in support of the views which had been opened by Mr. Robertson. His
Right Honourable and Learned Friend (the Lord Advocate) might rely
upon it that, on the part of the prisoner’s Counsel, no doubt whatever
was entertained of the perfect propriety of the motive by which his
Lordship had been actuated in framing the present indictment; they
were convinced that he had prepared and brought forward the case in
the manner which he conceived least likely to prejudice the prisoners
or to distract them in their defence. But, on the other hand, he could
with equal truth and sincerity assure his Lordship, that the objection
now raised had been taken from a firm conviction that the sustaining
of it was necessary for the safety of the law, and indispensable to
the ends of justice. It had been said that the decisions of the Court
ought to be adhered to, that its practice ought not to be infringed
upon; and yet it was admitted that the present was the first case which
had ever occurred of three separate acts of murder being combined in
the same indictment. In this situation, then, were they not justified
in submitting to the Court the objection which had been taken upon
the ground of this unprecedented combination? The Learned Lord had
intimated an intention to desert the diet _pro loco et tempore_ against
the pannel M‘Dougal. But the question still remained whether the
interests of the male prisoner would not be dreadfully prejudiced in
his defence, if put upon his trial for three separate acts of murder,
committed at different times, and in different places. Now he contended
that the present form of the indictment was adopted to effect an
illegitimate object: it was calculated to lead to great injustice to
the prisoner. What the Prosecutor insisted on passing to a Jury was
an indictment charging three distinct murders: he averred that there
were separate and unconnected acts of this crime; and he assumed that
there was sufficient proof to bring them home to the prisoner. But
every man, whatever the number of charges against him might be, was to
be held and presumed to be innocent till the contrary was proved, and
a conviction obtained against himself. There might, or there might not
be sufficient proof to convict him; but he contended for the benefit
of the ordinary presumption. “Give us,” said the Learned Counsel,
“the benefit of this presumption, to which we are entitled, and then
let us see how the case will stand.” In the indictment before their
Lordships three murders were charged; murders committed at different
times; murders of different persons, totally unconnected and living in
different places; and the last of these was stated to have been done in
conjunction with a third person who had no connection with the other
two. But if the Public Prosecutor were in a situation to prove one of
these murders, it would infer the death of the pannel. Then for what
end or purpose of public justice were three murders crammed into one
indictment? If the Prosecutor was unable to prove any one of them,
there was no necessity surely for putting it into this indictment.
Suppose evidence were brought to prove the first, but totally failed,
and the second, but also failed, or at least left them in such doubt
that a verdict of not guilty or not proven would have been returned
if they had been tried separately; nobody would maintain that a false
or improbable charge might not become a make-weight in the evidence
to prove a separate and distinct murder. The prisoner might take his
trial on a combination of such charges, but unless your Lordship
interfered _ex parte judicis_, the result would be what he described.
The prejudice arose from this _talis qualis_ accession, not proved,
but assumed; and from the prejudice thus credited the prisoner might
be convicted. They could not lay the present indictment before a Jury
without necessarily prejudicing that Jury; and yet the Lord Advocate
came forward and alleged that he thought the whole objection frivolous
and untenable, saying that it was an attempt to smother the indictment
altogether; that is, he called an objection to an indictment, which did
not contain a specific allegation of a specific crime, but a congeries
of offences huddled together and charged _in cumulo_, an attempt to
smother it! How smothered? If the indictment was improperly framed, if
two or three charges were crammed into it instead of one, the prisoner
was entitled to have it smothered. He was entitled to a fair trial, and
if the libel was so constructed that this could not be afforded him, he
had a right to have it smothered. Every thing relative to a specific
charge their Lordships would receive, if brought forward in a competent
form; but the point previously adverted to still returned--Were they to
receive evidence in regard to two charges which might not be proved,
and which yet might affect the minds of the Jury in regard to the third
and lead to a conviction? The Learned Lord indeed said, that there was
only one sort of evidence, and that the crime had been committed in the
same place. But the place was not the same; in fact, the _loci_ were
as distinct as if the one crime had been committed in the Canongate of
Edinburgh and the other in the remotest corner of Scotland. In popular
language and popular conceptions, they might be held and represented
as the same, but this would never do in matters of law. They must have
the _locus_ strictly libelled. Nor was the time the same. The first
was committed at the distance of six months from the second: the first
took place in April, another took place in the beginning of October,
and a third occurred in the end of October. Now, might not the prisoner
prove an _alibi_ in regard to one of these crimes though not in regard
to the other? But, further, the acts were different. It was in vain to
say that all the murders were of the same _genus_, for this might be
said of all the murders that ever had been or ever would be committed;
and on the face of the indictment they were all different. In the major
proposition no aggravation was libelled, but it was said that all
these murders had been committed with the intent of disposing of the
dead bodies to the Surgeons, or with some other purpose or intent to
the Prosecutor unknown. Did the Learned Lord mean to say that he would
fail if he did not prove this intent? But that purpose was a separate
crime, as was sufficiently manifest from the late case (among others)
of Bradwell at Glasgow. It could not, therefore, be maintained that
he would fail by not proving the intent--by not proving a different
crime from that libelled. It was perfectly plain that it was competent
to prove the intent, but the not proving it could not in the least
degree affect the libel. The crime consisted in the wilful murder;
and unless the motive amounted to a justification, or an alleviation
which reduced it to culpable homicide, the intent would be inferred
from the fact, and the highest punishment of the law would follow a
conviction. The evil of an indictment so framed as the present was to
produce an illegitimate effect by this combination of intention or
motive with the crime charged. The intent charged might have been laid
as a separate offence; but had this been done we should now have been
on a different objection, namely the competency of such a charge. To
these principles in the abstract, no exception could be taken. Now,
the Court would consider the situation in which the pannel was placed.
He had been put upon his defence fifteen days after his examination;
five declarations emitted by him were libelled on; and most manifestly
there did exist great prejudice against him. He did not say that this
would be a sufficient reason for postponing the trial, but it was a
sufficient reason for the Court taking care that he suffered no injury
in his defence. Another matter in which the prisoner was prejudiced,
by lumping together separate charges in the same indictment, was in
his challenges of the Jurymen. It was evident that the prisoner had an
interest that way. He did not know who the Jurymen were to be, and of
course could not mean to say that there was any danger of an improper
person being balloted; but he had a clear right in the abstract--a
right of which he ought not to be deprived. If he had been tried on
separate indictments he would have had fifteen challenges, whereas by
the combination of the charges in the same indictment he had only five.
Now there might be Jurymen liable to challenge in one case and not in
another, just as one witness might be perfectly unexceptionable in one
case and liable to the most serious and fatal objections in another.
He contended, therefore, that in every view the principle was in their
favour, as well as the justice and imperious necessity of the case.
The Learned Gentleman then referred to the authorities. He began
by commenting on the passage which had been quoted from Sir George
Mackenzie; which, he contended, the Lord Advocate had misunderstood, as
it was quite evident, that George Mackenzie used the word “summonds” as
synonymous with “indictment,” since an “accumulation of crimes,” the
subject treated of, could not be predicated of a summons in the common
acceptation of that term. And the doctrine laid down by this author was
that an “accumulation of crimes is intended, either to læse the fame
of the defender, or to distract him in his defence.” Now what did the
Lord Advocate say in answer to this? He referred to a passage in Mr.
Baron Hume’s work where that learned person says, that “the competency
has never been disputed of charging in one libel any number of criminal
acts, if they are all of one nature and species, or even of one class
and general description.” But it was evident that the offences of which
Mr. Hume spoke were of a different description from murder; for he
expressly added the qualification, “so as to adhere in this point of
view, and stamp a character on the pannel as one who is an habitual
and irreclaimable offender in this sort,” (vol. ii. p. 166.) And
accordingly the instances which he gave were of the crimes of theft
and housebreaking; crimes which were susceptible of being aggravated
by habit and repute, and of which the punishment might be restricted.
But murder admitted of no such aggravation, and never was restricted.
Hear, however, what Mr. Hume said in reference to those cases: “The
Court, whenever they find that the immediate trial of such manifold
changes is likely to prove oppressive, either to the witnesses, the
Jury, or themselves; _and still more, if they see cause to believe that
it may embarrass the pannel in his defence, or beget prejudices against
him in the minds of the Jury_;--in any of these cases, they have it
certainly in their power to divide or parcel out the libel, and proceed
in the first instance to the trial of as many of the articles as may
fitly be dispatched in a single diet, &c.” (vol. ii. p. 168.) The
cases which occurred in 1696 might, however, be referred to in support
of a contrary doctrine; but “if they are, I answer” said the Learned
Counsel--“Are your Lordships prepared to do what was done in those
cases? Are they to rule your Lordships’ decision in a case without any
precedent whatsoever?” But even these did not bear on the present case;
and none adverse to the principle had occurred since the year 1784.
Even the case of 1784 itself was not opposed to the principle. _There_,
there was connection. The case of Surridge and Dempster was mentioned
as a case of two murders, as a case where more than one murder was
charged in the indictment; but these were clearly _partes ejusdem
negotii_; they were committed in immediate sequence and in furtherance
of the same “foul and atrocious design.” It was quite plain, therefore,
that the cases quoted did not apply; that they had no bearing whatever
on the present case, where three different and unconnected murders
were charged against the same individual, and where another party was
mixed up with him in one of the alleged crimes. Were they not entitled,
then, to ask their Lordships, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
(which it was not denied the Court possessed) “to divide and parcel
out” the charges in this indictment, and to find it incompetent to
go to trial upon it as it presently stood? The Learned Counsel then
adverted to the state of the law of England on this subject, commenting
on the passage quoted by Mr. Robertson from the work of Chitty, and
concluded by observing that this was in all respects a most serious
case, and deserved the utmost attention of the Court. No instance of
three murders charged in one indictment had happened in his time; many
instances had indeed occurred in former times; yet it had never been
the practice to try the charges _in cumulo_. But the more anomalous
and unprecedented the case, the more necessary was it to the ends of
justice, and the more important to the law, that it should be proceeded
in with the utmost caution.
Their Lordships then delivered their opinions on the objection which
had been raised and so ably argued by the prisoner’s Counsel.
* * * * *
LORD PITMILLY.--The Court were peculiarly circumstanced in being called
upon to give an opinion on an indictment in a case, part of which
must unquestionably go to trial. He was quite clear that one of the
charges must undergo an investigation; that the trial to that extent
must proceed. But Counsel were by no means precluded from stating the
objection they had brought forward, and which, appearing to them in
the light it did, it became their duty to press upon the attention of
the Court. This accordingly they had done with equal zeal and ability,
in a manner which did honour to themselves, and reflected credit on
the Bar of Scotland. But it was the duty of the Court to be calm and
guarded; to express their opinions in a dignified and dispassionate
manner; and to avoid any thing which was either calculated to unsettle
the established principles of that law or to form a bad precedent for
the future. He agreed that there were two different questions before
the Court; the first of which was, whether Helen M‘Dougal ought to
have been included in the indictment. And on that point he had no
doubt of the Prosecutor’s right so to include her. He approved of
what the Lord Advocate had done, and he had no hesitation in saying,
that the trial should now proceed. The other question was of a very
different nature; namely, whether it was competent, and also whether
it was proper and fitting, that Burke should now go to trial upon an
indictment, charging three murders, or should be tried on one or other
of these charges. Of the competency he had no doubt whatever. His
Lordship was much struck with the indictment when he first saw it, and
he felt it to be his duty, as it is always the duty of the Court on
such occasions, to inform his mind in regard to the principle on which
it had been framed. He went to the authorities on the subject, and
after a careful examination of them he had no doubt of the competency.
When he looked at the cases of Beaumont and Gillespie, particularly
the latter, where nine separate acts of forgery were charged, he could
not have the smallest doubt as to the competency of including these
several charges in the same indictment. Our practice on this point was
too firmly fixed to admit of any question, that one individual may
be charged with several crimes of the same nature, and committed at
different times. The English cases referred to he put altogether out of
view, because this was not a new point, now raised for the first time,
and to be settled by a reference to principle or analogy, but a matter
fixed by our own practice, and not again to be brought into dispute.
He was therefore quite clear as to the competency. But where it was a
question of discretion merely, and where that discretion, as in the
present case, was strongly appealed to, the Court would interfere,
because it was their bounden and sacred duty to prevent a prisoner from
suffering prejudice in his defence. The present prisoners, by their
highly respectable Counsel, declared that they would suffer prejudice
if they were put upon their trial on all the charges, and it was not
for the Court to say whether that might or might not be the case. Three
consecutive trials might or might not be beneficial to the prisoner.
In his opinion they were more advantageous to the Prosecutor. By
this means he learned how to conduct his case; and if he saw a link
awanting in one trial, he might endeavour, by means of additional
evidence, to supply it in the next. It did appear to him, therefore,
that what the pannels asked for by the mouths of their counsel, was
calculated to do them more prejudice than submitting to go to trial
upon the indictment as it now stood. But they had doubtless been well
and judiciously advised, and were prepared to take the consequences.
He held, however, that the Prosecutor had done right in including both
of them in the same indictment; and that by doing so he had taken the
only and most effectual means in his power not to prejudice them either
in preparing for their defence or on their trial. He well remembered a
case in which the danger, disadvantage, and odium attending consecutive
trials were strikingly exemplified. It happened in consequence of the
Aberdeen riots, and the parties were brought to trial at the instance
of a private prosecutor. His Lordship was counsel for the pannels, and
they were acquitted. Not satisfied with this, however, the private
prosecutor reared up a new indictment upon new grounds. And he could
never forget the feeling which was excited, by this attempt to bring
the parties acquitted to a second trial, in the Court, the Bar, and
the country at large; there was one general cry of indignation against
a proceeding so shameless and oppressive; the consequence of which
was, that the private prosecutor became alarmed, and the attempt was
quashed. This was the natural course of things. And, in general, it was
lenity, and humanity, and justice, to include all such cases in the
same indictment. In the present instance, no result such as that which
took place in Aberdeen was to be feared. But the Court being clearly
vested with a discretion, and the pannels having strongly appealed to
that discretion, it was his opinion that the cases should be tried
separately.
LORD MEADOWBANK entirely concurred in the views of Lord Pitmilly.
The nature of this case and the impression it had produced upon the
public were such, that it required the most careful and anxious
consideration; but he was confident that the more thoroughly their
Lordships were convinced of the existing state of excitement in the
public mind concerning it, the greater would be their anxiety that the
prisoners suffered no prejudice on their trial or in their defence.
The question here was one of very great and general importance. But
if it had been entertained on the question of competency, it would
have shaken the whole system of our criminal procedure. Our practice
of accumulating a number of charges in the same indictment had been
steady and uniform. With respect to the earlier cases referred to,
particularly that in 1696, he must say that he could not for his
soul comprehend upon what grounds the counsel for the prisoner had
attempted to invalidate their authority. The particular case referred
to occurred _after_ the Revolution, when the Judges were as great and
eminent lawyers as ever sat in that Court. But in order to show the
uniformity of the practice, he needed not go farther back than the case
of Murdiston and Miller, where several acts, committed by different
individuals in different counties, were put into the same indictment;
yet not one iota of an objection was urged against the proceeding
similar to what they had heard to-day. Our own practice, in cases of
forgery, which was a capital crime, left no doubt upon the matter.
Several acts of this description of crime were constantly charged in
the same indictment.--In cases of robbery, it was not competent to
libel aggravation. The Prosecutor was not admitted to libel habit and
repute. That was now settled law. It had not been so formerly; and
accordingly, when he had the honour to fill the same situation, which
his learned friend (the Lord Advocate) now held, he had directed an
indictment to be raised to try the point,--and the law was now settled.
But it was competent to accumulate several acts in the same indictment,
and to have it tried by the same evidence and before the same Jury.
It was competent where there was several acts of robbery charged
against different individuals; and there was one case of a father and
a daughter, where the daughter was charged with two acts, and the
father with all the three libelled. He was therefore of opinion that
the Lord Advocate had done right in proceeding as he did. But the Court
had a discretion; and to that discretion the prisoners had appealed.
But having stated his opinion of that discretion, he deemed it right
to say, that the Court was not answerable for the consequences. The
prisoners had exercised _their_ discretion, and he warned them to
consider well the step they had taken. As to the Court they were bound
to sit there and try the cases one after another.
LORD MACKENZIE also agreed with his learned brothers as to the
competency. In so far as discretion was concerned he likewise
concurred, upon the statement made by the pannel and his counsel that
he would suffer prejudice. He saw that the pannel was well and ably
advised; and he could not take it upon him to allege that there was any
thing absurd or unreasonable in the request which had been made.
LORD JUSTICE CLERK.--The only question here was as to the competency
of the charge against Burke: for the Lord Advocate had intimated
his intention not to proceed at present against the woman. After
listening attentively to all that had been said, after considering the
authorities, and recollecting something of the practice of this Court,
he thought the indictment framed in a legal and proper manner. Burke
was not accused of one crime, but of three different acts of the same
crime; and, therefore, he did not come within the reach of those cases
referred to by Mr. Hume. If this indictment was a bad one, the Court
had been guilty of a great dereliction of its duty in sustaining many
indictments framed upon precisely the same principle. He recollected a
case of several acts of robbery, a capital crime, and one of the four
pleas of the Crown, included in the same indictment; and how could they
distinguish between such a charge and that of murder, which was another
of the pleas of the Crown? In fact, it was not now in the power of the
Court to depart from the practice which had been so firmly established
and so steadily followed. The Court, however, had a discretion, and
where it was appealed to they would exercise it. The Court had even
found an indictment irrelevant where it was strongly alleged by the
pannel that he would suffer prejudice were he tried upon it in its
actual shape.--Upon the responsibility of the respectable Counsel, who
had stated that the present prisoners would suffer prejudice if they
were tried upon the indictment before them as it now stood, he was of
opinion that the Court should interpose in virtue of its discretion.
But they ought to do so upon principle. They ought to find the libel
relevant, and also to find it competent to proceed to the trial of the
charges _seriatim_, leaving it to the option of the Prosecutor to say
which of them he might choose to begin with.
This accordingly became the judgment of the Court. The objection was
repelled, but in respect of the allegation that the pannel would suffer
prejudice were he tried upon the indictment as it stood, find it
competent to proceed with only one of the charges at a time, leaving
it to the Lord Advocate to say which of them he thinks proper to begin
with.
The LORD ADVOCATE.--In consequence of the opinion of the Court I shall
proceed with the last charge, which includes both the man and the
woman. The objection in regard to the latter has now been completely
removed.
The DEAN OF FACULTY.--I beg to remind the learned Lord of his former
statement, that he would desert the diet against the woman.
The LORD ADVOCATE.--The case is now completely changed. My former
statement was made upon the supposition that the trial as to Burke was
to proceed upon all the three charges at once.
The Prisoners on being asked by the Lord Justice Clerk, if they were
guilty or not guilty of the crimes charged in the third article of the
Indictment, each answered “Not guilty.” The following Jury were then
chosen.
Nichol Allan, Manager of the Hercules Insurance Company, Edinburgh.
John Paton, Builder, do.
James Trench, Builder, do.
Peter M‘Gregor, Merchant, do.
William Bonar, Banker, do.
James Banks, Agent, Leith Walk.
James Melliss, Merchant, Edinburgh.
John M‘Fie, Merchant, Leith.
Thomas Barker, Brewer, do.
Henry Fenwick, Grocer, Dunbar.
David Brash, Grocer, Leith.
David Hunter, Ironmonger, Edinburgh.
Robert Jeffrey, Engraver, do.
William Bell, Grocer, Dunbar.
William Robertson, Cooper, Edinburgh.
_First Witness_ called for the prosecution, was JAMES BRAIDWOOD, of the
Fire Office Establishment, who being duly sworn.
Question. Was that plan made by you? A. It was.
Q. What plan is it? A. It is a plan of some houses in the West Port, to
which I was conducted by an officer.
Q. Is the plan a correct one of the under ground houses? A. It is.
MARY STEWART _Examined_.
Q. Do you remember a person of the name of Campbell, coming to live at
your house during last harvest? A. Yes, Sir, Michael Campbell.
Q. How long is it since he left your house? A. On the Monday before the
fast day.
Q. Do you remember a woman coming to your house to enquire after him?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. By what name did she call herself? A. She called herself Madgy
Campbell, and also Duffie, which she said was the name of her former
husband.
Q. She came from Glasgow? A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did she state she came in search of her son? A. Yes.
[Illustration: GROUND PLAN
_OF_
BURKE’S HOUSE
as Produced in Court.
_Published by Thomas Ireland Jun.^r Edinburgh._ _T. Clerk Sc._]
Q. What time did she leave your house? A. I came out of the Infirmary
on Thursday, and she left me on Friday, the 31st October.
Q. Did she tell you where she was going? A. She said she was going to
search for her son.
Q. Do you know a person of the name of Charles M‘Lauchlan?
A. Yes, Sir; he slept with the woman’s son.
Q. Have you ever seen that woman since? A. Not till I saw her at the
Police Office.
Q. What hour did she leave your house? A. I think between 7 and 8
o’clock in the morning.
Q. Do you remember when you saw the woman’s body at the Police Office?
A. Yes, sir; it was on Sunday, two days after.
Q. Could you recognize the body? A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What dress did she leave your house in? A. In an old dark printed
gown, much patched, short sleeves, open before, sewed with white thread
in the back; black bombazet petticoat, and red striped short-gown.
Q. Would you know these things? A. Yes, Sir.
[These articles were shown to witness, and she identified the old
printed gown, and short dress.]
By the Court.--Q. Do you know what her age might be?
A. Between forty and fifty.
By Counsel.--Q. What size was she? A. She was a little broad set woman.
By the Court.--Q. When she stopt in your house, was she in good health?
A. Yes, my Lord.
Q. Did you ever see her drunk? A. No, my Lord.
CHARLES M‘LAUCHLAN _Examined_.
Q. In the month of October last, did you reside in the house of Mrs
Stewart in the Pleasance? A. Yes, Sir; along with one Michael Campbell.
Q. What time did he leave that house? A. About the end of October.
Q. Do you remember a woman coming to the house in October? A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When she came did Michael Campbell live at the house? A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What name did the woman go by? A. Mrs Campbell’s name was Marjory
M‘Gonegal; Duffie was her second husband’s name.
Q. Had you ever seen her before? A. Yes, Sir; at home, in the County
Donegal in Ireland.
Q. Did she remain some days at Stewart’s? A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What time did she leave? A. She went away on Friday the 31st
October, between the hours of nine and ten in the morning.
Q. Did you go with her? A. Yes, Sir, as far as my own shop door at the
foot of St Mary’s Wynd, where she shook hands with me. I asked her
where she was going, and she told me she was leaving town.
Q. Did she appear in good health and sober? A. Yes, Sir, she appeared
to be of sober habits.
Q. Did she come in search of her son? A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Do you know if she had any money? A. No.
Q. Did she complain of having none? A. I never heard her.
Q. Did she pay any thing for her lodgings at Stewart’s? A. Her son paid
for them.
Q. Did she breakfast at Stewart’s that morning? A. No, Sir.
Q. Did you ever see her again in life? A. No, Sir.
Q. When did you see the body? A. I saw it at the Police office, on
Sunday the 2d November.
Q. You knew it to be that of the woman Campbell?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did she ever call herself Docherty? A. No, Sir.
WILLIAM NOBLE _Examined_.
Q. You are a shop-boy at Mr. Rymer’s, at Portsburgh?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Do you know the prisoner Burke by sight? A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Do you know a man of the name of Hare? A. Yes.
Q. What do you sell? A. Groceries.
Q. Do you recollect a body found in the West Port? A. I recollect a
woman came to the door, and asked charity, on Friday 31st October. Q.
Was Burke in the shop at the time? A. He was.
Q. Tell us what passed between Burke and the woman who asked charity?
A. He asked her name, and she said it was Docherty.
Q. What did he say to that? A. He said she was a relation of his
mother’s.
Q. Did Burke say what his mother’s name was? A. No.
Q. Did Burke and the woman seem acquainted? A. Don’t recollect Q. What
happened after that? A. Burke took her away with him, and said, he
would give her her breakfast. This was on the Friday morning.
Q. When did you see Burke after? A. He came back on Saturday, and
bought a box.
Q. What sort of a box was it? A. A tea-box.
He was shewn a tea-chest, and asked, if that was it? A. Could not say.
It was like it.
Q. Have your tea boxes any particular mark? A. No.
Q. Did Burke pay for the box? A. No, it is not paid for yet.
Q. Whom did he send for it? A. Mrs Hare came for it about half an hour
after Burke left our shop, and got it away.
ANNE BLACK or CONNAWAY _Examined_.
Q. You live in Wester Portsburgh? A. Yes.
Q. What does your house consist of? A. One room.
Q. You go down a stair to it? A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And going down the stair you come to a passage? A. Yes.