful to remain in a free occasion of sin,, whether it

be present or absent; for to do so is to expose oneself rashly to the

danger of sin (see 258 sqq.).

266. It is not lawful for one who is in a necessary occasion of sin to

neglect means that are adapted to preserve him from the moral contagion

by which he is surrounded; for to neglect spiritual safeguards and

protections in such a case is to refuse to resist temptation (see 252

sqq.). The means that should be used depend on circumstances, but

prayer and firm resolves to avoid sin should be employed in every case.

267. The gravity of the sin committed by one who freely remains in an

occasion of sin, or who does not use the requisite spiritual helps in a

necessary occasion, depends on various factors: (a) if the sin to which

he is tempted is light, he does not sin gravely; (b) if the sin to

which he is tempted is serious, and the occasion is proximate, he sins

gravely; (c) if the occasion is remote, he sins venially.

268. The Motives of Sin.--The purposes that lead men to sin can be

considered as follows: (a) according to the predominant vices of

individual men, which are for them motives for committing their other

sins (particular motives)--e.g., a man whose chief sin is unbelief

and who is led by it to intolerance, blasphemy, despair, etc.; (b)

according to the natural relationship and sequence between sins

themselves, by which some are usually the motives for others _in all

men (general motives)_.

269. The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as

the different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is

impossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin,

on the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that

most often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows:

(a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued

(the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the

views of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved

(the vice of avarice); (d) one’s own good, not sufficiently wished (the

vice of sloth); (e) the neighbor’s good, not suffiviently desired (the

vices of envy and anger).

270. The seven vices mentioned above are usually calle the capital, or

head vices, since the other sins are directed by them just as the other

parts of the body are directed by the head.

271. Among the seven capital vices there are two that have principality

over the others: (a) in the intention of the sinner the motive force

that impels to sin is always some inordinate desire of his own personal

excellence, and hence pride is the beginning of all sin; (b) in the

execution of the sin the opportunity for satisfying every base desire

is afforded by money, and thus avarice is the root of nourishment of

all evils.

272. The Results of Sin.--There are two kinds of sins from the

viewpoint of origin: (a) original sin, which is inherited from Adam by

all his descendants (except Christ and the Blessed Virgin); (b) actual

sin, which is committed by the personal will of each sinner.

273. The immediate consequences of original sin were that Adam lost for

himself and his posterity the gifts of the state of original innocence.

Thus: (a) the soul in subjection to God was endowed with the beauty

of holiness, to which succeeded the deformity of enmity against Him;

(b) the powers of the soul were in harmony, the lower subject to the

higher, but to this succeeded a state of disunion and rebellion and

what are called the four wounds of nature, the intellect and will

becoming prone to error and sin, and the sensitive appetites tending

inordinately towards delights or away from difficulties; (c) the body

which had been in subjection to the soul and endowed with freedom from

suffering and mortality, became burdensome to the soul and subject to

pain and death.

274. The consequences that are common to all sin, both original and

actual, are: (a) the sinner loses the spiritual beauty to which sin is

opposed, and this loss is called the stain of sin, since the soul

defiles itself by inordinate contact with what it loves; (b) the sinner

incurs the debt of punishment, since sin is an injustice against the

internal law of reason and against the external law of God and man.

275. The stain of sin is not: (a) a mere privation or absence of grace,

for otherwise all sins would be the same; nor (b) a mere passing shadow

over the soul, since the bad state of the will can remain after the act

of sin.

276. The stain of sin differs according to the sin. (a) The stain of

original sin is the privation of original justice (i.e., of the

subjection of reason and will to God), as being a voluntary privation

through the will of the first parent Adam; (b) the stain of mortal sin

is the privation of sanctifying grace, as connoting the act of the

individual will through which it was incurred; (c) the stain of venial

sin is the privation of the fervor of charity resulting from the sin,

inasmuch as it, to some extent, hinders the beauty of interior grace

from appearing in external acts.

277. The stain of grave sin is the disfigurement of death, for (a) it

removes the principle of supernatural existence (i.e., grace); (b) it

takes away the principles of supernatural activity (i.e., the infused

habits), though faith and hope may remain; (c) it deprives the soul of

the rights that belong to the spiritually living (i.e., of merits

already acquired).

278. The stain of venial sin is the disfigurement of disease, for (a)

it disposes one for spiritual death (i.e., for mortal sin); (b) it

lessens spiritual vitality, by setting up habits that make the practice

of the virtues more difficult.

279. The penalty of sin is threefold according to the threefold offense

of sin. (a) Inasmuch as sin is against reason, it is punished by

remorse of conscience; (b) inasmuch as it is against ecclesiastical,

civil or other human law, it is punished by man; (c) inasmuch as it is

against divine law, it is punished by God.

280. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its duration. (a)

Grave sin, since it deprives of spiritual life and turns man away from

his Last End, introduces a radical and, of itself, irreparable

disorder, and thus incurs an eternal punishment; those who die in grave

sin will be sentenced to eternal punishment. (b) Venial sin does not

inflict spiritual death, but is a defect or excess, not as regards the

Last End, but as regards the means to the Last End. Thus, it incurs,

not an eternal, but a temporal punishment.

281. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its quality. (a) Sin

by which man turns away from his Last End is punished by the pain of

loss, the deprivation of eternal happiness which was despised. This

pain may be called infinite, inasmuch as it is the loss of Infinite

Good. (b) Sin, in so far as it is an inordinate turning towards created

things, is punished by the pain of sense, which comes through

creatures. This pain is finite.

282. Sin may be a punishment of sin: (a) if a later sin results from a

former sin (e.g., God may permit those who refuse to serve Him, to

become the servants of their passions); (b) if the commission of sin is

accompanied by internal or external sufferings (e.g., the jealous

indulge their vice at the expense of great mental torment).

283. Not all the afflictions that befall mankind are chastisements. In

the strict sense, only those evils are punishments which are inflicted

by the lawgiver against the will of the offender as a vindication of

justice violated by the personal offense of the latter. Hence we must

distinguish punishment from the following: (a) from satisfaction, which

is compensation willingly endured for one’s own sin, or freely offered

for another’s (e.g., David after his repentance performed penance for

his sins; Christ on the cross offered His satisfaction for the human

race); (b) from medicinal afflictions, which are intended, not as

reparations to injured justice, but as remedies to preserve men against

sin or relapse, or to afford them opportunities for progress (e.g., the

calamities of Job, the condition of the man born blind, the dolors of

the Blessed Virgin, the physical evils Which in this world sometimes

happen to subjects as a punishment on their rulers, etc.); (c) from the

natural defects of fallen human nature, such as hunger, thirst,

disease, etc. These are only indirectly the consequences of original

sin, the direct punishment, from which they follow, being the infirmity

and corruption of nature produced by original sin.

Question III

LAW

284. In the previous Question we considered the internal principles of

human acts--that is, habits, good and bad, from which they proceed. Now

we shall turn to the external principles, good and bad, that move one

to one’s acts. The external principle that moves to evil is the demon,

who tempts us to sin; the external principle that moves to good is God,

who instructs us by His law and helps us by His grace to fulfill it.

Temptation has been discussed already, and grace belongs to Dogmatic

Theology; the next Question to be considered, therefore, is Law.

Art. 1: LAW IN GENERAL

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 90-92.)

285. Definition.--Law is an ordinance of the reason for the common good

promulgated by him who has authority in the community.

(a) It is an ordinance, that is, a command or prohibition which has

obligatory and lasting force. Hence, advice is not a law, because not

obligatory; a rule that binds only during the lifetime of the lawgiver

or of those who received it is not strictly a law, because not enduring.

(b) It is an ordinance of the reason, since the rule and standard of

human acts is reason (see 64 sqq.). Hence, the arbitrary will of a

ruler commanding what is against reason would not be law, but rather

iniquity.

(c) It is made for the common good, that is, it must tend to promote,

directly or indirectly, general happiness, which is the end of society.

Hence, the commands of a tyrant which benefit a few at the expense of

public peace and prosperity are not truly laws.

(d) It is made by him who has authority, that is, by the person or

persons who have the lawmaking power according to the form of

government. Hence, the decisions of an advisory body or the decrees of

a usurper are not laws.

(e) It is made by the proper authority in a community, that is, as here

understood, in a self-sufficing community, which has its own means for

attaining its end and is independent in its own order of other

societies. Hence, the regulations made by parents for their family are

not called laws, since the family is not a self-sufficing society.

(f) It is an ordinance that has been promulgated, that is, brought to

the notice of those whom it binds. Hence, a law that has been drawn up

but not published as such, is not obligatory even for those who know of

its existence. A law becomes obligatory, however, as soon as it has

been promulgated, and the presumption then is that the law is known;

but he who is inculpably ignorant is not guilty of formal sin if he

breaks the law.

286. Division.--According as the immediate lawgiver is God or man, laws

are divine or human. Divine laws are threefold: (a) the eternal law is

the ordinance of the divine mind which from eternity has directed the

motions and actions of all creatures for the common good of the

universe; (b) the natural law is the light of man’s reason as an

impression and reflection of the eternal law; (c) the positive divine

law is that which God of His free will has added to the natural law,

viz., the Mosaic law under the Old Testament and the law of the Gospel

under the New Testament.

287. Human laws are ecclesiastical or civil according to the authority

from which they originate.

288. Collision of Laws.--Not infrequently it happens that opposite laws

seem to call for fulfillment at the same time, as, when in case of

unjust attack it seems that one is bound to defend oneself and bound

not to injure the other party. Hence arises a conflict of obligations

and rights. But the difficulty is only apparent; for, since God is a

just and wise lawgiver, He does not intend either that one should be

held to impossibilities, or that a superior obligation should yield to

one that is inferior. Hence, the rule in such cases of apparent

collision of laws is:

(a) if a person can recognize which of the two obligations is superior,

he is bound to follow that one; (b) if he is unable to discover after

careful examination which obligation has the greater claim, and must

decide at once, he may decide for the law whose observance seems to him

safer; or, if he sees no difference as regards safety, he may decide

for either as he wishes. If the decision is wrong, the error is

involuntary, and hence not imputable as sin.

289. When the contending precepts belong to different categories of

law, the higher law must be followed. (a) The natural law has

precedence over the positive law, divine or human. For example, the

natural law of self-preservation allowed David to eat the loaves of

proposition, a thing forbidden by the positive divine law. The same law

of self-preservation allows a starving man to take what does not belong

to him according to human laws, if it is necessary for his life. The

same law of self-preservation excuses one from assisting at Mass, if

one is very ill.

(b) The positive divine law has precedence over human law. Example: The

command of Christ to his Apostles to preach His Name was to be obeyed

rather than the command of the Sanhedrin to the contrary (Acts, v. 19).

(c) The ecclesiastical law has precedence over civil law, for the end

of the Church is higher than that of the State, and the Church’s

judgment about the means to her end should prevail.

290. The precedence of ecclesiastical over civil law does not mean that

the Church has the right to interfere in matters that belong to the

jurisdiction of the State, or that the Church should insist on settling

every dispute by its own action alone.

(a) A law on matters purely civil and political made by the Church in

opposition to a law of the State would not prevail over the latter,

for, as the Church admits, “whatever is to be ranged under the civil

and political order is rightly subject to the civil authority” (Leo

XIII).

(b) A law on matters directly or indirectly spiritual, made by the

Church but not necessary to her end, can be made the subject of

negotiation or even of compromise by the Church in order to avoid a

conflict of laws; in fact, the Church has shown her willingness to make

concessions, where possible, for the common peace and happiness.

291. When contending laws belong to the same category of laws, the more

important, or more urgent, or more necessary law prevails.

(a) The law that defends greater goods (those that are spiritual,

internal, or common) has precedence over the law that defends lesser

goods (the temporal, external, or private). Examples: The natural law

that one must save oneself from persecution and death yields to the

natural law that one must not blaspheme or deny God, and hence one must

prefer to die rather than blaspheme. The law that one may not expose

one’s life to danger yields to the law that the common welfare must be

defended; hence, citizens are obliged to go to war when the nation

calls, pastors and physicians to remain at their posts in time of

pestilence, disaster, etc.

(b) Obligations of justice have precedence over obligations of charity,

for in the former case a stricter right is in question. Example: Titus

is keeping $5.00 in order to pay a debt to Caius, who needs the money

today; Balbus, who is very poor, asks Titus to give the money to him.

Titus should pay Caius.

(c) Negative or prohibitory laws have precedence over affirmative or

preceptive laws (see 371). Example: Titus is asked to write out a

testimonial stating that he knows that Balbus is honest, competent,

etc. Balbus has claims on the help of Titus on account of a promise

made in the past; but Titus knows very well that Balbus is not

competent, honest, etc. The law forbidding lies prevails here over the

law that one keep a promise made.

292. Since rights and duties are correlative--there being a duty that

corresponds to every right, and vice versa--and since both are

regulated by law, the principles given for the apparent collision of

laws can be applied to the apparent collision of rights.

(a) Rights of a higher kind have preference over rights of a lower

kind. Therefore, the rights that arise from birth itself, or from the

fact that one is a human being (e.g., the right to life), are superior

to the rights that are acquired through some condition, such as

inheritance or contract (e.g., the right to property, etc.). Example:

Titus must get his child, who is in danger of death, to a hospital

without delay. Balbus is getting ready for a pleasure ride, but Titus

takes his car since there is no other ready means of getting to the

hospital. Titus acts within his natural rights, if the car is returned

safely and as soon as possible to the owner. According to civil law his

act would be technical larceny, but in view of the necessity courts and

juries would certainly not insist on the letter of the law.

(b) Inalienable rights (i.e., those which one may not renounce, because

they are also duties), such as the right to serve God, the right to

live, etc., are superior to alienable rights (i.e., those which one may

renounce), such as the right to marry, the right to own property, etc.

Example: One may surrender the right to drink intoxicants in order to

serve God or preserve one’s life.

293. The Basis of All Laws.--Prior to every other law and the ground

and principle of all laws is the Eternal Law; for, since this is the

plan of Divine Wisdom directing from eternity all acts and movements to

their particular ends and to the end of the universe, it follows that

all other laws are reflections of the eternal plan and realizations of

the divine decree. The Eternal Law differs from other laws in various

ways:

(a) as to duration. The Eternal Law existed before anything was made,

whereas all other laws begin to exist when they are promulgated;

(b) as to breadth of application. The Eternal Law regulates, not only

contingent things (such as actions) but also necessary things (such as

that man should have a soul, hands and feet); for all things created,

whether they be contingent or necessary, are subject to divine

government. Human laws, as is evident, cannot regulate what is

necessary (e.g., it would be foolish for them to decree that men must

or must not have souls);

(c) as to subjects. The Eternal Law rules, not only rational creatures

(i.e., angels and men), but also irrational creatures, such as matter,

plants, and animals. The former are ruled through commands, which

require that they direct themselves to their End; the latter are ruled

through the inclinations given them by God, which move them to the ends

He desires them to attain. Human laws cannot regulate the acts of

irrational creatures, for these creatures cannot understand a command

as such, and man cannot give them natural inclinations (e.g., it would

be foolish to make a law for cats against the catching of birds).

294. The laws to be considered in the pages that follow are temporal

and moral. Thus: (a) they are laws promulgated at some particular time,

either from the beginning of humanity (as is the case with the Natural

Law) or later (e.g., the Mosaic Law, the Christian Law, etc,); (b) they

are laws regulating, not the necessary (as is the case with

metaphysical or mathematical laws), but the contingent; (c) they are

laws given, not to the irrational creature (as is the case with

physical and biological laws), but to the rational, that it may attain

its end through self-government in accordance with law.

Art. 2: THE NATURAL LAW

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 93, 94.)

295. Meaning.--The Natural Law is so called for the following reasons:

(a) it is received by man, not through special promulgation, but along

with his rational nature. Hence, St. Paul says that the Gentiles, who

had not received the laws specially promulgated, were a law unto

themselves, that is, through their rational nature (Rom., ii. 14); (b)

it includes only such precepts as can be known or deduced from the very

nature of man, and thus some pagans fulfilled the Law of Moses

naturally, i.e., as regards its natural precepts (Rom., ii. 14); (c) it

can be known from the natural light of reason without instruction,

being a law written on the heart of man (Rom, ii. 15).

The Natural Law is defined theologically as a participation of the

Eternal Law in man. Three elements constitute its essence in its

integrity: (a) a passive participation of the Eternal Law consisting in

man’s nature and faculties with their inclinations to their proper acts

and ends. This man shares with all creatures. (b) an active

participation in the Eternal Law proper to man. This consists in the

activity of man’s intellect through which he shares in God’s providence

and government in a special way as one who can rule himself and others.

Reason, reflecting upon the natural inclinations and ordering them to

their proper acts and ends, formulates (c) a dictate or command of the

practical reason. This command constitutes the essence of Natural Law.

“Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm, IV. 6): _Offer up the

sacrifice of justice_, as though some one asked what the works of

justice are, adds: _Many say, Who showeth us good things_, in answer to

which he says: _The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon

us_. Thus the Psalmist implies that the light of natural reason,

whereby we discern what is good and bad, which is the function of the

Natural Law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light.

It is therefore evident that the Natural Law is nothing else than the

rational creature’s participation in the eternal law” (_Summa Theol_.

I-II, q. 91, a.2).

296. Relation of the Natural Law to Other Laws.-(a) The Natural Law is

inferior to the Eternal Law; for, while the Eternal Law exists in the

mind of God, underived from any other law and is regulative of all

created things, the Natural Law exists in the mind of man, as a

derivation and image of the Eternal Law and a rule for man’s acts only.

(b) It is superior to Positive Law, for all Positive Law is a deduction

from or a determination of Natural Law.

297. Division.--Since Natural Law is the reflection of the eternal plan

of Divine Wisdom in the reason of man, we cannot distinguish different

species of it according to difference of lawgivers or subjects. The

objects regulated are, however, different; and hence we may distinguish

various precepts of Natural Law.

(a) According to the difference of persons to whom natural duties are

owed, there are natural laws concerning God (e.g., that God must be

honored), natural laws concerning self (e.g., that one must not commit

suicide), and natural laws concerning the neighbor (e.g., that

injustice must not be done).

(b) According to the difference of natural inclinations in man, there

are, first, natural laws common to him with all beings (e.g., the law

of self-preservation, and hence it is a natural duty of man to take

sleep, food, drink, remedies, etc., as necessary for life); secondly,

natural laws common to him with all sentient beings or animals (e.g.,

the law of preservation of the species, and hence it is a natural duty

of man to rear and provide for his children); thirdly, natural laws

proper to man as a rational being (e.g., the laws that he should

cultivate his powers of mind and will, and hence it is a natural duty

of man to further religion and education, and to organize into

societies and to respect the rights of others).

298. According to their necessity for the primary or the secondary end

of a natural inclination, the laws of nature are divided into primary

and secondary. (a) The primary end of a natural inclination is the

conservation of a natural good; and so it is a primary law of nature

that man should take the food, drink, sleep and exercise necessary for

life, and that he should avoid poison or other things that cause death.

(b) The secondary end of a natural inclination is the betterment of a

natural good, or its easier conservation; thus, it is a secondary law

of nature that man should use those kinds of food or drink that promote

his health, that he should be careful about his diet, practise

moderation, etc.

299. Primary and secondary laws of nature are also explained as

follows: (a) a primary law is one that expresses the principal purpose

of a natural inclination (e.g., social good, that is, the begetting and

rearing of children, is the primary law of the married state); (b) the

secondary law is one that expresses a less important purpose of a

natural inclination. For example, individual good (i.e., companionship,

mutual assistance, the practice of virtue and freedom from temptation)

is the secondary purpose to be promoted in the married state.

300. Precepts of the Natural Law may be divided also on account of the

different relations they have to one another or to our knowledge.

(a) According to the priority they have among themselves, the laws of

nature are divided into the first principle and the secondary

principles. The first principle, which is general, which depends on no

other, and which is the root of all the others, is: “Good must be done,

evil omitted.” The secondary principles are particular, and they apply

this general principle to the natural inclinations of man mentioned

above, which reason indicates as ends of action--i.e., as goods to be

sought.

(b) According to the priority they have with respect to our knowledge

of them, the laws of nature are divided, first, into axiomatic

precepts, which are evident and are granted by all (e.g., that good is

to be done, that one should follow reason, that one should not do to

others what one does not wish done to oneself etc.), and, secondly,

into inferred precepts (e.g., that one should not steal from others, as

one does not wish others to steal from oneself).

301. The inferred precepts are also of two kinds, namely, general and

particular. (a) The general precepts are those that are deduced

immediately from the axioms as universal conclusions (e.g., the

commandments of the Decalogue, the principle that one should return

what one borrowed). (b) The particular precepts are those that are

deduced only remotely from the axioms as conclusions about cases in

which many particular conditions and circumstances are involved (e.g.,

many conclusions about contracts, the conclusion that a loan is to be

paid in some particular way, at this particular time, etc.).

302. According to the invariability or permanence of their

subject-matter, the laws of nature are of two kinds, namely, necessary

and contingent. (a) The necessary laws are those whose matter always

bears the same relation of essential conformity to or difformity from

reason. For example, the command, “Thou shalt not take the name of the

Lord in vain,” is necessary, because God remains always worthy of

honor, and there is no conceivable or possible case in which it could

become useful to speak of Him with dishonor. (b) The contingent laws of

nature are those whose matter generally, but not always, bears the same

essential relation to right reason. For example, the command, “Thou

shalt not kill,” is contingent, because, though man generally remains

worthy of having his life respected by others, there are cases when it

might be injurious to the common welfare, and hence to natural law,

that an individual be permitted to live, as when he has committed and

been convicted of a capital crime.

303. According to the manner in which they oblige, the laws of nature

are twofold, namely, absolute and relative. (a) Absolute laws are those

that oblige for every case and condition, because the matter with which

they are concerned is intrinsically good or bad in every instance

(e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between parent and child, the law

against polyandry). (b) Relative laws of nature are those that oblige

except in case of a most grave public necessity, because the matter

with which they are concerned is generally and of its very nature

becoming or unbecoming (e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between

brother and sister, the law forbidding polygamy).

304. According to the manner in which the obligation is contracted,

laws of nature are of two kinds, viz., those whose obligatory force

depends entirely on the nature of things (e.g., the law that God must

be honored), and those whose obligatory force depends upon, an act of

the will of man freely undertaking an obligation, which the nature of

things then demands that he fulfill (e.g., the laws that those who have

made vows, oaths, contracts, etc., should live up to that which they

have freely promised).

305. Properties.--Since the Natural Law is the reflection of God’s

Eternal Law impressed on the rational nature of man, it has the

following properties: (a) it is both declarative and imperative; being

immanent in man, it declares to him his duty; being transcendent in its

origin, it speaks with the voice of authority; (b) it is universal, or

for all, for it declares the necessities of nature, which are the same

in all men; (c) it is unchangeable, that is, it admits of neither

abrogation, nor dispensation, nor emendatory interpretation, for the

essences of things, on which it is based, do not change; (d) it is

recognizable and indelible, that is, it cannot fail to be known and

cannot be forgotten by mankind, for it is promulgated through the light

of reason given to man.

306. The Natural Law is of universal obligation. It is in force in all

places, at all times, and for all persons. (a) Thus, those who have not

the use of reason, such as infants and the insane, are subject to the

Natural Law on account of their human nature which is injured by any

transgression of its inclinations. Their ignorance, of course, excuses

them from formal sin (see 24 sqq., 97 sqq.). Example: It is sinful to

induce or permit children to blaspheme or become intoxicated, not only

because of scandal or of harm done to them, but also because such

things are necessarily repugnant to their dignity as human beings. (b)

those who have the use of reason are subject to the Natural Law, and

their transgressions are imputable as formal sins and incur the debt of

punishment.

307. The Natural Law is unchangeable, not as regards additions, but as

regards subtractions. (a) Additions may be made to the Natural Law,

for, in many points not determined by it, it is well that supplementary

regulations be made to provide for particular situations. These

additions, made by Positive Law, divine and human, are amplifications

rather than changes, for they must not be out of harmony with Natural

Law. (b) Subtractions may not be made from the Natural Law--that is,

there can be no exception when it declares that a certain thing must

always be observed, and there can be no abrogation when it declares

that a certain thing must be observed usually.

308. From the foregoing it follows that no precept of the Natural Law

can be abrogated--that is, repealed and deprived of all force, so that

what was today a precept of nature should no longer be such tomorrow;

for the necessities of nature on which the Natural Law is based do not

change.

309. As to the question whether any precepts of the Natural Law may be

dispensed or not, distinction must be made between two kinds of

dispensation.

(a) A dispensation in the strict sense is granted when a legislator

relaxes for a particular case the obligation of a law, although the

subject-matter of the law still remains. Example: Titus is in the class

of those who are bound by the law of fast, but he is exempted by

competent authority from the obligation of the law.

(b) A dispensation in the wide sense is granted when the subject-matter

of the law is taken away by the legislator himself or by another, so

that it ceases to be comprehended under the law, although the

obligation of the law still remains. Example: Balbus owed money to

Caius, but, as Caius forgave him the debt, he is no longer in the class

of those who are bound by law as debtors to Caius; he is not exempted,

however, from the obligation of the general law that one must pay one’s

debts.

310. There are various opinions as to the possibility of a dispensation

from the Natural Law granted by God, but the following doctrine seems

the most probable.

(a) God Himself cannot dispense in any way from those precepts whose

matter is necessary (see 302), such as axiomatic precepts (viz., those

that prohibit malice and those that command duties to be fulfilled at a

proper time and place). For all the subject-matter of these precepts is

intrinsically either consonant with or dissonant from right reason.

Example: God could not by decree abolish the Ten Commandments, for, as

long as God is God, He must remain worthy of worship, praise and love;

and, as long as man is man, it must be against his rational nature to

murder, steal, lie. etc.

(b) God cannot grant a dispensation in the strict sense from those

precepts of the Natural Law whose matter is contingent, such as the

precepts against the taking of human life, against taking possessions

from others against their will, etc. For, as long as the subject-matter

of these precepts remains what it is supposed to be by the law,

transgression of them is necessarily opposed to reason. Example: God

cannot command the killing of a person who has the right to life, nor

the taking of property that rightly belongs to another.

(c) God can grant a dispensation in the wide sense from contingent

precepts of the Natural Law--that is, He can make a change as regards

the subject-matter, so that it no longer falls under the law. Thus,

since God is the supreme Lord of life and property, He can without

injury to human rights command that a person be put to death or

deprived of his property by another. These acts would not constitute

murder (i.e., unjust homicide) or stealing (i.e., unlawful taking); for

God has a higher claim on life and possessions than the immediate

owners have. Examples: The command to Abraham to kill his son was not a

dispensation from the law against murder any more than the sending of

death to the first-born of Egypt was the commission of murder by God.

The command given the Israelites to carry away with them the goods of

the Egyptians was not a dispensation from the law against theft, any

more than the destruction of the fruits of the Egyptians by plagues was

the commission of theft by God.

311. Is God able to make a decree which sets up a most grave public

necessity opposed to the observance of a law of nature?

(a) If there is question of absolute laws (see 303), this cannot be

done, for God cannot deny Himself by making a disposition contrary to

His Eternal Law. Example: We do not read that God ever sanctioned

polyandry or marriage between parent and child, and it seems that He

could never permit such things as lawful.

(b) If there is question of relative laws (see 303), the decree in

question can be made by God; for the unbecomingness of that which is

forbidden by a relative law passes away in the face of a great need.

Example: Since God desired the propagation of the human race from one

man and one woman, marriage between brothers and sisters was not

against the Natural Law at the beginning. Since God desired the speedy

multiplication of the chosen people after the patriarchal era, polygamy

was not repugnant to nature among the Jews of that period.

312. Is God able to remove a natural obligation in a case of private

necessity, that is, when the fulfillment would be harmful to an

individual?

(a) Natural obligations that do not depend upon any free consent of the

will given to them (see 304) cannot be removed except by a dispensation

widely so-called and when their matter is contingent (as explained in

309-310). Examples: God could not dispense an individual from the duty

of confessing Him in order to escape death, for the subject-matter of

the law here is necessary. God, could dispense an individual from the

obligation of not taking the property of another, for God is the

principal owner of all things, including those possessed by others.

(b) Natural obligations that depend upon the act or deed of human

beings consenting to obligation (see 304) can be removed. For since

human beings cannot know all the circumstances existent, or all the

conditions that will arise, it can happen that a thing agreed to or

promised is only seemingly good, or will change from good to bad, so

that while the promise or agreement made is in itself good and

naturally obligatory, its fulfillment would work harm and evil, or be

useless, or would prevent the accomplishment of a greater good. It is

reasonable, therefore, that God should release from obligation here,

thus changing the subject-matter of the law, so that it is no longer

comprehended under the law (see 309-310). Example: Titus vows or swears

that he will give a certain alms or make a certain pilgrimage; but,

when the time for fulfillment arrives, his circumstances have so

changed that it would not be advisable for him to keep the promise

made. The Church, acting in the name of God, can declare that the

subject-matter of this promise has become harmful and is not longer

suitable, and hence that the obligation has ceased.

313. Human Authority and Modification of the Natural Law.

(a) Additions to the Natural Law may be made, not only by positive laws

of God, but also by human laws of Church or State, through the

introduction of that which Natural Law permits, or the determination or

confirmation of that which Natural Law contains implicitly or

explicitly. Examples: Division of property rights introduced by the law

of nations; conditions for valid contracts determined by particular

codes; the laws against theft and murder confirmed by definite

penalties prescribed for those crimes.

(b) Subtractions from Natural Law cannot be made by any human

authority, for God has not delegated His power of dispensing which He

has as supreme owner of all things. Examples: No human authority could

authorize a father to sacrifice his innocent son, nor permit a servant

to carry away the effects that belong to his employer.

314. Apparent Cases of Dispensation from Natural Law made by Human

Authority. (a) The Church frees from the obligation of vows, contracts

and promissory oaths, from impediments to marriage, from espousals,

etc. In so doing, however, she does not dispense from the Natural Law

that vows, contracts, etc., should be fulfilled, but only declares in

the name of God that the subject-matter of an obligation contracted by

act of man’s will has become unsuitable for vow, contract, etc., and

hence is no longer comprehended under the law.

(b) Societies or private individuals can free from the obligation of

paying or returning to them what they have a right to, as when a

creditor forgives a debt, or an owner permits a thief to keep what he

stole. In so doing, however, they do not dispense from the law of

nature that one should pay one’s debts and not keep ill-gotten goods;

they only change the quality of the things in question so that they

cease to be due another or ill-gotten, and hence no longer fall under

the law. This differs, too, from the dispensation that God can grant;

for He can transfer rights without the consent of the immediate owner

(see 310).

315. Interpretation--that is, explanation of the law which indicates

whether or not it obliges in a particular case--may be applied to the

Natural Law as follows:

(a) Interpretation which explains the intention the lawgiver had in

making the law and the sense he gave to the words of the law (verbal

interpretation), may be made when either a law itself is not entirely

clear, or some person is not clever enough to see its meaning. Example:

The commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” needs to be interpreted, for it

does not forbid every kind of killing.

(b) Interpretation which explains the intention a lawgiver would have

had, had he foreseen a particular case in which his law would be

harmful, and which therefore sets the will of the lawgiver against the

words of the law (emendatory interpretation, _epieikeia_), may not be

applied to the Natural Law; for God, unlike human legislators, foresees

things not only in general, but also in particular, and hence there is

no room for correction or benign interpretation of natural laws.

Example: Titus, who was a chronic invalid, committed suicide in order

that his family might be freed from distress. He argued that the Fifth

Commandment did not foresee the difficulties of earning a living under

modern conditions, and that his sacrifice would be pleasing to God.

Titus did not reason well, for suicide is forbidden for motives that

apply universally (e.g., that society, and especially one’s family, are

injured by the act of suicide).

316. Verbal interpretation of the Natural Law is made as follows: (a)

by private authority--that is, by those who are competent, on account

of learning and prudence, to understand the meaning of the law, such as

moral theologians; (b) by public authority--that is, by those who are

appointed to rule, with the prerogative of declaring the meaning of the

Natural Law. The Pope, since he must feed the flock of Christ, is

divinely constituted to interpret Natural Law, and does so

authentically and infallibly. Thus, the Church declares that certain

matrimonial impediments are natural, and therefore incapable of being

dispensed.

On the competence of the Church to give authoritative interpretations

of the natural law in the field of morals, Pius XII has spoken clearly

and forcefully: “... it must openly and firmly be held that the power

of the Church has never been limited to the boundaries of strictly

religious matters’ as they are called; but the whole content of the

natural law, its institution, interpretation and application are within

its power insofar as its moral element is concerned. For the

observation of the natural law, by the ordination of God, is the way by

which man must strive to attain his supernatural end. On the road to

this supernatural end. it is the Church that is his leader and guide.

This is the way the Apostles acted, and from the earliest times the

Church held to this way of acting as it does today--and not in the

manner of a private leader and counselor, but from the command and

authority of God” (AAS 46 [1954] 671-672).

317. From the foregoing it follows that the Natural Law is so

unchangeable that it cannot be abrogated or properly dispensed, or

given an emendatory interpretation. But, though the law itself remains,

there are cases in which non-observance of it is excused from guilt.

These cases can be reduced to physical and moral impossibility.

(a) In cases of physical impossibility (i.e., when the powers requisite

for observance are wanting), one is manifestly excused; for law is

reasonable, and it is not reasonable to require impossibilities.

Examples: Infants are not guilty of sin against the Natural Law, when

they do not pray; for they lack the use of reason, which is presupposed

by the notion of prayer. He who is unable to work is not obliged to

earn support for relatives.

(b) In cases of moral impossibility (i.e., when a law cannot be kept

without the infringement of a higher law or the loss of a higher good),

one is also excused; for it is unreasonable to prefer the less to the

more important. Example: Titus lends a revolver to Balbus. Later he

asks that it be returned to him, as he wishes to kill himself. Now,

property is less valuable than life, and hence Balbus is unable in this

case to observe the law which requires that things borrowed must be

returned.

318. Moral impossibility is also defined as the inability to observe

the law without serious injury or loss to oneself or a third party.

Serious injuries are such as deprive some one of great goods, such as

the use of reason, life, knowledge, friendship, health, reputation,

property. Serious losses are such as prevent one from obtaining notable

goods, The following rules indicate when grave inconvenience excuses,

and when it does not excuse, from the guilt arising from the

non-observance of Natural Law:

(a) when the law is negative (i.e., prohibitory), no inconvenience

excuses from sin; for that which is forbidden by the Natural Law is

always morally evil, and hence more to be shunned than even the

greatest physical evil, or death. Example: One is obliged, under grave

or light sin, as the case may be, to forfeit all temporal goods rather

than blaspheme, murder, lie, etc.;

(b) when the law is affirmative (or mandatory), an inconvenience which,

all things considered, is really and relatively grave, excuses from

sin; for that which is commanded by the Natural Law is not always

morally obligatory, but only at the right time and in the right

circumstances (see 371), and hence its omission is not always morally

evil. Examples: Sempronius vowed that he would go on foot to a place of

pilgrimage, but when the day came he had a sprained ankle that would be

badly injured if he walked. Caius received a jewel stolen from Balbus

and promised that he would return it at once to the owner, but he finds

that he cannot do so now without danger, either of the arrest of

himself or of the one who took the jewel. Titus sees a person who has

been seriously injured lying by the roadside, but he is tired, and

neither gives help himself nor summons aid. In the first two cases the

inconvenience is grave, and hence Sempronius may ride to the place of

pilgrimage, and Caius may return the jewel to Balbus later; but the

inconvenience of Titus is slight, and does not excuse him from sin.

319. Just as the Natural Law is unchangeable, because based on the

unchangeable Eternal Law instituting the nature of man, so is it easily

knowable, because it is promulgated by the light of reason. Hence: (a)

invincible ignorance of the entire Natural Law is impossible in any

person who has the use of reason; (b) complete forgetfulness of the

Natural Law by mankind is impossible.

320. Those who have not the use of reason, either habitually (as

children and the insane) or actually (as the intoxicated), may be

invincibly ignorant of the Natural Law--for example, they may be unable

to perceive even the difference between right and wrong. As to those

who have the use of reason, they can be ignorant of the Natural Law

only as follows:

(a) they cannot ever be invincibly ignorant of the most general

precepts (such as “good is to be done,” “evil is to be avoided”), for

since they know the difference between right and wrong, they must also

perceive that which is contained in the concepts of right and wrong,

viz., that the former is something desirable and which ought to be

done, the latter something undesirable which must not be done;

(b) one cannot, as a rule, be invincibly ignorant of those precepts

that are immediately inferred as necessary conclusions from the most

general precepts (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned”),

for the conclusion follows so easily from the manifest principle that

only in exceptional cases could one be excused for not knowing its

truth;

(c) one can, even as a rule, be ignorant of precepts that are inferred

as necessary but very remote conclusions from the most general

precepts, (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned at such a

time or place, or in such a manner or condition”), for this conclusion

is so far removed from its premise, and there are so many factors to be

considered, that considerable knowledge and skill in reasoning are

required for a correct judgment--things in which many people are

lacking.

321. The Commandments of the Decalogue follow directly from the most

general precepts of the Natural Law, and so to them may be applied what

was said in the previous paragraph. Hence: (a) generally speaking, no

person who has the use of reason can be invincibly ignorant of the

Commandments. St. Paul blames the pagans as inexcusable in various sins

committed against the Decalogue; (b) in special cases, a person who has

the use of reason can be invincibly ignorant of one or more

Commandments; for while the Commandments may be easily inferred by most

persons from the common principles of right and wrong, there are

sometimes involuntary impediments that hinder the right employment of

reason. Thus, children and older persons whose mentality is

undeveloped, although they know the difference between right and wrong,

are frequently unable to draw the conclusion that follows from it

(e.g., that one should not tell lies).

322. The Commandments regarding which invincible ignorance may most

easily exist are: (a) those that deal with merely internal acts, for

the malice of violating them is less apparent. Hence, many theologians

admit that even among Christians the wickedness of sinful thoughts and

desires may be inculpably unknown, at least when the wickedness of the

corresponding external acts is also not known; (b) those that deal with

the control of sensuality, for the impulse to inordinate acts is at

times most vehement. Unde theologi sunt qui affirmant malitiam

peccatorum externorum contra sextum invincibiliter ignorari posse, non

solum apud infideles, sed etiam apud Christianos, ita quod ab

adolescentibus facile ad tempus ignorari possit malitia mollitiei.

323. If a Commandment be applied to some particular case in which there

are many circumstances to be considered, or some reason that appears to

change the subject-matter of the law, even adults who have the perfect

use of reason may be invincibly ignorant; for in such instances we are

considering, not an immediate, but a remote conclusion from the general

principles of Natural Law.

(a) If the case is difficult relatively (i.e., in view of the training

or lack of education of the person studying it), there can be

invincible ignorance, at least for a time. Examples: Jepthe, according

to St. Jerome, appears to have been invincibly ignorant that it was not

lawful for him to slay his daughter. Being a soldier and living in a

rude age, he perhaps did not appreciate the sacredness of human life.

Unlettered persons might conceivably think in good faith that it is not

wrong to commit perjury in order to help one in danger, to steal in

order to pay debts, to think evil if there is no intention to fulfill

it, to do what the majority do or what is tolerated, etc.

(b) If the case is difficult absolutely (i.e., in view of the matter

itself, which is complicated and obscure), there can be invincible

ignorance, even for a long time. Thus, it is so difficult to settle

many problems pertaining to justice (i.e., to the application of the

Seventh Commandment) that we find professional theologians who take

opposite sides, or admit that, speculatively speaking, they do not know

where the truth lies.

324. The Natural Law can never be erased from the hearts of men. (a) In

abnormal circumstances only, as when the general power of reasoning has

been weakened or lost, can the Natural Law be forgotten. Thus, to a

degenerate who becomes violently insane murder and other crimes may

appear as good acts. But no community could govern itself by the

standards of madmen and long survive. (b) In normal circumstances

(i.e., as long as the general power of reasoning remains unimpaired),

the Natural Law cannot be forgotten, as far as its general principles

or immediate conclusions are concerned, although it may be overlooked

or lost sight of when it is applied to particular cases, or when remote

conclusions are deduced from it.

325. As long, therefore, as a body of men remain sane, even though they

be uncivilized or addicted to crime, they cannot become oblivious of

the Natural Law. (a) The general principles (“good is to be done,”

“evil is to be avoided”) cannot vanish from the mind, although, in

particular affairs, anger, pleasure, or some other passion may prevent

men from thinking about them. Thus, when the mob spirit takes hold of a

crowd, it becomes intent only on violence or revenge, and gives no

thought to conscience. (b) The secondary precepts, such as those

contained in the Decalogue, cannot be obliterated from the mind,

although in applying them to concrete situations a people may go astray.

There are many examples of laws, both ancient and modern, which

permitted or commanded, for particular cases, things contrary to the

current application of natural precepts. Thus, the Spartans and the

Romans ordered the murder of infants who were weakly and of slaves

whose master had been killed. Some ancient races encouraged robberies

committed beyond the boundaries of the states, and savage tribes have

been found who had the practice of putting to death parents who were

aged or infirm.

326. The causes of wrong applications of the Natural Law are the

following:

(a) Some causes are involuntary. Thus, the correct application may be

difficult, as when more than one moral principle has to be considered

and applied; or, if the case is not difficult, the person who makes the

application may be mentally undeveloped, or his mind may be blinded on

account of his bad education or environment. Examples: The races who

saw no infamy in robbery committed against their neighbors, lived in a

wild age when such acts of violence seemed necessary as measures of

self-protection. The savage killed his aged parents, because to his

untutored mind this seemed an act of mercy.

(b) Some causes are voluntary, such as neglect of the truth, vicious

habits, etc. Examples: St. Paul blames the pagans for their idolatry,

because they had darkened their own minds about God. Pirates and

bandits who came to regard violence as necessary for their own defense

were responsible for their state of mind, inasmuch as they had chosen a

life of crime.

327. Transgression of Natural Law, therefore, is not imputable as

formal sin if it is not voluntary. Hence: (a) lack of knowledge

excuses, when ignorance is involuntary (e.g., those who have not the

use of reason, as infants and the unconscious; children and others

mentally undeveloped who cannot grasp the meaning of some precept;

educated persons who are unable to get a right solution of some knotty

problem of morals, etc.); (b) lack of consent excuses in whole or in

part (as when one acts through fear).

Art. 3: THE POSITIVE DIVINE LAW

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 98-108.)

328. Meaning.--The Positive Divine Law is the law added by God to the

Natural Law, in order to direct the actions of man to his supernatural

End, to assist him to a better observance of the Natural Law, and to

perfect that which is wanting in human law.

(a) The Last End of man is not natural, but supernatural (see 20), and

hence it was necessary that, in addition to the precepts which guide

man towards his natural beatitude, there should be added precepts that

will guide him towards his supernatural beatitude: “The Law of the Lord

gives wisdom to little ones” (Ps. xviii. 8).

(b) The light of natural reason was sufficient to instruct man in the

Natural Law, but through sin that light had become obscured, with the

result that evil customs set in, and very many were at a loss how to

apply the Natural Law, or applied it wrongly. Hence, it was most

suitable that the Natural Law should be summed up in brief commandments

and given externally by the authority of God. This was done through the

Decalogue, which is a part of the Positive Divine Law of both the

Mosaic and the Christian dispensations: “The testimony of the Lord is

faithful” (Ps. xviii. 8).

(c) Human laws are the product of fallible human judgment; they can

direct only such acts as are external, and they are unable to forbid or

punish many evil deeds. Hence, it was necessary that there should be

positive divine laws to supply for what is wanting in human law: “The

law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls” (Ps. xviii. 8).

329. The Positive Divine Law differs from the Natural Law as to

subject-matter, permanence, and manner of promulgation.

(a) The precepts of the Natural Law are necessary, since they follow as

necessary consequences from the nature of man, the precepts of the

Positive Law of God, excluding those that are external promulgations of

the Natural Law, are not necessary, since they follow from the free

decree of God raising man to that which is above his nature.

(b) The precepts of the Natural Law are unchangeable, since the nature

of man always remains the same. Of the precepts of the Positive Law of

God some were changed, because given only for a time (such as the

ceremonial laws of Judaism); others, absolutely speaking, could be

changed, because not necessarily connected with the end God has in view

(e.g., the laws concerning Sacraments).

(c) The precepts of both kinds of law are immediately from God; but the

Natural Law is promulgated only in a general way, through the light of

reason given to man along with his nature, while the Positive Law of

God is proclaimed by special commands (e.g., “thou shalt not steal”).

330. The Positive Divine Law contains two kinds of precepts, viz.,

natural and supernatural commandments. (a) The natural precepts were

given in order to recall to the minds of men the laws knowable through

reason which had become obscured through passion, custom or example.

The Commandments given to Moses on the tablets of stone renewed the

natural precepts which God had written through reason on the hearts of

men. (b) The supernatural precepts were given in order to point out to

men the duties their supernatural destiny imposed. Example: The

precepts of faith, hope, charity.

331. Division.--There are four historical states of man with reference

to his Last End, and to each of these correspond positive divine laws.

(a) The state of Original Innocence is that which existed in Paradise

before the Fall. Man had been raised to the supernatural state, and

hence he was obliged to the supernatural acts of faith, hope, charity,

etc.; he was subject to God, both as to body and soul, and hence he was

obliged to offer some kind of external sacrifice; he was sanctified

immediately by God, and hence was not bound to the use of any

sacraments; but he was still in a state of probation, and was subject

to various special regulations, such as the commands to avoid the fruit

of a certain tree, to labor in Eden, etc.

(b) The state of the Law of Nature is that which existed from the Fall

to the giving of the written law through Moses. It is called the state

of the Law of Nature, not in the sense that there were no supernatural

precepts then in force, but in the sense that there were as yet no

written precepts. In that period man knew the Natural Law, not from

commandments written on tablets of stone, but from the law of reason

inscribed in his heart; he knew the supernatural precepts, not from

scriptures given him by God, but from tradition or special divine

inspiration. In addition to the inner acts of supernatural worship and

faith in the Messiah to come and the outer sacrifices, there were

during this state certain rites of purification, or sacraments, by

which fallen man was purified from sin. A special precept of the

patriarchial times was the prohibition made to Noe against the eating

of flesh with blood in it.

(c) The state of the Mosaic Law is that which existed from the giving

of the law on Sinai until the giving of the New Testament law by Christ.

(d) The state of the Christian Law, or of the New Law, is that which

began with Christ and the Apostles and will continue till the end of

the world.

332. The Mosaic Law.--This was the special law of God to the Jews, the

people chosen by God as the race from which the Saviour of the world

was to come. It has two periods: the period of preparation and the

period of the Law.

(a)The period of preparation for the Law began with the Promise or

Covenant given to Abraham. A law is not given except to a people (see

285), and, as the peoples of the world at that time had returned to the

general corruption that reigned before the Deluge, God chose Abraham to

be the father of a new nation in which true religion should be

preserved until the Redeemer of the world had come. The rite of

circumcision was ordered as a mark of the covenant and a sacrament of

remission.

(b) The period of the Law began with the promulgation of the Decalogue

on Sinai. The descendants of Abraham had grown into a nation and had

been freed from slavery, and they were thus ready to receive a special

law. Their history thereafter shows how God trained them according to

the pattern of the Mosaic Law and prepared them for the providential

mission, which, through the Messiah, should be theirs, of giving to the

world the perfect and universal Law of the Gospel.

333. The Excellence of the Mosaic Law.--(a) The Law was good (Rom, vii.

12): it commanded what was according to reason and forbade what was

opposed to reason; it had God for its Author and prepared man for the

Law of Christ. (b) The Law was imperfect (Heb., vii. 19); it was given

for a time when men were spiritually but children and not ready as yet

for the teaching and morality of the Gospel; it forbade sin and

provided punishments, but the necessary helps for observing it came

only from faith in Christ, the Author of the New Law.