THE GATHERING OF THE FORCES.
After the surrender of Fort Donelson, the force confronting Halleck was
the command of General Beauregard, stationed at Columbus, Island Number
Ten, at Forts Pillow and Randolph, at Memphis, and at convenient points
on the railroads in Mississippi. The next objective point that presented
itself was Memphis, and, as preliminary, the fortified points on the
river above it. But Memphis had large railway connections. The direct
road to Nashville was cut at its crossing over the Tennessee River, but
at Humboldt it intersected the Mobile and Ohio, which joined Columbus
with Mobile. The Memphis and Charleston, running nearly due east to
Chattanooga, also intersected the Mobile and Ohio at Corinth. The
Mississippi and Tennessee, in connection with the New Orleans, Jackson
and Great Northern, gave a route nearly due south to New Orleans, and
this intersected at Jackson, Mississippi, another road running east, and
which needed only a connecting link between Selma and Montgomery,
Alabama, to make it also a through route to the Atlantic States. To
destroy the junction at Humboldt would cut off railway connection with
Columbus. To destroy the junction at Corinth would cut off connection
with the east. A little eastwardly of Corinth, near Eastport, was a
considerable railroad bridge over Bear Creek. General Halleck's first
step, therefore, was to break these railway connections, and as General
A.S. Johnston was falling back southwardly, it became doubly important
to sever these connections for the purpose of preventing a conjunction
of the forces under Johnston and Beauregard. Lieutenant-Commander Phelps
had gone up to Florence, at the foot of Muscle Shoals, immediately after
the surrender of Fort Henry, without difficulty. An expedition up the
Tennessee, to send out strong, light parties, suggested itself as the
natural means of accomplishing the first step. General Halleck proposed
to accomplish this by his lieutenants before taking the field in person.
Halleck was sedate, deliberate, cautious. He had written a book on
strategy and logistics, and his attention appeared sometimes to be
distracted from the actual conditions under which the present military
operations were to be conducted by his retrospective reference to the
rules which he had announced. Grant, under his extremely quiet demeanor,
was full of restless activity. His purpose seemed to be to strike and
overcome the enemy without waiting; to use whatever seemed the best
means at hand; ready at all times to change for better means if they
could be found; but never to cease striking. Halleck was worried by
being jogged to new enterprises, but heartily supported them when once
begun. C.F. Smith had a brusque manner, but a warm heart. He was direct
and honest as a child. He seemed impetuous, but his outburst was a rush
of controlled power. He was a thorough soldier, an enthusiast in his
profession, the soul of honor, the type of discipline. His commanding
officer was to him embodied law; it would have been impossible for him
to conceive that his duty and subordination could in any way be affected
by the fact that his pupil in the Military Academy had become his
commander.
General Grant, being commander of the Military District of Western
Tennessee, with limits undefined, sent General C.F. Smith from Fort
Donelson, fifty miles up the river to Clarksville, to take possession of
the place and the railway bridge over the river there. General Grant
wrote to General Cullum, advising him of this movement and proposing the
capture of Nashville, but adding he was ready for any move the General
Commanding might direct. On the 24th he wrote to General Cullum, General
Halleck's chief of staff, that he had sent four regiments to
Clarksville, and would send no more till he heard from General Halleck.
Next day he wrote that the head of Buell's column had reached Nashville,
and he would go there on the receipt of the next mail, unless it should
contain some orders preventing him. He went to Nashville on the 27th,
and returned to Fort Donelson next day. In his absence there was, among
some of the troops about Fort Donelson, fresh from civil life and
restive under the inactivity and restraint of a winter camp, some
disorder and insubordination. There was, moreover, some marauding in
which officers participated. General Grant, on his return, published
orders repressing such practices, arrested the guilty parties and sent
the arrested officers to St. Louis to report to General Halleck.
On March 1st General Halleck sent to General Grant, from St. Louis, an
order directing the course of immediate operations: "Transports will be
sent to you as soon as possible to move your column up the Tennessee
River. The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the
railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the
connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that
these objects should be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments
of cavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may, by rapid
movements, reach these points from the river without very serious
opposition. Avoid any general engagement with strong forces. It will be
better to retreat than to risk a general battle. This should be strongly
impressed upon the officers sent with the expedition from the river.
General C.F. Smith, or some very discreet officer, should be selected
for such commands. Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as
may be practicable, you will return to Danville and move on Paris....
Competent officers should be left to command the garrisons of Forts
Henry and Donelson in your absence...." General Grant received the order
on March 2d, and repaired at once to Fort Henry. On the 4th the forces
at Fort Donelson marched across to the Tennessee, where they were
speedily joined by Sherman's division and other reinforcements coming by
boat up the river.
On March 2d General Halleck, having received an anonymous letter
reflecting on General Grant, telegraphed to General McClellan, the
General-in-Chief, at Washington: "I have had no communication with
General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my
authority, and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much
demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac
by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general
immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can
get no reports, no returns, no information of any kind from him.
Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any
regard to the future. I am worn out and tired by this neglect and
inefficiency. C.F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the
emergency." Next day McClellan answered by telegraph: "The future
success of our cause demands that proceedings such as General Grant's
should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as
private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of
the service requires it, and place C.F. Smith in command. You are at
liberty to regard this as a positive order, if it will smooth your way."
On the 4th General Halleck telegraphed to Grant: "You will place
Major-General C.F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself
at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and
position of your command?" Grant replied next day: "Troops will be sent
under command of Major-General Smith, as directed. I had prepared a
different plan, intending General Smith to command the forces which
should go to Paris and Humboldt, while I would command the expedition
upon Eastport, Corinth, and Jackson in person.... I am not aware of ever
having disobeyed any order from your headquarters--certainly never
intended such a thing. I have reported almost daily the condition of my
command, and reported every position occupied...." An interchange of
telegrams of substantially the same tenor, General Halleck's gradually
losing their asperity, lasted a week longer. On March 10th, the day
before the President, by War Order No. 3, relieved General McClellan
from the supreme command of the armies, General L. Thomas,
Adjutant-General of the Army, wrote to General Halleck: "It has been
reported that, soon after the battle of Fort Donelson, Brigadier-General
Grant left his command without leave. By direction of the President, the
Secretary of War directs you to ascertain and report whether General
Grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and if so,
for how long; whether he has made to you proper reports and returns of
his forces; whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorized or
not in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and if so,
what?" On the 13th Halleck telegraphed to Grant, who had asked to be
relieved if his course was not satisfactory, or until he could be set
right: "You cannot be relieved from your command. There is no good
reason for it. I am certain that all which the authorities at Washington
ask is, that you enforce discipline and punish the disorderly....
Instead of relieving you, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the
field, to assume the immediate command and lead it on to new victories."
To this Grant replied next day: "After your letter enclosing copy of an
anonymous letter upon which severe censure was based, I felt as though
it would be impossible for me to serve longer without a court of
inquiry. Your telegram of yesterday, however, places such a different
phase upon my position that I will again assume command, and give every
effort to the success of our cause. Under the worst circumstances I
would do the same." On the 15th General Halleck replied to the
Adjutant-General of the Army, fully exonerating General Grant. General
C.F. Smith felt keenly the injustice done to Grant, and gladly
relinquished command of the expedition when Grant assumed it.
Meanwhile the army with its stores had been gathering on a fleet of
boats between Fort Henry and the railroad bridge. To the three divisions
of Fort Donelson, First, Second, and Third, commanded by C.F. Smith,
McClernand, and Lewis Wallace, were added a fourth, commanded by
Brigadier-General S.A. Hurlbut, and a fifth by Brigadier-General W. T.
Sherman. While C.F. Smith commanded the expedition, his division was
commanded by W.H.L. Wallace, who had been promoted to brigadier-general.
The steamer Golden State, with one-half of the Fortieth Illinois,
reached Savannah, on the right bank of the river, on March 5th. The
Forty-sixth Ohio arrived the next day. Behind these was the fleet of
more than eighty steamboats, carrying the five divisions and convoyed by
three gunboats, a vast procession extending miles along the winding
river, each boat with its pillar of smoke by day, and of fire by night.
The fleet began arriving at Savannah on the 11th, and lined both shores
of the river. Lewis Wallace's division sent a party to the railroad west
of the river, striking it at Purdy, tearing up a portion, but doing no
permanent injury, and returned. On the 14th, General Smith sent
Sherman's division up the river to strike the railroad near Eastport.
Rain fell in torrents, roads melted into mud, and small streams rose
with dangerous rapidity. The expedition, arrested by an unfordable
torrent, returned just in time to reach the landing by wading through
water waist-deep. The boats left in the night of the 15th, and stopped
at Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the river, about nine miles
above Savannah. Hurlbut's division was already on boats at this landing,
having been ordered thither by General C.F. Smith on the evening of the
14th.
The first step in the programme laid down in General Halleck's order of
March 1st, the destruction of the railroad near Eastport, had failed,
and events had now required a material change in the programme. General
Buell on March 3d telegraphed to Halleck: "What can I do to aid your
operations against Columbus?" Halleck, replying next day that Columbus
was evacuated and destroyed, added: "Why not come to the Tennessee and
operate with me to cut Johnston's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New
Madrid.... Estimated strength of enemy at New Madrid, Randolph and
Memphis is fifty thousand. It is of vital importance to separate them
from Johnston's army. Come over to Savannah or Florence, and we can do
it. We can then operate on Decatur or Memphis, or both, as may appear
best." Buell rejoined on the 5th: "The thing I think of vital importance
is that you seize and hold the bridge at Florence in force." On the 6th
Halleck telegraphed: "News down the Tennessee that Beauregard has
twenty thousand men at Corinth, and is rapidly fortifying it. Smith will
probably not be strong enough to attack it. It is a great misfortune to
lose that point. I shall reinforce Smith as rapidly as possible. If you
can send a division by water around into the Tennessee, it would require
only a small amount of transportation to do it." To this Buell
telegraphed on the 9th, insisting on his suggestions made on the 5th.
Halleck dispatched on the 10th: "My forces are moving up the Tennessee
River as rapidly as we can obtain transportation. Florence was the point
originally designated, but, on account of the enemy's forces at Corinth
and Humboldt, it is deemed best to land at Savannah and establish a
depot. The transportation will serve as ferries. The selection is left
to C.F. Smith, who commands the advance.... You do not say whether we
are to expect any reinforcements from Nashville." On the same day Buell
telegraphed: "... The establishment of your force on this side of the
river, as high up as possible, is evidently judicious.... I can join you
almost, if not quite as soon, by water, in better condition and with
greater security to your operations and mine. I believe you cannot be
too promptly nor too strongly established on the Tennessee. I shall
advance in a very few days, as soon as our transportation is ready." On
the 11th the President issued War Order No. 3. "Major-General McClellan,
having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the
Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the
other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of
the Potomac.
"Ordered further, that the two departments now under the respective
commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that,
under General Buell, as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely
drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the
Department of the Mississippi; and that, until otherwise ordered,
Major-General Halleck have command of said department." Immediately upon
the receipt of this order, General Halleck ordered Buell to march his
army to Savannah. The forces of the Confederacy were gathering at
Corinth; the forces of Halleck and Buell were massing at Savannah.
Instead of a hurried dash by a flying column, to tear up a section of
railway as ancillary to a real movement elsewhere, the programme now
contemplated a struggle by armies for the retention or for the
destruction of a strategic point deemed almost vital to the Confederacy.
About the close of February, General Beauregard sent a field-battery,
supported by two regiments of infantry, to occupy the river-bluff at
Pittsburg Landing, twenty-three miles northwest from Corinth, and nine
miles above Savannah. Lieutenant-Commander Gwin, who was stationed at
Savannah with two gunboats, the Tyler and the Lexington, proceeded to
Pittsburg Landing, on March 1st, and, after a brisk skirmish, silenced
the battery and drove it and its supports away. General C.F. Smith, in
pursuance of the authority given him by General Halleck, selected this
as the point of assembly of the army.
Lick Creek, above the landing, and Snake Creek, below it, empty into the
river about three miles apart, the landing being nearer the mouth of
Snake Creek. Lick Creek, rising in a swamp, flows eleven miles nearly
northeast to the river. Snake Creek flows nearly east to the river. Owl
Creek flows nearly parallel to Lick Creek, at a distance from it varying
from three to five miles, and empties into Snake Creek something more
than a mile from its mouth. The land enclosed between these creeks and
the river is a rolling plateau from eighty to a hundred feet above the
river-level. The riverfront of this plateau is cut by sundry sloughs
and ravines, which were at that time overflowed by back-water. One of
these deep ravines, running back at right angles to the river, is
immediately above the bluff at the landing. About a mile back from the
river, and about a mile above the landing, is a swell in the ground, not
marked enough to be called a ridge. From this higher ground extend the
head ravines of Oak Creek,[1] a rivulet or brook flowing to the west,
passing within a few hundred yards of Shiloh Church, and then turning to
the northwest and flowing into Owl Creek. In the reports of Sherman's
division this rivulet is treated as the main branch of Owl Creek, and
called by that name. From the same rising ground, ravines, wet only
after a rain, extend east and southeast to Lick Creek. From the same
position extend the head ravines of Brier Creek,[1] a deep ravine with
little water, which flows almost due north and empties into Snake Creek
a little below the mouth of Owl Creek. The three principal creeks, Lick,
Snake, and Owl, flow through swampy valleys, bordered by abrupt bluffs.
Oak Creek, from the neighborhood of Shiloh Church to its mouth, flows
through a miry bottom bordered by banks of less height. The land was for
the most part covered with timber, partly with dense undergrowth; in
places were perhaps a dozen open fields containing about eighty acres
each. A road, lying far enough back from the river to avoid the sloughs,
led from the landing to Hamburg Landing, about six miles above. Another
road from the landing crossed Brier Creek and Snake Creek just above
their junction, and continued down the river to Crump's Landing. The
road to Corinth forked near the landing, one branch of it passing by
Shiloh Church, the other keeping nearer to the river, but both
reuniting five or six miles out. The position selected thus, gave ample
room to camp an army, was absolutely protected on the sides of the
river, Snake Creek, and Owl Creek, while from its south face a ridge
gave open way to Corinth. The open way to Corinth was also an open way
from Corinth to the landing. This accessible front could easily have
been turned into a strong defence, by taking advantage of the rolling
ground, felling timber, and throwing up slight earthworks. But the army
had many things yet to learn, and the use of field fortification was one
of them.
[Footnote 1: The names Oak Creek and Brier Creek are obtained from
Colonel Charles Whittlesey, who made a study of the field every day for
two weeks succeeding the battle.]
In pursuance of General C.F. Smith's instructions to occupy the landing
strongly, General Sherman ordered General Hurlbut to disembark his
division and encamp it at right angles to the road about a mile out. The
Corinth road designated was the one lying nearer to the river. About
half a mile beyond the position selected for the camp the road forks,
one being the Corinth road running southwest, the other running nearly
due west, passed about four hundred yards north of Shiloh Church,
crossed Oak Creek and Owl Creek immediately above their junction, and
continued to Purdy. General Hurlbut the same day issued a field order in
minute detail, and the First and Second Brigades being all of the
division at hand, marched to the prescribed point, Burrows' battery
being posted at the road; the First Brigade at right angles with the
road, with its left at the battery; the Third Brigade at right angles
with the road, its right at Burrows' battery, and Mann's battery at its
left. The Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Veatch, subsequently
arriving, camped to the rear and partially to the right of the First
Brigade, so as almost to interlock with the camp of General C.F. Smith's
division.
On the 18th, Sherman's division of four brigades landed, and moved out
a few days later to permanent camp. The Second Brigade, sent to watch
some fords of Lick Creek, was posted in the fork of a cross-road running
to Purdy from the Hamburg road. The Fourth Brigade, commanded by Colonel
Buckland, camped with its left near Shiloh Church, and its color-line
nearly at right angles with the Corinth road. The First Brigade,
commanded by Colonel McDowell, went into camp to the right of Buckland,
and was separated from him by a lateral ravine running into Oak Creek;
the camp was pitched between the Purdy road and the bluff-banks of Oak
Creek. The Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Hildebrand, was posted to
the left of Shiloh Church, its right being near the church. Precision in
camping was not exacted, and the left regiment of Colonel Hildebrand's
Brigade, the Fifty-third Ohio, in order to enclose a fine spring of
water within the brigade, pitched its camp about two hundred yards to
the left and front of its next regiment (the Fifty-seventh Ohio), and
was separated from the rest of the brigade by this distance and by a
stream with swampy borders which emptied into Oak Creek. General
Sherman's headquarters were to the rear of Shiloh Church. His batteries,
Taylor's and Waterhouse's, together with his cavalry, were camped in
rear of the infantry.
General Grant arrived at Savannah on the 17th and assumed command,
reported to General Halleck, and on the same day ordered General C.F.
Smith's division to Pittsburg Landing. His division, the Second,
encamped, not in a line, but in convenient localities on the plateau
between Brier Creek and the river. McClernand with the First Division
was sent a few days later, and selecting the most level ground, laid out
the most regular camp. His front crossed the Corinth road about
two-thirds of a mile in rear of Shiloh Church, the road intersecting his
line near his left flank; the direction of his line was to the
northwest, reaching toward the bluffs of the valley of Snake Creek.
General Prentiss reported to General Grant for assignment to duty, and
about March 25th, six new regiments, not yet assigned, reported to him
and were by him put into two brigades constituting the Sixth Division.
These brigades were subsequently increased by regiments assigned to him
as late as April 5th and 6th. The Fifth Ohio Battery, Captain
Hickenlooper, arriving on April 5th, was assigned to the Sixth Division,
and went into camp. Prentiss' camp faced to the south. It is not easy
now to identify precisely its position. It appears incidentally, from
reports of the battle of April 6th, that a ravine ran along the rear of
the right of the division camp, and another ravine in front of the left.
The left regiment (the Sixteenth Wisconsin) of the right brigade
(Peabody's) lay on the lower or most southern branch of the Corinth
road; the left flank of the division was in sight of Stuart's brigade;
there was a considerable gap between its right flank and Sherman's
division. The divisions were not camped with a view to defence against
an apprehended attack; but they did fulfil General Halleck's
instructions to General C.F. Smith, to select a depot with a view to the
march on to Corinth. Sherman's division lay across one road to Corinth,
with McClernand's in its rear; Prentiss' division lay across the other
road to Corinth, with Hurlbut in his rear, and C.F. Smith was camped so
as to follow either. The divisions did not march to the selected ground
and pitch camp in a forenoon; but, partly from the rain and mud, partly
want of practice, some of the divisions were several days unloading from
the boats, hauling in the great trains then allowed to regiments
(twenty-seven wagons and two ambulances to a regiment in some cases,)
laying out the ground, and putting up tents. General Sherman, before
settling down in his camp, made a reconnoissance out to Monterey,
nearly half way to Corinth, and dislodged a detachment of hostile
cavalry camped there. Every division and many of the brigades found a
separate drill-ground in some neighboring field, and constant drilling
was preparing the command for the march to Corinth.
Major-General C.F. Smith received an injury to his leg by jumping into a
yawl early in March. This injury, seeming trivial at first, resulted in
his death on April 25th. It became so aggravated by the end of March
that he was obliged to move from Pittsburg Landing to Savannah, leaving
Brigadier-General W.H.L. Wallace in command of his division, and
Major-General McClernand, senior officer present, at Pittsburg. General
Grant--who went up from Savannah every day to visit the camps, and was
requested by General McClernand, by letter on March 27th, to move his
headquarters to Pittsburg Landing--was about to transfer his
headquarters thither on April 4th, when he received a letter from
General Buell saying he would arrive next day at Savannah, and
requesting an interview. The transfer of headquarters was accordingly
postponed till after the interview.
General L. Wallace's division disembarked at Crump's Landing on the same
side of the river with Pittsburg Landing, and a little above Savannah.
His First Brigade went into camp near the river; the Second at Stony
Lonesome, about two miles out on the road to Purdy; the Third Brigade
immediately beyond Adamsville, on the same road. The Third Brigade went
into camp on the inner slope of a sharp ridge, and cut down the timber
on the exterior slope, to aid the holding of the position in case of an
attack in front.
While Grant's army was sailing up the river and getting settled at
Pittsburg, General Buell with five divisions of his army was marching
from Nashville to Savannah. Immediately on receiving General Halleck's
order to march, he sent out his cavalry to secure the bridges on his
route, in which they succeeded, except in the cases of the important
bridge over Duck Creek at Columbia, and an unimportant bridge a few
miles north of that. On the 15th, the Fourth Division, commanded by
Brigadier-General A. McD. McCook, moved out, and at intervals, up to
March 20th, it was followed in order by the Fifth, Brigadier-General
T.L. Crittenden, Sixth, Brigadier-General T.J. Wood, and First,
Brigadier-General George H. Thomas--37,000 men in all. Having no
pontoons, General Buell built a bridge over Duck Creek. This would have
caused little delay later in the war; but to fresh troops, who yet had
to learn the business of military service, it was a formidable task, and
was not completed till the 29th. While waiting for the completion of the
bridge, General Buell's command learned that General Grant's army was on
the west bank of the Tennessee. General Nelson at once asked permission
to ford the stream and push rapidly on to Savannah. Permission being
obtained, the division, with Ammen's brigade--the Twenty-fourth Ohio,
Sixth Ohio, and Thirty-sixth Indiana in front--began their march early
on the morning of the 29th, the men stripped of their pantaloons,
carrying their cartridge-boxes on their necks; the ammunition-boxes of
the artillery taken from the limbers and carried over on scows, and
tents packed in the bottom of the wagon-beds, to lift ammunition and
stores above water.
The bridge was finished and the march resumed the same day. Nelson
having secured the advance, his eagerness gave an impetus to the entire
column. The divisions were ordered to camp at night six miles apart,
making a column thirty miles long. But this prevented the clogging of
the march on the wet and soft roads, the alternate crowding up and
lengthening out of the column, the weary waiting of the crowded rear for
the obstructed front to move, nights spent on the road, and late
bivouacs reached toward morning. It made Buell's advance slow, but it
prevented the new troops from being worn out, and brought them in good
condition onto the field. General Buell intended to take at Waynesboro
the road to Hamburg Landing, instead of the direct road to Savannah, and
put his army there into a separate camp. General Nelson, however, moving
faster than was expected, drew the divisions behind him through
Waynesboro, on the road to Savannah, before General Buell issued the
order, and so unconsciously defeated the intention. Nelson's brigade
reached Savannah during April 5th, Crittenden's division camped that
night a few miles distant, and General Buell himself reached Savannah or
its outskirts some time in the evening.
General A.S. Johnston was encamped with his army at Edgefield, opposite
Nashville, on February 15th. A despatch from General Pillow that evening
announced a great victory won by the garrison of Fort Donelson. Just
before daybreak of the 16th another despatch was received, that Buckner
would capitulate at daylight. Immediately staff and orderlies were
aroused, and the troops put in motion across the river to Nashville. The
morning papers were filled with the "victory, glorious and complete,"
and the city was ringing with joy. In the forenoon the news spread of
the surrender of Donelson. The people were struck with dismay, the city
was in panic, the populace was delirious with excitement. A wild mob
surrounded Johnston's headquarters and demanded to know whether their
generals intended to fight or not.
Johnston immediately began the abandonment of Nashville. First were
sent off the fifteen hundred sick brought on from Bowling Green,
together with the tenants of the hospitals at Nashville. The railway was
then taxed to its utmost to carry away the stores of most value. It was
evident that all the stores could not be taken away, and pillage of
commissary stores and quartermaster stores by citizens was permitted. A
regiment of infantry and a battalion of cavalry were put on guard and
patrolled the streets to reduce the riotous to order. Johnston moved out
with his command on February 18th, leaving Floyd and Forrest with a
force in Nashville to preserve order, remove the public stores, and to
destroy what could not be removed.
Popular excitement always demands a victim, and the outcry was almost
universal that Johnston should be relieved from command. But, to a
deputation that went to Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy,
with this request, he replied: "I know Johnston well. If he is not a
general, we had better give up the war, for we have no general."
Johnston found the Tennessee, running from Alabama and Mississippi up to
the Ohio, in the possession of the National fleets and armies. The force
under his immediate command was therefore separated from the force under
Beauregard that was guarding the Mississippi. Unless they should join,
they would be beaten in detail. To join involved the surrender either of
Central Tennessee or of the Mississippi. Johnston resolved to give up
Central Tennessee until he could regain it, and hold on to the
Mississippi. But to hold the Mississippi required continued possession
of the railroads, and such points especially as Corinth and Humboldt.
Corinth, both from its essential importance and its exposure to attack
by reason of its nearness to the river, was the point for concentration.
Johnston moved from Nashville to Murfreesboro, not on the direct route
to Corinth, to conceal his purpose. At Murfreesboro he added to the
forces brought from Bowling Green between three and four thousand of the
men who escaped from Donelson, and the command of General Crittenden
from Kentucky, quickly raising his force at Murfreesboro to seventeen
thousand men. Leaving Murfreesboro on February 28th, marching through
Shelbyville to Decatur, he arrived at Corinth, on March 24th, with
twenty thousand men. General Bragg, with ten thousand well-drilled
troops from Pensacola, had preceded him. General Ruggles, with a
brigade, came from New Orleans; Major-General Polk, with General
Cheatham's division from Columbus, with the troops that escaped from
Island No. Ten the night before escape was cut off, and various outlying
garrisons under General Beauregard's command, swelled the concourse. Van
Dorn, having failed to drive Curtis back into Missouri, was ordered to
come with his command to Corinth. A regiment arrived before April 6th,
the rest later. Detached commands guarding the line of the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad were called in. The governors of States were called
on and raised new levies. Beauregard made a personal appeal for
volunteers, which brought in several regiments. Johnston had before
called for reinforcements in vain. Now every nerve was strained to aid
him. An inspection of his command satisfied him that if all the soldiers
detailed as cooks and teamsters were relieved, he would have another
brigade of effective men. He sent messengers through the surrounding
country, urging citizens to hire their negroes as cooks and teamsters
for ninety days, or even sixty days. But the messengers returned with
the answer that the planters would freely give their last son, but they
would not part with a negro or a mule.
General Bragg, on arriving at Corinth, wished to attack the troops as
they were beginning to land at Pittsburg and Crump's landings. General
Beauregard forbade this, writing to Bragg: "I would prefer the
defensive-offensive--that is, to take up such a position as would compel
the enemy to develop his intentions, and to attack us, before he could
penetrate any distance from his base; then, when within striking
distance of us, to take the offensive and crush him wherever we may
happen to strike him, cutting him off, if possible, from his base of
operations or the river."
On March 25th, Johnston completed the concentration of his troops. Van
Dorn was in person in Corinth, and was ordered to bring forward his
command. Johnston determined to wait as long as practicable for it.
Meanwhile, to hasten the organization and preparation of his army, he
appointed Gen. Bragg chief of staff for the time, but to resume command
of his corps when the movement should begin. Of him, Colonel William
Preston Johnston says, in his life of his father--a valuable book,
prepared with great industry, and written with an evident desire to be
fair: "In Bragg there was so much that was strong marred by most evident
weakness, so many virtues blemished by excess or defect in temper and
education, so near an approach to greatness and so manifest a failure to
attain it, that his worst enemy ought to find something to admire in
him, and his best friend something painful in the attempt to portray him
truly." A thorough disciplinarian and a master of detail, his merits
found full play, and his defects were less apparent in his position on
the staff.
Johnston was organizing his army; Grant was assembling his twenty-three
miles away. On the other side of the Tennessee, ninety miles from
Savannah, Buell, halted by Duck Creek, was building a bridge for his
troops--a bridge which it required twelve days to construct. Johnston
having completed his concentration, it was his obvious policy to attack
before Grant should be further reinforced. General Beauregard, in his
letter of March 18th to Bragg, said: "While I have guarded you against
an uncertain offensive, I am decidedly of the opinion that we should
endeavor to entice the enemy into an engagement as soon as possible, and
before he shall have further increased his numbers by the large numbers
which he must still have in reserve and available--that is, beat him in
detail." Lee wrote to Johnston, on March 26th: "I need not urge you,
when your army is united, to deal a blow at the enemy in your front, if
possible, before his rear gets up from Nashville. You have him divided,
and keep him so, if you can." It was Johnston's purpose, and expressed,
to attack Grant before Buell should arrive. But he determined to
continue organizing and waiting for Van Dorn as long as that would be
safe.
At eleven o'clock at night of April 2d, Johnston learned that Buell was
moving "rapidly from Columbia, by Clifton, to Savannah." About one
o'clock in the morning of Thursday, the 3d, preliminary orders were
issued to hold the troops in readiness to move at a moment's notice,
with five days' rations and one hundred rounds of ammunition. The
movement began in the afternoon. The army was arranged in three corps,
commanded respectively by Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, and a reserve under
Breckenridge. Beauregard was second in command, without a specific
command. Major-General Hardee's corps consisted of Brigadier-General
Hindman's division and Brigadier-General Cleburne's brigade. The
division consisted of Hindman's brigade, commanded by Colonel Shaver,
and Brigadier-General Wood's brigade. Wood's brigade comprised five
regiments, and two battalions of infantry and a battery; Cleburne's
brigade was composed of six regiments and two batteries. Major-General
Bragg's corps consisted of two divisions, commanded respectively by
Brigadier-General Ruggles and Brigadier-General Withers. The brigades of
Ruggles' division were commanded by Colonel Gibson, Brigadier-General
Patton Anderson, and Colonel Pond. Withers' brigades were commanded by
Brigadier-Generals Gladden, Chalmers, and Jackson. The brigades of
Chalmers and Gladden contained each five regiments and a battery; the
other brigades contained each four regiments and a battery, with, in
Anderson's and Pond's each, an additional battalion of infantry.
Major-General Polk's corps had two divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-General Clark and Major-General Cheatham. Clark's brigades
were commanded by Colonel Russell and Brigadier-General A.P. Stewart;
Cheatham's brigades were commanded by Brigadier-General B.R. Johnson and
Colonel Stephens. Each brigade was made up of four regiments of infantry
and a battery. Brigadier-General John C. Breckenridge's reserve
comprised three brigades, commanded by Colonel Trabue, Brigadier-General
Bowen, and Colonel Statham. Trabue had five regiments and two
battalions, Bowen four regiments, and Statham six regiments of infantry.
Each brigade had a battery. By the returns, Cleburne's brigade was the
largest, having 2,750 effectives. Besides, were three regiments, two
battalions and one company of cavalry. This force comprised 40,000 of
the 50,000 effectives gathered at Corinth. Different returns vary a few
hundred more and a few hundred less. General Johnston telegraphed to
Jefferson Davis, when the movement began, that the number was 40,000. In
forming for battle, the army was to deploy into three parallel lines,
the distance between the lines to be one thousand yards. Hardee's corps
to be the first; Bragg's the second; and the third to be composed of
Polk on the left and Breckenridge on the right.
Hardee, moving out in advance, in the afternoon of Thursday, halted
Friday forenoon at Mickey's house, about seventeen miles from Corinth.
Bragg's corps bivouacked Friday night in rear of Hardee. Clark's
division of Polk's corps followed in due order on its road. Cheatham's
division, on outpost on the railroad at Purdy and Bethel, under orders
to defend himself if attacked, otherwise to assemble at Purdy, march
thence to Monterey, and thence to position near Mickey's, did not leave
Purdy till Saturday morning, and reached his position Saturday
afternoon. Breckenridge, who marched from his station at Burnesville
through Farmington without entering Corinth, using a cross-road, could
not pull his wagons through the mud, and failed to get as far as
Monterey Friday night. While Hardee was lying near Mickey's house, his
cavalry felt the National outposts, and a reconnoitring party from the
National camp struck Cleburne's brigade.
The order issued at Corinth required the columns to be deployed by seven
o'clock, Saturday morning, and the attack to begin at eight o'clock.
Hardee began his movement at daybreak, Saturday, deployed about ten
o'clock, and waited. His line being too short to extend from Owl Creek
to Lick Creek, Gladden's brigade was moved forward from Bragg's corps,
and added to Hardee's right. The rest of Withers' division moved into
position behind Hardee's right; but Ruggles' division, constituting the
right of Bragg's line, did not appear. Successive messengers bringing no
satisfaction, General Johnston rode to the rear with his staff, till he
found Ruggles' division standing still, with its head in an open field.
It was set in motion, Polk followed; Cheatham arrived from Purdy;
Breckenridge extricated his command from the deep mud, and, by four
o'clock in the afternoon, the deployment and formation of the army was
complete. It was too late to attack that day. Beauregard urged that it
was too late to attack at all, that it would now be impossible to
effect a surprise, that the expedition should be abandoned and the
troops march back to Corinth. Johnston directed the troops to bivouac,
and attack to be made next day at daylight.
Of the five divisions at Pittsburg Landing, the organization of
four--the First, McClernand's; Second, C.F. Smith's, commanded by
Brigadier-General W.H.L. Wallace, General Smith being ill at Savannah;
the Fourth, Hurlbut's; and the Fifth, Sherman's--was completed. The
Sixth, commanded by Prentiss, was still in process of formation.
McClernand's First Brigade, composed of the Eighth and Eighteenth
Illinois, Eleventh and Thirteenth Iowa, was commanded by Colonel Hare,
of the Eleventh Iowa; the Second was composed of the Eleventh,
Twentieth, Forty-fifth, and Forty-eighth Illinois, and commanded by Col.
Marsh, of the Twentieth Illinois; the Third, of the Seventeenth,
Twenty-ninth, Forty-third, and Forty-ninth Illinois. Colonel Ross, of
the Seventeenth Illinois, the senior colonel, being ill and absent, the
command of this brigade devolved on Colonel Reardon, of the
Twenty-ninth. The Second Division comprised three brigades: the First,
commanded by Colonel Tuttle, of the Second Iowa, contained the Second,
Seventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Iowa; the Second, commanded by
Brigadier-General McArthur, comprised the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Missouri, Ninth and Twelfth Illinois, and Eighty-first Ohio. The
Fourteenth Missouri, at that time, went by the name of Birge's
Sharpshooters; the Third, commanded by Colonel Sweeney, of the
Fifty-second Illinois, comprised the Eighth Iowa, and the Seventh,
Fiftieth, Fifty-second, Fifty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth Illinois. The
Fourth Division contained three brigades: the First, commanded by
Colonel Williams, of the Third Iowa, contained the Third Iowa,
Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-first Illinois; the Second,
commanded by Colonel Veatch, of the Twenty-fifth Indiana, contained the
Twenty-fifth Indiana, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Forty-sixth Illinois;
the Third, commanded by Brigadier-General Lauman, who reported for duty
Saturday, April 5th, and was then assigned to this command, comprised
the Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Indiana, and the Seventeenth and
Twenty-fifth Kentucky. The Fifth Division contained four brigades: the
First, commanded by Colonel McDowell, of the Sixth Iowa, was made of the
Sixth Iowa, Forty-sixth Ohio, and the Fortieth Illinois; the Second,
commanded by Colonel Stuart, of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, was made of
the Fifty-fifth Illinois and the Fifty-fourth and Seventy-first Ohio;
the Third, commanded by Colonel Hildebrand, of the Seventy-seventh Ohio,
contained the Fifty-third, Fifty-seventh, and Seventy-seventh Ohio; the
Fourth, commanded by Colonel Buckland, of the Seventy-second Ohio,
contained the Forty-eighth, Seventieth, and Seventy-second Ohio. The
Sixth Division was organized into two brigades: the First Brigade,
commanded by Colonel Peabody, of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, contained
the Twenty-first and Twenty-fifth Missouri, Twelfth Michigan, and
Sixteenth Wisconsin. The Second, commanded by Colonel Miller, of the
Eighteenth Missouri, comprised the Eighteenth Missouri and Sixty-first
Illinois. The Sixteenth Iowa, assigned to this brigade, arriving fresh
from the recruiting depot, without ammunition, on April 5th, reported to
General Prentiss that day, but was sent by him to the landing early in
the morning of the 6th, and was by General Grant assigned to duty that
day in another part of the field. The Eighteenth Wisconsin arrived and
reported on April 5th, and the Twenty-third Missouri arrived in the
morning of the 6th, and reported on the field at nine o'clock.[2] But
these two regiments were not formally assigned to either brigade. The
Fifteenth Iowa, assigned to this division, arrived the morning of April
6th, and was assigned to duty in another part of the field. The
Fourteenth Wisconsin, assigned to the division, arrived late in the
night of April 6th, and served on the 7th with Crittenden's division of
Buell's army.
[Footnote 2: The Fifteenth Michigan arriving without ammunition,
immediately before the attack began, marched to the rear for ammunition
and, returning to the field, fought through the day between the
Eighteenth Missouri and the Eighteenth Wisconsin.]
The artillery was not attached to brigades, but was under the direct
command of division commanders. The batteries of Schwartz and
McAllister, and Burrow's Fourteenth Ohio Battery served with
McClernand's division. Willard's Company A, First Illinois Artillery,
commanded by Lieutenant Wood, and Major Cavender's battalion of
Companies D, H, and I, First Missouri Artillery, were attached to W.H.L.
Wallace's division. Mann's four-gun battery, Ross' Second Michigan, and
Myer's Thirteenth Ohio batteries, were attached to Hurlbut's division.
Behr's Sixth Indiana Battery, and Barrett's Company B, and Waterhouse's
Company E, First Illinois Artillery, were attached to Sherman's
division. Barrett's battery had formerly been commanded by Captain Ezra
Taylor, promoted Major of the First Illinois Artillery, and was still
commonly called Taylor's battery, and is so styled in some of the
reports of the battle. Munch's Minnesota and Hickenlooper's Fifth Ohio
Battery were attached to Prentiss' division. There was some change in
the assignment of batteries on April 5th. The above gives their position
as it was on April 6th. Bouton's Company I, First Illinois Artillery,
and Dresser's battery, commanded by Captain Timony, though not assigned,
were given positions on the field by Major Ezra Taylor, Sherman's chief
of artillery, by direction of General Grant. Margraff's Eighth Ohio
Battery served with Sherman, Powell's Company F, Second Illinois
Artillery, served with Prentiss. Madison's Company B, Second Illinois
Artillery, served at the landing. Captain Silversparre's four-gun
battery of twenty-pound Parrotts, though assigned to McClernand,
remained at the landing from lack of horses and equipage to pull them
out to camp.
The Third Division, commanded by General Lewis Wallace, comprised three
brigades: The First Brigade, commanded by Colonel Morgan L. Smith, of
the Eighth Missouri, comprising the Eleventh and Twenty-fourth Indiana
and the Eighth Missouri, was in camp at Crump's Landing; the Second
Brigade, commanded by Colonel Thayer, of the First Nebraska, comprising
the First Nebraska, Twenty-third Indiana, and Fifty-eighth and
Sixty-eighth Ohio, was camped at Stony Lonesome, two miles out from
Crump's Landing; the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Whittlesey, of
the Twentieth Ohio, comprising the Twentieth, Fifty-sixth,
Seventy-sixth, and Seventy-eighth Ohio, was in camp at Adamsville, three
miles out beyond Stony Lonesome, or five miles from Crump's Landing.
Buell's Battery I, First Missouri Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant
Thurber, and Thompson's Ninth Indiana Battery, constituted the artillery
of the division.
The cavalry consisted of the Fifth Ohio, Fourth and Eleventh Illinois,
Companies A and B, Second Illinois, under Captain Houghtaling, two
companies of regular cavalry under Lieutenant Powell, Stewart's
battalion, and Thielman's battalion. The Third Battalion of the Fifth
Ohio and the Third Battalion of the Eleventh Illinois remained with
Lewis Wallace. The rest of the cavalry was assigned to different
divisions, but the assignment was changed on April 5th.
The Fifth Ohio Cavalry, attached to Sherman's division till April 5th,
frequently made reconnoitring expeditions some miles to the front, and
frequently encountered parties of hostile cavalry. Thursday, April 3d,
General Sherman sent Buckland's brigade out on a reconnoissance on the
Corinth road, but with strict injunctions, in accordance with General
Halleck's repeated order, not to be drawn into a fight with any
considerable force of the enemy, that would risk bringing on a general
engagement. Buckland marched to the fork of the road about five miles
out, which must have been at Mickey's. General Hardee states that
Mickey's is about eight miles from the landing. Posting the brigade
between the roads, he sent two companies out on each road. Both
encountered hostile cavalry, understood to be pickets, within half a
mile, began skirmishing with them, and saw a larger body of cavalry
beyond. The companies were recalled, and the brigade reached camp a
little before dark and reported. Next day, Friday, the 4th, a cavalry
dash on Buckland's picket-line swooped off a lieutenant and seven men.
General Buckland, who was near, sent information to Sherman, who sent
out 150 cavalry. Major Crockett, who was drilling his regiment near by,
sent a company to scout beyond the picket-line. Major Crockett was sent
by General Buckland with another company, to bring the first one back.
Before long firing was heard, Buckland started with a battalion to the
rescue, found the second company had been attacked and Major Crockett
captured, pushed on a distance estimated at two miles, attacked unseen a
body of cavalry just about to charge upon the first company, was
reinforced by the cavalry sent out by Sherman, pursued the hostile
cavalry a distance estimated another mile, came in view of artillery and
infantry, was fired on by the artillery, returned bringing in ten
prisoners, and found General Sherman at the picket-posts with a brigade
in line. The same evening, in obedience to an order from General
Sherman, Buckland sent him a written report. This advance was the attack
upon Cleburne's brigade reported by General Hardee.
Saturday the cavalry were moving camps, in obedience to the order of
reassignment. Batteries were moving about under the same order. Buckland
and Hildebrand anxiously visited their picket-lines and observed the
parties of hostile cavalry hovering in the woods beyond. Some of the men
on picket claimed they had seen infantry. Captain Mason of the
Seventy-seventh Ohio, on picket, observed at daylight, Saturday morning,
numbers of rabbits and squirrels scudding from the woods to and across
his picket-line. General Sherman was advised, but he had no cavalry to
send out; the Fifth had gone, and the Fourth not yet reported. He
enjoined Buckland and Hildebrand to be vigilant, strengthen their
pickets, and be prepared for attack. Additional companies were sent out
to increase the pickets, Buckland established a connecting line of
sentries from the picket reserve to camp, to communicate the first alarm
on the picket-line, and instructed his officers to be prepared for a
night attack.
Saturday afternoon, General Prentiss, in consequence of information
received from his advance guard, sent Colonel Moore, of the Twenty-first
Missouri, with three companies from his regiment, to reconnoitre the
front. The line of his march being oblique to the line of the camp, led
him out beyond the front of Sherman's line. He marched in that direction
three miles, saw nothing, and returned to camp. The oblique direction of
his march prevented his running into Hardee's lines. Prentiss, assured
there was some activity--a cavalry reconnoissance in his front--pushed
his pickets out a mile and a half and reinforced them. McClernand, the
same day, went out with Colonel McPherson and a battalion of cavalry on
a reconnoissance toward Hamburg and a short distance out on the road to
Corinth, and saw a few hostile scouts back of Hamburg.
General Lewis Wallace's reconnoitring parties developed the presence of
a considerable force at Purdy and Bethel, on the railroad. Getting
information, Friday night, of signs of preparation for movement by this
force, an order was sent to the brigade at Adamsville to form line at
daybreak. The other brigades reached Adamsville at an early hour, and
all remained prepared to repel attack till noon. The activity observed
at Purdy and Bethel was, in fact, Cheatham's preparation for his march,
Saturday, to his position in General Polk's line. General Grant being
advised, Friday, by L. Wallace, of the assembling of the force in his
front, directed W.H.L. Wallace to hold his division in readiness to move
to the support of L. Wallace immediately in case he should be
threatened; and advised Sherman to instruct his pickets to be on the
alert, and to be ready to move in support with his whole division, and
with Hurlbut's if necessary, if an attack on L. Wallace should be
attempted. W.H.L. Wallace and Sherman commanded, by their respective
positions, the bridges across Owl Creek, over which passed the two roads
from the camps at Pittsburg Landing to L. Wallace.
Saturday, Sherman wrote to Grant: "All is quiet along my lines now. We
are in the act of exchanging cavalry, according to your orders. The
enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of
infantry and one battery of artillery about six miles out. I will send
you in ten prisoners of war, and a report of last night's affair, in a
few minutes.
"Your note is just received. I have no doubt that nothing will occur
to-day, more than some picket-firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the
worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be
drawn out far, unless with certainty of advantage; and I do not
apprehend anything like an attack upon our position." A little later in
the day, General Sherman wrote to Grant: "I infer that the enemy is in
some considerable force at Pea Ridge [another name for Monterey]; that
yesterday they crossed a bridge with two regiments of infantry, one
regiment of cavalry, and one battery of field-artillery, to the ridge on
which the Corinth road lays. They halted the infantry and artillery at a
point about five miles in my front, and sent a detachment to the house
of General Meeks, on the north of Owl Creek, and the cavalry down toward
our camp. This cavalry captured a part of our advance pickets, and
afterward engaged two companies of Colonel Buckland's regiment, as
described by him in his report herewith enclosed. Our cavalry drove them
back upon their artillery and infantry, killing many and bringing ten
prisoners (all of the First Alabama Cavalry), whom I send you." General
Grant on the same day despatched to General Halleck: "Just as my letter
of yesterday to Captain McLean, Assistant Adjutant-General, was
finished, notes from Generals McClernand's and Sherman's assistant
adjutant-generals were received, stating that our outposts had been
attacked by the enemy, apparently in considerable force. I immediately
went up, but found all quiet. The enemy took two officers and four or
five of our men prisoners, and wounded four. We took eight prisoners and
killed several. Number of the enemy's wounded not known. They had with
them three pieces of artillery, and cavalry and infantry. How much
cannot, of course, be estimated. I have scarcely the faintest idea of an
attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should
such a thing take place. General Nelson's division has arrived. The
other two, of Buell's column, will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is
my present intention to send them to Hamburg, some four miles above
Pittsburg, when they all get here. From that point to Corinth the road
is good, and a junction can be formed with the troops from Pittsburg at
almost any point. Colonel McPherson has gone with an escort to-day to
examine the defensibility of the ground about Hamburg, and to lay out
the position of the camp, if advisable to occupy that place." Earlier on
the same day General Grant also telegraphed to General Halleck: "The
main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points
east. Small garrisons are also at Bethel, Jackson, and Humboldt. The
number at these places seems constantly to change. The number of the
enemy at Corinth, and within supporting distance of it, cannot be far
from eighty thousand men." General Halleck was preparing to leave St.
Louis and come to the front to take immediate command of the combined
army for the march on to Corinth. He advised Buell he would leave in the
beginning of the coming week.