While the first victory of the war was in the Far East and the
possibility of events of world-wide significance hung upon the
level-headedness of Commodore Dewey at Manila, it was realized that the
war must really be fought in the West. Both President McKinley and the
Queen Regent of Spain had issued proclamations stating that they would
adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris and not resort to the
use of privateers. The naval contest, therefore, was confined to the
regular navies. Actually the American fleet was superior in battleships,
monitors, and protected cruisers; the Spanish was the better equipped in
armored cruisers, gunboats, and destroyers.
Both Spain and the United States hastily purchased, in the last days of
peace, a few vessels, but not enough seriously to affect their relative
strength. Both also drew upon their own merchant marines. Spain added
18 medium-sized vessels to her navy; the United States added in all 123,
most of which were small and used for scouting purposes. The largest and
most efficient of these additional American ships were the subsidized
St. Paul, St. Louis, New York, and Paris of the American line, of
which the last two, renamed the Harvard and Yale, proved to be of great
service. It was characteristic of American conditions that 28 were
private yachts, of which the Mayflower was the most notable. To man
these new ships, the personnel of the American Navy was increased from
13,750 to 24,123, of whom a large number were men who had received some
training in the naval reserves of the various States.
The first duty of the navy was to protect the American coast. In 1885
the War Department had planned and Congress had sanctioned a system
of coast defense. Up to 1898, however, only one quarter of the sum
considered necessary had been appropriated. Mines and torpedoes were
laid at the entrances to American harbors as soon as war broke out, but
there was a lack of highpower guns. Rumors of a projected raid by the
fast Spanish armored cruisers kept the coast cities in a state of high
excitement, and many sought, by petition and political pressure, to
compel the Navy Department to detach vessels for their defense. The
Naval War Board, however, had to remember that it must protect not only
the coast but commerce also, and that the United States was at war not
to defend herself but to attack. Cuba was the objective; and Cuba must
be cut off from Spain by blockade, and the seas must be made safe for
the passage of the American Army. If the navy were to accomplish all
these purposes, it must destroy the Spanish Navy. To achieve this
end, it would have to work upon the principle of concentration and not
dispersion.
For several months before the actual declaration of war with Spain, the
Navy Department had been effecting this concentration. On the 21st of
April, Captain William T. Sampson was appointed to command the forces on
the North Atlantic station. This included practically the whole
fleet, except the Pacific squadron under Dewey, and the Oregon, a new
battleship of unusual design, which was on the Pacific coast. On the
1st of March she was ordered from the Bremerton Yard, in the State of
Washington, to San Francisco, and thence to report in the Atlantic. Her
voyage was the longest emergency run undertaken up to that time by a
modern battleship. The outbreak of the war with Spain meant the sealing
of all ports in which she might have been repaired in case of emergency.
Rumors were rife of Spanish vessels ready to intercept her, and the eyes
not only of the United States but of the world were upon the Oregon.
A feeling of relief and rejoicing therefore passed through the country
when this American warship arrived at Key West on the 26th of May, fit
for immediate and efficient service.
The fleet, though concentrated in the Atlantic within the region of
immediate hostility, was divided for purposes of operation into a major
division under the immediate command of Admiral Sampson and a flying
squadron under Commodore Schley. * The first undertook the enforcement
of the blockade which was declared on the 21st of April against Cuba,
and patrolled the northern coast from Gardenas to Bahia. Key West was
soon filled with Spanish prizes. On the 27th of April a brush took place
between batteries at Matanzas and some of the American vessels, without
loss of life on either side, except for a mule which bids fair to become
immortal in history through being reported by the Spanish as their
only casualty and the first of the war. Admiral Sampson, following the
tradition of the American Navy of aiming at a vital spot, wished to
attack Havana; and a careful study of its fortifications seems to show
that he would have had a good chance of success. Chance, however, might
have caused the loss of some of his vessels, and, with the small margin
of naval superiority at its disposal the Naval War Board was probably
wise in not allowing him to take the risk.
* A patrol squadron of cruisers under Commodore Howell was also
established to protect the coast from the Delaware capes to eastern
Maine. "It can scarcely be supposed," writes Admiral Chadwick, "that
such action was taken but in deference to the unreasoning fear of
dwellers on the coast."
It was, in fact, Spain which took the initiative and decided the matter.
Her West India Squadron was weak, even on paper, and was in a condition
which would have made it madness to attempt to meet the Americans
without reenforcement. She therefore decided to dispatch a fighting
fleet from her home forces. Accordingly on the 29th of April, Admiral
Cervera left the Cape Verde Islands and sailed westward with one fast
second-class battleship, the Cristobal Colon, three armored cruisers,
and two torpedo boat destroyers. It was a reasonably powerful fleet as
fleets went in the Spanish War, yet it is difficult to see just what
good it could accomplish when it arrived on the scene of action. The
naval superiority in the West Indies would still be in the hands of
the concentrated American Navy, for the Spanish forces would still be
divided, only more equally, between Spanish and Caribbean waters. The
American vessels, moreover, would be within easy distance of their home
stations, which could supply them with every necessity. The islands
belonging to Spain, on the other hand, were ill equipped to become
the base of naval operations. Admiral Cervera realized to the full the
difficulty of the situation and protested against an expedition which he
feared would mean the fall of Spanish power, but public opinion forced
the ministry, and he was obliged to put to sea.
For nearly a month the Spanish fleet was lost to sight, and dwellers on
the American coast were in a panic of apprehension. Cervera's objective
was guessed to be everything from a raid on Bar Harbor to an attack on
the Oregon, then on its shrouded voyage from the Pacific coast. Cities
on the Atlantic seaboard clamored for protection, and the Spanish fleet
was magnified by the mist of uncertainty until it became a national
terror. Sampson, rightly divining that Cervera would make for San
Juan, the capital and chief seaport of Porto Rico, detached from his
blockading force a fighting squadron with which he sailed east, but not
finding the Spanish fleet he turned back to Key West. Schley, with the
Flying Squadron, was then ordered to Cienfuegos. In the meantime Cervera
was escaping detection by the American scouts by taking an extremely
southerly course; and with the information that Sampson was off San
Juan, the Spanish Admiral sailed for Santiago de Cuba, where he arrived
on May 19, 1898.
Though Cervera was safe in harbor, the maneuver of the American fleet
cannot be called unsuccessful. Cervera would have preferred to be at
San Juan, where there was a navy yard and where his position would have
obliged the American fleet either to split into two divisions separated
by eight hundred miles or to leave him free range of action. Next to San
Juan he would have preferred Havana or, Cienfuegos, which were connected
by railroad and near which lay the bulk of the Spanish Army. He found
himself instead at the extreme eastern end of Cuba in a port with no
railroad connection with Havana, partly blocked by the insurgents, and
totally unable to supply him with necessities.
Unless Cervera could leave Santiago, his expedition would obviously have
been useless. Though it was the natural function of the American fleet
to blockade him, for a week after his arrival there was an interesting
game of hide and seek between the two fleets. The harbors of Cienfuegos
and of Santiago are both landlocked by high hills, and Cervera had
entered Santiago without being noticed by the Americans, as that part
of the coast was not under blockade. Schley thought Cervera was at
Cienfuegos; Sampson was of the opinion that he was at Santiago. When it
became known that the enemy had taken refuge in Santiago, Schley began
the blockade on the 28th of May, but stated that he could not continue
long in position owing to lack of coal. On the 1st of June Sampson
arrived and assumed command of the blockading squadron.
With the bottling up of Cervera, the first stage of the war passed.
The navy had performed its primary function: it had established its
superiority and had obtained the control of the seas. The American coast
was safe; American commerce was safe except in the vicinity of Spain;
and the sea was open for the passage of an American expeditionary
force. Nearly the whole island of Cuba was now under blockade, and the
insurgents were receiving supplies from the United States. It had been
proved that the fairly even balance of the two fleets, so anxiously
scanned when it was reported in the newspapers in April, was entirely
deceptive when it came to real efficiency in action. Moreover, the
skillful handling of the fleets by the Naval War Board as well as by
the immediate commanders had redoubled the actual superiority of the
American naval forces.
A fleet in being, even though inferior and immobilized, still counts as
a factor in naval warfare, and Cervera, though immobilized by Sampson,
himself immobilized the greater number of American vessels necessary to
blockade him. The importance of this fact was evident to every one when,
in the middle of June, the remainder of the Spanish home fleet, whipped
hastily into a semblance of fighting condition, set out eastward under
Admiral Camara to contest the Philippines with Dewey. It was impossible
for the United States to detach a force sufficient to cross the Atlantic
and, without a base, meet this fleet in its home waters. Even if a
smaller squadron were dispatched from the Atlantic round Cape Horn, it
would arrive in the Philippines too late to be of assistance to Dewey.
The two monitors on the Pacific coast, the Monterey and the Monadnock,
had already been ordered across the Pacific, a voyage perilous for
vessels of their structure and agonizing to their crews; but it was
doubtful whether they or Camara would arrive first in the Philippines.
The logic of the situation demanded that the main American fleet be
released. Cervera must be destroyed or held in some other way than at
the expense of inactivity on the part of the American warships. Santiago
could not be forced by the navy. Two methods remained. The first and
simpler expedient was to make the harbor mouth impassable and in this
way to bottle up the Spanish fleet. It was decided to sink the collier
Merrimac at a narrow point in the channel, where, lying full length,
she would completely prevent egress. It was a delicate task and one of
extraordinary danger. It was characteristic of the spirit of the fleet
that, as Admiral Chadwick says, practically all the men were volunteers.
The honor of the command was given to Lieutenant Richmond Pearson
Hobson, Assistant Naval Constructor, who had been in charge of the
preparations. With a crew of six men he entered the harbor mouth on
the night of the 3d of June. A shell disabled the steering gear of
the Merrimac, and the ship sank too far within the harbor to block the
entrance entirely. Admiral Cervera himself rescued the crew, assured
Sampson of their safety in an appreciative note; and one of the best
designed and most heroic episodes in our history just missed success.
The failure of the Merrimac experiment left the situation as it had
been and forced the American command to consider the second method
which would release the American fleet. This new plan contemplated the
reduction of Santiago by a combined military and naval attack. Cervera's
choice of Santiago therefore practically determined the direction of
the first American overseas military expedition, which had been in
preparation since the war began.