By Baron L. Hengelmuller.
Late Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States.
_The following letter was written by Baron Hengelmuller to Col. Theodore
Roosevelt._
ABBAZIA, Sept. 25, 1914.
My Dear Mr. Roosevelt:
Our correspondence has suffered a long interruption. Your last letter
was from July of last year. I do not know whether you ever received my
answer, by which I thanked you for your preface to my book. You were in
Arizona when I wrote it, and soon after your return you started for
Brazil. At the occasion of your son's wedding I sent him a telegram to
Madrid, but I had no chance to write to you because I had no information
with regard to the length of your stay and your whereabouts in Europe.
Now I write to you at the time of a most momentous crisis in the world's
history, and I do so impelled by the desire to talk with you about my
country's cause and to win your just and fair appreciation for the same.
I wish I could address my appeal to the American people, but having no
standing and no opportunity to do so, I address it to you as to one of
America's most illustrious citizens with whom it has been my privilege
to entertain during many years the most friendly relations.
Since the outbreak of the war our communications with America are slow
and irregular. In the beginning they were nil. From the end of July to
the middle of August we received neither letters, telegrams, nor papers.
I suppose it was the same with you concerning direct news from us. Our
adversaries had the field all for themselves and they seem to have made
the most of it. To judge from what I have learned since and from what I
could glean in our papers, the New York press seem to have written about
us and Germany very much in the same tone and spirit as they did about
you during your last Presidential campaign. I have seen it stated that
The Outlook published an article in which Austro-Hungary was accused of
having brought about the war through her greed of conquest and the
overbearing arrogance of her behavior toward Servia. I do not know
whether I cite correctly, as I have not seen the article, and I am aware
that you have severed your connection with The Outlook after your return
from Brazil. I only mention the statement as an illustration of what I
have said above, for if a review of the standing of The Outlook opens
its columns to such a glaringly false accusation the daily papers have
certainly not lagged behind.
It is natural that our adversaries should be anxious to win the
sympathies of the American people. So are we. But it is not for this
purpose that I now write to you. Sympathy is a sentiment and, as a rule,
not to be won by argument. What I want to discuss with you are the
causes of this war and the issues at stake.
The Cause of the War.
Undoubtedly the war broke out over our conflict with Servia, but this
conflict was not of our seeking. We had no wish of aggrandizement or
extension of power at the expense of Servia, but Servia covets territory
which belongs to us, and for years has pursued her ends by the most
nefarious and criminal means. The assassination of our heir to the crown
and his consort was not an isolated fact, but only the most glaring
link in a long chain of plotting and agitating against us. This
attitude of Servia toward us dates back to the day when the gang of
officers who murdered their own King came to power, and when it became
their policy to keep a hold over their own people by exciting their
ambitions against us. This policy reached its first climax when we
declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we had occupied
and developed for thirty years. You were in office then, and the events
of the time are familiar to you. The crisis ended then by Servia's
formal acknowledgment that our annexation violated none of her rights,
and by her promise to cultivate henceforth correct and friendly
relations with us. This promise was not kept. The plotting continued,
lies were disseminated about a pretended oppression of our South Slav
population, and associations were formed for the purpose of stirring
them to discontent and if possible to treason.
Things came to a second climax with the murder of Archduke Francis
Ferdinand. The plot for this crime was hatched in Servia, the bombs and
revolvers for its execution were furnished there, and Servian officers
instructed the murder candidates in their use. At last we could stand it
no longer. What we wanted from Servia was the punishment of the plotters
and accomplices and a guarantee for normal relations in the future. This
was the object of our ultimatum. Servia made a show of complying with
some of our demands, but in reality her answer was evasive.
These facts are exposed and authenticated in the note which we sent to
the powers after having presented our ultimatum in Belgrade and in the
memorandum which accompanied it. I do not know whether the American
papers published these documents at the time. Today they are outstripped
by greater events, but for the just appreciation of our proceedings in
regard to Servia they are indispensable.
In reality, however, our conflict with Servia was not the cause of the
great war now raging, but only the spark which brought the overloaded
powder barrel to explosion. Who talks of Servia today, and who believes
that France, England, and Japan are making war on Germany and on us
because of Servia? The war broke out because Russia decided to shield
Servia against the consequences of her provocations and because, owing
to preconcerted arrangements, the situation in Europe was such that the
action of one great power was bound to bring all or nearly all the
others into the field. And again those preconcerted arrangements were
the outcome of a mass of pent-up passions, of hatred, envy, and
jealousy, the like of which--all Hague conferences and pacific unions
notwithstanding--the world has never seen before.
We are fully aware of the danger which threatened us from Russia when we
formulated our demands in Belgrade. Russia's population is three times
as large as ours and it was not with a light heart that our Emperor-King
took his final resolution. But our national honor and our very existence
as a self-respecting power were at stake. We could not hesitate. Now we
are in a struggle for life or death and we mean to carry it through with
full confidence in the rightfulness of our cause and in the force of our
arms. In one respect events have already belied the calculations of our
enemies, who counted on internal dissensions within our own borders. I
am happy to say that Croatians, Slovenes, and a large majority of our
own Servians are fighting in our ranks with the same valor and
enthusiasm as Czechs, Rumanians, Poles, Magyars, and Germans.
But why did Russia decide to assail us? During the whole nineteenth
century she has shown herself a very shifty and unreliable protectress
of Servia. She made use of the smaller country when it suited her own
aggressive purposes against others, and she dropped it whenever it
served her ends. It was so at the time of the Turkish war of 1877 and of
the Berlin Congress, and it remained so until with the advent of the
present dynasty Servia offered a sure prospect of becoming and remaining
a permanent tool in Russia's hands and a thorn in our flesh.
Russia is an aggressive power. For 200 years she has extended her
dominions at the cost of Sweden first, of Poland and Turkey afterward.
Now she thinks our turn has come. Finding us to be in the way of her
ultimate aims in the Balkan Peninsula, she began to regard us as her
enemy. For years the propaganda for undermining the bases of our empire
has been carried on in the name of Pan-Slavism. It seems that she judged
that now the time had come to draw the consequences and to bring things
to a final issue. With what result remains to be seen.
Germany Bound to Aid Austria.
By the terms of our treaty of alliance Germany was bound to come to our
assistance if we were attacked by Russia. There was no secrecy about
that treaty. Its text had been made public long ago and its purely
defensive character brought to the knowledge of the world. No more than
we did Germany entertain hostile intentions or nourish hostile feelings
against Russia. There were no clashing interests to excite the first, no
historical reminiscences to justify the second. If it is otherwise in
Russia, it is because her present leaders find German power in the way
of their conquering aspirations against us. Germany, true to her
obligations, hastened to our side when she saw us menaced, and when she
declared war she did it because she had positive information that in
spite of formal and solemn assurances to the contrary Russia
mobilization was proceeding.
The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public.
Whether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive
purposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword
in the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise. But there is
no mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no
doubt about the greed for revenge which during the last forty-four years
has swayed the overwhelming majority of her people and been the
dominant factor of her foreign policy. It was for this object that she
entered into her alliances and agreements, and it is for this cause that
she is fighting now.
It is simple hypocrisy to talk about German aggressiveness against
France. France stood in no danger of being attacked by Germany if she
had chosen to remain neutral in the latter's war with Russia. Asked
whether she would do so, she replied that her actions would be guided by
her interests. The meaning of this reply was clear, and left Germany no
choice. The formal declaration of war became then a mere matter of
political and military convenience, and has no bearing on the moral
issue of the case.
But why has England plunged into this war? Officially and to the world
at large she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of
Belgian neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was
solemnly declared that England could not stand by and passively tolerate
such a breach of international law and obligations.
No Austrian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful
smile. Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of
standing and renown have put to their Government, viz., whether they
would equally have declared war on France if that violation of
neutrality had first come from her side. In face of this question having
remained unanswered, and in face of what has come to light since about
French preparations in Belgium, there is no need to expiate on this
subject. All that there is to be said about it has been said by the
German Chancellor in open session of the Reichstag, and all that may be
added is the remark that, considering England's history and what she did
before Copenhagen in 1807, she of all nations should be the last to put
on airs of moral indignation over the application of the principle that
in time of war "salus reipublicae suprema lex est."
The existence of a convention binding England to France in case of war
has--as far as I know--never been admitted officially by England. As I
see now from manifestations of Englishmen disapproving of their
country's participation in the war, the belief exists nevertheless that
such a convention had been concluded. But whether England's declaration
of war was the consequence of previously entered obligations or the
outcome of present free initiative, the main fact remains that in the
last resort it sprang from jealousy of Germany's growing sea power and
commercial prosperity. This feeling was the dominant factor in English
foreign policy, just as greed for revenge was in France. It was the
propelling power for the agreements which England has made and for
others which she endeavored but did not succeed in bringing about.
England claims the dominion over the seas as her native right, and, what
is more, she holds it. Her title is no better and no worse than that of
the Romans when they conquered the world, or of the Turkish Sultans in
the days of their power. Like them, she has succeeded in making good her
claim. For three centuries the nations of Continental Europe have been
hating, fighting, and devastating each other for the sake of strips of
frontier land and a shadowy balance of power. These centuries were
England's opportunity, and she has made the most of it. That she should
mean to keep what she has and hold to her maritime supremacy as to the
apple of her eye is natural. Whether it is for the benefit of mankind
that it should be so, and whether the world in general would not be
better off if there existed a balance of power on sea as well as on
land, does not enter into the present discussion. What is more to the
purpose is that in reality England's sea power stood in no danger at
all. To any thinking and fair-minded observer it must be clear that
Germany, hemmed in by hostile neighbors in the east and west, and
obliged, therefore, to keep up her armaments on land, would not have
been able to threaten England's maritime superiority for generations to
come. If the issue has been thrown into the balance, it has been done so
by England's own doing.
But it is not only the nascent German Navy that excited the distrust
and envy of England. German colonies and every trading German vessel
seem equally to have become thorns in English eyes. The wish to sweep
those vessels from off the seas, to destroy all German ports, in one
word, to down Germany, has long been nourished and lately openly avowed
in England. Norman Angell's theories about the great illusion of the
profitability of modern warfare seem to have made mighty small
impression on his countrymen.
Russian lust of conquest, French greed of revenge, and English envy were
the forces at work in the European powder magazine. The Servian spark
ignited it, but the explosion was bound to come sooner or later. What
alone could have stopped it would have been England's stepping out of
the conspiracy. That she did not do so, in fact became its really
directing power, will forever remain a blot on her history.
About Japan's motives and methods I do not think it necessary to write.
American public opinion will hardly need any enlightenment on this
subject. America forced Japan out of the isolation in which she had
lived during centuries. I hope the day may not come when she will wish
that she had not done so.
The issues of the war stand in relation to its causes and the same
attempts have been made to distort and falsify them in the eyes of the
American public. I have seen it stated in a New York paper that this war
is a fight between civilization and barbarism, and I have seen a member
of the present English Cabinet quoted as having said that the issue was
one between militarism and freedom, civilization and freedom standing,
of course, in both cases on the side of our enemies.
Not a War for Civilization.
More idiotic rot--excuse the expression--I have never read in my life.
What has civilization to do with Servia's murderous plotting against
us? What with Russia's desire to shield her from the consequences
of her aggressions and to demonstrate to the world that we are of
no account in the Balkans and to establish her own--more or less
veiled--protectorate there? And if the case of civilization is advanced
by Japan's ousting Germany from Kiao-Chau, why should it not be equally
furthered if Japan did the same to England in Hongkong, Singapore, or,
if the opportunity offered, in India itself? And a person must be indeed
at his wits' end for arguments to proclaim Russia as a standard bearer
of freedom in her war against us. Compare her treatment of Poles, Finns,
Ukrainanians (small Russians) and Hebrews with the freedom which the
different nationalities enjoy in our empire! And England herself. Is it
for freedom's sake that she holds Gibraltar and that she subjugated the
Boers?
No! Civilization and freedom have nothing to do with the issues at stake
now, least of all in the sense that our enemies have drawn the sword for
their cause. It is a war for conquest and supremacy stirred up by all
the hateful passions in human nature, fully as much as any war that has
ever been waged before. But we did not stir it up. We are fighting for
our existence, right and justice are on our side, and so we trust will
victory be.
The causes of the war are clear. To make its issues still clearer,
imagine for a moment and merely for argument's sake the consequences of
our adversaries being successful. Russia, England, and Japan would
remain masters of the field. Is this a consummation any thinking
American can wish for?
These are the considerations I wished to lay before you, and I ask your
assistance to bring them before the American people. I ask for no reply,
no manifestation of feelings or opinion from you. What I ask you is to
publish this letter as an open letter addressed by me to you, signed
with my full name. How to do this I leave entirely to you. It goes
without saying that your private reply, if you favor me with one, will
be treated as such.
Hoping to meet you in better times, and sending our kindest regards to
Mrs. Roosevelt, believe me, yours most sincerely,