OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY
INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE
SOVEREIGN POWER.
[Sidenote: The different forms of commonwealths but three.]
The difference of commonwealths, consisteth in the difference of the
sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the
multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an
assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath
right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the
rest; it is manifest, there can be but three kinds of commonwealth. For
the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it
is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one
man, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY: when an assembly of all that
will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth:
when an assembly of a a part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY.
Other kind of commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more,
or all, must have the sovereign power, which I have shown to be
indivisible, entire.
[Sidenote: Tyranny and oligarchy, but different names of monarchy, and
aristocracy.]
There be other names of government, in the histories, and books of
policy; as _tyranny_, and _oligarchy_: but they are not the names of
other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that
are discontented under _monarchy_, call it _tyranny_; and they that are
displeased with _aristocracy_, call it _oligarchy_: so also, they which
find themselves grieved under a _democracy_, call it _anarchy_, which
signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes, that want
of government, is any new kind of government: nor by the same reason
ought they to believe, that the government is of one kind, when they
like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the
governors.
[Sidenote: Subordinate representatives dangerous.]
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they
please, give authority to one man, to represent them every one; as well
as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and
consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a monarch,
as absolutely, as to any other representative. Therefore, where there is
already erected a sovereign power, there can be no other representative
of the same people, but only to certain particular ends, by the
sovereign limited. For that were to erect two sovereigns; and every man
to have his person represented by two actors, that by opposing one
another, must needs divide that power, which, if men will live in peace,
is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of
war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And
therefore as it is absurd, to think that a sovereign assembly, inviting
the people of their dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to
make known their advice, or desires, should therefore hold such
deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representatives of
the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a monarchy. And I
know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little
observed; that in a monarchy, he that had the sovereignty from a descent
of six hundred years, was alone called sovereign, had the title of
Majesty from every one of his subjects, and was unquestionably taken by
them for their king, was notwithstanding never considered as their
representative; the name without contradiction passing for the title of
those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry
their petitions, and give him, if he permitted it, their advice. Which
may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute
representative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that
office, and to take heed how they admit of any other general
representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge
the trust committed to them.
[Sidenote: Comparison of monarchy, with sovereign assemblies.]
The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth, consisteth not
in the difference of power; but in the difference of convenience, or
aptitude to produce the peace, and security of the people; for which end
they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may
observe; first, that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is
one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person.
And though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common
interest; yet he is more, or no less careful to procure the private good
of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if
the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private:
for the passions of men, are commonly more potent than their reason.
From whence it follows, that where the public and private interest are
most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy,
the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and
honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation
of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure,
whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through
want or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: whereas in
a democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much
to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth
many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.
Secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he
pleaseth; and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the
matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and
as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will.
But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none are admitted but
such as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part
are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than
of knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which
may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it.
For the _understanding_ is by the flame of the passions, never
enlightened, but dazzled. Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an
assembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own
multitude.
Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch, are subject to no other
inconstancy, than that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that
of nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number. For the absence
of a few, that would have the resolution once taken, continue firm,
which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments, or the
diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to-day, all
that was concluded yesterday.
Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy, or
interest; but an assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce
a civil war.
Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great and
inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the
sovereign power is in an assembly: for their power is the same; and they
are as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a
monarch by flatterers; and becoming one another’s flatterers, serve one
another’s covetousness and ambition by turns. And whereas the favourites
of monarchs, are few, and they have none else to advance but their own
kindred; the favourites of an assembly, are many; and the kindred much
more numerous, than of any monarch. Besides, there is no favourite of a
monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies:
but orators, that is to say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though
they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse,
requires less eloquence, such is man’s nature, than to excuse; and
condemnation, than absolution more resembles justice.
Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy, that the sovereignty
may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern between good and
evil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his power, must be in the
hand of another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to govern by
his right, and in his name; as curators, and protectors of his person,
and authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of
the sovereign power, into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men; is
to say that all government is more inconvenient, than confusion, and
civil war. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must
arise from the contention of those, that for an office of so great
honour, and profit, may become competitors. To make it appear, that this
inconvenience, proceedeth not from that form of government we call
monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent monarch hath appointed
who shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressly by
testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the custom in that case
received: and then such inconvenience, if it happen, is to be
attributed, not to the monarchy, but to the ambition, and injustice of
the subjects; which in all kinds of government, where the people are not
well instructed in their duty, and the rights of sovereignty, is the
same. Or else the precedent monarch hath not at all taken order for such
tuition; and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule,
that the tuition shall be in him, that hath by nature most interest in
the preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least
benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by
nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an infant into the
power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or
damage, is not tuition, but treachery. So that sufficient provision
being taken, against all just quarrel, about the government under a
child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public peace,
it is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy, but to the ambition
of subjects, and ignorance of their duty. On the other side, there is no
great commonwealth, the sovereignty whereof is in a great assembly,
which is not, as to consultations of peace, and war, and making of laws,
in the same condition, as if the government were in a child. For as a
child wants the judgment to dissent from counsel given him, and is
thereby necessitated to take the advice of them, or him, to whom he is
committed: so an assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the
counsel of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a child has need
of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person and authority: so also,
in great commonwealths, the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and
troubles, have need of _custodes libertatis_; that is of dictators, or
protectors of their authority; which are as much as temporary monarchs,
to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their power;
and have, at the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof, than
infant kings, by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors.
[Sidenote: Definition of monarchy, and other forms.]
Though the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but three; that
is to say, monarchy, where one man has it; or democracy, where the
general assembly of subjects hath it; or aristocracy, where it is in an
assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from
the rest: yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that
have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to
three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other forms,
arising from these mingled together. As for example, elective kingdoms;
where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time; or
kingdoms, wherein the king hath a power limited: which governments, are
nevertheless by most writers called monarchy. Likewise if a popular, or
aristocratical commonwealth, subdue an enemy’s country, and govern the
same, by a president, procurator, or other magistrate; this may seem
perhaps at first sight, to be a democratical, or aristocratical
government. But it is not so. For elective kings, are not sovereigns,
but ministers of the sovereign; nor limited kings, sovereigns, but
ministers of them that have the sovereign power: nor are those provinces
which are in subjection to a democracy, or aristocracy of another
commonwealth, democratically or aristocratically governed, but
monarchically.
And first, concerning an elective king, whose power is limited to his
life, as it is in many places of Christendom at this day; or to certain
years or months, as the dictator’s power amongst the Romans; if he have
right to appoint his successor, he is no more elective but hereditary.
But if he have no power to elect his successor, then there is some other
man, or assembly known, which after his decease may elect anew, or else
the commonwealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the
condition of war. If it be known who have the power to give the
sovereignty after his death, it is known also that the sovereignty was
in them before: for none have right to give that which they have not
right to possess, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if
there be none that can give the sovereignty, after the decease of him
that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the law
of nature, to provide, by establishing his successor, to keep those that
had trusted him with the government, from relapsing into the miserable
condition of civil war. And consequently he was, when elected, a
sovereign absolute.
Secondly, that king whose power is limited, is not superior to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superior, is
not supreme; that is to say not sovereign. The sovereignty therefore was
always in that assembly which had the right to limit him; and by
consequence the government not monarchy, but either democracy, or
aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the kings had a privilege
to lead their armies; but the sovereignty was in the Ephori.
Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman people governed the land of Judea,
for example, by a president; yet was not Judea therefore a democracy;
because they were not governed by any assembly, into the which, any of
them, had right to enter; nor an aristocracy; because they were not
governed by any assembly, into which, any man could enter by their
election: but they were governed by one person, which, though as to the
people of Rome, was an assembly of the people, or democracy; yet as to
the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the
government, was a monarch. For though where the people are governed by
an assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a democracy, or aristocracy; yet when they are
governed by an assembly, not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy;
not of _one_ man, over another man; but of one people, over another
people.
[Sidenote: Of the right of succession.]
Of all these forms of government, the matter being mortal, so that not
only monarchs, but also whole assemblies die, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an
artificial man, so there be order also taken, for an artificial eternity
of life; without which, men that are governed by an assembly, should
return into the condition of war in every age; and they that are
governed by one man, as soon as their governor dieth. This artificial
eternity, is that which men call the right of _succession_.
There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the
succession is not in the present sovereign. For if it be in any other
particular man, or private assembly, it is in a person subject and may
be assumed by the sovereign at his pleasure; and consequently the right
is in himself. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new
choice; then is the commonwealth dissolved; and the right is in him that
can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute the
commonwealth, for their perpetual, and not temporary security.
In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail, unless the multitude
that are to be governed fail. And therefore questions of the right of
succession, have in that form of government no place at all.
In an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dieth, the election of
another into his room belongeth to the assembly, as the sovereign, to
whom belongeth the choosing of all counsellors and officers. For that
which the representative doth, as actor, every one of the subjects doth,
as author. And though the sovereign assembly may give power to others,
to elect new men, for supply of their court; yet it is still by their
authority, that the election is made; and by the same it may, when the
public shall require it, be recalled.
[Sidenote: The present monarch hath right to dispose of the succession.]
The greatest difficulty about the right of succession, is in monarchy:
and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not
manifest who is to appoint the successor; nor many times, who it is whom
he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more
exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the
question, who shall appoint the successor, of a monarch that hath the
sovereign authority; that is to say, who shall determine of the right of
inheritance, (for elective kings and princes have not the sovereign
power in propriety, but in use only), we are to consider, that either he
that is in possession, has right to dispose of the succession, or else
that right is again in the dissolved multitude. For the death of him
that hath the sovereign power in propriety, leaves the multitude without
any sovereign at all; that is, without any representative in whom they
should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: and
therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch; every man
having equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks best able to
protect him; or if he can, protect himself by his own sword; which is a
return to confusion, and to the condition of a war of every man against
every man, contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first
institution. Therefore it is manifest, that by the institution of
monarchy, the disposing of the successor, is always left to the judgment
and will of the present possessor.
And for the question, which may arise sometimes, who it is that the
monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance
of his power; it is determined by his express words, and testament; or
by other tacit signs sufficient.
[Sidenote: Succession passeth by express words;]
By express words, or testament, when it is declared by him in his
lifetime, _viva voce_, or by writing; as the first emperors of Rome
declared who should be their heirs. For the word heir does not of itself
imply the children, or nearest kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man
shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his estate. If
therefore a monarch declare expressly, that such a man shall be his
heir, either by word or writing, then is that man immediately after the
decease of his predecessor, invested in the right of being monarch.
[Sidenote: Or, by not controlling a custom;]
But where testament, and express words are wanting, other natural signs
of the will are to be followed: whereof the one is custom. And therefore
where the custom is, that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth,
there also the next of kindred hath right to the succession; for that,
if the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise, he might
easily have declared the same in his life-time. And likewise where the
custom is, that the next of the male kindred succeedeth, there also the
right of succession is in the next of the kindred male, for the same
reason. And so it is if the custom were to advance the female. For
whatsoever custom a man may by a word control, and does not, it is a
natural sign he would have that custom stand.
[Sidenote: Or, by presumption of natural affection.]
But where neither custom, nor testament hath preceded, there it is to be
understood, first, that a monarch’s will is, that the government remain
monarchical; because he hath approved that government in himself.
Secondly, that a child of his own, male, or female, be preferred before
any other; because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature, to
advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their
own, rather a male than a female; because men, are naturally fitter than
women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own issue
faileth, rather a brother than a stranger; and so still the nearer in
blood, rather than the more remote; because it is always presumed that
the nearer of kin, is the nearer in affection; and it is evident that a
man receives always, by reflection, the most honour from the greatness
of his nearest kindred.
[Sidenote: To dispose of the succession, though to a king of another
nation, not unlawful.]
But if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words
of contract, or testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:
for he may sell, or give his right of governing to a stranger; which,
because strangers, that is, men not used to live under the same
government, nor speaking the same language, do commonly undervalue one
another, may turn to the oppression of his subjects; which is indeed a
great inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the
subjection to a stranger’s government, but from the unskilfulness of the
governors, ignorant of the true rules of politics. And therefore the
Romans when they had subdued many nations, to make their government
digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they
thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole nations, and sometimes
to principal men of every nation they conquered, not only the
privileges, but also the name of Romans; and took many of them into the
senate, and offices of charge, even in the Roman city. And this was it
our most wise king, king James, aimed at, in endeavouring the union of
his two realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained,
had in all likelihood prevented the civil wars, which make both those
kingdoms, at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to
the people, for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will; though
by the fault of many princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient.
Of the lawfulness of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever
inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger, may arrive
also by so marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may
descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawful.
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