OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION
OF A COMMONWEALTH.
[Sidenote: The end of commonwealth, particular security:]
The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and
dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon
themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight
of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is
to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war,
which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown in chapter XIII, to
the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them
in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their
covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the
fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.
[Sidenote: Which is not to be had from the law of nature:]
For the laws of nature, as _justice_, _equity_, _modesty_, _mercy_, and,
in sum, _doing to others, as we would be done to_, of themselves,
without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are
contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride,
revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words,
and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the
laws of nature, which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to
keep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or
not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely
on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in
all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one
another, has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law
of nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their
honour; and men observed no other laws therein, but the laws of honour;
that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and
instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do
cities and kingdoms which are but greater families, for their own
security, enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and
fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, and
endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by
open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are
remembered for it in after ages with honour.
[Sidenote: Nor from the conjunction of a few men or families:]
Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men, that gives them
this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side
or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient
to carry the victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion.
The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is not
determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we
fear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so
visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to
move him to attempt.
[Sidenote: Nor from a great multitude, unless directed by one judgment:]
And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be
directed according to their particular judgments, and particular
appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither
against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For
being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of
their strength, they do not help but hinder one another; and reduce
their strength by mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily,
not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there
is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular
interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent
in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a
common power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all
mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be
any civil government, or Commonwealth at all; because there would be
peace without subjection.
[Sidenote: And that continually.]
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the
time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgment,
for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain
a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy; yet
afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one
part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they
must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again
into a war amongst themselves.
[Sidenote: Why certain creatures without reason, or speech, do
nevertheless live in society, without any coercive power.]
It is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live
sociably one with another, which are therefore by Aristotle numbered
amongst political creatures; and yet have no other direction, than their
particular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can
signify to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and
therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why mankind cannot do the
same. To which I answer,
First, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there
ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war; but amongst
these not so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the common good differeth not
from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they
procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth in
comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do
not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their
common business; whereas amongst men, there are very many, that think
themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest;
and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way;
and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in
making known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet
they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others,
that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness
of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and
evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.
Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between _injury_ and
_damage_; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not
offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when
he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and
control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men, is by
covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if
there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their
agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in
awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit.
[Sidenote: The generation of a commonwealth.]
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them
from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and
thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and
by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or
upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality
of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one
man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and
acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their
person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern
the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every
one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than
consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same
person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as
if every man should say to every man, _I authorise and give up my right
of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this
condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his
actions in like manner_. This done, the multitude so united in one
person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently,
of that _mortal god_, to which we owe under the _immortal God_, our
peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular
man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength
conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the
wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their
enemies abroad. [Sidenote: The definition of a commonwealth.] And in him
consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is _one
person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with
another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may
use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for
their peace and common defence_.
[Sidenote: Sovereign, and subject, what.]
And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have
_sovereign power_; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
The attaining to this sovereign power, is by two ways. One, by natural
force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and
their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they
refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their
lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst
themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on
confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may
be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by _institution_;
and the former, a commonwealth by _acquisition_. And first, I shall
speak of a commonwealth by institution.
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