By Arthur v. Briesen.
Of the law firm of Briesen & Knauth; Doctor of Laws, New York
University; philanthropist; has served the American public as
head of important civic bodies and Governmental commissions.
_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
Having been requested by you to express my views with reference to the
war which is now lacerating Europe, I take pleasure to comply with your
desire.
As an American citizen I am, of course, under obligations to be neutral
and to send no ammunition to either belligerent. At the same time the
German blood in my veins naturally causes me to sympathize with Germany
in this conflict. But even if we leave out of consideration any matter
of sympathy, if we look upon the situation in an entirely unbiased
spirit, the conclusion which I propose to lay before you appears to be
irresistible.
The questions that seem to have agitated the American public mostly in
connection with this awful conflict have been:
_First_--Who is to blame for bringing about this war, and,
_Second_--Assuming that Germany was not to blame for beginning
the war, is she to blame for violating the neutrality of
Belgium?
If we should find the fault regarding the first question to lie
primarily with England and secondarily with Russia, we should at once
clear the German people and their Government from the charge that has
heretofore been brought against them for having incited the war. And if
we should find that the neutrality of Belgium was not binding upon any
country whose existence or whose interests were threatened by other
countries, that fact would then absolve either country from a charge
which thus far seems to have been brought against one of them.
_How was the war brought about?_ As far back as 1906 it is known, and
can be proved by the files of New York papers, to say nothing of
official correspondence now found in Brussels and elsewhere, that
measures were started by England to circumscribe or isolate the German
Empire, and treaties were entered between England, France, and Russia
(the Triple Entente) to insure joint action against Germany when
necessary.
Germany herself has been peaceful, progressive, and anxious to retain
her position as a nation undisturbed by others, as a nation that should
advance in art, in science, in population, and in all things that make
happiness through peace. What was the situation in other countries?
Since 1870 _France_ had cried for revenge (_revanche_). Its school
books, newspapers, public speakers, and political leaders were all
charged with the one great idea of seeking revenge against Germany for
having retaken Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, which France had wrongfully
occupied since the time of Louis XIV. Alsace and Lorraine had been
German for centuries before; they were wrested from Germany without even
a semblance of an excuse at the close of the seventeenth century, and
were largely German in language and in spirit in 1870. Goethe's studies
in Strassburg and his visits to Frederica von Sesenheim in the
eighteenth century show that he was living in a German country whenever
he was in Alsace. A _united_ Germany did not exist prior to 1870.
However, the cry for revenge was there, and France distinctly declared
it to be her policy to take her revenge as soon as opportunity offered.
France was, therefore, a pronounced enemy of Germany ever since 1870,
and when asked by the German Government on July 31, 1914, whether she
would remain neutral in a Russian-German war (Annex 25, German "White
Paper") she answered: "France would do that which might be required of
her _by her interests_." This answer was given on Aug. 1, 1914, (Annex
27, German "White Paper.") Today we may well ask France whether, since
Aug. 1, 1914, she has done that which was required by her interests.
_Russia_ may next be looked at. How did Russia become involved in this
contest? The little kingdom of Servia, which had familiarized itself
with the fine art of disposing of crowned heads by throwing its King and
Queen, Alexandra and Draga, out of the window of their castle, caused
through its officials and its followers to have the heir to the Austrian
throne and his wife cruelly assassinated on June 28, 1914. This
assassination was an act of enmity toward Austria and a step toward the
enlargement of Servia. Deeming her existence threatened and her national
dignity offended, Austria sent a rather sharp demand under date of July
23, 1914, to Servia, requiring prompt and thorough satisfaction for the
gross attack made upon her and her reigning family through Servia's
official directions.
Strange to say, however, the British "White Book" shows that three days
before, on July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, (Paper 1, British "White
Book,") wrote to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, a letter
in which he states:
In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within
reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she
could produce for making any demand, the more chance there
would be of smoothing things over. _I hated the idea of a war
between any of the great powers_, and that any of them should
be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.
On July 24, 1914, the Austrian message to Servia became known to all
countries, and on the same day Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador
at St. Petersburg, wrote that he had been asked by Mr. Sazonof, Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to meet him at the French Embassy to
discuss matters, as Austria's step clearly meant that war was imminent.
He wrote that Mr. Sazonof expressed himself as follows (British Paper
6):
He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to
_proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France_. The French
Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all
the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if
necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any
diplomatic negotiations.
Later, on July 29, 1914, Sir George Buchanan wrote to Sir Edward Grey
(Paper 72, English "White Book") as follows:
I made it clear to his Excellency that, _Russia being
thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted_ if
Servia were attacked by Austria.
Sir George Buchanan would not have said that if he had not been
authorized to do so. He would not have said a "general war could not be
averted if Servia were attacked by Austria"; and by "general war" he
meant, and we all understand he meant, a war between England, France,
and Russia on one side and Germany and Austria on the other.
Servia's reply to the demand of Austria, which was dated July 25, 1914,
not being deemed satisfactory, Austria proceeded to a punitive
expedition against Servia, and she repeatedly asserted and assured all
the other powers that the expedition was merely punitive and that
neither the independence nor the territorial integrity of Servia were at
all involved or in any danger.
But all this had no effect upon Russia. In fact, when Russia was first
informed of the Austrian demand (Annex 4, German "White Book") Minister
of Foreign Affairs Sazonof made wild complaints on _July_ 24, 1914,
against Austria-Hungary. What he said most definitely was this:
_That Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian
dispute to be confined to the parties concerned._
This was the keynote of the Russian situation and of the Russian
intention. Russia wanted, of course, to expand its realm as far
westward as possible, and it wanted to take advantage of the opportunity
offered by the necessary consequences of the dreadful insult and cruelty
practiced by Servia on Austria, not only to prevent the punishment of
Servia, but also to proceed against Germany, for, as Paper 4 says:
"Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be
_confined_ to the parties concerned."
Who, then, was to blame for not allowing the war to be confined, for not
permitting Austria to punish the murderers of her King, but utilizing
this opportunity for the purpose of bringing about the great war which
Russia and France had carefully prepared long ago? The great war which
should involve all the civilized nations in a conflict, and threaten to
extinguish Austria and to carry barbarism into the heart of Europe! She
_did_ not permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the
parties concerned.
Again, in Paper 56, (English "White Book,") we find the English
Ambassador to Austria writing to Sir Edward Grey on July 27, 1914, the
following:
If actual war broke out with Servia it would be _impossible_
to localize it, for _Russia_ was not prepared to give way
again.
Again, in Paper 72, (English "White Book,") dated July 28, 1914, from
the English Ambassador in Russia to Sir Edward Grey:
I made it clear to his Excellency (German Ambassador) that,
_Russia being thoroughly in earnest_, a general war could not
be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.
Paper 121, (English "White Book,") British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir
Edward Grey under date of July 31, 1914:
He (the German Secretary of State) again assured me that both
the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia,
and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been
urging Austria to show willingness to continue
discussions--and telegraphic and telephonic communications
from Vienna had been of a promising nature--_but Russia's
mobilization had spoiled everything_.
I could repeat, _ad infinitum_, quotations from these books to show
that Russia not only wanted this war if Austria wanted to punish Servia
for her misdeeds, but started it against the protest of Germany, and
started it, I sincerely believe, largely because encouraged by Great
Britain.
_England_: The letter written by the Belgian Chargé at St. Petersburg to
his Government on July 30, 1914, which letter was published in THE NEW
YORK TIMES on Oct. 7, 1914, and which letter, nearly a month before, had
been published abroad and never disavowed by the Belgian Government,
states distinctly on the part of Belgium:
_What is incontestable is that Germany has striven here, as
well as at Vienna, to find some means of avoiding a general
conflict...._ M. Sazonof, Russian Foreign Minister, has
declared that it would be impossible for Russia not to hold
herself ready and to mobilize, but that these preparations
were not directed against Germany. This morning an official
communiqué to the newspapers announces that "the reserves have
been called under arms in a certain number of Governments."
Knowing the discreet nature of the official communiqué one can
without fear assert that _mobilization is going on
everywhere_.
... One can truly ask one's self whether the whole world does
not desire war and is trying merely to retard its declaration
a little in order to gain time. England began by allowing it
to be understood that she did not want to be drawn into a
conflict. Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador) said that
openly. Today one is firmly convinced at St. Petersburg--one
has even the assurance of it--that England will support
France. This support is of enormous weight, and _has
contributed not a little to give the upper hand to the war
party_.
The German Emperor during these times believed England to be really and
honestly striving to avoid the war; he went so far as to announce in one
of his letters published in the "White Book" that "he had shoulder to
shoulder with England tried to bring about a peaceful solution." It
certainly now appears that all this while England had made her
arrangements with France and with Russia, and had strengthened the war
party in Russia to such an extent that Russia's desire to set Europe
afire was rendered possible.
_Belgian neutrality._ It is charged that Germany violated an alleged
treaty with Belgium, which treaty is supposed to have guaranteed the
integrity of Belgium. When Germany found her efforts to maintain peace
frustrated, Russian troops having crossed the German frontier on the
afternoon of Aug. 1, while France opened hostilities on Aug. 2, she
announced to Belgium on Aug. 2, 1914, that she found herself under
obligation, to prevent a French attack through Belgium, to pass through
Belgian territory; she expressed her readiness to guarantee the
integrity of the kingdom and its possessions and to pay any damage
caused if Belgium would, in a friendly way, permit such a passage of
troops through it.
The English "White Book" contains, Paper 151, dated Aug. 3, 1914, which
paper we repeat in full:
(British Minister to Belgium to Sir Edward Grey.)
French Government have offered through their Military Attaché
the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian
Government. Following reply has been received today: We are
sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering
eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, _we do
not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers_. Belgian
Government will decide later on the action which they may
think it necessary to take.
In short, Belgium says in the foregoing notice to France, that she does
not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers.
Was Germany justified in disregarding any previous treaty which related
to Belgium if her interests required her so to do?
_United States Supreme Court:_ In its unanimous opinion in the Chinese
exclusion cases, reported on Pages 581 to 611 of Vol. 130 of United
States Reports, the Supreme Court of the United States had this very
question before it. A treaty had been entered into by the United States
and China, allowing Chinese subjects the right to visit and reside in
the United States and to there enjoy the same privileges that are
enjoyed by citizens of the United States. After that treaty an act of
Congress was passed in violation of the treaty, providing it to be
unlawful thereafter for Chinese laborers to enter the United States. The
question was, whether we had the right to violate a treaty solemnly
entered into with another country? On this subject the court said (Page
600):
The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations
was elaborately considered in THE HEAD MONEY CASES, and it was
there adjudged: "that so far as a treaty made by the United
States with any foreign nation can become the subject of
judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is
subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement,
modification, or repeal," 112 U.S. 580, 599. This doctrine was
affirmed and followed in WHITNEY v. ROBERTSON, 124 U.S. 190,
195. It will not be presumed that the legislative department
of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict
with the treaties of the country; _but that circumstances may
arise which would not only justify the Government in
disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests
of the country that it should do so, there can be no question.
Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the
country._
In the same opinion the Supreme Court calls attention to an act passed
in 1798, declaring that the United States were freed and exonerated from
the stipulations of previous treaties with France. This subject was
fully considered by Justice Curtis, who held, as the Supreme Court says
(Page 602): "That whilst it would always be a matter of the utmost
gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so
was a prerogative of which no nation could be deprived without deeply
affecting its independence."
We observe, therefore, that under our own ideas of international law the
United States claims the right to disregard its stipulations if the
interests of the country should require it. And the same right we should
concede to other nations. Particularly to Germany in the present
instance, when we find her battling for her very existence against
enemies that seek to destroy her, against enemies that surround her on
all sides, against enemies that do not hesitate to bring troops into the
conflict from the wilds of Africa and Asia, and who do not hesitate to
drag Japan into this war, causing her to disregard Chinese neutrality in
her effort to capture a small settlement, lawfully occupied in China by
a handful of German soldiers.
In this connection I quote the British sentiment, as expressed by
Gladstone regarding Belgium neutrality in the year 1870:
But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who
have held in this House, what plainly amounts to the assertion
that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is
binding to every party to it, irrespective altogether of the
particular position in which it may find itself at the time
when the occasion for _acting on the question arises_.
This shows that England herself reserved the right, whenever her
interests required her to do so, to act in violation of the treaty with
Belgium. That, at least, is my understanding of Gladstone's language.
England did not respect Danish neutrality a hundred years ago, when she
destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen because her interests required,
and England does not now, through its Asiatic ally, and directly,
respect Chinese neutrality, claiming the right primarily to consult her
own interests. Should this right, asserted by our own Supreme Court, and
actually assumed by England and Japan, be denied to Germany? Finally, I
understand that The Hague Conference of 1907 drafted a convention which
reads:
The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Belligerents
are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of
war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power. Great
Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy refused to sign
it and did not sign it. Russia was not represented.
MILITARISM. There is one more subject which many people in this country
have failed to understand, and that is the matter of militarism. German
militarism is supposed to be something dreadful, and many good people
believe that it would be a great advance toward eternal peace if that
militarism could be wiped out. Well, now, let us see.
If Germany did not require every one of her sons to spend a year, or at
most two years, in the army, and if she had not provided for all these
men sufficient arms and accoutrements for immediate use in case of war,
what would have happened when Russia entered her territory, or when
France came on a like errand?
Any one who lives among enemies is expected to be sufficiently prepared
to defend himself should they attack him, be he ever so peaceful.
At the time the United States of America was born there was no such
thing as Germany. Every country around it had a slice of it. Napoleon
took the larger western part of Germany as his property, England held
Hanover, the former Kingdom of Poland held Saxony, Austria held Silesia,
and so there was no Germany. The Teutonic races had no home in which
they could develop and live without interference by others. To prevent
such interference Germany of all nations needed an army; to prevent
similar interference at sea England of all nations needed a navy. That
great British Navy bears precisely the same relation to the protection
of Great Britain at sea which the German Army bears to the protection of
Germany on land.
To sum up, what are the countries fighting for? Russia for her
enlargement; she has no grudge whatever against Germany except that it
exists. France for revenge; she has no grudge whatever against Germany
except that she wants revenge for 1870. What grudge has England against
Germany, except that Germany has grown commercially, financially, and
industrially to a position which threatens to crowd England into a
second rank? Jealousy appears to control the English attitude.
The position apparently assumed by England is best expressed by the King
of England in his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, dated July 30,
1914:
My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and
France to _suspend further military preparations_ if Austria
will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and
neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory
settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile
suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his
great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal,
thus proving that Germany and England are working together to
prevent what would be an international catastrophe.
On July 31, the very next day, Sir Edward Grey wrote the telegram, No.
111, (English "White Book,") to the British Ambassador at Berlin, in
which we find the following:
I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be
possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria
that they would undertake to see that she obtained full
satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did
not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian
territory. _As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already
declared her willingness to respect them._ (Established by
Paper 3, July 24, and Paper 5, July 26, German "White Book.")
Hence, we find that all King George said he wanted had been granted, and
yet England entered into the war. Why? Probably because she thought, as
France had expressed it, that she acted in pursuance of her interests.
And what is Germany fighting for? Does she want anything from anybody?
She wants to be left alone; she always wanted to be left alone; she
prospered while she was left alone; she grew while she was left alone.
Not being left alone she has to defend herself. Hence, I bespeak for
Germany and for her side fair play, just judgment on behalf of the
American people.
ARTHUR v. BRIESEN.
New York, Oct. 17, 1914.