FORTIFYING OUR LINE
The 4th of July showed the Japanese the power and energy of our
troops. It illustrated their capabilities not only in defence, but of
successfully delivering an attack; for it should be noted that the
minimum number of troops on the advanced positions took part in the
engagement of that day. Having retaken Big Ridge, Green Hills, and the
foot hills of Kuen-san, still holding the defile--the second key to the
advanced positions--and having made some progress with the fortifying
of all the defensive line, we completely stopped the enemy's forward
movement towards the outer forts, on which work was now being pressed
on. At this time our mobile shore defences (a division of gunboats)
were able to shell the enemy's positions, his rear communications, and
his bivouacs, with great success. Thanks to the result of the battle of
the 4th, the enemy felt that they were liable to attack themselves; the
desperate and well-planned attack of our right flank, under the command
of General Kondratenko, on that day had come as a nasty surprise. After
Kinchou they had advanced victoriously--as they liked. The battle of
June 26, with our abandonment of Kuen-san, confirmed them in the belief
that Russians were incapable of taking advantage of and of holding good
positions; but the actions of July 3 and 4 made them more careful, and
not quite so ready to believe blindly in their lucky star. They now
assumed the defensive, and began to construct field fortifications,
to build wire entanglements, and to lay mines all along their defence
line and captured heights. They became still more careful when our
outpost line moved forward, and, attacking their outposts, occupied
with our pickets the hills in front of Green Hills, from the foot of
Kuen-san to the sea. If only that hill had been still in our hands, our
position would have been splendid: under the energetic Kondratenko,
we would have very soon turned it into quite a formidable fort, which
would have been able to shell the enemy at every point, for all the
roads leading from their position to Dalny would have been distinctly
visible. But what could we now do? Fock had, knowingly or unknowingly,
spoilt everything, and in the face of common sense given up the hill. I
repeat, Kuen-san was never properly fortified, and so the Japanese had
been able to capture it with small loss. Had it been fortified, they
would have paid a long and heavy price for it.
One day when Butusoff, commanding the section on the right flank of
Green Hills, was lying on his face on his favourite little hill, and
looking intently at the top of Kuen-san through his glasses, I asked
him what he thought of it. He had intended for some time to send some
scouts there, and so he used to study all the approaches to the top by
day.
'Oh, I think a lot of it! So long as Kuen-san belongs to the Japanese,
we can do no good here. Remember that they can clearly see everything
that we do. Now, look at the top; look up there,' he said, pointing.
'Not there--more to the right; up above that first point.'
'I see!'
'Look! You can see those little poles running all the way down? Those
are for telephone-wires. From the top of that hill they will be able to
correct the fire of the whole of their batteries, just as they did
on Mount Samson. Do you remember? Well, all their batteries are being
connected up with telephone to that peak. I stay here by the hour, and
I have seen how they have connected up by telephone from one peak to
another.'
[Illustration: A BOMBPROOF.]
Thanks to the fairly successful operations under General Kondratenko,
people in the Fortress were now somewhat less nervous, and they began,
with their usual optimism, at once to believe that the enemy would
be checked for a long time on the advanced works. True, Kondratenko
had taken the place of Fock, but the real state of affairs was not
understood. Few knew that we might expect a decisive advance any day,
and that it was impossible to hold the enemy long on our most absurd
line of positions, stretching for seventeen miles, with such forces as
were allotted by the District Staff. But however much it was hoped that
we would succeed in checking the enemy for a longer or shorter time,
every one quite understood that if we were not reinforced from the
north the Japanese must sooner or later close up to the Fortress and
begin to bombard it.
In view of this, the leading people, especially those with families,
began to build for themselves bomb-proofs; but, owing to the lack of
the necessary material, labour, and knowledge, most of these were made
in a primitive fashion, and would have given absolutely no protection
against shells, nor even against splinters; but, ostrich-like, the
builders obtained a sense of security from the concealment afforded.
Stössel, with his extraordinary ideas on everything, took a different
view; in every unofficial way he showed his disapproval of these
buildings and made fun of them. However, this did not prevent him
having one built for himself in his own courtyard, and also one for
the staff-officers of the district. In this the latter took refuge
during the bombardment. They might have built ten bomb-proofs each
for themselves if they had liked, but why should they interfere
with others, especially with those who had wives and children? It
was absurd, barbarous. The building of bomb-proofs should have been
encouraged. Kinchou had shown what damage could be done by small
shells, and what might we not expect from siege-guns? The whole of
Arthur should have been turned into a catacomb, for besides the
healthy, there were all the sick and wounded to be protected; but,
when no proper bomb-proofs had been constructed during six years in
the batteries, it is not surprising that none had been built for the
hospitals.
While Stössel harried those building bomb-proofs and created general
annoyance by his extraordinary sallies and orders, things were
elsewhere progressing. The work on Temple and Water-Supply Redoubts,
which were destined, after Ta-ku-shan, to play so brilliant a part in
the defence, and on which the waves of the August storm were to be
broken, were pushed on. General Smirnoff, anticipating the course of
operations, decided to fortify, as I have said, beside the main line
of defences, the forts which at this time were almost ready--203 Metre
Hill, the hills lying in front of Angle, Divisional, Long, and Orphan
Hills. It must be remembered that at the time of his arrival in the
Fortress there was only one advanced work; this was Temple Redoubt,
with capacity for a company.
Much was done to improve this work, and after the destruction of
Siu-shuing village, close by, and the construction of two lunettes, it
really had some defensive value.
One interesting point was that Stössel and Fock insisted on the
fortification of Angle Hill, which was of minor importance, in
preference to strengthening 203 Metre Hill, which was of the greatest
tactical value. This action was against Smirnoff's opinion, and
necessitated the occupation of Pan-lun-shan and the forward slopes
of Angle Hill. Work on these could only be useless, but, to avoid
unpleasantness, General Smirnoff gave orders that they should be
fortified, and he himself, together with Kondratenko, made a thorough
examination of the ground, though no one realized better than he the
waste of time, men, material, and guns, all of which were so urgently
wanted in other parts. In the event Smirnoff's opinion proved correct.
Angle Hill had to be abandoned, with its guns, on the first day of the
August attack; but 203 Metre Hill held out for long, and it was only
after its capture, on December 5, that the Japanese were first able to
shell the harbour and shipping.
While we worked hard at the fortifications and swept the Roads for
mines, everything went on quietly on the advanced positions now
established along Green Hills. The enemy showed no activity, and did
not disturb us with a single shot, but, like us, worked hard, getting
troops into position and bringing up guns and ammunition to the front
lines. Fock especially insisted on Upilazy Ridge being fortified,
anticipating that the main attack would be against that flank, and,
as he was complete master on that side and was supported by Stössel,
he concentrated the greater part of the material, engineers, and
sappers there. The right flank, to which he paid no attention, was
left to itself. Heaven knows what would have happened on July 26 if
Smirnoff had not discovered this in time, and, as already stated, sent
Kondratenko there. From July 4 he, with the assistance of some engineer
officers, began to get the position on Green Hills into some order;
but General Fock was very displeased with his activity, and interfered
wherever he could. Had Smirnoff and Kondratenko given way, the results
of the fighting on July 26 would have been disastrous, and I am sure
that such a rout would have taken place among our men that the enemy
would have driven us right into Arthur. (The retirement on Fock's flank
was almost a rout.)
In the middle of July Stössel inspected the advanced positions we
were holding--at least, he visited the left flank, commanded by Fock.
This was only natural, for the mere fact of Smirnoff and Kondratenko
evincing interest on the right would have been enough to make him
ignore it. I assisted at this visit, and was personally assured by
Stössel that the attack would certainly fall on the left, while the
enemy would merely demonstrate on the right. This inspection was indeed
a farce, for all knew that, had Stössel given any orders, which he did
not, they would not have been carried out.
We went along the Shininsky Ridge, and at 2 p.m. reached the howitzer
battery. It consisted of two howitzers on wooden platforms. On one
side was pitched a tent for the men, on the other one for the officer.
The heat was unbearable, and not a breath of wind fanned the air.
Kuen-san stood just above us, and with glasses we could see what was
being done by the enemy. After a few words with his Chief of the Staff,
Kondratenko came up to Stössel and, pointing out the desirability of
delaying the enemy's work on that side, suggested that a few shells
should occasionally be dropped on to them. Stössel agreed and gave
the order accordingly; but no sooner had the men begun to load than
the General came up, and rudely telling Kondratenko that he was in
command there, persuaded Stössel to cancel the order. The incident was
enlightening. We moved on, Stössel remarking on more than one occasion
that bomb-proofs were necessary, and receiving the invariable reply
that they were being made. None, however, were visible, nor had the
fire trenches any sort of overhead cover.
Gradually we made our way homewards, back to the railway, and then
by train to Port Arthur, to resume again our daily life, and to read
the instructive orders in which Stössel gave us the benefit of his
experience at the front!