MOLE WARFARE
October 1 was an epoch in the history of the defence of Port Arthur,
for it was on that day that the first of the 11-inch shells fell into
the Fortress, and so changed the aspect of affairs.
It was during a conference held on the positions that a message was
received that an 11-inch shell had fallen in Chi-kuan-shan Fort,
destroyed the masonry, and killed and wounded several men. Those who
were present suggested that a bombardment had again begun from seaward.
'No, no. These are newly mounted land guns--big guns. I am afraid they
will do for the forts and the fleet.'
The majority of those present doubted it.
'You doubt it? It is no use. You will soon see.'
I walked with General Smirnoff back from this conference along the
hills. As the bullets were whistling over the deep trench along which
we were walking, I could not help thinking that there was nothing
worse than this whistling--one got used to shells, but not to this
ceaseless squeaking of invisible birds. We had scarcely got on to
Mitrofanieff Hill when a pillar of smoke, sand, and stones rose up out
of Chi-kuan-shan Fort, as if a gigantic tree had sprouted up and been
thrown down. Then, with clockwork regularity, fantastic trees grew up
every few minutes in different directions along the north-east front,
and we heard the roars of dreadful explosions. Eight of them occurred
in Erh-lung-shan and Chi-kuan-shan Forts this day and did great damage
to the casemates. They were different to anything I had yet seen.
About two o'clock in the afternoon a bombardment of the town began;
the fire was concentrated near the Tifonty Mill and grew heavier
every minute. As the area of the falling shells gradually contracted,
it became clear that the target was this mill which supplied us all
with flour. This was the first day of a special bombardment of the
town: there were no 'shorts'; it was a deliberate cannonade. The fire
continued steadily, and the mill was struck by several shells.
The result of the foreigners' visit to us was apparent!
The conditions in the besieged Fortress--the wearing, trying
uncertainty, the want of confidence, and the constant, unavoidable
danger began to tell. The younger men lost their nerve, and suicides
commenced.
On October 2, nine 11-inch shells fell in Fort No. 4, and it was
reported that a large howitzer was mounted to the right of, and in rear
of, Sugar Head.
On October 5 a fire was caused on Tiger's Tail by the enemy's shells.
In the morning we attacked Signal Hill, which we had abandoned the
day before. After a fierce and bloody fight we recaptured it, and it
remained ours till the end of the siege. On this day Raschevsky's diary
says:
'The parallels and approaches of the gradual attack against
Chi-kuan-shan Fort, Open Caponier No. 3 and No. 2 Battery, have
got much closer. The Japanese are working with great perseverance,
notwithstanding our fire and occasional sorties. It has been decided to
make these oftener and of greater strength.'
And on the 7th he continued:
'... The approaches also are being pushed forward with greater
perseverance than ever toward our works; we can, in the daytime, even
see the men digging, while we are not strong enough to concentrate
our gun-fire on them. The situation of the approaches is particularly
dangerous in front of No. 3 Open Caponier, where the distance between
the enemy and ourselves is only 50 yards.'
In the afternoon the enemy suddenly began to shell the quarters of
Stössel and Smirnoff by _rafales_ from their small guns. Their sudden
and extraordinarily accurate shooting is proof that they had learned
from the 'correspondents' where Stössel and the Commandant were living,
for up to this they had always fired on the Viceroy's house. As soon as
the first shells began bursting near Stössel's quarters he at once gave
orders that General Volkoff's house, which was at the foot of Quail
Hill, should be got ready for him, and he began to move. However, an
11-inch shell happening to strike this house, compelled him to abandon
the idea.
On the 8th Raschevsky wrote:
'Since 9 a.m. their big howitzers had been busy firing at our howitzer
batteries Nos. 20 and 21. By 1 o'clock they had fired about fifty-five
shells at them. The left half of the masonry battery, No. 21,
afterwards presented a picture of complete destruction: the concrete is
in many places destroyed, and has fallen down in great masses.'
For six days now the town had been bombarded with 11-inch shells--great
masses of metal of awful destructive power. Nowhere could we find
real safety from them except, perhaps, in the bomb-proofs of Madame
Subotin, dug out of the rock. The concrete of the forts, the armour on
the battleships, were penetrated clean through. From October 1 life
in Arthur was any thing but pleasant. On the evening of the 9th
the enemy seemed to be concentrating near Rocky Redoubt, Water-Supply
Redoubt, and the village close by.[26] We had made an attack, but as
they were in great force, we had to withdraw. They were also active on
the west front. The following is the entry in the diary for the 9th:
[Illustration: BOMBARDMENT: JAPANESE SHELLS BURSTING ON HILL.]
'It was quite quiet up to 12 o'clock. Exactly at noon a salvo was
fired at the town. After a short time it was repeated, and then, at 2
o'clock, the enemy turned all his nearest batteries on to the trench
in front of Erh-lung-shan Fort, which we had recently recaptured, and
we were obliged to abandon it again. To-day a sortie was ordered on
the Redoubts with the object of seizing them and some of the Japanese
trenches in front. In the event of success the enemy would, of course,
have had to evacuate his parallels and approaches to Chi-kuan-shan
Fort, from which they were now only 150 yards distant. The attack
failed.'
On the 10th the 11-inch shells did much damage on the north-east front.
General Stössel published the following order this day:
'On the 7th instant I received the following telegram from the
Commander-in-Chief, dated Mukden, September 20:
'"I have received your despatch of September 16, and I congratulate
you warmly on your fresh success. We are making energetic
preparations for an advance. The 1st Army Corps has already arrived.
God be with you! Trust to me to succour you."'
When Kuropatkin received General Stössel's piteous despatch asking
that he might be allowed to remain on in Arthur, he had forwarded it
to Petersburg, asking what he was to do (Stössel had by this time been
made Aide-de-Camp to the Tsar, and had been promoted to the Third-Class
Order of St. George), adding that he had already twice recalled him
from the Fortress. Petersburg replied that it left the matter entirely
to him. Kuropatkin naturally did not think that Stössel had changed
his spots by having had the above distinctions conferred on him, but
being a clever and experienced diplomat, he did not wish definitely to
recall a newly-appointed Imperial aide-de-camp, and so kept silence.
On the 11th and 12th there was fighting round Chi-kuan-shan and
Erh-lung-shan forts on the east, as well as Fortification No. 3 and
Tumulus Redoubt, where the enemy gained ground. On the west they were
entrenching on the slopes of 203 Metre and Long Hill. The following is
an extract from the diary for October 12:
'The enemy's approaches are getting closer up. With wonderful energy
and perseverance they are digging them towards Chi-kuan-shan Fort,
Open Caponier No. 2, and B Battery. Early this morning two additional
approaches were made towards Kuropatkin Lunette, and parallels were
begun. Our artillery fire is not continuous enough to stop them.
Sorties are not often made, and when made few scouts go with them,
so that they are carelessly carried out, and have little result;
consequently the siege-works are progressing rapidly. In the last
parallel in front of B Battery the Japanese have built a thick
bomb-proof with a covering of Chinese wood, apparently with the object
of protecting the gun crews from hand-thrown grenades.
'We are all alarmed for the condition of the caponier of the main
faces of Chi-kuan-shan. They have mined behind the counter-scarp, and
evidently mean to blow it up. In anticipation of this we are making two
counter-mine galleries from the corners of the caponier, which, running
for twelve yards, ought to hit their main gallery, but as the soil here
is almost rocky, progress is slow, and we may be late in intersecting
the enemy's gallery. In order to ascertain the position of their shaft,
and the direction of their gallery, orders have been given for a sortie
to-morrow, in which the sappers will take part.'
[Illustration: RESULTS OF A BOMBARDMENT.]
This sortie failed through the clumsiness and noise of the men who were
not specially trained scouts.
From Chi-kuan-shan we made another sortie on the night of the 15th.
This also failed, owing to the majority of the men turning tail.
Stössel's order about sorties undoubtedly had a good deal to do with
the poor spirit shown on this occasion. An attempt was also made to
stop the work on the sap-head by firing the war-head of a torpedo
charged with 70 pounds of pyroxiline out of a torpedo-tube on the
parapet. On the 17th General Gorbatovsky took the place of General
Nadein as commander of the right flank of the defences.
In some places now the enemy were face to face with our men, with only
a distance of twenty to thirty yards between them. Taking cover behind
sand-bags, the Japanese were doggedly continuing step after step, yard
after yard, and fresh earth was constantly being thrown up out of the
deep saps which hid the men working. Occasionally one would see the
glint of a spade, or a black forage cap, and along the communicating
trenches here and there would run a Japanese dressed in black.
On the 20th Raschevsky wrote:
'At 3 a.m. a sortie was made from Chi-kuan-shan. Its arrangement was
entrusted to me, as its main object was to reconnoitre the enemy's
works nearest to the fort: 40 infantry and 5 sappers took part in
it. Owing to the failure of the two preceding sorties, this one was
most carefully prepared. The men were ordered to go round the foot of
the glacis and its slopes, and to dash on to the head of the enemy's
three approaches. If possible they were to destroy the works, and not
attempt to pursue, but immediately to return. A party of 25 infantry
and 3 sappers, under the command of Ensign Marchenko, were to go round
the fort from the left, and to lie concealed on the glacis. The other
portion, under the command of a non-commissioned officer, was to
break through the wire entanglement placed along the glacis of the
right face, and to lie down there silently and wait for the signal
for the general attack by both parties. The signal was to be a ray of
searchlight thrown on to the nearest peak of Ta-ku-shan. The first
flash, at 2.45 a.m., was to be a warning for the men to be ready:
the second, at 3 a.m., was to be the signal for the general attack.
Both parties were then to dash simultaneously down the glacis right
on to the appointed place. By doing this we hoped partly to escape
the fire of the enemy's machine-guns, which in the previous sorties
had fired along the direction of the salient angle of the glacis, and
along the slopes under the flanks of the fort. Our men were not to
fire till discovered, but directly the Japanese opened fire, the guns
and infantry from the neighbouring works were at once to concentrate
their fire on their near trenches--not, however, closer than a
certain given direction towards the foot of the glacis--in order to
divert their attention. At the same time a demonstration was to be
made from the covered way of the salient angle by raising dummies up
above the glacis, and throwing stones tied with string on to the wire
entanglement to make it appear as if we were trying to advance from the
centre and not from the sides.
'As all the members of the sortie parties knew beforehand where to
go and what to do, everything turned out almost as we had hoped. The
sortie was a complete surprise to the enemy, and, when our men dashed
on to the heads of their approaches, they were seized with panic. From
the glacis I could hear their shouts of fear distinctly, and their fire
was comparatively weak, no machine-guns being used. After these shouts
we heard a few cheers, and then, after five or ten minutes, our men
appeared at the caponier, where they rushed, fearing that the Japanese
would recover themselves and get to work with their machine-guns.
However, they successfully went down the ladders into the ditch and
got round the caponier. They had ascertained that the Japanese were
making galleries under the caponier of the fort. The direction of one
was along under the axis of the caponier; the direction of the other we
did not discover. The heads of their galleries were found covered by
bomb-proofs, into one of which a sapper managed to throw a six-pound
bomb. We lost 3 killed and 7 wounded, amongst whom, to our great
regret, was Marchenko, very dangerously wounded. The result of the
sortie was so far very successful, and our countermining will now no
longer consist of groping blindly.'
Colonel Raschevsky was inclined to judge our men severely, because
they dug slower than the Japanese; he called them absolute children.
I cannot agree. The Russian soldier, when he came to Port Arthur, was
physically strong, though intellectually starved. By this time he had
become physically starved as well. No soldiers of Western Europe would
have done what he did.
Extracts from Colonel Raschevsky's Diary.
_October 22._--'The Japanese approaches are being particularly
developed these days in front of Kuropatkin Lunette. There are scarcely
any new ones in front of Chi-kuan-shan, but the men saw from Caponier
No. 2 that stones were being carried out from under the glacis; they
were evidently from mine-galleries.
'To-day, for the first time, was heard a suspicious knocking in our
counter-mines. I myself listened for a long time from both galleries,
but could hear nothing. I think it must have been a mistake, and the
noise was probably made by some one in the caponier. However, I have
told the miners to listen oftener and more carefully.'
'_October 23._--The enemy have not yet done anything to seize Open
Caponier No. 3, and the position there is most curious. We have dug a
trench and are holding two branch ends. At these ends are our sentries;
the Japs are behind the sand-bag traverse. Occasionally our men throw
hand-grenades at them, but they haven't as yet replied. At this close
range it is impossible to prevent constant firing, each trying to spot
the other and shoot first.
'Our men resort to the following ruse: one fastens a pole on his back,
on this is put a fur cap and round it a great-coat. He then crawls on
all fours along the trench. The Japs at once open fire on what they
think is a man, and, exposing themselves, give us a target. Generally
speaking, the men are in excellent spirits, though things are daily
getting worse. It is becoming colder--almost freezing at night, and in
the thin bomb-proofs it is uncomfortable, and in the trenches horrible.
The danger from the enemy's fire is daily increasing and the food is
wretched. But our men don't seem to notice it; on the contrary, they
seem to be more light-hearted and full of life.
'A chicken costs 12 roubles, a goose 20, an egg 1, a pound of flour 1,
a pound of horse-flesh 1/2 rouble.'[27]
The Colonel was to-day kinder to the men. His engineer heart had
grieved at the slow progress made with the works, and it was quite
comprehensible. His one desire was at all costs to interfere with,
to delay, the enemy's works, not to give him a chance of seizing the
trenches of the fort. In Chi-kuan-shan the men felt uneasy, expecting
an explosion, but the countermining was in Raschevsky's capable hands.
On the 24th he wrote:
'Yesterday morning the noise of the enemy working was heard in our left
gallery in front of Chi-kuan-shan; this time it was more easy to be
certain of than yesterday. Judging from the loudness of it, the enemy
cannot be further than 20 to 25 yards away, and are advancing. However,
the sounds are very indistinct,' etc.
On the 25th he wrote:
'Since 4 a.m. the enemy has ceased work in front of Chi-kuan-shan, and
has not recommenced up to the present. This is very suspicious. We must
in any case not stop our work, but must shove on our two galleries and
sink two new ones.'
On the 26th:
'At 4 a.m. we suddenly heard the Japs working from the left gallery in
front of Chi-kuan-shan, and the thud of their tools seemed much nearer
and more distinct. When I listened to it about 9 a.m. it seemed as if
they were at work almost 5 feet to the left and a little above. The
calculations for a camouflet[28] to destroy their gallery worked to a
charge of about 320 pounds of powder, and I at once gave orders for a
chamber to be dug out and all the necessary material for tamping it to
be got ready.
'After listening most carefully, we all came to the conclusion that
the enemy was sinking a shaft from the surface of the glacis with
the object of destroying our left gallery. At 8 p.m. the Commandant
arrived, and, having listened attentively, said that he wished to fire
the first camouflet himself.'
The besiegers had driven a long gallery under this fort so as to blow
it up, and the defenders dreaded an explosion any moment. The dangers
were much exaggerated, for some one spread a rumour that the Japs were
laying a charge of thousands of pounds of dynamite, and the whole fort
would be blown into the air. Though this was of course absurd, in
their hearts the men believed it and it acted on their spirit.
It was a calm moonlight night when the Commandant went to inspect the
fort and the progress in mining. Having received the report of the
officer commanding, General Smirnoff went to look at the destruction to
the masonry work, which had just been badly breached by 11-inch shells.
Then he descended into a subterranean casemate, where he was met by
Colonel Grigorenko, the Fortress Chief Engineer, Colonel Raschevsky,
Colonel Tretiakoff (an expert in mining), and some junior officers.
Having gone down into the low subterranean gallery and crawled to the
end, he listened attentively to the work being done by the enemy. From
this gallery he crawled through to the next, where he again listened.
Not more than 3 to 4 feet of granite can have been between him and the
enemy. Every one looked at each other in astonishment; this daring act
of Smirnoffs surprised us. Amongst the men the word was passed in an
instant: 'The Commandant himself has crawled into the gallery.' Some
believed it, some did not; but it made a great impression.
At a conference in the officers' casemate (where General Kondratenko
was killed later on) it was decided to load the camouflet without
loss of time. The condition of the fort was indeed serious; any hour,
any minute, an explosion might take place. It was a question of who
could explode their mine first--a game, and a dangerous game! All were
nervous; but General Smirnoff calmed every one by a few words.
[Illustration: GENERAL SMIRNOFF FIRING THE CAMOUFLET.]
Heavy and continual bombardment of the position was carried on on the
26th and 27th. At 11 a.m. on the 27th the Commandant, accompanied by
Lieutenant Hammer, arrived in the fort, where everything was ready for
firing the camouflet. All the Fortress guns were ordered, in case of a
successful explosion, at once to open fire on the enemy's batteries
if they should concentrate their fire on the fort. At this time the
enemy were methodically shelling this fort, Kuropatkin Lunette, and B
Battery with 11-inch shells, which were detonating every two or three
minutes. After an inspection of the tamping,[29] the electric leads
were extended from the station in the casemate to the outer parapet,
when, taking advantage of the interval between the shells, the General
went on to the parapet and pressed the firing-key.
Above the caponier rose a cloud of dust and smoke, out of which
projected planks, stones, and bodies. We had succeeded,[30] and
the garrison breathed again. The awful, weary hours of waiting had
passed. Congratulating every one, the General went down into the inner
courtyard. His presence as Head of the Fortress at the most dangerous
place in the defences soon became known, and inspired every one to
further efforts.
On the 28th the Japanese blew a breach through the wall of Caponier No.
3. They followed this up with an assault, but were repulsed. The same
afternoon batteries were shelling the road from Little to Big Eagle's
Nest, from the saddle of Ta-ku-shan. This only emphasized what the loss
of that hill meant to us. One cannot help asking why, when Velichko
drew out the plans of the Fortress, he did not insist on Ta-ku-shan
being fortified? It was a natural fort! Could he not realize the
difficulty of defending a fortress when its roads are under shell-fire
from the very commencement, and he our leading Professor of Military
Engineering? On the western front there was considerable activity
towards Wolf's Hills, the trenches of Siu-shuing village.
So far, Smirnoff had endeavoured to imbue the men with the idea of
no surrender, but General Fock now wrote a memorandum in which he
persuaded General Stössel to lay mines under our forts in order that
they might be blown up when it was decided to abandon them! Smirnoff
protested most vehemently, trying to show that mining our own forts (to
say nothing of the danger to the men in them) would sap at its very
roots the principle that a fort might perish but must never surrender,
and would consequently demoralize the troops.
Stössel believed Fock, and insisted. The Commandant then sent
Grigorenko to him, who submitted a detailed report, in which he pointed
out most clearly that the results of the explosions of such mines
would, generally speaking, be inconsiderable, whilst the mines, if
laid, would constitute a great danger to the garrison, as a chance
11-inch shell might cause a premature explosion. But Stössel had made
up his mind, and ordered chambers to be made in the forts for the
laying of charges. In Chi-kuan-shan, however, the Commander, Lieutenant
Floroff, said point-blank that so long as he was in the fort it should
not be mined.
General Stössel was in the habit of issuing frequent orders direct
to General Biely, Commanding the Fortress Artillery, and gave the
strictest instructions that not a gun was to be mounted without his
special sanction. As he never visited the fronts attacked, and,
therefore, could not judge of the state of affairs himself, the result
of this order could have been merely to make unpleasantness for General
Smirnoff and to interfere with his work. Though things were usually
done in the end as Smirnoff wished, all this hindered progress and
made matters very difficult. When systematic attacks began before
the general assault of October 30, Stössel, ignoring the Commandant,
told General Biely to open fire from the north-east front on to the
ground near to the fortifications at sunset--at first at intervals,
more often between 7 and 8 p.m., and again intermittently from then
till 10 p.m. His ostensible reason was that the enemy would attack at
that time. Of course, they did not do so, but despite the protests of
Smirnoff, Biely, and Kondratenko, he insisted upon this cannonade--an
utter waste of ammunition, when every shell was valuable.
To fire away our ammunition pointlessly in this manner was
unjustifiable, nay suicidal, and the motive for doing so is difficult
to comprehend.
The following were some reports received on the 29th:
'There has been gun and rifle-fire all night. A fight is now being
waged for the trenches. In Chi-kuan-shan the enemy have blown in
the roof and outer wall of the caponier, and are making use of iron
shields in the attack. From the opening they have dug a trench to their
trenches. The fire is increasing on Erh-lung-shan, Fortification No. 3,
and Tumulus.'
On the night of the 29th a heavy bombardment of the position took
place, and on the 30th there was a general assault. The following
telephone messages will show the progress of the fighting:
_From Colonel Naumenko._
11.50 a.m.--'The artillery-fire is increasing. Shrapnel has begun. We
are awaiting the attack.'
_From Sub-Lieutenant Vonliarliarsky._
12 noon.--'The Japs are storming B Battery.'
12.30 p.m.--'A bayonet fight is going on in B Battery.'
12.50 p.m.--'A Japanese flag has been planted on the parapet of B
Battery. It has been torn down, but the Japs are near the guns.'
_From Captain Golovan._
1.55 p.m.--'Fortification No. 3 is on fire. Our men are holding the
gorge.'
2.10 p.m.--'Fortification No. 3 is burning and the face has been
occupied by the Japs. Our men are in the gorge. Chi-kuan-shan,
Fortification No. 2 and Kuropatkin Lunette were captured, but have been
retaken.'
2.23 p.m.--'Fortification No. 3 has been recaptured.'
_From Colonel Semenoff_:
11.30 a.m.--'The Japs are in force under Erh-lung-shan.'
12.25 p.m.--'Water Supply Redoubt and trenches are strongly occupied by
the Japs.'
1 p.m.--'The Japs are moving in force on Erh-lung-shan.'
2.5 p.m.--'The Japs were driven out of B Battery at 1 p.m. They are on
Wolfs Hills in force.'
2.25 p.m.--'From Wolf's Hills the Japs are moving in front of Water
Supply Redoubt.'
5.15 p.m.--'The Japs are entrenching themselves in front of the
obstacles of Fortification No. 3. They are laying sand-bags along the
trench that was ours. They have got storming ladders.'
* * * * *
The third general assault on October 30 was preceded for four days by
a cruel bombardment, which began at midday on the 26th, and gradually
increased till the night of the 29th. For forty-eight hours the works
on the north-east front were incessantly pounded, the enemy deciding to
break down and annihilate everything with their fire, and then to dash
on the defenders with the bayonet. The night of the 30th was black, and
the sky cloudy. Morning came, and the fire increased, and by 10 a.m.
the whole front was enveloped in dense smoke: the hills were literally
reeking. The whole destructive energy of hundreds of guns was thrown on
the portion from B Battery to Fortification No. 3. It seemed as if
everything there must be destroyed--every living thing killed, that no
one could be left to defend, and that any moment the enemy would dash
in to fight in the very streets. Further opposition seemed useless,
inhuman. The fire slackened, and then again broke out; shrapnel was
poured on to those points that were to be stormed; the other works
were paralysed by high explosive shells. The assault began, and the
Commandant quickly moved the reserve companies along the ravines to the
attacked points. The enemy dashed in with the bayonet, and hand-to-hand
fighting ensued. The Commandant followed the progress of the assault
and defence on the telephone, and the reserves were massed in time at
all the most dangerous points successively.
[Illustration: KUROPATKIN LUNETTE AFTER THE ASSAULT IN OCTOBER.]
At last the front was again clear. We had survived the third assault,
and the crisis was over.
The October attacks were short, but most determined and bloody. As
regards their success, it was but slight. The enemy had gained some
dozens of yards--no more. Our total loss was Open Caponier No. 2,
already quite destroyed by the bombardment. The Japanese had fired over
150,000 shells.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 26: Dapalidjuan.]
[Footnote 27: About 10 roubles go to the English sovereign.]
[Footnote 28: A camouflet is a mine calculated to break down and
shatter an enemy's underground gallery without causing any crater at
the surface.--E. D.S.]
[Footnote 29: To 'tamp' a mine is to fill up the gallery by which it is
loaded with earth or other material, so that the force of the explosion
shall not be dissipated in that direction.--E.D.S.]
[Footnote 30: From the description it seems that this was more than a
camouflet.--E. D.S.]