By Dr. Edmund von Mach.
Instructor of Fine Arts, Harvard, 1899-1903; Instructor in
History of Art, Wellesley College, 1899-1902; Lecturer in
History of Art, Bradford Academy, Cambridge, Mass. Author of
many books on Greek and Roman sculpture and the history of
painting. Served in the German Army, 1889-91.
Hon. James M. Beck has eloquently argued the case of the Allies against
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and submitted his findings with confident
assurance of their acceptance by the Supreme Court of Civilization.
Carried away by his zeal he has at times used terms not warranted by the
evidence, such as "the irrepressible Kaiser," "stupid falsehood,"
"duplicity," and the like, but since the court can be trusted to
disregard such expressions no further attention will be paid to them.
To a certain extent this article is not a reply but a continuation of
Mr. Beck's argument, for, wherever our personal sympathies may lie, we
are all equally interested in discovering the truth. In the final
settlement of peace American public opinion may, nay, will, have a
prominent voice. If it is exerted on the strength of a true
understanding of European events, it will contribute to the
establishment of a lasting peace.
As to the evidence submitted Mr. Beck seems to err in believing that
Governments are accustomed to publish in their various white, gray, or
orange papers "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."
This is nowhere done, for there are many bits of information which come
to a Government through its diplomatic connections which it would be
indelicate, discourteous, or unwise to give to the public. The official
documents on American foreign relations and all white, gray, or orange
papers are "edited." They are understood to be so by Congress,
Parliament, the Reichstag, the Duma, &c., and no charge of dishonesty
can be maintained against the respective Governments on that score.
If the Chancellor says that Germany was using her good offices in
Vienna, this is as valuable a bit of evidence as the reprint of a
dispatch in the "White Paper," unless we wish to impugn his veracity,
and in that case the copy of a dispatch would be valueless, for he might
have forged it. The entire argument, therefore, against Germany and
Austria, based on what Mr. Beck calls the "suppression of vitally
important documents," is void, unless you will apply it equally to Great
Britain and the other countries.
In Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" Mr. Beck has missed no important
documents because he looked at England's well-prepared case through
sympathetic eyes, and it did not occur to him to ask, "Where are all the
documents bearing on Italian neutrality?" Does he believe that England
was so little interested in the question whether she would have to fight
two or three foes, and whether her way to Egypt and India would be safe
or threatened? There are many dispatches to and from Rome included in
the "White Paper," but not a mention of Italy's position.
The first paper contains a letter to the British Ambassador in Berlin
concerning the Austro-Servian relations. Is it not probable that Sir
Edward Grey's attention was called to this question by his Ambassador in
Vienna? Where is his letter? Or, if Sir Edward thought of it himself,
why did he not mention his conversation also to Sir M. de Bunsen in
Vienna? Where is this note? Are we to assume that Sir M. de Bunsen made
his first report on July 23, although Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin had
an interesting report to make a day earlier?
We can thus go through the whole British "White Paper" and discover the
omission of many interesting documents.
No. 38 is a letter from Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome, dated on July 23 and
received on July 27. He had no doubt sent also a telegram. What did it
contain, and why was it not published under the date of its arrival
instead of the letter which had been delayed in transit?
Where Is No. 28?
In No. 29 Sir Edward Grey refers in a telegram to Sir R. Rodd to what "I
had said to the German Ambassador." Such a reference could have a
meaning for Sir R. Rodd only if he had been informed of this
conversation. There is no dispatch printed in the "White Paper"
containing this information. Possibly it was so entwined with other
instructions, which Sir Edward Grey did not care to have known, that it
could not be published. Was it perhaps sent to the printer first as No.
28, and removed at the last moment when it was too late to change the
subsequent numbers? Or, if this assumption is wrong, what was printed
originally as No. 28? Where is No. 28? There are other omissions, and
one especially noteworthy one between Nos. 80 and 106 which will be
discussed later.
Viewed in this light, the English "White Paper" loses much of the value
of a complete record, which it has had in the eyes of many. There is
absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of those dispatches which
have been printed, but it becomes incumbent upon the searcher after the
truth to inquire whether the existence of unprinted (in the case of the
German "White Paper" Mr. Beck uses the term "suppressed") papers may not
at times alter the interpretation which should be given to those that
are printed.
Since we have no published records anywhere concerning the advice given
to Italy by the Allies, and the gradual steps leading up to Italy's
decision to remain neutral; nor any hint as to the day when her decision
was communicated to England and the other powers, it would be futile to
speculate on this subject. Since, however, the Queen of Italy and the
wife of the Commander in Chief of the Russian forces are sisters, and
since it was in the interest of the Allies to keep Italy neutral, it is
not unreasonable to assume that an exchange of opinion took place
between Italy and the Allies concerning the conditions under which Italy
would remain neutral.
If the actual opening of hostilities could be so managed that Germany
could be called the aggressor, then Italy probably declared that she
would not enter the war. This is a very important phase of the case, and
the omission from Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" of all dispatches
dealing with Italian neutrality is much to be regretted.
Since we are dealing with the Italian dispatches here, it may be
advisable to consider at once all the communications which are published
as having passed between Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassador, Sir
Rennell Rodd, in Rome. They are numbered 19, (perhaps 28,) 29, 35, 36,
38, 49, 57, 63, 64, 80, 81, 86, 92, 100, and 106, of which the important
numbers are 38, 57, 64, 80, and 86.
On July 23 Sir Edward Grey was informed that "the gravity of the
situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that
it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to
score a definite success." (No. 38.)
Austria, in other words, believed that to let the murder of her
heir-apparent pass unpunished would have meant a deathblow to her
prestige, and consequently, as any one familiar with her conditions will
agree, to her existence. Russia, on the other hand, on July 25 said (see
No. 17, report from Sir G. Buchanan) that she could not "allow (note the
word) Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the
Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face
all the risks of war."
These two dispatches to Sir Edward Grey tell the whole story in a
nutshell. Austria believed, rightly or wrongly, that it was a question
of life or death for her, while Russia claimed the right of preventing
Austria from becoming the predominate power in the Balkans, and actually
threatened war. Russia did not claim to be concerned with the justice of
Austria's demands on Servia.
No such definite word of Russia's intention was sent to Germany, for on
July 26 Sir M. de Bunsen reported Germany's confident belief that
"Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia." (No. 32.)
On the next day Sir Rennell Rodd reports from Rome (No. 57) that the
Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that "if Servia will even now
accept it (the Austrian note) Austria will be satisfied" and refrain
from a punitive war. He, moreover, believes--and this is very
important--that Servia may be induced to accept the note in its entirety
on the advice of the four powers invited to the conference, and this
would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to
Austria-Hungary alone. Since Italy was to be one of the four powers, the
Minister's belief was doubtless based on accurate information. There is
then as late as July 27 no claim made by Servia that Austria's demands
are unreasonable. She only hates to yield to Austria alone. Austria, in
the meanwhile, (No. 57,) repeats her assurance that she demands no
territorial sacrifices from Servia.
On the next day, July 28, Sir Rennell Rodd reports (No. 64) that "Servia
might still accept the whole Austrian note, if some explanation were
given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to
intervene." Austria, on her part, had explained that "the co-operation
of the Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in
judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have willfully
misinterpreted this." (No. 64.)
From these reports it appears that the differences between Austria and
Servia were on the way to a solution. Austria claimed that her demands
were just, and Servia did not deny this. Austria further claimed that
her prestige, her very existence, demanded the prompt compliance with
her requests by Servia. She explained in a satisfactory way the one
point on which Servia had taken exceptions, and Servia was on the point
of complying, and would have complied, if the powers had been willing to
let her do so. Such a conclusion of the incident would have strengthened
Austria's prestige and assured the punishment of the murderers of
Serajevo.
Russia's Remark About Austria.
The reason why Servia was not allowed to submit was Russia's remark,
quoted above, that she would not "allow" Austria to become the
predominant power in the Balkans. It was, therefore, Russia's task to
prevent Servia from accepting Austria's note. Since war was her
alternative, baldly stated to England from the first, she had to do
three things--first, to secure as many allies as possible; secondly, to
weaken her enemies, preferably by detaching from them Italy, and,
thirdly, to get as much of a start in her mobilization as possible.
The treaties between Russia, France, and Great Britain, unlike those
between Germany, Austria, and Italy, have never been published. Whatever
their wording may be, Russia was at first apparently not absolutely sure
of the support of France, (No. 17,) and France, it would seem, was
unwilling to tempt fate without the help of England. That England should
be willing to join such a combination for such a cause seemed so
preposterous to Germany that she did not believe it. Without England no
France, without France no war, for alone Russia could not measure
herself against Austria. Austria would not have attacked her of her own
free will, but if Russia had attacked Austria, the whole world knew from
the published treaties that Germany was bound to come to the assistance
of her ally. It would have been two against one, and the two could have
waited until Russia had finished her cumbersome mobilization. For even
if she had her whole army of many million men on the frontier, Austria
and Germany together were strong enough to stem her advance.
Russia's only chance, therefore, when Servia was on the point of
yielding, and Austria had almost re-established her prestige, was to
secure the help of France, but this meant also the promise of England.
The demands made on England by Russia, some of which are quoted in the
"White Paper," are too well known to deserve repetition. This was the
chief thing that counted, to get England's promise. The next was to
detach Italy from her allies, (but of this there are no documents
available,) and the third to gain time for her mobilization. All the
other suggestions and counter-suggestions which fill the English "White
Paper" are insignificant, as soon as the fundamental positions of
Austria and Russia are understood.
Germany has claimed that England promised her support to Russia and
France on July 30, or in the night of July 29, and, to prove it, has
published the letter from the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg to his
Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in translation in THE NEW YORK
TIMES on Oct. 7. This letter, which has not been officially denied by
the Allies, states that the promise of England's support gave the
Russian war party the upper hand and resulted in the order of complete
mobilization.
English "White Paper's" Testimony.
Strangely enough, and doubtless by an oversight, the English "White
Paper" contains two dispatches (Nos. 80 and 106) which seem to confirm
the accuracy of M. de l'Escaille's statement, viz., that England
promised the Russian-French combination her support.
On July 29 Sir Rennell Rodd wrote to Sir Edward Grey (No. 80) that the
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him "there seemed to be a
difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As
Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves,
if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he
thought it would have a great effect."
In a later dispatch of the same day (No. 86) he deprecates Russia's
partial mobilization, which he fears has spoiled the chances of
Germany's exerting any pressure on Austria.
But on the next day, July 30, these remarkable words occur: "He [the
Italian Minister] had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to
give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that
we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid
issue with us." (No. 106.)
Readers of the "White Paper" will look in vain for an explanation of
such a change of heart on Germany's part. What does "now" mean in the
last letter? And why does Germany seem "convinced" that England will act
with Russia--if not that she has heard of the promise mentioned by M. de
l'Escaille, as given early on July 30 or late the 29th? The dates agree,
and unless Sir Edward Grey publishes further papers to explain the
change that had taken place between July 29 and July 30 one seems forced
to accept this explanation.
What is Germany's attitude? Does she rush into war? Not at all, for she
is "most anxious to avoid issue" with England. (No. 106.) Germany knew
that Russia had begun to mobilize. Every day, every hour counted; for
against the masses of Russia she had only her greater speed to match.
She knew that England had gone over to Russia, although she was probably
hoping that the alliance between the Saxon and the Slav was not yet
irrefragable. Still, the prospects were dark. But in spite of this the
efforts were renewed to see what could be done in Vienna.
The famous exchange of telegrams between royalty began in the evening of
July 29; and here it is wise to halt for a moment. On July 30 the Czar
telegraphed to the Emperor in reply to the Emperor's expression of
regret that Russia should be mobilizing, as follows: "The military
measures in force now were decreed five days ago." That is, according to
the Czar, the Russian mobilization had begun on July 25. On July 27,
however, the Russian Minister of War, M. Suchomlinow, had declared to
the German Military Attaché "on his word of honor" that no mobilization
order had been issued. July 25, however, it will be remembered, was the
day on which Sir G. Buchanan had reported from St. Petersburg that
Russia will "face all risks of war" if she can feel sure of the support
of France.
On July 31 Russia mobilized her entire army, which led to Germany's
ultimatum that Russia demobilize within twelve hours. No reply was
received to the request, and orders for the mobilization of the German
Army were issued at 5:15 P.M., Aug. 1, after the German Ambassador in
St. Petersburg had been instructed to declare that, owing to the
continued mobilization of the Russian Army, a state of war existed
between the two countries.
Kaiser Tried to Keep Peace.
In order to understand this step one should read the book "La France
Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain," ("France Victorious in the Next
War,") by Col. Arthur Boucher, published in 1911. Col. Boucher has
stated the case baldly and so simply that every one can understand it.
In substance his argument is this: "Alone France has no chance, but
together with Russia she will win against Germany. Suppose the three
countries are beginning mobilization on the same day. Germany finishes
first, France second, and Russia last. Germany must leave some of her
troops on her eastern frontier, the rest she throws against France. All
France has to do is to hold them for a few days. [Col. Boucher mentions
the exact number of days. This book is not at hand, and the writer
prefers not to quote from memory.] Then Russia comes into play, more
German troops will be needed in the East, the French proceed to an
attack on their weakened enemy, and La France sera victorieuse."
Everything hinges on just a couple of days or so. A couple of days! And
how much of a start had Russia? She had begun on July 25; on July 27
definite news of the Russian mobilization was reported in Berlin,
although the Minister of War denied it "on his honor." On July 30
England was understood to have promised her support to Russia, and the
Czar acknowledged that Russia had been mobilizing for the past five
days. Five days! And Col. Boucher, expressing the opinion of military
experts, had counted on victory on a much smaller margin!
Do the Judges of the Supreme Court of Civilization realize the almost
super-human efforts in the interest of peace made by the German Emperor?
Russia has a start of five days, and on July 31 a start of six days. Can
we not hear all the military leaders imploring the Emperor not to
hesitate any longer? But in the interest of peace the Emperor delays. He
has kept the peace for Germany through the almost thirty years of his
reign. He prays to his God, in Whom he has placed his trust through all
his upright life, with a fervor which has often brought him ridicule.
Also, he still believes in England, and hopes through her efforts to be
able to keep the peace. He waits another day. A start of seven days for
Russia! The odds against Germany have grown tremendously. At last he
orders mobilization. For a longer delay he would not have been able to
answer to his country. As it is, there are many people who blame him
severely for having waited so long.
But William II. was right, for when the world will begin to realize the
agonies through which he must have passed during these days of waiting,
and the sacrifices he made in his effort to preserve peace, it will
judge Germany rightly, and call the Emperor the great prince of peace
that he is.
But, it has been said, why did he not avoid war, either by forcing
Austria to yield to Russia, or, if she refused, by withdrawing from her?
In common with the whole of Germany, he probably felt that Austria's
position was right. Servia herself, as has been seen above, did not
claim that she was unjustly treated, whatever outsiders thought of
Austria's demands; and Austria was fully justified by past events in
believing that it was with her a question of life and death. Should
Germany sacrifice her faithful friend under such circumstances, and for
what? For the arrogance of Russia, who would not "allow" her to
re-establish her prestige in a righteous cause? The word "righteous" is
used advisedly, because in the early stages of the controversy nobody,
not even Russia nor Servia herself, denied the justice of Austria's
demands. The writer is informed that even the liberal English press
found no fault with the course taken by Austria, although it commented
adversely on the language used in the note.
What would have been the result of peace bought by Germany at such a
cost? It would have alienated her only faithful friend without laying
the foundations for a lasting friendship with her opponents. This at
least was Germany's honest belief. She may have been wrong. History more
probably will call her right. To desert Austria might have postponed the
war, but when it would have come Germany would have stood alone, and,
worse, she would have lost her self-respect.
This claim may sound strange in the ears of those who have just
witnessed and will never forget the suffering of that beautiful little
country, Belgium. They hold that, since Germany invaded Belgium, it is
Germany who broke a treaty and who is to blame.
Mr. Beck considers this to be so self-evident that he deems it
unnecessary to advance any proof. He quotes the Chancellor's speech,
and, moving for a quick verdict, declares his motion of guilty carried.
The matter, however, is not quite so simple for the man who is seeking
for the whole truth. Let us look at the facts.
Belgium was a neutral country, just as any country has the right to
declare itself neutral, with this difference: that in 1839 she had
promised to five powers--Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia--that she would remain perpetually neutral. These five powers in
their turn had promised to guarantee her neutrality. She was, however, a
sovereign State, and as such had the undoubted right to cease being
neutral whenever she chose by abrogating the Treaty of 1839. If the
other high contracting parties did not agree with her, it was their
right to try to coerce Belgium to keep to her pledges, although this
would undoubtedly have been an infringement of her sovereignty.
The Treaty of 1839 contains the word "perpetual," but so does the treaty
between France and Germany, in which Alsace and Lorraine are ceded by
France to be perpetually an integral part of the German Empire. Does
this mean that France, if the Allies should win, could not retake these
provinces? Nobody probably will believe this.
The Treaty of 1839 was a treaty just like the Treaty of 1871, with this
difference, that the latter treaty was concluded between two powers, and
the earlier one between five powers on one side and Belgium and Holland
on the other. This gave certain rights to all the signatory powers, any
one of whom had the right to feel itself sufficiently aggrieved to go to
war if any other power disregarded the treaty.
Rights of Neutrals.
There was once another neutral State, the city and district of Cracow,
also established by a treaty to which Great Britain was a signatory.
Three of the signers considered the conditions developing in Cracow to
be so threatening that they abolished Cracow as an independent State.
Great Britain sent a polite note of protest, and dropped the matter.
Since that time, however, two Hague Conferences have been held and
certain rules agreed upon concerning the rights and duties of neutrals.
The Belgian status of inviolability rests on these rules, called
conventions, rather than on the Treaty of 1839. During the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870 Mr. Gladstone very clearly stated that he
did not consider the Treaty of 1839 enforceable. Great Britain,
therefore, made two new treaties, one with France and one with Prussia
(quoted and discussed in Boston Evening Transcript, Oct. 14, 1914) in
which she promised to defend Belgian neutrality, by the side of either
France or Prussia, against that one of them who should infringe the
neutrality.
These treaties were to terminate one year after peace had been
concluded between the contestants. A treaty, like the one of 1839,
however, which was considered unenforceable in 1870, can hardly be
claimed to have gained new rights in 1914. In calm moments nobody will
claim that a greater sanctity attaches to it than to the treaty in which
Alsace and Lorraine are ceded forever to Germany.
No, it is The Hague Conventions to which we must look. The first
convention (1899) contained no rules forbidding belligerents from
entering neutral territory. In the second conference it was thought
desirable to formulate such rules, because it was felt that in war
belligerents are at liberty to do what is not expressly forbidden. At
the request of France, therefore, a new set of rules was suggested, to
which Great Britain and Belgium offered valuable amendments. The rules
were finally accepted, and are today parts of international law. They
read; "Article I. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Article
II. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either
munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power."
These articles, together with the whole convention called "Rights and
duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land," have been
ratified and therefore accepted as law by the United States of America,
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia and other minor
powers. Great Britain experienced a change of heart, and, although her
own delegates had moved these articles, she refused to ratify them, when
she ratified most of the other conventions on Nov. 27, 1909. (A table
showing the ratifications of conventions has been published by The World
Peace Foundation, Boston.)
The Case of Belgium.
Since Great Britain did not accept these articles as law, she was not
bound by them, for the principle of The Hague Conferences is that a
nation is bound only by those laws which it accepts. The remarkable
fact, therefore, appears that the only one of the big nations which had
refused to accept these articles, and which, therefore, might have moved
her troops across a neutral country and have claimed that she could do
so with a clear conscience because she broke no law which was binding on
her, was Great Britain. And the world now sees the spectacle of Great
Britain claiming to have gone to war because another power did what she
herself could have done, according to her own interpretation, with
impunity. Japan has broken the international law by infringing the
neutrality of China, but Great Britain can claim that she did not break
a law by doing exactly what Japan did.
It is not asserted here that the citizens of Great Britain are not
absolutely sincere in their belief of the causes which have allied them
with the Russians and the Japanese, and the Indians and the Zouaves, and
the negroes and the French and the Belgians against Germany. Their
Government, however, should have known that the presumption of
insincerity exists when one charges against others a crime which one
would have felt at liberty to commit one's self. Yet, more, the British
Government knew better than anybody else that Germany had not even
committed this crime; for, according to all laws of justice, no person
or nation can claim the inviolability of a neutral when he has committed
"hostile acts against a belligerent, or acts in favor of a belligerent."
(Article XVII. of The Hague Conference of 1907.)
The question, therefore, arises, "Did Belgium commit acts in favor of
one of Germany's opponents, if not actually hostile acts against
Germany?" In order to understand Germany's charge that Belgium had
committed such acts, attention must be directed to one of the most
unfortunate stipulations of the Treaty of 1839, which compelled Belgium
to maintain several fortresses. This meant that a small neutral people,
sandwiched in between two great powers, had to keep itself informed on
military affairs. Instead of being able to foster a peaceful state of
mind, which is the surest guarantee of neutrality, the Belgians were
forced to think military thoughts.
[Illustration: ANDREW CARNEGIE
_(Photo (c) by Underwood & Underwood.)_
_See Page 415_]
[Illustration: JACOB H. SCHIFF
_(Photo by American Press Assn.)_
_See Page 459_]
In the eighties and early nineties they suspected France of designs on
their integrity. Since then a change in the popular feeling has taken
place and in recent years the instruction of the Belgian artillery, for
instance, was intrusted to French officers in active service. These
officers were constantly at home and very properly concerned with
solving military problems such as a future war with Germany might
present. What was more natural than that these same officers, when they
were detached for a few months or years to Liège or Namur or Huy, taught
their Belgian charges to prepare against a German attack, and to look
upon the French as their friends and the Germans as their enemies? If
conditions had been different, and German officers had been in charge of
Belgian fortresses, the Belgian guns in practice would always have been
trained on imaginary French invaders.
French Officers in Belgian Forts.
If this is understood it will be seen that in the case of war the actual
neutrality of the Belgian garrisons would naturally be determined by the
position taken by that nation whose officers had been in charge of the
Belgian fortresses. And this might be entirely independent of the
professed wishes of the Belgian people or their Government. If French
officers in active service remained in the several fortresses, or even
only in one after the beginning of hostilities, and if the French
campaign plans contemplated an attack through Belgium, then Belgium had
committed an "act in favor of France" by not forcing the French officers
to leave, and had forfeited the rights and privileges granted by The
Hague Convention of 1907 to a neutral State.
Did French officers remain in Liège or in any other Belgian fortress
after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to go through Belgium?
Germany has officially made both claims. The first can easily be
substantiated by the Supreme Court of Civilization by an investigation
of the prisoners of war taken in Belgium. Until an impartial
investigation becomes possible no further proof than the claim made by
the German Government can be produced.
The second charge is contained in No. 157 of the English "White Paper"
in these words of instruction from the German Foreign Secretary to the
German Ambassador in London: "Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that
German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which
was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information."
Sir Edward Grey has attacked Germany for invading Belgium, but has
nowhere denied that Germany had the unimpeachable evidence she said she
had, and which of course nullified any previous assurance from France.
It is not known whether Sir Edward Grey was shown this evidence or not,
but if the preservation of Belgian neutrality was Great Britain's chief
concern, why did she not offer to negotiate treaties with Germany and
France as she had done in 1870? It will be remembered that then she
bound herself to join with either of the contestants in defending
Belgian neutrality against the attacks of the other.
As the case stands today, on the evidence of Sir Edward Grey's own
"White Paper" and speeches, Great Britain is making war on Germany
because:
1. She broke the Treaty of 1839, although her own Gladstone had declared
this treaty to be without force, and although the status of neutral
States had been removed by The Hague Convention from the uncertainty of
treaties to the security of international law.
2. Great Britain makes war against Germany because Germany has broken
Articles I. and II. of Chapter 1 of The Hague Convention referring to
neutrals, although Great Britain herself has refused to recognize these
articles as binding upon her own conduct.
3. She makes war on Germany although she has never denied the
correctness of Germany's assertion that she had unimpeachable proof of
France's intentions of going through Belgium, which, together with the
sojourn of French officers in Belgium, constitutes the offense which,
according to The Hague Convention, deprives a so-called neutral State of
the privileges granted in Articles I. and II.
It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are which Germany
possesses, and which for military reasons she has not yet been able to
divulge. She has published some of them, namely, the proof of the
continued presence of French officers on Belgian soil, and has given the
names and numbers of the several army corps which France had planned to
push through Belgium.
The case then stands as follows:
1. Was the inviolability of Belgium guaranteed by Articles I. and II. of
The Hague Convention? Yes.