During the half century that intervened between John Quincy Adams and
James G. Blaine, the Monroe Doctrine, it was commonly believed, had
prevented the expansion of the territories of European powers in the
Americas. It had also relieved the United States both of the necessity
of continual preparation for war and of that constant tension in which
the perpetual shifting of the European balance of power held the nations
of that continent. But the Monroe Doctrine was not solely responsible
for these results. Had it not been for the British Navy, the United
States would in vain have proclaimed its disapproval of encroachment.
Nor, had Europe continued united, could the United States have withstood
European influence; but Canning's policy had practically destroyed
Metternich's dream of unity maintained by intervention, and in 1848 that
whole structure went hopelessly tumbling before a new order. Yet British
policy, too, failed of full realization, for British statesmen always
dreamed of an even balance in continental Europe which Great Britain
could incline to her wishes, whereas it usually proved necessary, in
order to preserve a balance at all, for her to join one side or the
other. Divided Europe therefore stood opposite united America, and our
inferior strength was enhanced by an advantageous position.
The insecurity of the American position was revealed during the Civil
War. When the United States divided within, the strength of the nation
vanished. The hitherto suppressed desires of European nations at once
manifested themselves. Spain, never satisfied that her American empire
was really lost, at once leaped to take advantage of the change. On a
trumped up invitation of some of the inhabitants of Santo Domingo, she
invaded the formerly Spanish portion of the island and she began war
with Peru in the hope of acquiring at least some of the Pacific islands
belonging to that state.
More formidable were the plans of Napoleon III, for the French, too,
remembered the glowing promise of their earlier American dominions. They
had not forgotten that the inhabitants of the Americas as far north as
the southern borders of the United States were of Latin blood, at least
so far as they were of European origin. In Montevideo there was a French
colony, and during the forties France had been active in proffering her
advice in South American disputes. When the second French Republic had
been proclaimed in 1848, one of the French ministers in South America
saw a golden chance for his country to assume the leadership of all
Latin America, which was at that time suspicious of the designs of
the United States and alarmed by its rapid expansion at the expense of
Mexico. With the power of the American Government neutralized in
1861, and with the British Navy immobilized by the necessity of French
friendship, which the "Balance" made just then of paramount interest to
Great Britain, Napoleon III determined to establish in Mexico an empire
under French influence.
It is instructive to notice that General Bernhardi states, in "Germany
and the Next War" which has attracted such wide attention and which has
done so much to convince Americans of the bad morals of autocracy, that
Great Britain lost her great chance of world dominance by not taking
active advantage of this situation, as did France and Spain. It is
indeed difficult to see what would have been the outcome had Great
Britain also played at that time an aggressive and selfish part. She
stayed her hand, but many British statesmen were keenly interested in
the struggle, from the point of view of British interests. They did not
desire territory, but they foresaw that the permanent separation of the
two parts of the United States would leave the country shorn of weight
in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. North and South, if separated,
would each inevitably seek European support, and the isolation of
the United States and its claim to priority in American affairs would
disappear. The balance of power would extend itself to the Western
Hemisphere and the assumption of a sphere of influence would vanish with
the unity of the United States.
Nor did the close of the Civil War reveal less clearly than its
beginning the real international position of the United States. When
the country once more acquired unity, these European encroachments were
renounced, and dreams of colonial empire in America vanished. There was
a moment's questioning as to the reality of the triumph of the North--a
doubt that the South might rise if foreign war broke out; but the
uncertainty was soon dispelled. It was somewhat embarrassing, if not
humiliating, for the Emperor of the French to withdraw from his Mexican
undertaking, but the way was smoothed for him by the finesse of
Seward. By 1866 the international position of the United States was
reestablished and was perhaps the stronger for having been tested.
In all these years, however, the positive side of the Monroe Doctrine,
the development of friendly cooperation between the nations of America
under the leadership of the United States, had made no progress. In
fact, with the virtual disappearance of the American merchant marine
after the Civil War, the influence of the United States diminished.
Great Britain with her ships, her trade, and her capital, at that time
actually counted for much more, while German trade expanded rapidly
in the seventies and eighties and German immigration into Brazil gave
Prussia a lever hold, the ultimate significance of which is not even yet
fully evident.
Under these circumstances, Blaine planned to play a brilliant role as
Secretary of State in President Garfield's Cabinet. Though the President
was his personal friend, Blaine regarded him as his inferior in
practical statecraft and planned to make his own foreign policy the
notable feature of the Administration. His hopes were dashed, however,
by the assassination of Garfield and by the accession of President
Arthur. The new Secretary of State, F T. Frelinghuysen, reversed
nearly all of his predecessor's policies. When Blaine returned to
the Department of State in 1889, he found a less sympathetic chief in
President Harrison and a less brilliant role to play. Whether his final
retirement before the close of the Harrison Administration was due
directly to the conflict of views which certainly existed or was a play
on his part for the presidency and for complete control is a question
that has never been completely settled.
Narrow as was Blaine's view of world affairs, impossible as was
his conception of an America divided from Europe economically and
spiritually as well as politically and of an America united in itself
by a provoked and constantly irritated hostility to Europe, he had an
American program which, taken by itself, was definite, well conceived,
and in a sense prophetic. It is interesting to note that in referring
to much the same relationship, Blaine characteristically spoke of the
United States as "Elder Sister" of the South American republics, while
Theodore Roosevelt, at a later period, conceived the role to be that of
a policeman wielding the "Big Stick."
Blaine's first aim was to establish peace in the Western Hemisphere by
offering American mediation in the disputes of sister countries. When he
first took office in 1881, the prolonged and bitter war existing between
Chili, Bolivia, and Peru for the control of the nitrate fields which lay
just where the territories of the three abutted, provided a convenient
opportunity. If he could restore peace on an equitable basis here, he
would do much to establish the prestige of the United States as a wise
and disinterested counselor in Spanish American affairs. In this his
first diplomatic undertaking, there appeared, however, one of the
weaknesses of execution which constantly interfered with the success of
his plans. He did not know how to sacrifice politics to statesmanship,
and he appointed as his agents men so incompetent that they aggravated
rather than settled the difficulty. Later he saw his mistake and made a
new and admirable appointment in the case of Mr. William H. Trescot of
South Carolina. Blaine himself, however, lost office before new results
could be obtained; and Frelinghuysen recalled Trescot and abandoned the
attempt to force peace.
A second object of Blaine's policy was to prevent disputes between
Latin American and European powers from becoming dangerous by acting as
mediator between them. When he took office, France was endeavoring to
collect from Venezuela a claim which was probably just. When Venezuela
proved obdurate, France proposed to seize her custom houses and to
collect the duties until the debt was paid. Blaine protested, urged
Venezuela to pay, and suggested that the money be sent through the
American agent at Caracas. He further proposed that, should Venezuela
not pay within three months, the United States should seize the custom
houses, collect the money, and pay it to France. Again his short term
prevented him from carrying out his policy, but it is nevertheless
of interest as anticipating the plan actually followed by President
Roosevelt in the case of Santo Domingo.
Blaine was just as much opposed to the peaceful penetration of European
influence in the Western Hemisphere as to its forceful expression. The
project of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, to be built and owned
by a French company, had already aroused President Hayes on March 8,
1880, to remark: "The policy of this country is a canal under American
control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this
control to any European power or to any combination of European powers."
Blaine added that the passage of hostile troops through such a canal
when either the United States or Colombia was at war, as the terms of
guarantee of the new canal allowed, was "no more admissible than on the
railroad lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United
States."
It is characteristic of Blaine that, when he wrote this dispatch, he was
apparently in complete ignorance of the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, in which the United States accepted the exactly opposite
principles--had agreed to a canal under a joint international guarantee
and open to the use of all in time of war as well as of peace.
Discovering this obstacle, he set to work to demolish it by announcing
to Great Britain that the treaty was antiquated, thirty years old, that
the development of the American Pacific slope had changed conditions,
and that, should the treaty be observed and such a canal remain
unfortified, the superiority of the British fleet would give the nation
complete control. Great Britain, however, could scarcely be expected to
regard a treaty as defunct from old age at thirty years, especially as
she also possessed a developing Pacific coast. Moreover, if the treaty
was to British advantage, at least the United States had accepted it.
Great Britain, therefore, refused to admit that the treaty was not in
full force. Blaine then urged the building of an American canal across
the Isthmus of Nicaragua, in defiance of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty--a
plan which received the support of even President Arthur, under whom a
treaty for the purpose was negotiated with the Republic of Nicaragua.
Before this treaty was ratified by the Senate, however, Grover
Cleveland, who had just become President, withdrew it. He believed in
the older policy, and refused his sanction to the new treaty on the
ground that such a canal "must be for the world's benefit, a trust
for mankind, to be removed from the chance of domination by any single
power."
The crowning glory of Blaine's system, as he planned it, was the
cooperation of the American republics for common purposes. He did not
share Seward's dream that they would become incorporated States of the
Union, but he went back to Henry Clay and the Panama Congress of 1826
for his ideal. During his first term of office he invited the republics
to send representatives to Washington to discuss arbitration, but his
successor in office feared that such a meeting of "a partial group of
our friends" might offend Europe, which indeed was not improbably part
of Blaine's intention. On resuming office, Blaine finally arranged
the meeting of a Pan-American Congress in the United States. Chosen
to preside, he presented an elaborate program, including a plan for
arbitrating disputes; commercial reciprocity; the establishment of
uniform weights and measures, of international copyright, trade-marks
and patents, and, of common coinage; improvement of communications; and
other subjects. At the same time he exerted himself to secure in
the McKinley Tariff Bill, which was just then under consideration, a
provision for reciprocity of trade with American countries. This meeting
was not a complete success, since Congress gave him only half of what
he wanted by providing for reciprocity but making it general instead of
purely American. Nevertheless one permanent and solid result was secured
in the establishment of the Bureau of American Republics at Washington,
which has become a clearing house of ideas and a visible bond of common
interests and good feeling.
Throughout the years of Blaine's prominence, the public took more
interest in his bellicose encounters with Europe, and particularly with
Great Britain, than in his constructive American policy; and he failed
to secure for either an assured popular support. His attempt to widen
the gulf between Europe and America was indeed absurd at a time when the
cable, the railroad, and the steamship were rendering the world daily
smaller and more closely knit, and when the spirit of democracy,
rapidly permeating western Europe, was breaking down the distinction
in political institutions which had given point to the pronouncement
of 1823. Nevertheless Blaine did actually feel the changing industrial
conditions at home which were destroying American separateness, and
he made a genuine attempt to find a place for the United States in the
world, without the necessity of sharing the responsibilities of all the
world, by making real that interest in its immediate neighbors which his
country had announced in 1823. Even while Blaine was working on his plan
of "America for the Americans," events were shaping the most important
extension of the interests of the United States which had taken place
since 1823.