_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
Allow me to submit the following in answer to the article of James M.
Beck, entitled "Case of the Double Alliance vs. the Triple Entente,"
published in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 25, 1914:
The case of "Russian Mobilization vs. German Mediation." Q.--Upon whom
was the duty to yield?
Mr. Beck has spent considerable time and effort to prove, at least by
inference, that Germany must have been informed beforehand of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Personally, I am convinced that the
ultimatum in question was sent with the full knowledge and consent of
Germany; and, whether this is true or not, I maintain that it was
Austria's duty to inform her ally before taking a step which was likely
to endanger the peace of Europe.
The concession of this point takes me immediately to the ultimatum
itself and to the question, "Was the tenor of the ultimatum justified?"
Mr. Beck, in his judgment, says: "The ultimatum is grossly unreasonable
and disappropriate to any grievance that Austria had." Perhaps Mr. Beck
is right, but I have good reasons to think that the tenor of the
ultimatum was fully justified, in view of Servia's former conduct.
Austria was dealing here with a Government the real spirits of which had
come into power by the commission of one of the most dastardly crimes of
modern times. A crime which, at the time of its commission, sent a shock
of horror through the entire civilized world, to wit, "the outrageous
murder of the former King and Queen of Servia," outrageous because it
was perpetrated by the so-called aristocracy of Servia. The
long-continued agitation carried on by Servia against Austria, at the
instigation of Russia, which finally culminated in another no less
outrageous assassination, that of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his
consort, to my idea fully justified Austria in making demands which
under ordinary circumstances might have been termed "unreasonable."
The question whether Austria was justified in going to war against
Servia is a debatable one, but I respectfully refer to the fact that our
own country, the United States, was only very recently on the verge of
precipitating war with a "much weaker" nation than ours, on account of
the latter's refusal to salute the American flag. Neither did we stop on
that occasion with the ultimatum, but we followed it up with dispatching
a fleet of warships, the landing of troops, and the seizure of Vera
Cruz.
From the time Austria's ultimatum was sent all the great powers seemed
to have professed a great eagerness for the preservation of peace. Mr.
Beck asserts that Germany was not sincere in its desire for peace and
could have avoided the war if it had seriously tried to exert its
influence over Austria. This finding is based on the inference drawn
from the fact that Germany failed to achieve any results.
To determine whether Mr. Beck is justified in finding as he does, it is
necessary, first of all, to examine the exact status of the powers at
the time the ultimatum was sent. We find that Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, for which it was seeking redress. An issue was
therefore raised between Austria and Servia. Germany, although Austria's
ally, immediately defined its attitude by declaring emphatically that
"the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria
alone."
Why Did Russia Mobilize?
I beg to ask Mr. Beck to answer the following question: By what
right--moral, legal, or equitable--did Russia make Servia's cause its
own? Did Russia have any alliance with Servia? I further ask: What
privity existed between Austria, Servia, and Russia?
Suppose Mr. Beck can justify the action of Russia, although a "rank
outsider," in taking Servia's part, how can he possibly justify the
positively unreasonable and, under the circumstances, most dangerous
step of "actual mobilization" on the part of Russia?
Mr. Beck has tried to justify the mobilization by quoting the Russian
excuse "that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against
Austria." On close examination what does this amount to? It resolves
itself into a situation somewhat like this: A sends an ultimatum to B
seeking redress for a wrong committed by B upon A, whereupon C mobilizes
"for defense against A." I leave it to the average American of ordinary
intelligence to find a reason for C's mobilization "for defense against
A." Mr. Beck might as well try to justify a mobilization on the part of
Japan if the United States was preparing to invade Mexico for the
purpose of redressing an insult to the American flag. Does Mr. Beck
realize the seriousness of actual mobilization by Russia at that
critical moment? Not one of the other powers dared to take this one step
which among nations is regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war.
And what did the Kaiser do at this moment? He did the only thing he
could do, and, I dare say, the only thing our American Nation could have
done under the same circumstances. He wired the Czar and stated: "I am
willing to bring my influences to bear upon Austria, provided you agree
to cease mobilization." Was this demand unreasonable? What else could
Germany have done, I ask, with the Russian bear standing on the border
with the sword already drawn? This moment was the crucial and decisive
one in the prologue to this awful world drama.
The only question therefore and the all-important one to be submitted to
the Court of Civilization, is, Whose duty was it to yield? Was it
Russia's, with the sword already drawn against a country which had not
attacked it, not even threatened it, or was it Germany's, with the sword
in the sheath?
In his "conclusion," Mr. Beck speaks of Germany as "beset on every hand
by powerful antagonists." Does he really mean to deprive the German
Emperor of the right to demand as a condition precedent to mediation on
his part the discontinuance of mobilization by Russia?
Mr. Beck in his "judgment" under Paragraph 4 says "that Austria, having
mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its
forces." The use of the qualifying word "reasonably" seems to indicate
that even Mr. Beck is not quite certain that Russia was in fact
justified in mobilizing its forces.
Is it reasonable, just, and fair of Mr. Beck to expect Germany, "beset
on every hand by powerful antagonists," to permit Russia to continue
mobilizing its 18,000,000 soldiers and have Germany believe that Russia
was sincere in its "peaceful intentions" in the face of actual
mobilization? At this moment the German Kaiser made a very reasonable
demand upon Russia to cease mobilization, and I ask every fair-minded
American, whether lawyer or layman, "whose duty it was to yield" at this
moment. The answer to this question will settle the much-disputed point
as to the actual cause of the war.
In conclusion, I beg to ask Mr. Beck: Why expect so much of Germany and
nothing of Russia, when Germany had not merely professed her peaceful
intentions, but actually maintained peace for over forty years, during
which period not a foot of territory had been acquired by her through
conquest? This is a fact.
Coming into a court of law supported by such a reputation, does Mr. Beck
really believe that the decision of the court would have been in favor
of Russia? Does Mr. Beck really believe that the decision would have
been against Germany, whose war lord was begging the Czar almost on his
knees to avoid the awful calamity by the discontinuance of mobilization?
Picture the United States about to invade Mexico to redress an insult to
the American flag. Picture England as the ally of the United States, and
Japan supporting Mexico, without any alliance existing between the two
latter countries. To make this example conform to the actual facts under
discussion, we must, of course, assume that both Japan and England are
situated in the North American Continent, and across the border from the
United States and England. Japan, with an army of 18,000,000 soldiers,
(assumed for the purpose of argument,) mobilizes her army, professedly
for defense against the United States. Could any fair-minded American
possibly expect England to intercede with her ally, the United States,
without first demanding the demobilization of Japan? Whose duty was it
to yield?
The actual fact is that Germany even then did not declare war against
Russia until Russian soldiers had actually crossed not the Austrian but
the German border.
I may add that in writing the above I am prompted only by the very
natural desire, viz., to impress upon the jury composed of the American
people the one fact which should be given the most careful consideration
in order to enable it to arrive at a just verdict in the case submitted,
and this fact is "the mobilization of Russia."