OF COUNSEL.
[Sidenote: Counsel what.]
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary
and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the
confusion of counsels, and commands, arising from the imperative manner
of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the
words _do this_, are the words not only of him that commandeth; but also
of him that giveth counsel; and of him that exhorteth; and yet there are
but few, that see not that these are very different things, or that
cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that
speaketh, and to whom the speech is directed, and upon what occasion.
But finding those phrases in men’s writings, and being not able, or not
willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake
sometimes the precepts of counsellors, for the precepts of them that
command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with
the conclusions they would infer, or the actions they approve. To avoid
which mistakes, and render to those terms of commanding, counselling and
exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.
[Sidenote: Differences between command and counsel.]
COMMAND is, where a man saith, _do this_, or _do not this_, without
expecting other reason than the will of him that says it. From this it
followeth manifestly, that he that commandeth, pretendeth thereby his
own benefit: for the reason of his command is his own will only, and the
proper object of every man’s will, is some good to himself.
COUNSEL, is where a man saith, _do_, or _do not this_, and deduceth his
reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it.
And from this it is evident, that he that giveth counsel, pretendeth
only, whatsoever he intendeth, the good of him, to whom he giveth it.
Therefore between counsel and command, one great difference is, that
command is directed to a man’s own benefit; and counsel to the benefit
of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may
be obliged to do what he is commanded; as when he hath covenanted to
obey: but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled, because the
hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow
it, then is the counsel turned into the nature of a command. A third
difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of
another man’s counsel; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to
himself: but to demand right to counsel another, argues a will to know
his designs, or to gain some other good to himself: which, as I said
before, is of every man’s will the proper object.
This also is incident to the nature of counsel; that whatsoever it be,
he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: for to ask
counsel of another, is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall
think best; and consequently, he that giveth counsel to his sovereign,
whether a monarch, or an assembly, when he asketh it, cannot in equity
be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of
the most, or not, so it be to the proposition in debate. For if the
sense of the assembly can be taken notice of, before the debate be
ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further counsel; for the
sense of the assembly, is the resolution of the debate, and end of all
deliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel, is author of it;
and therefore cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot, no man
else can. But if one subject giveth counsel to another, to do anything
contrary to the laws, whether that counsel proceed from evil intention,
or from ignorance only, it is punishable by the commonwealth; because
ignorance of the law is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take
notice of the laws to which he is subject.
[Sidenote: Exhortation and dehortation what.]
EXHORTATION and DEHORTATION is counsel, accompanied with signs in him
that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed: or to say it
more briefly, _counsel vehemently pressed_. For he that exhorteth, doth
not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tie
himself therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he
counselleth to action: as he that dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And,
therefore, they have in their speeches, a regard to the common passions
and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of
similitudes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory, to
persuade their hearers of the utility, honour, or justice of following
their advice.
From whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation is
directed to the good of him that giveth the counsel, not of him that
asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a counsellor; who, by the
definition of counsel, ought to regard not his own benefit, but his whom
he adviseth. And that he directeth his counsel to his own benefit, is
manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial
giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently
proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own
benefit, and but accidentally to the good of him that is counselled, or
not at all.
Secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieth only where a
man is to speak to a multitude; because when the speech is addressed to
one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously than
can be done in a multitude; which are too many to enter into dispute,
and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.
Thirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are required to
give counsel, are corrupt counsellors, and as it were bribed by their
own interest. For though the counsel they give be never so good; yet he
that gives it, is no more a good counsellor, than he that giveth a just
sentence for a reward, is a just judge. But where a man may lawfully
command, as a father in his family, or a leader in an army, his
exhortations and dehortations, are not only lawful, but also necessary,
and laudable. But then they are no more counsels, but commands; which
when they are for execution of sour labour, sometimes necessity, and
always humanity requireth to be sweetened in the delivery, by
encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of counsel, rather than in
harsher language of command.
Examples of the difference between command and counsel, we may take from
the forms of speech that express them in Holy Scripture. _Have no other
Gods but me; make to thyself no graven image; take not God’s name in
vain; sanctify the sabbath; honour thy parents; kill not; steal not,
&c._ are commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is
drawn from the will of God our king, whom we are obliged to obey. But
these words, _Sell all thou hast; give it to the poor; and follow me_,
are counsel; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from
our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have _treasure in Heaven_.
These words, _Go into the village over against you, and you shall find
an ass tied, and her colt; loose her, and bring her to me_, are a
command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their
Master: but these words, _Repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus_,
are counsel; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any
benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be king in what manner soever
we rebel; but of ourselves, who have no other means of avoiding the
punishment hanging over us for our sins.
[Sidenote: Differences of fit and unfit counsellors.]
As the difference of counsel from command, hath been now deduced from
the nature of counsel, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt
that may arise to him that is to be counselled, by the necessary or
probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the
differences between _apt_ and _inept_ counsellors be derived from the
same. For experience, being but memory of the consequences of like
actions formerly observed, and counsel but the speech whereby that
experience is made known to another; the virtues, and defects of
counsel, are the same with the virtues, and defects intellectual: and to
the person of a commonwealth, his counsellors serve him in the place of
memory, and mental discourse. But with this resemblance of the
commonwealth, to a natural man, there is one dissimilitude joined, of
great importance; which is, that a natural man receiveth his experience,
from the natural objects of sense, which work upon him without passion,
or interest of their own; whereas they that give counsel to the
representative person of a commonwealth, may have, and have often their
particular ends and passions, that render their counsels always
suspected, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down for
the first condition of a good counsellor, _that his ends, and interests,
be not inconsistent with the ends and interests of him he counselleth_.
Secondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an action comes into
deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such
manner, as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he
ought to propound his advice, in such form of speech, as may make the
truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firm ratiocination,
as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will
permit. And therefore _rash and unevident inferences_, such as are
fetched only from examples, or authority of books, and are not arguments
of what is good, or evil, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion;
_obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphorical
speeches, tending to the stirring up of passion_, (because such
reasoning, and such expressions, are useful only to deceive, or to lead
him we counsel towards other ends than his own) _are repugnant to the
office of a counsellor_.
Thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience,
and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those
things that to the administration of a great commonwealth are necessary
to be known, _no man is presumed to be a good counsellor, but in such
business, as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath also much
meditated on, and considered_. For seeing the business of a commonwealth
is this, to preserve the people in peace at home, and defend them
against foreign invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of
the disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the
nature of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without
study; and of the strength, commodities, places, both of their own
country, and their neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designs
of all nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to,
without much experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but
every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man
in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel,
as I have said before (chap. VIII.) is judgment. And the differences of
men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of
study or business, and of others to another. When for the doing of any
thing, there be infallible rules, as in engines and edifices, the rules
of geometry, all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel,
that has learnt, or found out the rule. And when there is no such rule,
he that hath most experience in that particular kind of business, has
therein the best judgment, and is the best counsellor.
Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth, in a business
that hath reference to another commonwealth, _it is necessary to be
acquainted with the intelligences, and letters_ that come from thence,
_and with all the records of treaties, and other transactions of state_
between them; which none can do, but such as the representative shall
think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to counsel,
can have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude.
Fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better
counselled by hearing them apart, than in an assembly; and that for many
causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man;
but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with _aye_, or
_no_, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by
the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing some that have
spoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction; or for fear of
appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the
contrary opinion. Secondly, in an assembly of many, there cannot choose
but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the public; and
these their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and
eloquence draws others into the same advice. For the passions of men,
which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in an assembly are
like many brands, that inflame one another, especially when they blow
one another with orations, to the setting of the commonwealth on fire,
under pretence of counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart,
one may examine, when there is need, the truth, or probability of his
reasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent
interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an assembly,
where, in every difficult question, a man is rather astonied, and
dazzled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the
course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many,
called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the
ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the politics; and
give not their advice with care of the business propounded, but of the
applause of their motley orations, made of the divers coloured threds,
or shreads of authors; which is an impertinence at least, that takes
away the time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of
counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in deliberations that
ought to be kept secret, whereof there be many occasions in public
business, the counsels of many, and especially in assemblies, are
dangerous; and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit
such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed,
and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.
To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of counsel
from a great assembly of counsellors, that wisheth for, or would accept
of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his children,
disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private
estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his
prosperity? A man that doth his business by the help of many and prudent
counsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does
it best, as he that useth able seconds at tennis play, placed in their
proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own judgment only; as
he that has no second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his
business in a framed counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of
consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly, out of envy or
interest, retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and
like one that is carried to the ball, though by good players, yet in a
wheel-barrow, or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded also by the
inconcurrent judgments, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so
much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of
all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him
lose. And though it be true, that many eyes see more than one; yet it is
not to be understood of many counsellors; but then only, when the final
resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same
thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private
benefit; they that desire not to miss their mark, though they look about
with two eyes, yet they never aim but with one; and therefore no great
popular commonwealth was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy
that united them; or by the reputation of some eminent man amongst them;
or by the secret counsel of a few; or by the mutual fear of equal
factions; and not by the open consultations of the assembly. And as for
very little commonwealths, be they popular, or monarchical, there is no
human wisdom can uphold them, longer than the jealousy lasteth of their
potent neighbours.
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