OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS.
[Sidenote: Sin, what.]
A SIN, is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of
the legislator. For such contempt, is a breach of all his laws at once.
And therefore may consist, not only in the _commission_ of a fact, or in
speaking of words by the laws forbidden, or in the _omission_ of what
the law commandeth, but also in the _intention_, or purpose to
transgress. For the purpose to break the law, is some degree of contempt
of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be delighted in the
imagination only, of being possessed of another man’s goods, servants,
or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud,
is no breach of the law, that saith, _Thou shalt not covet_: nor is the
pleasure a man may have in imagining or dreaming of the death of him,
from whose life he expecteth nothing but damage, and displeasure, a sin;
but the resolving to put some act in execution, that tendeth thereto.
For to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it
were real, is a passion so adherent to the nature both of man, and every
other living creature, as to make it a sin, were to make sin of being a
man. The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both
to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the first motions of the
mind, though checked with the fear of God, be sins. But I confess it is
safer to err on that hand, than on the other.
[Sidenote: A crime, what.]
A CRIME, is a sin, consisting in the committing, by deed or word, of
that which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what it hath
commanded. So that every crime is a sin; but not every sin a crime. To
intend to steal, or kill, is a sin, though it never appear in word, or
fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge:
but till it appear by something done, or said, by which the intention
may be argued by a human judge, it hath not the name of crime: which
distinction the Greeks observed, in the word ἁμάρτημα, and ἔγκλημα, or
ἀιτία; whereof the former, which is translated _sin_, signifieth any
swerving from the law whatsoever; but the two latter, which are
translated _crime_, signify that sin only, whereof one man may accuse
another. But of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there
is no place for human accusation. In like manner the Latins by
_peccatum_, which is _sin_, signify all manner of deviation from the
law; but by _crimen_, which word they derive from _cerno_, which
signifies _to perceive_, they mean only such sins, as may be made appear
before a judge; and therefore are not mere intentions.
[Sidenote: Where no civil law is, there is no crime.]
From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, may
be inferred, first, that where law ceaseth, sin ceaseth. But because the
law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude,
arrogance, and all facts contrary to any moral virtue, can never cease
to be sin. Secondly, that the civil law ceasing, crimes cease: for there
being no other law remaining, but that of nature, there is no place for
accusation; every man being his own judge, and accused only by his own
conscience, and cleared by the uprightness of his own intention. When
therefore his intention is right, his fact is no sin: if otherwise, his
fact is sin; but not crime. Thirdly, that when the sovereign power
ceaseth, crime also ceaseth; for where there is no such power, there is
no protection to be had from the law; and therefore every one may
protect himself by his own power: for no man in the institution of
sovereign power can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his
own body; for the safety whereof all sovereignty was ordained. But this
is to be understood only of those, that have not themselves contributed
to the taking away of the power that protected them; for that was a
crime from the beginning.
[Sidenote: Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man.]
The source of every crime, is some defect of the understanding; or some
error in reasoning; or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the
understanding, is _ignorance_; in reasoning, _erroneous opinion_. Again,
ignorance is of three sorts; of the _law_, and of the _sovereign_, and
of the _penalty_. Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man;
because every man that hath attained to the use of reason, is supposed
to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to
himself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do
anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man come from the
Indies hither, and persuade men here to receive a new religion, or teach
them anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this country,
though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth,
he commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not only
because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he
would not approve in another, namely, that coming from hence, he should
endeavour to alter the religion there. But ignorance of the civil law,
shall excuse a man in a strange country, till it be declared to him;
because, till then no civil law is binding.
[Sidenote: Ignorance of the civil law excuseth sometimes.]
In the like manner, if the civil law of a man’s own country, be not so
sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the action
against the law of nature; the ignorance is a good excuse: in other
cases ignorance of the civil law, excuseth not.
[Sidenote: Ignorance of the sovereign excuseth not.]
Ignorance of the sovereign power, in the place of a man’s ordinary
residence, excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the
power, by which he hath been protected there.
[Sidenote: Ignorance of the penalty excuseth not.]
Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuseth no man:
for in breaking the law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were
not a law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not
what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth
all the known consequences of it; but punishment is a known consequence
of the violation of the laws, in every commonwealth; which punishment,
if it be determined already by the law, he is subject to that; if not,
then he is subject to arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he
which does injury, without other limitation than that of his own will,
should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his will
whose law is thereby violated.
[Sidenote: Punishments declared before the fact, excuse from greater
punishments after it.]
But when a penalty, is either annexed to the crime in the law itself, or
hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the delinquent is
excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not
great enough to deter men from the action, is an invitement to it:
because when men compare the benefit of their injustice, with the harm
of their punishment, by necessity of nature they chuse that which
appeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are punished more
than the law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished
for the same crime; it is the law that tempted, and deceiveth them.
[Sidenote: Nothing can be made a crime by a law made after the fact.]
No law, made after a fact done, can make it a crime: because if the fact
be against the law of nature, the law was before the fact; and a
positive law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore
cannot be obligatory. But when the law that forbiddeth a fact, is made
before the fact be done; yet he that doth the fact, is liable to the
penalty ordained after, in case no lesser penalty were made known
before, neither by writing, nor by example, for the reason immediately
before alleged.
[Sidenote: False principles of right & wrong causes of crime.]
From defect in reasoning, that is to say, from error, men are prone to
violate the laws, three ways. First, by presumption of false principles:
as when men, from having observed how in all places, and in all ages,
unjust actions have been authorized, by the force, and victories of
those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the
cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort, and those that have
failed in their enterprises, have been esteemed the only criminals; have
thereupon taken for principles, and grounds of their reasoning, _that
justice is but a vain word_: _that whatsoever a man can get by his own
industry, and hazard, is his own_: _that the practice of all nations
cannot be unjust_: _that examples of former times are good arguments of
doing the like again_; and many more of that kind: which being granted,
no act in itself can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law,
but by the success of them that commit it; and the same fact be
virtuous, or vicious, as fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a
crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Cæsar, the same laws standing,
turn again into a crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of
the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: False teachers mis-interpreting the law of nature.]
Secondly, by false teachers, that either misinterpret the law of nature,
making it thereby repugnant to the law civil; or by teaching for laws,
such doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are
inconsistent with the duty of a subject.
[Sidenote: And false inferences from true principles, by teachers.]
Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles; which happens
commonly to men that are hasty, and precipitate in concluding, and
resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion
of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature
require not time and study, but only common experience, and a good
natural wit; whereof no man thinks himself unprovided: whereas the
knowledge, of right and wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no
man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects
in reasoning, there is none that can excuse, though some of them may
extenuate, a crime in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of
his own private business; much less in them that undertake a public
charge; because they pretend to the reason, upon the want whereof they
would ground their excuse.
[Sidenote: By their passions.]
Of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime, one, is
vain glory, or a foolish overrating of their own worth; as if difference
of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or blood, or some
other natural quality, not depending on the will of those that have the
sovereign authority. From whence proceedeth a presumption that the
punishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all
subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they
are inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the
name of the _vulgar_.
[Sidenote: Presumption of riches,]
Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the
greatness of their wealth, adventure on crimes, upon hope of escaping
punishment, by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon by money,
or other rewards.
[Sidenote: And friends.]
And that such as have multitude of potent kindred; and popular men, that
have gained reputation amongst the multitude, take courage to violate
the laws, from a hope of oppressing the power, to whom it belongeth to
put them in execution.
[Sidenote: Wisdom.]
And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own wisdom,
take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the
authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the laws with their
public discourse, as that nothing shall be a crime, but what their own
designs require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be
prone to all such crimes, as consist in craft, and in deceiving of their
neighbours; because they think their designs are too subtle to be
perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own
wisdom. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of
commonwealth, which can never happen without a civil war, very few are
left alive long enough, to see their new designs established: so that
the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity, and such as would
least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they
thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being
observed, do commonly deceive themselves, the darkness in which they
believe they lie hidden, being nothing else but their own blindness; and
are no wiser than children, that think all hid, by hiding their own
eyes.
And generally all vain-glorious men, unless they be withal timorous, are
subject to anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for
contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: and there are few crimes
that may not be produced by anger.
[Sidenote: Hatred, lust, ambition, covetousness, causes of crime]
As for the passions, of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, what
crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every man’s experience
and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving
that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and
all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindered,
but by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing
them. For in those things men hate, they find a continual, and
unavoidable molestation; whereby either a man’s patience must be
everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which
molesteth him. The former is difficult; the latter is many times
impossible, without some violation of the law. Ambition, and
covetousness are passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and
pressing; whereas reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and
therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects
proceed. And for lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the
vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy,
or uncertain punishments.
[Sidenote: Fear sometimes cause of crime, as when the danger is neither
present nor corporeal.]
Of all passions, that which inclineth men least to break the laws, is
fear. Nay, excepting some generous natures, it is the only thing, when
there is apparence of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws, that
makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a crime may be committed
through fear.
For not every fear justifies the action it produceth, but the fear only
of corporeal hurt, which we call _bodily fear_, and from which a man
cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted,
fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by
wounding him that assaulteth him: if he wound him to death, this is no
crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a commonwealth, to
have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbs, where the law cannot
arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from
his actions, or his threatenings, I may argue he will kill me when he
can, seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the
sovereign power, is a crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace or
some little injuries, for which they that made the laws, had assigned no
punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of reason,
to take notice of, and is afraid, unless he revenge it, he shall fall
into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from
others; and to avoid this, breaks the law, and protects himself for the
future, by the terror of his private revenge. This is a crime: for the
hurt is not corporeal, but phantastical, and, though in this corner of
the world, made sensible by a custom not many years since begun, amongst
young and vain men, so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured
of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear
of spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much
credit given to other men, that tell him of strange dreams and visions;
and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting
divers things, which nevertheless, to do, or omit, is contrary to the
laws; and that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be excused by
this fear; but is a crime. For, as I have shown before in the second
chapter, dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after
the impressions our senses had formerly received waking; and when men
are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be real visions;
and therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own, or
another’s dream, or pretended vision, or upon other fancy of the power
of invisible spirits, than is permitted by the commonwealth, leaveth the
law of nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of
his own, or another private man’s brain, which he can never know whether
it signifieth any thing or nothing, nor whether he that tells his dream,
say true, or lie; which if every private man should have leave to do, as
they must by the law of nature, if any one have it, there could no law
be made to hold, and so all commonwealth would be dissolved.
[Sidenote: Crimes not equal.]
From these different sources of crimes, it appears already, that all
crimes are not, as the Stoics of old time maintained, of the same allay.
There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a crime,
is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which the
crime, that seemed great, is made less. For though all crimes do equally
deserve the name of injustice, as all deviation from a straight line is
equally crookedness, which the Stoics rightly observed: yet it does not
follow that all crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked
lines are equally crooked; which the Stoics not observing, held it as
great a crime, to kill a hen, against the law, as to kill one’s father.
[Sidenote: Total excuses.]
That which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from it the nature of
a crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the
obligation of the law. For the fact committed once against the law, if
he that committed it be obliged to the law, can be no other than a
crime.
The want of means to know the law, totally excuseth. For the law whereof
a man has no means to inform himself, is not obligatory. But the want of
diligence to inquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; nor
shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of
his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the laws of nature;
because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only children, and
madmen are excused from offences against the law natural.
Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy (and he is then in
the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so),
if it be without his own fault, the obligation of the law ceaseth;
because he must obey the enemy, or die; and consequently such obedience
is no crime: for no man is obliged, when the protection of the law
faileth, not to protect himself, by the best means he can.
If a man, by the terror of present death, be compelled to do a fact
against the law, he is totally excused; because no law can oblige a man
to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a law were
obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, _If I do it not, I die
presently; if I do it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is
time of life gained_; nature therefore compels him to the fact.
When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life,
and cannot preserve himself any other way, but by some fact against the
law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth,
which he cannot obtain for money nor charity; or in defence of his life,
snatch away another man’s sword; he is totally excused, for the reason
next before alleged.
[Sidenote: Excuses against the author.]
Again, facts done against the law by the authority of another, are by
that authority excused against the author; because no man ought to
accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is
not excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the
violation of the law, both the author and actor are criminals. From
hence it followeth that when that man, or assembly, that hath the
sovereign power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a
former law, the doing of it is totally excused: for he ought not to
condemn it himself, because he is the author; and what cannot justly be
condemned by the sovereign, cannot justly be punished by any other.
Besides, when the sovereign commandeth anything to be done against his
own former law, the command, as to that particular fact, is an
abrogation of the law.
If that man, or assembly, that hath the sovereign power, disclaim any
right essential to the sovereignty, whereby there accrueth to the
subject, any liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power, that is to
say, with the very being of a commonwealth, if the subject shall refuse
to obey the command in anything contrary to the liberty granted, this is
nevertheless a sin, and contrary to the duty of the subject: for he
ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the sovereignty,
because it was erected by his own consent and for his own defence; and
that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through
ignorance of the evil consequence thereof. But if he not only disobey,
but also resist a public minister in the execution of it, then it is a
crime; because he might have been righted, without any breach of the
peace, upon complaint.
The degrees of crime are taken on divers scales, and measured, first, by
the malignity of the source, or cause; secondly, by the contagion of the
example; thirdly, by the mischief of the effect; and fourthly, by the
concurrence of times, places, and persons.
[Sidenote: Presumption of power aggravateth.]
The same fact done against the law, if it proceed from presumption of
strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the
law, is a greater crime than if it proceed from hope of not being
discovered, or of escape by flight: for presumption of impunity by
force, is a root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all
temptations, a contempt of all laws; whereas in the latter case, the
apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient
for the future. A crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same
crime proceeding from a false persuasion that it is lawful; for he that
committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or
other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that
doth it by error, after the error is shewn him, is conformable to the
law.
[Sidenote: Evil teachers extenuate.]
He, whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher, or an
interpreter of the law publicly authorized, is not so faulty as he whose
error proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his own principles and
reasoning: for what is taught by one that teacheth by public authority,
the commonwealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of law, till the same
authority controlleth it; and in all crimes that contain not in them a
denial of the sovereign power, nor are against an evident law, excuseth
totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions on his private judgment,
ought, according to the rectitude, or error thereof, to stand or fall.
[Sidenote: Examples of impunity extenuate.]
The same fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is a
greater crime, than if there have been many precedent examples of
impunity. For those examples are so many hopes of impunity, given by the
sovereign himself: and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope
and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in
the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.
[Sidenote: Premeditation aggravateth.]
A crime arising from a sudden passion, is not so great, as when the same
ariseth from long meditation: for in the former case there is a place
for extenuation, in the common infirmity of human nature: but he that
doth it with premeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye on
the law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to human
society; all which, in committing the crime, he hath contemned and
postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddenness of passion
sufficient for a total excuse: for all the time between the first
knowing of the law, and the commission of the fact, shall be taken for a
time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the law, to
rectify the irregularity of his passions.
Where the law is publicly, and with assiduity, before all the people
read and interpreted, a fact done against it, is a greater crime, than
where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with
difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their callings, and be
informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is
discharged upon common infirmity; but, in the former, there is apparent
negligence, which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power.
[Sidenote: Tacit approbation of the sovereign extenuates.]
Those facts which the law expressly condemneth, but the law-maker by
other manifest signs of his will tacitly approveth, are less crimes,
than the same facts, condemned both by the law and law-maker. For seeing
the will of the law-maker is a law, there appear in this case two
contradictory laws; which would totally excuse, if men were bound to
take notice of the sovereign’s approbation, by other arguments than are
expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent,
not only to the transgression of his law, but also to the observing of
it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot
reasonably impute the whole crime to the delinquent. For example, the
law condemneth duels; the punishment is made capital: on the contrary
part, he that refuseth duel, is subject to contempt and scorn, without
remedy; and sometimes by the sovereign himself thought unworthy to have
any charge, or preferment in war. If thereupon he accept duel,
considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of
them that have the sovereign power, he ought not in reason to be
rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the
punisher: which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or
any other kind of disobedience; but a care in governors, not to
countenance anything obliquely, which directly they forbid. The examples
of princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent
to govern their actions, than the laws themselves. And though it be our
duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty
never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and
supernatural grace to follow that precept.
[Sidenote: Comparison of crimes from their effects.]
Again, if we compare crimes by the mischief of their effects; first, the
same fact, when it redounds to the damage of many, is greater, than when
it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not
only in the present, but also, by example, in the future, it is a
greater crime, than if it hurt only in the present: for the former, is a
fertile crime, and multiplies to the hurt of many; the latter is barren.
To maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the
commonwealth, is a greater fault, in an authorized preacher, than in a
private person: so also is it, to live profanely, incontinently, or do
any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a professor of the law, to
maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakening of the
sovereign power, is a greater crime, than in another man: also in a man
that hath such reputation for wisdom, as that his counsels are followed,
or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the law, is a greater
crime, than the same fact in another: for such men not only commit
crime, but teach it for law to all other men. And generally all crimes
are the greater, by the scandal they give; that is to say, by becoming
stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go
in, as upon the light that other man carry before them.
[Sidenote: Læsa Majestas.]
Also facts of hostility against the present state of the commonwealth,
are greater crimes, than the same acts done to private men: for the
damage extends itself to all: such are the betraying of the strengths,
or revealing of the secrets of the commonwealth to an enemy; also all
attempts upon the representative of the commonwealth, be it a monarch,
or an assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed, to diminish the
authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession:
which crimes the Latins understand by _crimina læsæ majestatis_, and
consist in design, or act, contrary to a fundamental law.
[Sidenote: Bribery and false testimony.]
Likewise those crimes, which render judgments of no effect, are greater
crimes, than injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive money
to give false judgment, or testimony, is a greater crime, than otherwise
to deceive a man of the like, or a greater sum; because not only he has
wrong, that falls by such judgments; but all judgments are rendered
useless, and occasion ministered to force, and private revenges.
[Sidenote: Depeculation.]
Also robbery, and depeculation of the public treasure, or revenues, is a
greater crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a private man; because
to rob the public, is to rob many at once.
[Sidenote: Counterfeiting authority.]
Also the counterfeit usurpation of public ministry, the counterfeiting
of public seals or public coin, than counterfeiting of a private man’s
person, or his seal; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the damage
of many.
[Sidenote: Crimes against private men compared.]
Of facts against the law, done to private men, the greater crime, is
that, where the damage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible.
And therefore
To kill against the law, is a greater crime, than any other injury, life
preserved.
And to kill with torment, greater, than simply to kill.
And mutilation of a limb, greater, than the spoiling a man of his goods.
And the spoiling a man of his goods, by terror of death, or wounds, than
by clandestine surreption.
And by clandestine surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.
And the violation of chastity by force, greater, than by flattery.
And of a woman married, than of a woman not married.
For all these things are commonly so valued: though some men are more,
and some less sensible of the same offence. But the law regardeth not
the particular, but the general inclination of mankind.
And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or
gesture, when they produce no other harm, than the present grief of him
that is reproached, hath been neglected in the laws of the Greeks,
Romans, and other both ancient and modern commonwealths; supposing the
true cause of such grief to consist, not in the contumely, which takes
no hold upon men conscious of their own virtue, but in the pusillanimity
of him that is offended by it.
Also a crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person,
time, and place. For to kill one’s parent, is a greater crime, than to
kill another: for the parent ought to have the honour of a sovereign,
though he surrendered his power to the civil law; because he had it
originally by nature. And to rob a poor man, is a greater crime, than to
rob a rich man; because it is to the poor a more sensible damage.
And a crime committed in the time or place appointed for devotion, is
greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds
from a greater contempt of the law.
Many other cases of aggravation, and extenuation might be added: but by
these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude
of any other crime proposed.
[Sidenote: Public crimes what.]
Lastly, because in almost all crimes there is an injury done, not only
to some private men, but also to the commonwealth; the same crime, when
the accusation is in the name of the commonwealth, is called public
crime: and when in the name of a private man, a private crime; and the
pleas according thereunto called public, _judicia publica_, Pleas of the
Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an accusation of murder, if the accuser
be a private man, the plea is a Private Plea; if the accuser be the
sovereign, the plea is a Public Plea.
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