FORT DONELSON.
The capture of Fort Henry was important, but it would be of restricted
use unless Fort Donelson should also be taken. At this point the
Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers are only twelve miles apart. The little
town of Dover stood upon a bluff on the left bank of the Cumberland.
Immediately above it, two small brooks empty into the river, making a
valley or bottom overflowed by every high water. Immediately below the
town is Indian Creek. One branch of it, rising close by the head of the
upper one of the two brooks, flowing outwardly from the river toward the
west, then bending to the north and northeast, makes almost the circuit
of the town, about half a mile from it, before emptying into the creek.
Several small brooks, flowing from the north into Indian Creek, make
deep ravines, which leave a series of ridges, very irregular in outline,
but generally parallel to the river. About half a mile below the mouth
of Indian Creek, Hickman Creek, flowing eastwardly, empties into the
river at right angles with it. Small branches running into Hickman Creek
almost interlock with those emptying into Indian Creek, whereby the
series of ridges parallel to the river are made to extend continuously
from the valley of one creek to the valley of the other.
Fort Donelson, a bastioned earthwork, was erected on the river-bluff,
between the two creeks, its elevation being one hundred feet above the
water. A bend in the river gives the fort command over it as far as its
armament could carry. On the slope of the ridge facing down stream, two
water-batteries were excavated. The lower battery and larger one, was so
excavated as to leave traverses between the guns. A ten-inch columbiad
and nine thirty-two pound guns constituted the armament of the lower
battery; a rifled piece, carrying a conical ball of one hundred and
twenty-eight pounds, with two thirty-two pound carronades, the armament
of the upper. These water-batteries were, according to Colonel J.D.
Webster, General Grant's chief of staff, thirty feet above the
water-level at the time of the attack. Colonel Gilmer, the engineer who
constructed them, reported them as being fifty feet above the
water-level; but it does not appear at what stage of the water. As the
narrow channel of the river allowed an attacking party to present only a
narrow front, the batteries required but little horizontal range for
their guns, and the embrasures were accordingly made quite narrow. Eight
additional guns were in the fort.
Colonel Gilmer, going from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson, immediately
began the tracing and construction of works for infantry defence. The
river protected the east face of the position, and the valley of Hickman
Creek, filled with back-water from the river, sufficiently guarded the
north. The line traced was two miles and a half long, following the
recessions and salients. The right of the line, occupying a ridge
extending from creek to creek, was nearly parallel with the river, and
distant from it fourteen hundred yards in an air-line. It was somewhat
convex, projecting to the front about its centre, at the point where
Porter's battery was afterward posted. The left, facing to the south and
southwest, beginning just above Dover, on the point of a ridge
extending nearly to the river between the two small brooks, continued
out from the river along this ridge to its western extremity, and thence
across the valley of the small curved stream described as encircling
Dover and emptying into Indian Creek, to a V-shaped eminence in the fork
between this small stream and Indian Creek. This salient termination
was on the continuation of the line of the right or the west face of the
infantry works. This point was assigned to Maney's battery and Heiman's
brigade. The line of infantry defence was what came to be called, during
the war, rifle-pit--a trench with the earth thrown up on the outer side.
Batteries were constructed at nine points in the line, and armed with
the guns of eight field batteries.
[Illustration: The Line from Columbus to Bowling Green.]
The valley of Indian Creek made a break in the line; there was an
interval at the creek between the portion occupied by Heiman's line and
the work on the opposite slope, afterward the extreme left of General
Buckner's command. The entire line on both faces, except the portion
crossing the small valley or ravine to Heiman's left, followed the face
of ridges from fifty to eighty feet high, faced by valleys or ravines
filled with forest and underbrush. The trees were cut about breast-high,
and the tops bent over outward, forming a rude abattis extremely
difficult to pass through. The back-water filling the valley of Hickman
Creek was an advantage to the defenders of Donelson, in so far as it
served as a protection to one face of the position, and diminished the
distance to be guarded and fortified. It was quite as great an advantage
to the besiegers as it was to the besieged. They were by it relieved
from a longer, being an exterior, line. Their transports and supplies
could be landed and hauled out in security. Moreover, the back-water
extending up Indian Creek also, within the defensive lines, cut the
position in two, and made communication between the two parts
inconvenient.
Immediately upon the capture of Fort Henry, work was begun on this line
of infantry defence. The garrison, increased by the force from Fort
Henry, numbered about six thousand effective men, under the command of
Brigadier-General Bushrod R. Johnson. General Pillow, ordered by
General A.S. Johnston, arrived on February 9th from Clarksville with
2,000 men. He was immediately followed by General Clarke, who had been
stationed at Hopkinsville with 2,000 more; and Generals Floyd and
Buckner, who were at Russellville with 8,000 more, followed. General
Johnston began to set them all in motion by telegram from Bowling Green,
before he received news of the surrender of Fort Henry. General Floyd
was so averse to going to Donelson that he continued to remonstrate.
General Buckner, whose division had arrived, proposed on the night of
the 11th to take it back to General Floyd, his commanding officer at
Clarksville; but Pillow, who was senior to Buckner, ordered him to
remain, and repaired himself to Clarksville. Under the combined
influence of Pillow's persuasion and General Johnston's orders, Floyd
finally made up his mind to go, and arrived at Donelson with the last of
his command in the night of the 12th. Meanwhile, Major-General Polk had
sent 1,860 men from Columbus. On the night of February 12th, Donelson
was defended by about 20,000 men. The heavy guns in the water batteries
were manned mostly by details from light batteries and artillery drilled
a short time before the national force appeared, by two artillery
officers, under the supervision of Colonel Milton A. Haynes, Chief of
the Tennessee Corps of Artillery.
General Grant, in reporting to General Halleck, on February 6th, the
surrender of Fort Henry, added: "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson
on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry." It was soon clear that he could
not haul wagons over the road, and he proposed to go without wagons and
double-team his artillery. The water continued rising. For two miles
inland from Fort Henry the road was for the greater part under water. On
the 8th he telegraphed: "I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day with
infantry and cavalry alone, but all my troops may be kept busily
engaged in saving what we now have from the rapidly rising water." The
cavalry, however, fording the overflow, went to the front of Donelson on
the 7th, skirmished with the pickets, and felt the outposts.
General Halleck went earnestly to work gathering and forwarding troops
and supplies. Seasoned troops from Missouri, and regiments from the
depots in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio--so freshly formed that they had
hardly changed their civil garb for soldier's uniform before they were
hurried to the front to take their first military lessons in the school
of bivouac and battle--were alike gathered up. General Halleck
telegraphed Grant to use every effort to transform Fort Henry into a
work strong on its landward side, and by all means to destroy the
railroad bridge across the Cumberland at Clarksville, above Fort
Donelson. Grant was urging Commodore Foote to send boats up the
Cumberland to co-operate in an attack on Donelson.
On February 11th, Foote sailed from Cairo with his fleet. On the same
day Grant sent six regiments, which had arrived at Fort Henry on
transports, down the river on the boats from which they had not landed,
to follow the fleet up the Cumberland. He also on the same day moved the
greater part of his force out several miles from Fort Henry on to solid
ground. On the morning of the 12th, leaving General L. Wallace and 2,500
men at Fort Henry, he moved by two roads, diverging at Fort Henry, but
coming together again at Dover, with 15,000 men and eight field
batteries. The force was organized in two divisions; the first commanded
by General McClernand, the second by General C.F. Smith. McClernand had
three brigades. The first, commanded by Colonel R.J. Oglesby, comprised
the Eighth, Eighteenth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first
Illinois, the batteries of Schwartz and Dresser, and four companies of
cavalry. The second, commanded by Colonel W.H.L. Wallace, consisted of
the Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-fifth, and Forty-eighth Illinois, Colonel
Dickey's Fourth Illinois Cavalry, and Taylor's and McAllister's
batteries. The third, commanded by Colonel W.R. Morrison, comprised the
Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois. Smith's first brigade, commanded
by Colonel John McArthur, was composed of the Ninth, Twelfth, and
Forty-first Illinois. The second brigade was left at Fort Henry. The
third, Colonel John Cook, contained the Fifty-second Indiana, Seventh
and Fiftieth Illinois, Thirteenth Missouri, and Twelfth Iowa; and the
fourth, Colonel John G. Lauman, contained the Twenty-fifth and
Fifty-sixth Indiana, and the Second, Seventh, and Fourteenth Iowa. Major
Cavender's battalion of Missouri artillery was attached to the division.
Some of Major Cavender's guns were twenty-pounders. Three pieces in
McAllister's battery were twenty-four pound howitzers.
McClernand's division, preceded by the Fourth Illinois cavalry, marched
in advance on both roads. No opposition was encountered before reaching
the pickets in front of Donelson. The advance came in sight of the fort
about noon. McArthur's brigade, forming the rear of the column, halted
about three miles from the fort at 6 P.M., and moved into position at
half-past ten. It was observed by Colonel W.H. L. Wallace, whose brigade
was at the head of the column on the telegraph or direct road between
Forts Henry and Donelson, that the enemy's camps were on the other side
of the creek, which, on examination, was found to be impassable. He
moved up the creek and joined Colonel Oglesby, whose brigade was the
advance on the Ridge road, in a wooded hollow, screened from view from
the works by an intervening ridge.
The moment that deployment was begun, Oglesby's brigade, which was the
farther to the right, was briskly attacked by cavalry, who, after a
sharp skirmish, retired. McClernand's division was assigned to the
right, C.F. Smith's to the left. The day was spent feeling through the
thick woods and along deep ravines, and high, narrow winding ridges. At
times a distant glimpse was caught, through some opening, of the gleam
of tents crowning a height; at times, a regiment tearing its way through
blinding undergrowth was startled and cut by the sudden discharge from a
battery almost overhead, which it had come upon unawares. The advancing
skirmish-line was in constant desultory conflict with the posted
picket-line. Batteries, occasionally, where an opening through the
timber permitted, took a temporary position and engaged the hostile
batteries. The afternoon passed in thus developing the fire of the line
of works, feeling towards a position and acquiring an idea of the
formation of the ground. Smith's division, by night, was in line in
front of Buckner, and McClernand's right had crossed Indian Creek and
reached the Wynn's Creek road. The column had marched without
transportation. The men had nothing but what they carried in knapsack
and haversack. Shelter-tents had not yet come into use. The danger of
drawing the enemy's fire prevented the lighting of camp-fires. The army
bivouacked in line of battle. The besieged resumed at night their task,
which had been interrupted by the afternoon skirmishing, of completing
and strengthening their works.
Next morning, Thursday the 13th, arrived, and the fleet had not come.
Fifteen thousand men, without supplies, confronted 20,000 well
intrenched. A party was sent to destroy the railroad bridge over the
Tennessee, above Fort Henry, the trestle approach to which had been
partly destroyed by Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, to prevent effectually
reinforcements reaching Donelson from Columbus. Order was sent to
General Lewis Wallace, who had been left with a brigade in command at
Fort Henry, to join the besieging force. The two divisions on the ground
prosecuted the work of feeling for position and probing the enemy.
Colonel Lauman's brigade, of C.F. Smith's division, bivouacked the night
of the 12th, about a mile from the intrenchments. On the 13th he moved
over the intervening ridges till he came in view of the portion of the
works held by Colonel Hanson, constituting the right of General
Buckner's line. A deep hollow filled with timber filled the space
between Lauman and the works before him. On the farther slope, crowned
by the works, the slashed timber made an extensive abattis. Colonel
Veatch, with the Twenty-fifth Indiana, advanced across the ravine or
hollow, and forced his way partly up the slope. He remained with his
command two hours exposed to a fire to which, from their position, they
could make no effectual reply, and were recalled. The Seventh and
Fourteenth Iowa moved up to the left of the position reached by Colonel
Veatch, and a detachment of sharpshooters was posted so as to reach with
their fire the men in the trenches and divert their fire. At night
Lauman withdrew his command to the place of the previous night's
bivouac. Colonel Cook's brigade advanced, the morning of the 13th, on
the right of Lauman's. The left of his line came also in front of
Hanson's works. The valley was here filled with such an "immensity of
abattis" that he did not feel justified in ordering an attempt to cross
it, but kept up through the day a desultory fire of skirmishers and
sharpshooters over it. The demonstration made by Lauman and Cook
appeared so threatening that General Buckner sent the Eighteenth
Tennessee to reinforce Hanson. The Seventh Illinois, which constituted
the right of Cook's advance moving through the timber where a ridge
leads to a battery at a salient in General Buckner's line, suddenly
found itself under fire and retired. Colonel Cook formed his line with
the other four regiments upon a ridge overlooking the enemy's
intrenchments, about six hundred yards from them, separated from them by
a valley dense with timber, mostly cut so as to form abattis, and
remained in this position for the night.
McClernand continued pressing all day to his right, following the course
of the ridge along which the Wynn's Ferry road passes. By night his
right nearly or quite reached the point where the Wynn's Ferry road
issued from the intrenchments. His artillery was very active; the
companies acting at times separately, at times uniting and concentrating
their fire on some well-served battery, they silenced temporarily
several batteries, and in the afternoon shelled some camps. A determined
assault was made on the position held by Maney's battery, supported by
Colonel Heiman with the Tenth, Forty-eighth, and Fifty-third Tennessee,
and the Twenty-seventh Alabama. This position was, at the same time, the
most salient and the most elevated in the entire line of intrenchment.
It was so traced that both faces were swept by artillery and infantry
fire from portions of the works to the right and the left. Colonel
Morrison was directed with his brigade, the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth
Illinois, to assault this position. Colonel Haynie, of the Forty-eighth
Illinois, senior to Morrison, was ordered to join him and take the
command. Morrison, on the right, assaulted the left face of the work;
the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth assaulted the right. Crossing the
valley, they began the ascent, encountered the tangled abattis, and
while striving to tear their way through it, under a plunging fire from
the battery and the infantry above them, they were assailed by artillery
and infantry from a long extent of line beyond. They recoiled from this
toil and this double fire. The Forty-fifth Illinois was sent to
reinforce Morrison. The four regiments started again, forced their way
still farther up the abattis, and were again repelled. Undaunted, they
rushed up the hill-side the third time. Part of the command pierced
through the abattis and reached the rifle-pits. The summit of the
rifle-pits was a blaze of musketry. Maney's guns hurled shrapnel into
their faces. To Morrison's right and to Haynie's left, the long line of
rifle-pits was a line of musketry, and from projecting points the
batteries sent their fire. Morrison was wounded. His men could not climb
over the intrenchment. The regiments recalled, fell back in order out of
fire. The dead leaves on the hill-side were inflamed in some way, in
this close contest, and when artillery and musketry had ceased, helpless
wounded lying on the hill-side were burned to death. Colonel Heiman's
men, leaping over their works, were able to save some. General Buckner
reported his loss in the assault on Hanson's position as thirty-nine
killed and wounded. Ten killed and thirty wounded were reported as
Heiman's loss, most of them in Maney's battery. Nearly every regiment in
the entire line of the intrenchments suffered some casualties from the
National artillery. The national loss was more severe. The pertinacity
of the attack through the day prevented the besieged from suspecting the
inferiority in numbers of the attacking force.
The Carondelet, a thirteen-gun ironclad, arrived in the morning of the
13th, and fired at the water-batteries at long-range. One shot struck a
thirty-two-pound gun, disabling it, and killed Captain Dixon, of the
engineers, who had assisted Colonel Gilmer in the construction of both
Henry and Donelson. A shot from the one hundred and twenty-eight-pound
gun in the upper battery, entering a porthole, damaged the machinery of
the Carondelet, and she drew out of range.
The fleet, together with transports bringing reinforcements and
supplies, arrived toward evening. McClernand had moved so far around to
the right as to leave a wide gap between his left and Smith's division.
McArthur's brigade, of Smith's division, was moved to the right. Near
midnight, upon the request of General McClernand, McArthur detached two
regiments and moved them farther to the right, to within a quarter of a
mile of McClernand's left. Severe wind set in with the night. Snow fell
and the ground froze. Fires could not be lighted by either army. Some of
McClernand's regiments, having thrown away their blankets on going into
action, sat up all night.
General Lewis Wallace arrived from Fort Henry about noon, Friday, the
14th, and was placed in command of a division of troops just arrived on
the transports, styled Third Division. The First Brigade, commanded by
Colonel Charles Cruft, consisted of the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth
Kentucky, and the Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Indiana. The Third
Brigade, commanded by Colonel John M. Thayer, comprised the Fifty-eighth
and Seventy-sixth Ohio, and the First Nebraska. The Second Brigade was
not organized; but in the course of Saturday, the Forty-sixth,
Fifty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth Illinois and Twentieth Ohio, reported
separately, and were assigned to duty. General Wallace moved into
position on the right of General C.F. Smith, so as to hold the narrow
ridge or spur which faced the right of Buckner's line, and was separated
from McClernand by the valley of Indian Creek.
The day was quiet along the National lines, and was spent in defining
and adjusting the commands in position. Skirmishers exchanged occasional
shots, and artillerists from time to time tried the range of their
guns. McClernand moved his right still nearer to the river, Oglesby's
brigade reaching nearly to the extreme left of the Confederate works,
and to the head of the back-water up the valley of the small brooks
above Dover; the Eighth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-ninth Illinois were
respectively posted across the three roads, which, leaving the main road
along the ridge, called Wynn's Ferry road, crossed the hollow and
through the enemy's intrenchments into Dover. The cavalry reconnoitered
around the enemy's left, to the muddy and overflowed bottom extending
back from the river immediately above Dover.
According to the report of General Buckner it was decided, in a council
of general officers held that morning, to cut a way for the garrison out
through the enclosing force at once, before delay would make it
impracticable; that General Pillow was to lead, and Buckner to cover the
retreat of the army if the sortie proved successful. Buckner made the
necessary preparations, but early in the afternoon the order was
countermanded by General Floyd, at the instance of General Pillow, who,
after drawing out his troops for the attack, thought it too late for the
attempt. Though this is not mentioned in the reports of General Floyd,
General Pillow, or Colonel Gilmer, Colonel Baldwin in his report says
that General Buckner formed his division in open ground to the left and
rear of the intrenchments, for the purpose, apparently, of attacking the
National right, Colonel Baldwin's command being the head of the column;
that the column marched out by a road about two hundred yards from the
left of the intrenchments, and approached the right of the National line
by a course nearly perpendicular to it; but, after advancing a quarter
of a mile, General Pillow said it was too late in the day to accomplish
anything, and the troops returned to their quarters. Major Brown,
commanding the Twentieth Mississippi, reports substantially the same,
and adds they were under fire as soon as they began the advance, and one
of his men was shot before they advanced one hundred yards.
About three o'clock in the afternoon Flag Officer Foote moved his fleet
up the river to attack the fort. The flag-ship St. Louis and three other
ironclads, the Carondelet, Louisville, and Pittsburg, each armed with
thirteen guns, advanced, followed by the wooden gunboats Tyler and
Conestoga. The water-battery attacked was a mere trench twenty feet
wide, sunk in the hill-side. The excavated earth thrown up outside the
ditch made a rampart twelve feet through at the summit. Carefully laid
sand-bags added to the height of the rampart, and left narrow spaces for
embrasures; narrow, but sufficient there, where the channel of the
river, straight and narrow, required the fleet to advance in a straight
line and with a narrow front. Such a work, at an elevation of thirty
feet above the water, was almost unassailable.
The gunboats opened fire when a mile and a half from the fort, and
continued advancing slowly and firing rapidly till the ironclads were
within four hundred yards of the battery. The boats could use only their
bow-guns, three on each boat. After a severe action of an hour and a
half, a solid shot entering the pilot-house of the flag-ship, carried
away the wheel, and the tiller-ropes of the Louisville were disabled by
a shot. The relieving-tackles being no longer able to steer or control
these boats in the rapid current, they became wholly unmanageable, and
drifted down the river. The other two boats were also damaged, and the
whole fleet withdrew. There were fifty-four, officers and men, killed
and wounded on the fleet--Commodore Foote being one of the wounded. The
flag-ship alone was struck fifty-nine times. One rifled gun on the
Carondelet burst during the action. The terrible pounding by the heavy
navy guns seems to have inflicted no injury upon the earthworks, their
armament, or the men.
Transports arrived in the course of the day, bringing additional
reinforcements. General McArthur was ordered at 5 P.M. to occupy ground
on the extreme right of the National line, to act as a reserve to
General Oglesby. He reached the assigned position in the dark, about 7
P.M., and "encamped for the night, without instructions and without
adequate knowledge of the nature of the ground in front and on the
right." The troops, without shelter and without fires, suffered another
night of cold and wind and snow and sleet, after a day without food.
In the night, General Floyd, in council with General Pillow, General
Buckner, and Colonel Gilmer, determined to make a sortie in the morning,
and, if practicable, cut a way out, and retreat by the Wynn's Ferry road
to Charlotte. Pillow was to begin with an attack on McClernand's right,
assisted by the cavalry. When he should succeed in pushing back the
right, Buckner was to issue from the works and strike the division near
its centre. When the whole of the division should be rolled back onto
Lewis Wallace, leaving a cleared way out into the country over the road,
Pillow's division was to lead, and Buckner to hold the National forces
back and afterward serve as rear-guard on the retreat to Charlotte. The
brigade commanders were sent for and received instructions. No
instructions were given to them, nor was anything said in the council,
as to what supplies the troops should carry, and some regiments took
neither knapsacks nor rations. Before dawn, Saturday, the 15th, Pillow's
division began assembling, as on the previous day, on open ground in
rear of the extreme left of the intrenchments. Colonel Baldwin, who was
posted with two of his regiments, the Twenty-sixth Tennessee and
Twenty-sixth Mississippi, in Pillow's portion of the intrenchments,
while the rest of his brigade was west of Indian Creek, under Buckner,
held the advance, the Twentieth Mississippi being added to his command,
giving him a temporary brigade of three regiments. Colonel Heiman, with
his brigade and Maney's battery, strengthened by the Forty-second
Tennessee, were to remain in position and thence aid the attack while it
was going on. The Thirtieth Tennessee was to occupy the trenches vacated
by Buckner, while the Forty-ninth and Fiftieth Tennessee were to act as
garrison to the main work--the fort.
Commodore Foote wrote to General Grant desiring an interview with him,
and asking, as he was disabled by wounds, to be excused from going to
see Grant, requested that the interview be held on the flag-ship. The
Twentieth Ohio, which had arrived on transports the evening before and
was ordered to report to General Lewis Wallace the day before, while
marching after breakfast from the boats to the fort, met General Grant
with some of his staff riding down the river road to where the boats
lay. The sally had been made and the attack begun; but there was nothing
in the sound that came through several miles of intervening forest to
indicate anything more serious than McClernand's previous assaults.
Baldwin's brigade, leaving the intrenchments at 6 A.M., marched by the
right flank out a narrow and obstructed byroad, crossed the valley in
front of the works, and, while ascending the slope beyond, encountered
what they supposed to be a line of pickets. But Oglesby's hungry men had
slept little that cold night, and by simply rising to their feet were in
line of battle. Baldwin's brigade, in attempting to deploy, was thrown
into confusion, repeatedly rallied, and was thrown into disorder and
pushed back before its line was established. Colonel Baldwin, in his
report, says that deployment forward into line would have brought his
men into such an exposed situation that he threw his regiment first into
column of company, then deployed on the right into line, and admits that
practising tactics with new troops under fire is a different thing from
practice on the drill-ground. The movement that Colonel Baldwin
attempted with his leading regiment, the Twenty-sixth Mississippi, is
the same that General Sigel accomplished at Pea Ridge with such
brilliant effect, where he had by artillery fire to drive back the
enemy's line to gain room for each successive deployment.
The firing sufficiently notified General McArthur where he was, and,
without waiting for orders, he formed his brigade into line on Oglesby's
right. Pillow's division, continually filing out from the intrenchments,
continually extended his line to his left. McArthur, to gain distance to
his right, widened the intervals between his regiments, refused his
right, and prolonged it by a skirmish line. Oglesby brought into action
Schwartz's battery, then commanded by Lieutenant Gumbart, and the
batteries in position in the besieged intrenchments joined in the
combat. A tenacious fight, face to face, ensued--so stationary that its
termination seemed to be a mere question of endurance and ammunition.
General Pillow moved the Twentieth Mississippi by wheeling its left to
the front. In this position the regiment suffered so severely that it
withdrew and took shelter behind a rising ground. A depression was found
by which General B.R. Johnson's brigade could find comparative
protection while moving to their left and gaining distance to their
front. General McArthur found his right flank turned and his ammunition
nearly exhausted, and withdrew his brigade to a new position several
hundred yards to his rear. Oglesby moved the Eighteenth Illinois to the
right, to partially fill the vacated line, and brought up the Thirtieth
Illinois from its position in reserve to take the place left by the
Eighteenth. Colonel Lawler, of the Eighteenth, was wounded early in the
engagement. Captain Brush, who had succeeded to the command, was wounded
while carrying out this movement. The ammunition of the Eighteenth being
now nearly gone, it retired in good order to replenish, leaving 44 of
its number dead, and 170 wounded on the ground where it had stood.
McClernand, when he found his command heavily pressed, sent to Lewis
Wallace, the adjoining division commander, for aid. Wallace sent to
Grant's headquarters for instructions, but the General was away on the
flag-ship, and his staff did not take the responsibility of acting in
his place. Wallace, having been ordered to act on the defensive,
declined to move without first receiving an order. When McArthur fell
back, Oglesby's right became enveloped, McClernand repeated his request,
and Wallace, seeing the affair was serious, took the responsibility, and
ordered Cruft's brigade to advance. The Twenty-fifth Kentucky, on coming
up, by some mistake fired into the Eighth and Twenty-ninth Illinois.
These regiments and the Thirtieth Illinois broke and retired. The Eighth
had lost 55 killed and 188 wounded; the Twenty-ninth, 25 killed and 60
wounded; the Thirtieth, 19 killed and 71 wounded. The wounded had been
taken off to a building in the rear, which was turned into a hospital.
Cruft maintained his position stoutly, receiving and making charges, and
firing steadily from line. His men found the same difficulty that is
mentioned in reports of other commanders, of distinguishing the enemy
except when close at hand, or in motion. Their uniform, of the same
color with the dead leaves of dense scrub-oak, uniforms and foliage at a
short distance were undistinguishable. McArthur drew his brigade back
out of the contest, halted, and obtained ammunition and rations. His
men, who had fasted thirty-six hours, had one good meal before they
moved toward night to the extreme left, in support of the troops there
engaged. Cruft's brigade, being isolated, finally retired to the right
and rear, and took position near the hospital.
When the rest of Oglesby's brigade retreated, the Thirty-first Illinois,
Colonel John A. Logan, the left of the brigade and connecting with the
right of Colonel W.H.L. Wallace's brigade, wheeled so as to have its
line at right angles with the line of the enemy's intrenchments; for, as
McArthur's and Oglesby's commands crumbled away, Pillow's division,
rolling up McClernand's, were now advancing in a course parallel to the
front of their intrenchments. The Thirty-first held its ground; but
yielding was only a question of time. As Pillow's division in deploying
continually increased its front, Colonel Baldwin's brigade was
continually pressed to his right and came in front of W.H.L. Wallace's
brigade. McCausland's brigade, consisting of the Thirty-sixth and
Fiftieth Virginia, formed on Baldwin's right and in front of W.H.L.
Wallace, Their assault was aided by the batteries in position in the
intrenchments, and Wallace's batteries alternately replied to the
artillery and played upon the line of infantry. Wallace held his line,
and Pillow sent to Buckner to advance. Buckner held his command within
the intrenchments massed, waiting for his opportunity. He sent three
regiments, Third Tennessee, Eighteenth Tennessee, and Fourteenth
Mississippi, across the intervening hollow. They attacked with spirit;
but, confused by the missiles flying overhead, broken by pushing through
the snow-covered boughs, and galled by the hot fire they encountered,
they quickly fell back in disorder, and, according to General Buckner,
communicated their depression to the rest of his command.
Toward noon, as McClernand's right was rolled up and began to crumble,
Buckner, who had cheered his men, now led his division farther to his
right, near to Heiman's position in the intrenchments; there he
approached under cover till near Wallace's line. Three batteries
supported his charge--Maney's, Porter's, and Graves', these three
batteries concentrating their fire on Wallace's artillery. Forrest
brought his cavalry forward. Wallace's brigade, with Taylor's and
McAllister's batteries, and Logan's regiment, with boxes nearly empty,
withstood the combined attack. McAllister fired his last round of
ammunition. Taylor had fired seventeen hundred rounds of ammunition, an
average of two hundred and eighty-three rounds to the piece. The
infantry fired their last cartridge. The batteries of Maney, Graves, and
Porter poured in their fire; the divisions of Pillow and Buckner
aided--some regiments at a halt firing, but Buckner's advancing.
Forrest's cavalry hovered on the outskirts. Wallace gave the command to
fall back. McAllister had not horses left to haul off his three
howitzers, and had to leave two. The order did not reach the Eleventh
Illinois. The rest of the command fell back in regular order, and the
Eleventh and Thirty-first continued fighting. Colonel Logan, of the
Thirty-first, was wounded; the lieutenant-colonel was killed. Thirty
others were killed. The ranks were thinned by the wounded who had fallen
and been carried off the field. Ammunition was gone. Logan told
Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, of the Eleventh Illinois, who, having had his
wound dressed, had returned to his regiment, that the Thirty-first must
leave, and suggested that the Eleventh should take the position left by
the Thirty-first. The Thirty-first marched steadily from the field, and
the Eleventh, alone now, faced to the rear, wheeled to the left, and
continued the fight. But, assailed on both flanks as well as in front,
and finally charged by the cavalry, it was broken, and fell back in
disorder. The brigade fell back half a mile.
Fugitives from the front passed by General Lewis Wallace, who was
conversing with Captain Rawlins, General Grant's assistant
adjutant-general. Among them a mounted officer galloped down the road,
shouting, "We are cut to pieces." General Wallace at once ordered
Colonel Thayer's brigade to the front. Marching by the flank, they soon
met portions of Oglesby's and Colonel Wallace's brigades retiring from
the field. They all stated they were out of ammunition. Thayer's brigade
passed on at a double-quick. Position was taken; a battery, Company A,
Chicago Light Artillery, commanded by Captain Wood, was posted across
the road; to its right, the First Nebraska and Fifty-eighth Illinois; to
the left, the Fifty-eighth Ohio and a company of the Thirty-second
Illinois. The Seventy-sixth Ohio and Forty-sixth and Fifty-seventh
Illinois were posted in reserve. As soon as this line was formed,
interposed between the enemy and the retiring regiments, they halted and
waited for ammunition. The line was scarcely formed before a force,
coming up the road and through the forest, made a fierce attack. The
assault was vigorous. The line remained steady, and, with fire
deliberate and well aimed, quickly drove off the assailants. That closed
the attack made by the sortie. Colonel Cruft's brigade, the position of
which was not then known to General Wallace, was off at the right, near
enough to see the repulsed force retire in the direction of the works.
Cruft's brigade was brought into alignment with Thayer's, and Wallace
held the ground with his division.
McClernand's division was swept from the ground which it had occupied.
The desired road for retreat was open to the besieged. Buckner was in
the position assigned to him, and halting, awaited his artillery and
reserves from the intrenchments. General Pillow, who now found himself
within the intrenchments at the salient, held by Colonel Heiman,
directed the artillery to remain, and sent reiterated orders to Buckner
to return and resume his position within the works. He was in the act of
returning when he met General Floyd, who seemed surprised at the
movement. After some conversation, in which both agreed that the
original plan should be carried out, Floyd directed Buckner to remain
till he could see Pillow. After consulting with Pillow, Floyd sent
orders to Buckner to retire within the lines, and to repair as rapidly
as possible to his former position on the extreme right, which was in
danger of attack. By order of General B.R. Johnson, Colonel Drake's
brigade and the Twentieth Mississippi remained on the field.
General Grant, at his interview on the flag-ship, was advised of the
serious injury to the fleet, and informed that Commodore Foote, leaving
his two ironclads least injured to protect the transports at the
landing, would proceed to Cairo with the other two, repair them, hasten
the completion of the Benton and mortar-boats, and return to the
prosecution of the siege. General Grant, upon this, made up his mind to
intrench, and with reinforcements complete the investment of the enemy's
works. Reaching the lines about one o'clock on his return, he learned
the state of affairs, ordered General C.F. Smith to prepare to storm the
works in his front, repaired to the right, inspected the condition of
the troops, and gave orders to be ready to attack when General Smith
should make his assault.
The Fifty-second Indiana had been detached from Colonel Cook's brigade
to watch a gap in the intrenchments, near the extreme right of the
besieged line. At two o'clock General Smith ordered the assault by
Lauman's brigade; the Fifty-second Indiana was temporarily attached to
the brigade. The assaulting force was formed in column of battalions of
five companies each. The Second Iowa was in advance, with General Smith
in its centre, and followed in order by the Fifty-second Indiana,
Twenty-fifth Indiana, Seventh Iowa, and Fourteenth Iowa. Birge's
sharpshooters, deployed on each flank, opened a skirmishing fire. The
column advanced silently, without firing, crushed down the abattis,
covered the hill-side with battalions, heedless of the fire from the
garrison, pressed on to the works, leaped over, formed in line, and
drove the defending regiment to further shelter.
Just at this time General Buckner was gaining this, the extreme right of
the line of intrenchments, with Hanson's regiment, which had left it in
the morning for the sortie. Hanson pushed his men forward, but the works
were occupied. The Thirtieth Tennessee, which had been holding that
portion of the works during the day, fell back to another ridge or spur,
between the captured work and the main fort. Lauman's brigade pushed on
to assault that position. Hanson's regiment, the Third, Eighteenth, and
Forty-first Tennessee and Fourteenth Mississippi, came to the aid of the
Thirtieth; portions of Porter's and Graves' batteries were brought up.
The Forty-ninth and Fiftieth Tennessee, the garrison of the fort,
hastened out in support. General Smith sent for Cook's brigade and
artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson sent up two ten-pound Parrott
guns. Buckner held the inner ridge, to which his men had retired, and
intrenched it in the night. Smith held the works he had gained, an
elevation as high as any within the line. His battery established
there, enfiladed part of the line still held, and took in reverse nearly
the whole of the intrenchments. In the charge, the column, including
Birge's sharpshooters, but excluding the Fifty-second Indiana, lost 61
killed and 321 wounded; of these, the Second Iowa lost 41 killed and 157
wounded. General Smith, though sixty years old, spent the night without
shelter, on the captured ridge.
General Grant, having set in motion C.F. Smith's attack, rode to the
right and ordered the troops there to take the offensive and regain the
ground that had been lost. General Lewis Wallace moved with a brigade
commanded by Colonel Morgan L. Smith, and made of the Eighth Missouri
and Eleventh Indiana, in advance. These two regiments belonged to
Smith's division, and marched from Fort Henry to Donelson with Wallace.
Colonel M.L. Smith, in his report, calls this command the Fifth Brigade,
Third Division. The regimental commanders in their reports style it,
Fifth Brigade, General C.F. Smith's division. Following was Cruft's
brigade. General Wallace says, in his report: "As a support, two Ohio
regiments, under Colonel Ross, were moved up and well advanced on the
left flank of the assailing force, but held in reserve." Colonel Ross,
of the Seventeenth Illinois, arriving at the front that morning and
reporting for duty, was at once assigned to the command of the brigade
composed of the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois, and, as ordered by
General McClernand, moved with General Wallace in support and reserve,
till recalled about dark by McClernand. An Ohio regiment, the Twentieth,
Colonel Whittlesey, did go out in support and reserve, but it was not
under Colonel Ross, and it remained close to the enemy's works all
night.
The column approached the ridge held by Drake's brigade and the
Twentieth Mississippi. M.L. Smith's brigade came in front, where the
slope was bare; Cruft had to push up through bushes. General Wallace
speaks with admiration of the advance by Smith. He advanced his line and
ordered it to lie down, and to continue firing while lying down. As soon
as the fire of the enemy on the summit slackened, the regiments rose,
dashed up the hill, and lay down again before the fire from the hill-top
could be made effective. In a short time, with rapid bounds, the summit
was gained. Cruft's brigade pushed up through the bushes. Drake fell
back within the intrenchments. Wallace stationed his picket-line close
to the enemy's works. The retiring Confederate force took with them six
captured pieces of artillery, several thousand small arms, and between
two and three hundred prisoners; but returned to their trenches weary,
disappointed, disheartened.
In the night General Floyd and General Buckner met with General Pillow
and his staff, at General Pillow's headquarters, to consider the
situation. After some recrimination between Pillow and Buckner whether
the intention and plan had been to commence the retreat directly from
the battlefield, or first to cut a way out and then return to the works,
equip for a march and retreat by night, it was agreed to evacuate that
night and march out by the ground which had been gained. Pillow ordered
the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary to burn the stores at
half-past five in the morning. Precaution was taken, however, before
actually preparing for the movement, to send out scouts to see if the
way were still clear. The scouts returned with report that the National
forces had reoccupied the ground. This being doubted, other scouts were
sent out, who brought the same report in more positive terms. Pillow
proposed to cut a way out. Buckner said that was now impossible, and
Floyd acquiesced. Pillow at last assented to this, but proposed to hold
the fort at least one day longer and take the chances of getting out.
Buckner said that was impossible; a lodgement had been made in the key
of his position; assault would certainly follow as soon as it was light,
and he could not withstand it. It was remarked that no alternative was
left but to surrender. General Floyd said he would never surrender--he
would die first. Pillow said substantially the same. Buckner said, if he
were in command, he would surrender and share the fate of the garrison.
Floyd inquired of Buckner, "If the command should devolve on you, would
you permit me to take out my brigade?" To which Buckner replied, "Yes,
if you leave before the terms of capitulation are agreed on." Forrest
asked, "Gentlemen, have I leave to cut my way out?" Pillow answered,
"Yes, sir, cut your way out," and asked, "Is there anything wrong in my
leaving?" Floyd replied, "Every person must judge for himself of that?"
Whereupon General Pillow said, "Then I shall leave this place." General
Floyd turned to General Pillow and told him, "General Pillow, I turn the
command over, sir." General Pillow said, "And I pass it." General
Buckner said, "And I assume it," and countermanded the order for the
destruction of the commissary and quartermaster stores, and ordered
white flags to be prepared and a bugler to report to him.
At eleven o'clock that night Floyd telegraphed to General A.S. Johnston
a glorious victory. Four hours later, at the close of the council or
conference, he telegraphed: "We are completely invested by an army many
times our numbers. I regret to say the unanimous opinion of the officers
seems to be that we cannot maintain ourselves against these forces."
Colonel Forrest reported that upon examination he found that deep mud
and water made an escape by land, between the investing force and the
river, impracticable for infantry. Forrest marched out with all the
cavalry but Gantt's Tennessee battalion and two companies of Helm's
Kentucky cavalry, taking with him the horses of Porter's battery and
about two hundred men of various commands. There was not a steamboat at
the landing; General Floyd had sent all up the river with wounded and
prisoners. Not a skiff or yawl could be found. A little flatboat or scow
was got by some means from the other side of the river, and on this
General Pillow crossed the river with his staff and Colonel Gilmer. Two
steamboats returned at daybreak, one of them bringing "about four
hundred raw troops." The four hundred raw troops were dumped on shore,
and Floyd took possession of the boats. Floyd's brigade, consisting of
four Virginia regiments and the Twentieth Mississippi, had been divided
during the siege. The four Virginia regiments were organized into two
brigades, and the Twentieth Mississippi attached to another command. Two
Virginia regiments were ferried across the river, and the Twentieth
Mississippi, understanding that they were to be taken on board with
Floyd, stood on guard and kept off the growing crowd of clamorous
soldiers while the other two Virginia regiments embarked. The rope was
cut and Floyd steamed up the river, leaving the Twentieth Mississippi
and his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Breckenridge Drake, behind. It was said
afterward that word was received from General Buckner that the boat must
leave at once, or it would not be allowed to leave.
Soon after daybreak, Sunday the 16th, the men of Lauman's brigade heard
the notes of a bugle advancing from the fort. It announced an officer,
who bore to General Grant a letter from General Buckner, proposing the
appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation, and
also proposing an armistice until noon. General Grant replied,
acknowledging the receipt of the letter, and adding: "No terms except an
unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move
immediately upon your works." Buckner replied: "The distribution of the
forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders,
and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me,
notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday,
to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose."
White flags were displayed along the works; the National troops marched
in, and General Grant at once made the following order: "All prisoners
taken at the surrender of Fort Donelson will be collected as rapidly as
practicable near the village of Dover, under their respective company
and regimental commanders, or in such manner as may be deemed best by
Brigadier-General S.B. Buckner, and will receive two days' rations
preparatory to embarking for Cairo. Prisoners are to be allowed their
clothing, blankets, and such private property as may be carried about
the person, and commissioned officers will be allowed their side-arms."
There is disagreement as to the number of guns captured. There were
thirteen in the water-batteries and eight in the fort. Besides, there
were eight artillery companies, whose field-pieces were disposed in nine
positions along the line of intrenchments. Six of these companies were
those of Maney, Porter, Graves, Green, Guy, Jackson. The other two are
called Ross and Murray in the account in the Nashville _Patriot_, and
called Parker and French on the pen-sketch of the works showing the
position of the light batteries, found among the Confederate records.
The number of pieces in these batteries is not given. Badeau gives the
number of guns surrendered at sixty-five, and no reason is seen why that
is not correct.
There is no means of determining with any precision the number of the
garrison. General Grant, on the day of the surrender, reported the
number of prisoners taken as twelve to fifteen thousand. Badeau says the
number captured was 14,623; and that rations were issued at Cairo to
that number of prisoners taken at Fort Donelson. According to a report
or estimate made by Major Johnson, of the first Mississippi, and found
among his papers in Mississippi in 1864, the number "engaged" was
15,246, and the number surrendered 11,738. General Floyd gives no
estimate. General Pillow, in his brief to the Secretary of War of the
Confederacy, defending himself from charges, gives thirteen thousand as
about the number engaged in the defence; while General Buckner, in a
report made after he was exchanged, says the aggregate of the army
within the works was never greater than twelve thousand. An estimate
published in the Nashville _Patriot_ soon after the surrender makes the
number engaged 13,829.
Major Brown's estimate was evidently the most deliberate and careful,
yet it is not free from error. It is not accurate in the number of
casualties. The regimental reports made after the surrender are not
numerous, but they present some means of testing Major Brown's estimate.
According to that estimate, the Eighth Kentucky lost 19 killed and 41
wounded; according to the official report of Colonel Simonton,
commanding the brigade, the loss of the Eighth Kentucky was 27 killed
and 72 wounded. According to Major Brown's estimate, two of the Virginia
regiments lost none killed or wounded, and the aggregate of the loss of
the four regiments was 13 killed and 113 wounded; according to the
brigade reports, every regiment lost both killed and wounded, the
aggregate being 41 killed and 166 wounded. Major Brown's estimate omits
the Kentucky cavalry battalion of three companies. It names also only
seven artillery companies, while the Nashville _Patriot's_ account and
the memorandum on the manuscript plan of the intrenchments name eight.
This estimate is also incomplete. It gives only the number engaged
belonging to regiments and companies, and thereby excludes brigade and
division commanders, and their staff and enlisted men at their
headquarters; it also excludes the "four hundred raw troops" (the
reports give them no other designation) who arrived too late to be
engaged, but in time to be surrendered; and the estimate being only of
those engaged, excludes sick, special duty men, and all except the
muskets and sabres present for duty in the works. Such an estimate of
"effective" or "engaged" is no basis for a statement of the number
surrendered. The morning report of Colonel Bailey's regiment, the
Forty-ninth Tennessee, for January 14th, was 680 effectives out of an
aggregate of 777. His last morning report before the surrender was 393
effectives out of an aggregate of 773. Major Brown's estimate gives this
regiment 372 engaged. Colonel Bailey's morning report of those present
with him on the way from Donelson to Cairo, which included none from
hospitals, was, officers and men, 490.
There is no report of trustworthy accuracy, giving either the aggregate
or the effective strength. Ten thousand five hundred prisoners were put
into the charge of Colonel Whittlesey, of the Twentieth Ohio; of which
number he sent north, guarded by his own regiment, about six thousand
three hundred; another, but much smaller body, was put into the hands of
Colonel Sweeney. Besides these, were the wounded and sick in hospital,
in camp, and some left on the field. Colonel Whittlesey, at the time,
estimated the entire number taken charge of, including sick and wounded,
at 13,000. General Floyd said that the boats which carried across and
up the river his four Virginia regiments, took at the same time about as
many other troops; and he says he took up the river with him 986,
officers and men, of the four Virginia regiments. Pillow reported, on
March 14th, that several thousand infantry had got out in one way or
other, many of whom were at that time with him at Decatur, Ala., and the
rest under orders to rendezvous there. They continued slipping out after
the surrender. General B.R. Johnson, on the Tuesday after the surrender,
not having reported or been enrolled as a prisoner, walked with a
fellow-officer out of the intrenchments at mid-day, and, not being
challenged, continued beyond the National camps and escaped. The
accounts of the escape by boat with Floyd, on horse with Forrest, and by
parties slipping out by day and by night through the forest and
undergrowth and the devious ravines, fairly show that 5,000 must have
escaped. There was scarcely a regiment or battery, if, indeed, there was
a single regiment or battery, from which some did not escape. Eleven
hundred and thirty-four wounded were sent up the river by boat the
evening before the surrender, and General Pillow estimated the killed at
over four hundred and fifty. This accounts for an aggregate of over
nineteen thousand five hundred, sufficiently near the estimate of
nineteen thousand six hundred--the number in the place during the siege,
and the additional four hundred, who arrived only in time to be
surrendered.
General Floyd surmised the killed and wounded to be fifteen hundred.
Pillow estimated them at two thousand. The National loss was, in
McClernand's division, 1,445 killed and wounded, and 74 missing; in C.F.
Smith's division, 306 killed, 1,045 wounded, and 167 missing; and in
Lewis Wallace's division, 39 killed, 248 wounded, and 5 missing--making
an aggregate of 3,329 killed, wounded, and missing. General Grant sat
down before the place Wednesday the 12th, at noon, with 15,000 men, and
with that number closed in upon the works and made vigorous assaults
next day. Reinforcements began to arrive at the landing Thursday
evening, and when the place surrendered his army had grown by
reinforcements to twenty-seven thousand. Grant had no artillery but the
eight field-batteries which he brought over from Fort Henry to Donelson.
These were not fixed in position and protected by earthworks, but were
moved from place to place and used as batteries in the field.
The defensive line from Columbus to Bowling Green, broken by the capture
of Fort Henry, was now shattered. General A.S. Johnston evacuated
Bowling Green on February 14th, and on the 17th and 18th moved with the
main body of his troops from Nashville to Murfreesboro. The rear-guard
left Nashville on the night of the 23d, and the advance of Buell's army
appeared next morning on the opposite bank of the river. Columbus was
evacuated shortly after. The National authority was re-established over
the whole of Kentucky, the State of Tennessee was opened to the advance
of both army and fleet, and the Mississippi was cleared down to Island
Number Ten.
General Halleck telegraphed on February 17th, the day after the
surrender, to General McClellan: "Make Buell, Grant, and Pope
major-generals of volunteers, and give me command in the West. I ask
this in return for Donelson and Henry." Next day, the 18th, he
telegraphed to General Hunter, commanding the Department of Kansas,
thanking him for his aid in sending troops; and to Grant, ordering him
not to let the gunboats go up higher than Clarksville, whence they must
return to Cairo immediately upon the destruction of the bridge and
railroad. On the 19th he telegraphed to Washington: "Smith, by his
coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle was against us,
turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. Make him a
major-general. You cannot get a better one. Honor him for this victory,
and the whole country will applaud." On the 20th he telegraphed to
McClellan, "I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation
and delay are losing us the golden opportunity." Upon the receipt in
Washington of the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson, the President
at once appointed Grant major-general, and the Senate immediately
confirmed the appointment. Buell and Pope shortly after received the
same promotion. Later, in March, C.F. Smith, McClernand, and Lewis
Wallace were confirmed to the same rank. On March 11th, General Halleck
was assigned to the command of the Department of the Mississippi,
embracing all the troops west of a line drawn north and south
indefinitely through Knoxville, Tenn., and east of the western boundary
of Arkansas and Missouri. On February 15th, Grant had been assigned to
the command of the Military District of Tennessee, the limits of which
were not defined, and General W.T. Sherman succeeded to the command of
the District of Cairo.