DR. ELIOT'S FIRST LETTER.

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

The American people without distinction of party are highly content with

the action of their National Administration on all the grave problems

presented to the Government by the sudden outbreak of long-prepared war

in Europe--a war which already involves five great States and two small

ones. They heartily approve of the action of the Administration on

mediation, neutrality, aid to Americans in Europe, discouragement of

speculation in foods, and, with the exception of extreme protectionists,

admission to American registery of foreign-built ships; although the

legislation on the last subject, which has already passed Congress, is

manifestly inadequate.

Our people cannot see that the war will necessarily be short, and they

cannot imagine how it can last long. They realize that history gives no

example of such a general interruption of trade and all other

international intercourse as has already taken place, or of such a

stoppage of the production and distribution of the necessaries of life

as this war threatens. They shudder at the floods of human woe which are

about to overwhelm Europe.

Hence, thinking Americans cannot help reflecting on the causes of this

monstrous outbreak of primitive savagery--part of them come down from

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and part developed in the

nineteenth--and wondering what good for mankind, if any, can possibly

come out of the present cataclysm.

The whole people of the United States, without regard to racial origin,

are of one mind in hoping that mankind may gain out of this prodigious

physical combat, which uses for purposes of destruction and death all

the new forces of nineteenth-century applied science, some new liberties

and new securities in the pursuit of happiness; but at this moment they

can cherish only a remote hope of such an issue. The military force

which Austria-Hungary and Germany are now using on a prodigious scale,

and with long-studied skill, can only be met by similar military force,

and this resisting force is summoned more slowly than that of

Austria-Hungary and Germany, although the ultimate battalions will be

heavier. In this portentous physical contest the American people have no

part; their geographical position, their historical development, and

their political ideals combine to make them for the present mere

spectators, although their interests--commercial, industrial, and

political--are deeply involved. For the moment, the best thing our

Government can do is to utilize all existing neutrality rights, and, if

possible, to strengthen or develop those rights, for out of this war

ought to come more neutral States in Europe and greater security for

neutralized territory.

The Need for Discussion.

The chances of getting some gains for mankind out of this gigantic

struggle will be somewhat increased if the American people, and all

other neutral peoples, arrive through public discussion at some clear

understanding of the causes and the possible and desirable issues of the

war, and the sooner this public discussion begins, and the more

thoroughly it is pursued, the sounder will probably be the tendencies of

public sentiment outside of the contending nations and the conclusions

which the peace negotiations will ultimately reach.

When one begins, however, to reflect on the probable causes of the

sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than

primitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and widespread evils in

Europe from which America has been exempt for at least 150 years. The

first is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine

events, and the second is autocratic national Executives who can swing

the whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without

consulting the people or their representatives.

The actual catastrophe proves that secret negotiations like those

habitually conducted on behalf of the "concert of Europe," and alliances

between selected nations, the terms of which are secret, or at any rate

not publicly stated, cannot avert in the long run outrageous war, but

can only produce postponements of war, or short truces. Free

institutions, like those of the United States, take the public into

confidence, because all important movements of the Government must rest

on popular desires, needs, and volitions. Autocratic institutions have

no such necessity for publicity. This Government secrecy as to motives,

plans, and purposes must often be maintained by disregarding truth, fair

dealing, and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to

force comes, one Government may secure the advantage of taking the other

by surprise. Duplicity during peace and the breaking of treaties during

war come to be regarded as obvious military necessities.

The second great evil under which certain large nations of

Europe--notably Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary--have long suffered

and still suffer is the permanent national Executive, independent of

popular control through representative bodies, holding strong views

about rights of birth and religious sanctions of its authority, and

really controlling the national forces through some small council and a

strong bureaucracy. So long as Executives of this sort endure, so long

will civilization be liable to such explosions as have taken place this

August, though not always on so vast a scale.

Americans now see these things more clearly than European lovers of

liberty, because Americans are detached from the actual conflicts by the

Atlantic, and because Americans have had no real contact with the feudal

or the imperial system for nearly 300 years. Pilgrim and Puritan,

Covenanter and Quaker, Lutheran and Catholic alike left the feudal

system and autocratic government behind them when they crossed the

Atlantic. Americans, therefore, cannot help hoping that two results of

the present war will be: (1) The abolition of secret diplomacy and

secret understandings, and the substitution therefor of treaties

publicly discussed and sanctioned, and (2) the creation of national

Executives--Emperors, Sultans, Kings, or Presidents--which cannot use

the national forces in fight until a thoroughly informed national

assembly, acting with deliberation, has agreed to that use.

Opposite Tendencies.

The American student of history since the middle of the seventeenth

century sees clearly two strong though apparently opposite tendencies in

Europe: First, the tendency to the creation and maintenance of small

States such as those which the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized and

for two centuries secured in a fairly independent existence, and,

secondly, a tendency from the middle of the nineteenth century toward

larger national units, created by combining several kindred States

under one executive. This second tendency was illustrated strongly in

the case of both Germany and Italy, although the Prussian domination in

Germany has no parallel in Italy. Somewhat earlier in the nineteenth

century the doctrine of the neutralization of the territories of small

States was established as firmly as solemn treaties could do it. The

larger national units had a more or less federative quality, the

components yielding some of their functions to a central power, but

retaining numerous independent functions. This tendency to limited

unification is one which Americans easily understand and appreciate. We

believe in the federative principle, and must therefore hope that out of

the present European horror will come a new development of that

principle, and new security for small States which are capable of

guaranteeing to their citizens "life, liberty, and the pursuit of

happiness"--a security which no citizen of any European country seems

today to possess.

Some of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American

people are now watching from afar are commercial and economic. Imperial

Germany's desire for colonies in other continents--such as Great Britain

and France secured earlier as a result of keen commercial ambitions--is

intense. Prussia's seizure of Schleswig in 1864-5 had the commercial

motive; and it is with visions of ports on the North Sea that Germany

justifies her present occupation of Belgium. The Russians have for

generations desired to extend their national territory southward to the

Aegean and the Bosphorus, and eastward to good harbors on the Pacific.

Later they pushed into Mongolia and Manchuria, but were resisted

successfully by Japan. Austria-Hungary has long been seeking ports on

the Adriatic, and lately seized without warrant Herzegovina and Bosnia

to promote her approach toward the Aegean, and is now trying to seize

Servia with the same ends in view. With similar motives Italy lately

descended on Tripoli, without any excuse except this intense desire for

colonies--profitable or unprofitable. On the other hand, the American

people, looking to the future as well as to the past, object to

acquisitions of new territory by force of arms; and since the twentieth

century opened they have twice illustrated in their own practice--first

in Cuba, and then in Mexico--this democratic objection. They believe

that extensions of national territory should be brought about only with

the indubitable consent of the majority of the people most nearly

concerned. They also believe that commerce should always be a means of

promoting good-will, and not ill-will, among men, and that all

legitimate and useful extensions of the commerce of a manufacturing and

commercial nation may be procured through the policy of the "open

door"--which means nothing more than that all nations should be allowed

to compete on equal terms for the trade of any foreign people, whether

backward or advanced in civilization. No American Administration has

accepted a "concession" of land in China. They also believe that

peaceable extensions of territory and trade will afford adequate relief

from the economic pressure on a population too large for the territory

it occupies, and that there is no need of forcible seizure of territory

to secure relief. It is inevitable, therefore, that the American people

should hope that one outcome of the present war should be--no

enlargement of a national territory by force or without the free consent

of the population to be annexed, and no colonization except by peaceable

commercial and industrial methods.

Aggressive Force a Failure.

One of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present

outbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the

minds of thinking people that the whole process of competitive

armaments, the enlistment of the entire male population in national

armies, and the incessant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is

not a trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the

military preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have resulted

in the most terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate

outbreak is the only probable result of the system. For the future of

civilization this is a lesson of high value. It teaches that if modern

civilization is to be preserved, national Executives--whether imperial

or republican--must not have at their disposal immense armaments and

drilled armies held ready in the leash; that armaments must be limited,

an international Supreme Court established, national armies changed to

the Swiss form, and an international force adequate to deal with any

nation that may suddenly become lawless agreed upon by treaty and held

always in readiness. The occasional use of force will continue to be

necessary even in the civilized world; but it must be made not an

aggressive but a protective force and used as such--just as protective

force has to be used sometimes in families, schools, cities, and

Commonwealths.

At present Americans do not close their eyes to the plain fact that the

brute force which Germany and Austria-Hungary are now using can only be

overcome by brute force of the same sort in larger measure. It is only

when negotiations for peace begin that the great lesson of the futility

of huge preparations for fighting to preserve peace can be given effect.

Is it too much to expect that the whole civilized world will take to

heart the lessons of this terrible catastrophe and co-operate to prevent

the recurrence of such losses and woes? Should Germany and

Austria-Hungary succeed in their present undertakings, the whole

civilized world would be obliged to bear continuously, and to an

ever-increasing amount, the burdens of great armaments, and would live

in constant fear of sudden invasion, now here, now there--a terrible

fear, against which neither treaties nor professions of peaceable

intentions would offer the least security.

It must be admitted, however, that the whole military organization,

which has long been compulsory on the nations of Continental Europe, is

inconsistent in the highest degree with American ideals of individual

liberty and social progress. Democracies can fight with ardor, and

sometimes with success, when the whole people is moved by a common

sentiment or passion; but the structure and discipline of a modern army

like that of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia, has a despotic or

autocratic quality which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles

of democratic society. To make war in countries like France, Great

Britain, and the United States requires the widespread, simultaneous

stirring of the passions of the people on behalf of their own ideals.

This stirring requires publicity before and after the declaration of war

and public discussion; and the delays which discussion causes are

securities for peace. Out of the present struggle should come a check on

militarism--a strong revulsion against the use of force as means of

settling international disputes.

America Cannot Be Indifferent.

It must also be admitted that it is impossible for the American people

to sympathize with the tone of the imperial and royal addresses which,

in summoning the people to war, use such phrases as "My monarchy," "My

loyal people," "My loyal subjects"; for there is implied in such phrases

a dynastic or personal ownership of peoples which shocks the average

American. Americans inevitably think that the right way for a ruler to

begin an exhortation to the people he rules is President Wilson's way:

"My fellow-countrymen."

It follows from the very existence of these American instincts and hopes

that, although the people of the United States mean to maintain

faithfully a legal neutrality, they are not, and can not be, neutral or

indifferent as to the ultimate outcome of this titanic struggle. It

already seems to them that England, France, and Russia are fighting for

freedom and civilization. It does not follow that thinking Americans

will forget the immense services which Germany has rendered to

civilization during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to

serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least

abridged in the outcome of this war upon which she has entered so

rashly and selfishly and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated

Americans hope and believe that by defeating the German barbarousness

the Allies will only promote the noble German civilization.

[Illustration: JOHN W. BURGESS

_(Photo by Alman & Co.)_

_See Page 507_]

[Illustration: WILLIAM M. SLOANE

_(Photo by Pach.)_

_See Page 515_]

The presence of Russia in the combination against Germany and

Austria-Hungary seems to the average American an abnormal phenomenon;

because Russia is itself a military monarchy with marked territorial

ambitions; and its civilization is at a more elementary stage than that

of France or England; but he resists present apprehension on this score

by recalling that Russia submitted to the "Concert of Europe" when her

victorious armies were within seventeen miles of Constantinople, that

she emancipated her serfs, proposed The Hague Conferences, initiated the

"Duma," and has lately offered--perhaps as war measures only--autonomy

to her Poles and equal rights of citizenship to her Jews. He also

cannot help believing that a nation which has produced such a literature

as Russia has produced during the last fifty years must hold within its

multitudinous population a large minority which is seething with high

aspirations and a fine idealism.

For the clarification of the public mind on the issue involved, it is

important that the limits of American neutrality should be discussed and

understood. The action of the Government must be neutral in the best

sense; but American sympathies and hopes cannot possibly be neutral, for

the whole history and present state of American liberty forbids. For the

present, thinking Americans can only try to appreciate the scope and

real issues of this formidable convulsion, and so be ready to seize

every opportunity that may present itself to further the cause of human

freedom, and of peace at last.

The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 What Americans Say to Europe · 第 43 / 146 题