OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN
REPRESENTATIVE.
[Sidenote: The procuration of the good of the people.]
The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth
in the end, for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely
the procuration of _the safety of the people_; to which he is obliged by
the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author
of that law, and to none but him. But by safety here, is not meant a
bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every
man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth,
shall acquire to himself.
[Sidenote: By instruction and laws.]
And this is intended should be done, not by care applied to individuals,
further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain;
but by a general providence, contained in public instruction, both of
doctrine, and example; and in the making and executing of good laws, to
which individual persons may apply their own cases.
[Sidenote: Against the duty of a sovereign to relinquish any essential
right of sovereignty.]
And because, if the essential rights of sovereignty, specified before in
the eighteenth chapter, be taken away, the commonwealth is thereby
dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a
war with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in
this life; it is the office of the sovereign, to maintain those rights
entire; and consequently against his duty, first, to transfer to
another, or to lay from himself any of them. For he that deserteth the
means, deserteth the ends; and he deserteth the means, that being the
sovereign, acknowledgeth himself subject to the civil laws; and
renounceth the power of supreme judicature; or of making war, or peace
by his own authority; or of judging of the necessities of the
commonwealth; or of levying money and soldiers, when, and as much as in
his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making officers, and
ministers both of war and peace; or of appointing teachers, and
examining what doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the defence,
peace, and good of the people. [Sidenote: Or not to see the people
taught the grounds of them.] Secondly, it is against his duty, to let
the people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and reasons of
those his essential rights; because thereby men are easy to be seduced,
and drawn to resist him, when the commonwealth shall require their use
and exercise.
And the grounds of these rights, have the rather need to be diligently,
and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any civil law, or
terror of legal punishment. For a civil law, that shall forbid
rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essential rights of the
sovereignty), is not, as a civil law, any obligation, but by virtue only
of the law of nature, that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which
natural obligation, if men know not, they cannot know the right of any
law the sovereign maketh. And for the punishment, they take it but for
an act of hostility; which when they think they have strength enough,
they will endeavour by acts of hostility, to avoid.
[Sidenote: Objection of those that say there are no principles of reason
for absolute sovereignty.]
As I have heard some say, that justice is but a word, without substance;
and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himself, not
only in the condition of war, but also in a commonwealth, is his own,
which I have already showed to be false: so there be also that maintain,
that there are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those
essential rights, which make sovereignty absolute. For if there were,
they would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see,
there has not hitherto been any commonwealth, where those rights have
been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the
savage people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or
principles of reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the
materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and
industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well
building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious
men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers
effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began, though
poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute
commonwealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may
principles of reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make
their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. And
such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: which whether
they come not into the sight of those that have power to make use of
them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular
interests, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine
are not such principles of reason; yet I am sure they are principles
from authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall
come to speak of the kingdom of God, administered by Moses, over the
Jews, his peculiar people by covenant.
[Sidenote: Objection from the incapacity of the vulgar.]
But they say again, that though the principles be right, yet common
people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I
should be glad, that the rich and potent subjects of a kingdom, or those
that are accounted the most learned, were no less incapable than they.
But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine,
proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the
interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing
that setteth up a power to bridle their affections; and learned men, any
thing that discovereth their errors, and thereby lesseneth their
authority: whereas the common people’s minds, unless they be tainted
with dependance on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of
their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public
authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole nations be brought to
_acquiesce_ in the great mysteries of the Christian religion, which are
above reason, and millions of men be made believe, that the same body
may be in innumerable places at one and the same time, which is against
reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching,
protected by the law, to make that received, which is so consonant to
reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to
hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in
the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of
sovereignty, there is no difficulty, whilst a sovereign has his power
entire, but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom
he trusteth in the administration of the commonwealth; and consequently,
it is his duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his
duty, but his benefit also, and security against the danger that may
arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion.
[Sidenote: Subjects are to be taught not to affect change of
government.]
And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that
they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in
their neighbour nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever
present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed
than they, to desire change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an
aristocratical, or democratical assembly, cometh not from aristocracy,
nor from democracy, but from the obedience, and concord of the subjects:
nor do the people flourish in a monarchy, because one man has the right
to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state,
the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they
shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they
that go about by disobedience, to do no more than reform the
commonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish
daughters of Peleus, in the fable; which desiring to renew the youth of
their decrepid father, did by the counsel of Medea, cut him in pieces,
and boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new
man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of God’s
commandments: for there God says, _Non habebis Deos alienos_; Thou shalt
not have the Gods of other nations; and in another place concerning
_kings_, that they are _Gods_.
[Sidenote: Nor adhere, against the sovereign, to popular men.]
Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with
admiration of the virtue of any of their fellow-subjects, how high
soever he stand, or how conspicuously soever he shine in the
commonwealth; nor of any assembly, except the sovereign assembly, so as
to defer to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the sovereign
only, whom, in their particular stations, they represent; nor to receive
any influence from them, but such as is conveyed by them from the
sovereign authority. For that sovereign cannot be imagined to love his
people as he ought, that is not jealous of them, but suffers them by the
flattery of popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have
often been, not only secretly, but openly, so as to proclaim marriage
with them _in facie ecclesiæ_ by preachers, and by publishing the same
in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the
second of the ten commandments.
[Sidenote: Nor to dispute the sovereign power.]
Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great a
fault it is, to speak evil of the sovereign representative, whether one
man, or an assembly of men; or to argue and dispute his power; or any
way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into
contempt with his people, and their obedience, in which the safety of
the commonwealth consisteth, slackened. Which doctrine the third
commandment by resemblance pointeth to.
[Sidenote: And to have days set apart to learn their duty.]
Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when it is taught,
remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the
sovereign power is placed, without setting apart from their ordinary
labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are
appointed to instruct them; it is necessary that some such times be
determined, wherein they may assemble together, and, after prayers and
praises given to God, the sovereign of sovereigns, hear those their
duties told them, and the positive laws, such as generally concern them
all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the authority that maketh
them laws. To this end had the Jews every seventh day, a sabbath, in
which the law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they
were put in mind, that their king was God; that having created the world
in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from
their labour, that that God was their king, which redeemed them from
their servile, and painful labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after
they had rejoiced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawful
recreation. So that the first table of the commandments, is spent all in
setting down the sum of God’s absolute power; not only as God, but as
king by pact, in peculiar, of the Jews; and may therefore give light, to
those that have sovereign power conferred on them by the consent of men,
to see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects.
[Sidenote: And to honour their parents.]
And because the first instruction of children, dependeth on the care of
their parents, it is necessary that they should be obedient to them,
whilst they are under their tuition; and not only so, but that also
afterwards, as gratitude requireth, they acknowledge the benefit of
their education, by external signs of honour. To which end they are to
be taught, that originally the father of every man was also his
sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the
fathers of families, when by instituting a commonwealth, they resigned
that absolute power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the
honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right,
was not necessary to the institution of sovereign power; nor would there
be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the
care to nourish and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no
other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with
the fifth commandment.
[Sidenote: And to avoid doing of injury.]
Again, every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught, which,
consisting in taking from no man what is his, is as much as to say, to
cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbours, by violence or
fraud, of any thing which by the sovereign authority is theirs. Of
things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own
life, and limbs; and in the next degree, in most men, those that concern
conjugal affection; and after them, riches and means of living.
Therefore the people are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one
another’s person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugal
honour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one
another’s goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be showed
the evil consequences of false judgment, by corruption either of judges
or witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and
justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the
sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments.
[Sidenote: And to do all this sincerely from the heart.]
Lastly, they are to be taught, that not only the unjust facts, but the
designs and intentions to do them, though by accident hindered, are
injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in
the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth
commandment, and the sum of the second table; which is reduced all to
this one commandment of mutual charity, _thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thyself_: as the sum of the first table is reduced to _the love of
God_; whom they had then newly received as their king.
[Sidenote: The use of universities.]
As for the means, and conduits, by which the people may receive this
instruction, we are to search, by what means so many opinions, contrary
to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false principles, have
nevertheless been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have
in the precedent chapter specified: as that men shall judge of what is
lawful and unlawful, not by the law itself, but by their own
consciences; that is to say, by their own private judgments: that
subjects sin in obeying the commands of the commonwealth, unless they
themselves have first judged them to be lawful: that their propriety in
their riches is such, as to exclude the dominion, which the commonwealth
hath over the same: that it is lawful for subjects to kill such, as they
call tyrants: that the sovereign power may be divided, and the like;
which come to be instilled into the people by this means. They whom
necessity, or covetousness keepeth attent on their trades, and labour;
and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after
their sensual pleasures; which two sorts of men take up the greatest
part of mankind; being diverted from the deep meditation, which the
learning of truth, not only in the matter of natural justice, but also
of all other sciences necessarily requireth, receive the notions of
their duty, chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of
their neighbours or familiar acquaintance, as having the faculty of
discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in
cases of law and conscience, than themselves. And the divines, and such
others as make show of learning, derive their knowledge from the
universities, and from the schools of law, or from the books, which by
men, eminent in those schools and universities, have been published. It
is therefore manifest, that the instruction of the people, dependeth
wholly, on the right teaching of youth in the universities. But are not,
may some man say, the universities of England learned enough already to
do that? or is it you, will undertake to teach the universities? Hard
questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards
the latter end of Henry the Eighth, the power of the Pope, was always
upheld against the power of the commonwealth, principally by the
universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many preachers,
against the sovereign power of the king, and by so many lawyers, and
others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that
though the universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet
they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of
opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently
instructed; and it is no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that
subtle liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the civil
authority. But to the latter question, it is not fit, nor needful for me
to say either aye, or no: for any man that sees what I am doing, may
easily perceive what I think.
The safety of the people, requireth further, from him, or them that have
the sovereign power, that justice be equally administered to all degrees
of people; that is, that as well the rich and mighty, as poor and
obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the
great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence,
dishonour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these,
does the like to one of them: for in this consisteth equity; to which,
as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much subject,
as any of the meanest of his people. All breaches of the law, are
offences against the commonwealth: but there be some, that are also
against private persons. Those that concern the commonwealth only, may
without breach of equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is
done against himself, according to his own discretion. But an offence
against a private man, cannot in equity be pardoned, without the consent
of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.
The inequality of subjects, proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power;
and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign, that
is to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and
their subjects, in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of
great persons, is to be valued for their beneficence and the aids they
give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences,
oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by
the greatness of their persons; because they have least need to commit
them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in
this manner. Impunity maketh insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred,
an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness,
though with the ruin of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Equal taxes.]
To equal justice, appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the
equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the
equality of the debt that every man oweth to the commonwealth for his
defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of
his life; but also to fight, if need be, for the securing of his labour.
They must either do as the Jews did after their return from captivity,
in re-edifying the temple, build with one hand, and hold the sword in
the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the
impositions, that are laid on the people by the sovereign power, are
nothing else but the wages, due to them that hold the public sword, to
defend private men in the exercise of their several trades, and
callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is
the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich; the debt
which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a
rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have
the service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons
but for many more. Which considered, the equality of imposition,
consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the
riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there,
that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour,
consumeth little, should be more charged, than he that living idly,
getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more
protection from the commonwealth, than the other? But when the
impositions, are laid upon those things which men consume, every man
payeth equally for what he useth: nor is the commonwealth defrauded by
the luxurious waste of private men.
[Sidenote: Public charity.]
And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to maintain
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the charity of
private persons; but to be provided for, as far forth as the necessities
of nature require, by the laws of the commonwealth. For as it is
uncharitableness in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the
sovereign of a commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard of such
uncertain charity.
[Sidenote: Prevention of idleness.]
But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to
be forced to work; and to avoid the excuse of not finding employment,
there ought to be such laws, as may encourage all manner of arts; as
navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of manufacture that
requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still
increasing, they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently
inhabited: where nevertheless, they are not to exterminate those they
find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not to
range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court
each little plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in
due season. And when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then
the last remedy of all is war; which provideth for every man, by
victory, or death.
[Sidenote: Good laws, what.]
To the care of the sovereign, belongeth the making of good laws. But
what is a good law? By a good law, I mean not a just law: for no law can
be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done
by such power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and
that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in
the laws of a commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the
gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them. A good law is
that, which is _needful_, for the _good of the people_, and withal
_perspicuous_.
[Sidenote: Such as are necessary.]
For the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the
people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a
motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires,
rashness or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but
to keep them in their way. And therefore a law that is not needful,
having not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be conceived to
be good, when it is for the benefit of the sovereign; though it be not
necessary for the people; but it is not so. For the good of the
sovereign and people, cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign, that
has weak subjects; and a weak people, whose sovereign wanteth power to
rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws; but traps for
money: which where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, are
superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, insufficient to defend
the people.
[Sidenote: Such as are perspicuous.]
The perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the law itself,
as in a declaration of the causes, and motives for which it was made.
That is it, that shows us the meaning of the legislator; and the meaning
of the legislator known, the law is more easily understood by few, than
many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore
multiplication of words in the body of the law, is multiplication of
ambiguity: besides it seems to imply, by too much diligence, that
whosoever can evade the words, is without the compass of the law. And
this is a cause of many unnecessary processes. For when I consider how
short were the laws of ancient times; and how they grew by degrees still
longer; methinks I see a contention between the penners, and pleaders of
the law; the former seeking to circumscribe the latter; and the latter
to evade their circumscriptions; and that the pleaders have got the
victory. It belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator, (such as
is in all commonwealths the supreme representative, be it one man, or an
assembly), to make the reason perspicuous, why the law was made; and the
body of the law itself, as short, but in as proper, and significant
terms, as may be.
[Sidenote: Punishments.]
It belongeth also to the office of the sovereign, to make a right
application of punishments, and rewards. And seeing the end of punishing
is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the
offender, or of others by his example; the severest punishments are to
be inflicted for those crimes, that are of most danger to the public;
such as are those which proceed from malice to the government
established; those that spring from contempt of justice; those that
provoke indignation in the multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem
authorized, as when they are committed by sons, servants, or favourites
of men in authority. For indignation carrieth men, not only against the
actors, and authors of injustice; but against all power that is likely
to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the insolent act of
one of his sons, he was driven out of Rome, and the monarchy itself
dissolved. But crimes of infirmity; such as are those which proceed from
great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance
whether the fact be a great crime, or not, there is place many times for
lenity, without prejudice to the commonwealth; and lenity, when there is
such place for it, is required by the law of nature. The punishment of
the leaders and teachers in a commotion, not the poor seduced people,
when they are punished, can profit the commonwealth by their example. To
be severe to the people, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great
part be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was, that they were no
better instructed.
[Sidenote: Rewards.]
In like manner it belongeth to the office, and duty of the sovereign, to
apply his rewards always so, as there may arise from them benefit to the
commonwealth; wherein consisteth their use, and end; and is then done,
when they that have well served the commonwealth, are with as little
expense of the common treasure, as is possible, so well recompensed, as
others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully
as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it
better. To buy with money, or preferment, from a popular ambitious
subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the
minds of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward; (which is
ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a sign of
gratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the
damage of the public. It is a contention with ambition, like that of
Hercules with the monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one
that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the
stubbornness of one popular man, is overcome with reward, there arise
many more, by the example, that do the same mischief, in hope of like
benefit: and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice encreaseth by
being vendible. And though sometimes a civil war, may be deferred by
such ways as that, yet the danger grows still the greater, and the
public ruin more assured. It is therefore against the duty of the
sovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to reward those that
aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, and not
rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than
after a longer time with greater.
[Sidenote: Counsellors.]
Another business of the sovereign, is to choose good counsellors; I mean
such, whose advice he is to take in the government of the commonwealth.
For this word counsel, _consilium_, corrupted from _considium_, is of a
large signification, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit
together, not only to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also
to judge of facts past, and of law for the present. I take it here in
the first sense only: and in this sense, there is no choice of counsel,
neither in a democracy, nor aristocracy; because the persons counselling
are members of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors
therefore is proper to monarchy; in which, the sovereign that
endeavoureth not to make choice of those, that in every kind are the
most able, dischargeth not his office as he ought to do. The most able
counsellors, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evil
counsel, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace,
and defence of the commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who
expecteth benefit from public troubles; but the signs that guide to a
just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or
irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to
discharge their accustomed expenses, and may easily be observed by any
one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of
the public affairs, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a
great deal the less. For to know, who knows the rules almost of any art,
is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art; because no man can
be assured of the truth of another’s rules, but he that is first taught
to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any art, are,
much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good counsel
comes not by lot, nor by inheritance; and therefore there is no more
reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble, in matter of state,
than in delineating the dimensions of a fortress; unless we shall think
there needs no method in the study of the politics, as there does in the
study of geometry, but only to be lookers on; which is not so. For the
politics is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of
Europe, it hath been taken for a right of certain persons, to have place
in the highest council of state by inheritance; it is derived from the
conquests of the ancient Germans; wherein many absolute lords joining
together to conquer other nations, would not enter into the confederacy,
without such privileges, as might be marks of difference in time
following, between their posterity, and the posterity of their subjects;
which privileges being inconsistent with the sovereign power, by the
favour of the sovereign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them
as their right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last
no further honour, than adhereth naturally to their abilities.
And how able soever be the counsellors in any affair, the benefit of
their counsel is greater, when they give every one his advice, and the
reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an assembly, by way of
orations; and when they have premeditated, than when they speak on the
sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of
action; and are less subject to be carried away to contradiction,
through envy, emulation, or other passions arising from the difference
of opinion.
The best counsel, in those things that concern not other nations, but
only the ease and benefit the subjects may enjoy, by laws that look only
inward, is to be taken from the general informations, and complaints of
the people of each province, who are best acquainted with their own
wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of
the essential rights of sovereignty, to be diligently taken notice of.
For without those essential rights, as I have often before said, the
commonwealth cannot at all subsist.
[Sidenote: Commanders.]
A commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, shall not be
beloved nor feared as he ought to be by his army; and consequently,
cannot perform that office with good success. He must therefore be
industrious, valiant, affable, liberal and fortunate, that he may gain
an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his soldiers. This is
popularity, and breeds in the soldiers both desire, and courage, to
recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the
general in punishing, when need is, the mutinous, or negligent soldiers.
But this love of soldiers, if caution be not given of the commander’s
fidelity, is a dangerous thing to sovereign power; especially when it is
in the hands of an assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the
safety of the people, both that they be good conductors, and faithful
subjects, to whom the sovereign commits his armies.
But when the sovereign himself is popular; that is, reverenced and
beloved of his people, there is no danger at all from the popularity of
a subject. For soldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with
their captain though they love him, against their sovereign, when they
love not only his person, but also his cause. And therefore those, who
by violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful
sovereign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been
always put to the trouble of contriving their titles, to save the people
from the shame of receiving them. To have a known right to sovereign
power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his
own part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see
him able absolutely to govern his own family: nor, on the part of his
enemies, but a disbanding of their armies. For the greatest and most
active part of mankind, has never hitherto been well contented with the
present.
Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are
comprehended in that law, which is commonly called the _law of nations_,
I need not say anything in this place; because the law of nations, and
the law of nature, is the same thing. And every sovereign hath the same
right, in procuring the safety of his people, that any particular man
can have, in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law,
that dictateth to men that have no civil government, what they ought to
do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to
commonwealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and
sovereign assemblies; there being no court of natural justice, but in
the conscience only; where not man, but God reigneth; whose laws, such
of them as oblige all mankind, in respect of God, as he is the author of
nature, are _natural_; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of
kings, are _laws_. But of the kingdom of God, as King of kings, and as
King also of a peculiar people, I shall speak in the rest of this
discourse.
-------