It is alleged by the orthodox world that man's moral nature and
reasoning faculties, both became depraved by the fall. "Totally
depraved" has been the doctrine; but the gradual expansion and
enlightenment of the mind by progressive science have modified the
doctrine with some of the churches, and they have substituted "moral
depravity" for "total depravity."
But neither assumption can be scientifically or logically sustained. The
assumption that our reason is depraved is made the pretext for urging
the superiority of revelation, and making reason subordinate to it. We
are told, that, as our reason is depraved, we can not safely rely upon
it to judge and criticise the Bible or the doctrine of the churches. Mr.
Moody recently exclaimed, in a religious controversy, "I never reason
on religion. None but the disciples of devils reason. It is dangerous to
reason on religion." Unconscious of his ignorance, Mr. Moody assumed a
very ludicrous position.--By the _exercise_ of his reason on religion,
Mr. Moody came to the conclusion that it is _wrong_ to reason on
religion, thus committing the very sin he condemns in others. He
_reasons_ on religion to convince people that it is _wrong_ to reason on
religion, and thus violates his own principles. His case is analogous
to that of the town council which attempted to keep the prisoners of the
county in the old jail while they erected a new jail with the timbers of
the old one,--rather a difficult task to achieve, but not more so than
Mr. Moody's attempt to keep his reason in chains while he is trying
to exercise it. Or, rather, he insults his auditors by saying to them
virtually, "I will use my reason on matters of religion, but you must
not use _yours_." As a reasoning being he reasons with reasonable
beings, and addresses their reason to convince them they ought not
to reason on certain subjects. He uses logic to prove that logic is
dangerous, and should not be used. By reasoning against reason he pulls
_both ways_, like the Scotchman who attempted to lift himself by his
ears. He commits logical suicide when he attempts to show there is any
case in which reason should not be used. The truth is, a person can not
_think_ on the subject of religion without beginning to _reason_ on it,
because his _reasoning faculties and his thinking faculties are
both one_. He _thinks_ with his intellect, and he _reasons_ with his
intellect; and, the very moment _he begins to think, he begins to
reason_. And therefore, if it is _wrong to reason on religion, it
is wrong to have any religion_. We should not allow it to occupy our
thoughts for a single moment, and thus we would banish religion from
the world; which, however, would be no great loss if it is too absurd to
bear the test of reason. And, if it is wrong to _reason on religion_, it
is wrong to _reason on any subject_. The more _important_ the subject,
the more _necessary_ to use reason upon it, that we may make no mistakes
in regard to it. The truth is, reason is the _only faculty_ with which a
man can comprehend religion, revelation, or the Bible. This would prove
again that it is _wrong to have any religion_, if it is wrong to submit
it to the judgment, and test it by our reasoning faculties. Reason
is the principal faculty which distinguishes us from the brute; and,
therefore, to discard it if to approximate to the condition of the
brute. What a pity Mr. Moody had not been consulted in his creation that
he might have had his reasoning faculties left out! then he would not
be under the necessity of sinning daily by exercising his reason in
his attempts to stop its exercise. And then there are other serious
difficulties growing out of the reverend gentleman's position. His
reason being "depraved," we can place no confidence in its exercise or
decision in this case, so as to assume that his judgment and conclusions
are correct when he declares against reason. If he reaches his
conclusions through a depraved reason, they can be of no account.
The verdict can not transcend the judge or court which makes it. The
reasoner being depraved, his reasoning and decision in the case must be
depraved also, and therefore worthless. Verily the gentleman is in a bad
position, and rather a serious quandary; and every struggle to get out
only sinks him deeper. He is in the predicament of a dog running round
after his tail. And then we should like to ask the gentleman, If our
reason is not to be depended upon in matters of religion, how is it to
be depended upon in any case? And how does he know, or how can he know,
but that, his reason being depraved, it has lead him off the track,
in this case, in his attempts to put it in chains? Will the reverend
gentleman furnish a rule by which we can know in what case our reason
can be trusted, and in what cases we are to doff our moral manhood, and
lie prostrate in the dust with the brute? And then the rule, being
the product of a depraved reason, could not be relied upon. Really the
reverend gentleman is in an inextricable quandary. The case furnishes an
illustrative proof of the extent a man can make a fool of himself when
he attempts to shipwreck his reason, and a proof that orthodoxy is a
conglomeration of absurdities, and is entirely out of place in an age of
progressive thought, and an age of reason and science. The only evidence
we have ever had of the truth of the depravity of human reason is found
in the fact that men professing to have common sense and reason can
believe it to be true. And the fact that our moral sense instinctively
repels the doctrine of total depravity or moral depravity, and our
reason rises up in rebellion against it, is proof positive of its
absurdity.
The thought is here suggested, that, if God could not get along without
the adoption of an expedient calculated to corrupt our moral nature and
deprave our reason, he should not and would not have implanted in us
such an instinctive horror to the doctrine. This natural feeling of
repugnance is alone sufficient to condemn it, and prove that it is a
slander upon Infinite Wisdom, and a libel upon human nature, to assume
its existence. And such doctrine is evidently calculated to demoralize
society. An old Roman proverb teaches us, "Call a man a dog, and he
will be a dog." Call a child depraved, and it will feel depraved;
and, feeling so, it will act so. On the other hand, teach the child he
possesses the grand principle and feeling of an inherent nobility, and
he will rise to the dignity of moral manhood. Such is the difference in
the moral value of the two doctrines.