forward with the 3d and 11th Kentucky to attack the main position.
Artillery could not be used, for the guns could bear upon the abatis
only from the crest of which I have spoken, and if posted there the
cannoneers, at the very short range, would not have been able to serve
their pieces. The position could be won only by direct assault. The men
rushed up to the fallen timber, but became entangled in the network of
trunks and branches, and were shot down while trying to climb over or
push through them. I reinforced Johnson with a part of Smith's regiment,
the 5th Kentucky, but the jam and confusion incident to moving in so
circumscribed an area and through the dense undergrowth broke the force
of the charge. The enemy was quite numerous enough to defend a line so
short and strong and perfectly protected on both flanks. We had not more
than six hundred men actually engaged, and the fighting lasted not
longer than fifteen or twenty minutes. Our loss was about ninety, nearly
as many killed as wounded. Afterward we learned that Colonel Moore's
loss was six killed and twenty-three wounded. When General Morgan
ordered the attack he was not aware of the strength of the position; nor
had he anticipated a resistance so spirited and so skilfully planned. He
reluctantly drew off without another assault, convinced that to capture
the abatis and its defenders would cost him half his command. Among the
killed were Colonel D.W. Chenault and Captain Alexander Treble of the
11th Kentucky, Lieutenant Robert Cowan of the 3d, and Major Thomas Y.
Brent, Jr., and Lieutenants Holloway and Ferguson of the 5th. These
officers were all killed literally at the muzzles of the rifles.
Colonel Moore's position might easily have been avoided; indeed, we
passed around it immediately afterward, crossing the river at a ford
about two miles below the bridge. Morgan assailed it merely in
accordance with his habitual policy when advancing of attacking all in
his path except very superior forces.
On the same afternoon Captain William M. Magenis, assistant
adjutant-general of the division, a valuable officer, was murdered by a
Captain Murphy, whom he had placed under arrest for robbing a citizen.
Murphy made his escape from the guard two or three days subsequently,
just as the court-martial which was to have tried him was convening.
On the morning of July 5th the column reached Lebanon, which was
garrisoned by the 20th Kentucky Infantry, commanded by Colonel Charles
S. Hanson. The 8th and 9th Michigan Cavalry and the 11th Michigan
Battery, under command of Colonel James I. David, were approaching by
the Danville road to reinforce the garrison, necessitating a large
detachment to observe them. Morgan's demand for surrender having been
refused, artillery fire was directed upon the railroad depot and other
buildings in which the enemy had established himself; but, as the
Federals endured it with great firmness, it became necessary to carry
the town by assault. Our loss was some forty in killed and wounded,
including several excellent officers. One death universally deplored was
that of the General's brother, Lieutenant Thomas H. Morgan. He was a
bright, handsome, and very gallant lad of nineteen, the favorite of the
division. He was killed in front of the 2d Kentucky in the charge upon
the depot. The Federal loss was three killed and sixteen wounded, and
three hundred and eighty were prisoners.
Without delay we passed through Springfield and Bardstown, crossing the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad at Lebanon Junction, thirty miles from
Louisville, on the evening of the 6th. At Springfield two companies of
about ninety men were sent toward Harrodsburg and Danville to occupy the
attention of the Federal cavalry in that quarter. From Bardstown,
Captain W.C. Davis, acting assistant adjutant-general of the First
Brigade, was sent with a detachment of one hundred and thirty men to
scout in the vicinity of Louisville, to produce the impression that the
city was about to be attacked, and to divert attention from the passage
of the Ohio by the main body at Brandenburg. He was instructed to cross
the river somewhere east of Louisville and to rejoin the column on its
line of march through Indiana. He executed the first part of the program
perfectly, but was unable to get across the river. Tapping the wires at
Lebanon Junction, we learned from intercepted despatches that the
garrison at Louisville was much alarmed, and in expectation of an
immediate attack.
The detachments I have just mentioned, with some smaller ones previously
sent off on similar service, aggregated not less than two hundred and
sixty men permanently separated from the division; which, with a loss in
killed and wounded, in Kentucky, of about one hundred and fifty, had
reduced our effective strength at the Ohio, by more than four hundred.
The rapid and constant marching already began to tell upon both horses
and men, but we reached the Ohio at Brandenburg at 9 A.M. on the 8th.
Captains Samuel Taylor and H.C. Meriwether of the 10th Kentucky had been
sent forward the day before, with their companies, to capture
steamboats. We found them in possession of two large craft. One had been
surprised at the wharf, and steaming out on her, they had captured the
other. Preparations for crossing were begun; but, just as the first boat
was about to push off, an unexpected musketry fire was opened from the
Indiana side by a party of home-guards collected behind some houses and
haystacks. They were in pursuit of Captain Thomas H. Hines, who had that
morning returned from Indiana to Kentucky, after having undertaken a
brief expedition of his own. This fire did no harm, the river here being
eight hundred or a thousand yards wide. But in a few minutes the bright
gleam of a field-piece spouted through the low-hanging mist on the
farther bank. Its shell pitched into a group near the wharf, severely
wounding Captain W.H. Wilson, acting quartermaster of the First Brigade.
Several shots from this piece followed in quick succession, but it was
silenced by Lieutenant Lawrence with his Parrotts. The 2d Kentucky and
9th Tennessee were speedily ferried over without their horses, and
forming under the bluff they advanced upon the militia, which had
retired to a wooded ridge some six hundred yards from the river-bank,
abandoning the gun. The two regiments were moving across some open
ground, toward the ridge, sustaining no loss from the volleys fired at
them, and the boats had scarcely returned for further service when a
more formidable enemy appeared. A gunboat, the _Elk_, steamed rapidly
round the bend, and began firing alternately upon the troops in the town
and those already across. The situation was now extremely critical. We
could not continue the ferriage while this little vixen remained, for
one well-directed shot would have sent either of the boats to the
bottom. Delay was exceedingly hazardous, affording the enemy opportunity
to cut off the regiments we had already sent over, and giving the
cavalry in pursuit of us time to come up. If forced to give up the
attempt to cross the river, we must also abandon our comrades on the
other side. So every piece of artillery was planted and opened on the
gunboat, and after an hour or two of vigorous cannonading she was driven
off. By midnight all our troops were over.
[Illustration]
About noon of the 9th the column reached the little town of Corydon,
Indiana, which proved not nearly so gentle as its name. Our
advance-guard, commanded by Colonel R.C. Morgan, found a body of militia
there, ensconced behind stout barricades of fence rails, stretching for
some distance on each side of the road. Colonel Morgan charged the
barricade, his horses could not leap it, the militia stood resolutely,
and he lost sixteen men. A few dismounted skirmishers thrown upon the
flanks, and a shot or two from one of the pieces which accompanied the
advance-guard, quickly dispersed them, however, and we entered the town
without further resistance.
Our progress, quite rapid in Kentucky, was now accelerated, and we were
habitually twenty-one hours out of the twenty-four in the saddle, very
frequently not halting at night or going into camp at all. For the first
three or four days we saw nothing of the inhabitants save in their
character as militia, when they forced themselves on our attention much
more frequently than we desired. The houses were entirely deserted.
Often we found the kitchen fire blazing, the keys hanging in the
cupboard lock, and the chickens sauntering about the yard with a
confidence which proved that they had never before seen soldiers.
As the first scare wore off, however, we found the women and children
remaining at home, while the men went to the muster. When a thirsty
cavalryman rode up to a house to inquire for buttermilk, he was
generally met by a buxom dame, with a half-dozen or more small children
peeping out from her voluminous skirts, who, in response to a question
about the "old man," would say: "The men hev all gone to the 'rally';
you'll see 'em soon." We experienced little difficulty in procuring food
for man and horse. Usually upon our raids it was much easier to obtain
meat than bread. But in Indiana and Ohio we always found bread ready
baked at every house. In Ohio, on more than one occasion, in deserted
houses we found pies, hot from the oven, displayed upon tables
conveniently spread. The first time that I witnessed this sort of
hospitality was when I rode up to a house where a party of my men were
standing around a table garnished as I have described, eyeing the pies
hungrily, but showing no disposition to touch them. I asked, in
astonishment, why they were so abstinent. One of them replied that they
feared the pies might be poisoned. I was quite sure, on the contrary,
that they were intended as a propitiatory offering. I have always been
fond of pies,--these were of luscious apples,--so I made the spokesman
hand me one of the largest, and proceeded to eat it. The men watched me
vigilantly for two or three minutes, and then, as I seemed much better
after my repast, they took hold ravenously.
The severe marching made an exchange of horses a necessity, though as a
rule the horses we took were very inferior to the Kentucky and Tennessee
stock we had brought with us, and which had generally a large infusion
of thoroughbred blood. The horses we impressed were for the most part
heavy, sluggish beasts, barefooted and grass-fed, and gave out after a
day or two, sometimes in a few hours. A strong provost guard, under
Major Steele of the 3d Kentucky, had been organized to prevent the two
practices most prejudicial to discipline and efficiency--straggling and
pillage. There were very good reasons, independent of the provost guard,
why the men should not straggle far from the line of march; but the
well-filled stores and gaudy shop-windows of the Indiana and Ohio towns
seemed to stimulate, in men accustomed to impoverished and unpretentious
Dixie, the propensity to appropriate beyond limit or restraint. I had
never before seen anything like this disposition to plunder. Our
perilous situation only seemed to render the men more reckless. At the
same time, anything more ludicrous than the manner in which they
indulged their predatory tastes can scarcely be imagined. The weather
was intensely warm,--the hot July sun burned the earth to powder, and we
were breathing superheated dust,--yet one man rode for three days with
seven pairs of skates slung about his neck; another loaded himself with
sleigh-bells. A large chafing-dish, a medium-sized Dutch clock, a green
glass decanter with goblets to match, a bag of horn buttons, a
chandelier, and a bird-cage containing three canaries were some of the
articles I saw borne off and jealously fondled. The officers usually
waited a reasonable period, until the novelty had worn off, and then had
this rubbish thrown away. Baby shoes and calico, however, were the
staple articles of appropriation. A fellow would procure a bolt of
calico, carry it carefully for a day or two, then cast it aside and get
another.
From Corydon our route was _via_ Salem, Vienna, Lexington, Paris,
Vernon, Dupont, and Sumanville to Harrison, near the Ohio State line and
twenty-five miles from Cincinnati. Detachments were sent to Madison,
Versailles, and other points, to burn bridges, bewilder and confuse
those before and behind us, and keep bodies of military stationary that
might otherwise give trouble. All were drawn in before we reached
Harrison. At this point Morgan began demonstrations intended to convey
the impression that he would cross the Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Dayton
Railroad at Hamilton. He had always anticipated difficulty in getting
over this road; fearing that the troops from Kentucky would be
concentrated at or near Cincinnati, and that every effort would be made
to intercept him there. If these troops lined the railroad and were
judiciously posted, he knew it would be extremely difficult to elude
them or cut his way through them. He believed that if he could pass this
ordeal safely, the success of the expedition would be assured, unless
the river should be so high that the boats would be able to transport
troops to intercept him at the upper fords.
After remaining at Harrison two or three hours, and sending detachments
in the direction of Hamilton, he moved with the entire column on the
Hamilton road. But as soon as he was clear of the town, he cut the
telegraph-wires--previously left intact with the hope that they might be
used to convey intelligence of his apparent movement toward
Hamilton--and, turning across the country, gained the direct road to
Cincinnati. He hoped that, deceived by his demonstrations at Harrison,
the larger part of the troops at Cincinnati would be sent to Hamilton,
and that it would be too late to recall them when his movement toward
Cincinnati was discovered. He trusted that those remaining would be
drawn into the city, under the impression that he meant to attack,
leaving the way clear for his rapid transit. He has been criticized for
not attempting the capture of Cincinnati, but he had no mind to involve
his handful of wearied men in a labyrinth of streets. We felt very much
more at home amid rural surroundings. But if he had taken Cincinnati,
and had safely crossed the river there, the raid would have been so much
briefer, and its principal object to that extent defeated by the
release of the troops pursuing us.
[Illustration: LOOKING FOR THE FOOTPRINTS OF THE VAN.]
We reached the environs of Cincinnati about ten o'clock at night, and
were not clear of them until after daybreak. My brigade was marching in
the rear, and the guides were with General Morgan in the front. The
continual straggling of some companies in the rear of Johnson's brigade
caused me to become separated from the remainder of the column by a wide
gap, and I was for some time entirely ignorant of what direction I
should take. The night was pitch-dark, and I was compelled to light
torches and seek the track of the column by the foam dropped from the
mouths of the horses and the dust kicked up by their feet. At every halt
which this groping search necessitated, scores of tired men would fall
asleep and drop out of their saddles. Daylight appeared after we had
crossed all of the principal suburban roads, and were near the Little
Miami Railroad. I never welcomed the fresh, invigorating air of morning
more gratefully. That afternoon we reached Williamsburg, twenty-eight
miles east of Cincinnati.
The Ohio militia were more numerous and aggressive than those of
Indiana. We had frequent skirmishes with them daily, and although
hundreds were captured, they resumed operations as soon as they were
turned loose. What excited in us more astonishment than all else we saw
were the crowds of able-bodied men. The contrast with the South, drained
of adult males to recruit her armies, was striking, and suggestive of
anything but confidence on our part in the result of the struggle.
At Piketon we learned that Vicksburg had fallen, and that General Lee,
having been repulsed at Gettysburg, had retreated across the Potomac.
Under the circumstances this information was peculiarly disheartening.
As we approached Pomeroy the militia began to embarrass our march by
felling trees and erecting barricades across the roads. In passing near
that town we were assailed by regular troops,--as we called the
volunteers, in contradistinction to the militia,--and forced a passage
only by some sharp fighting. At 1 P.M. on the 18th we reached Chester,
eighteen miles from Buffington's Island. A halt here of nearly two hours
proved disastrous, as it caused us to arrive at the river after
nightfall, and delayed any attempt at crossing until the next morning.
Morgan thoroughly appreciated the importance of crossing the river at
once, but it was impossible. The darkness was intense, we were ignorant
of the ford and without guides, and were encumbered with nearly two
hundred wounded, whom we were unwilling to abandon. By instruction I
placed the 5th and 6th Kentucky in position to attack, as soon as day
broke, an earthwork commanding the ford, and which we learned was
mounted with two guns and manned by three hundred infantry. At dawn I
moved upon the work, and found it had been evacuated and the guns thrown
over the bluff. Pressing on a few hundred yards to reconnoiter the
Pomeroy road, we suddenly encountered the enemy. It proved to be General
Judah's advance. The 5th and 6th Kentucky instantly attacked and
dispersed it, taking a piece of artillery and forty or fifty prisoners,
inflicting some loss in killed and wounded.
The position in which we found ourselves, now that we had light enough
to examine the ground, was anything but favorable. The valley we had
entered, about a mile long and perhaps eight hundred yards wide at its
southern extremity,--the river running here nearly due north and
south,--gradually narrows, as the ridge which is its western boundary
closely approaches the river-bank, until it becomes a mere ravine. The
Chester road enters the valley at a point about equidistant from either
end. As the 5th Kentucky fell back that it might be aligned on the 6th
Kentucky, across the southern end of the valley, into which Judah's
whole force was now pouring, it was charged by the 8th and 9th Michigan
and a detachment of the 5th Indiana. A part of the 5th Kentucky was cut
off by this charge, the gun we had taken was recaptured, and our
Parrotts also fell into the hands of the enemy. They were so clogged
with dust, however, as to be almost unserviceable, and their ammunition
was expended. Bringing up a part of the 2d Kentucky, I succeeded in
checking and driving back the regiments that first bore down on us, but
they were quickly reinforced and immediately returned to the attack. In
the mean time Colonel Johnson's videttes on the Chester road had been
driven in, and the cavalry under Hobson, which had followed us
throughout our long march, deployed on the ridge, and attacked on that
side. I sent a courier to General Morgan, advising that he retreat up
the river and out of the valley with all the men he could extricate,
while Colonel Johnson and I, with the troops already engaged, would
endeavor to hold the enemy in check. The action was soon hot from both
directions, and the gunboats, steaming up the river abreast of us,
commenced shelling vigorously. We were now between three assailants. A
sharp artillery fire was opened by each, and the peculiar formation we
were compelled to adopt exposed us to a severe cross-fire of small arms.
We were in no condition to make a successful or energetic resistance.
The men were worn out and demoralized by the tremendous march, and the
fatigue and lack of sleep for the ten days that had elapsed since they
had crossed the Ohio. Having had no opportunity to replenish their
cartridge-boxes, they were almost destitute of ammunition, and after
firing two or three rounds were virtually unarmed. To this fact is
attributable the very small loss our assailants sustained. Broken down
as we were, if we had been supplied with cartridges we could have piled
the ground with Judah's men as they advanced over the open plain into
the valley. As the line, seeking to cover the withdrawal of the troops
taken off by General Morgan, was rolled back by the repeated charges of
the enemy, the stragglers were rushing wildly about the valley, with
bolts of calico streaming from their saddles, and changing direction
with every shrieking shell. When the rear-guard neared the northern end
of the valley,--out of which General Morgan with the greater part of the
command had now passed,--and perceived that the only avenue of escape
was through a narrow gorge, a general rush was made for it. The Michigan
regiments dashed into the mass of fugitives, and the gunboats swept the
narrow pass with grape. All order lost in a wild tide of flight.
About seven hundred were captured here, and perhaps a hundred and twenty
killed and wounded. Probably a thousand men got out with General Morgan.
Of these some three hundred succeeded in swimming the river at a point
twenty miles above Buffington, while many were drowned in the attempt.
The arrival of the gunboats prevented others from crossing. General
Morgan had gotten nearly over, when, seeing that the bulk of his command
must remain on the Ohio side, he returned. For six more days Morgan
taxed energy and ingenuity to the utmost to escape the toils. Absolutely
exhausted, he surrendered near the Pennsylvania line, on the 26th day of
July, with three hundred and sixty-four men.
The expedition was of immediate benefit, since a part of the forces that
would otherwise have harassed Bragg's retreat and swollen Rosecrans's
muster-roll at Chickamauga were carried by the pursuit of Morgan so far
northward that they were kept from participating in that battle.
But Morgan's cavalry was almost destroyed, and his prestige impaired.
Much the larger number of the captured men lingered in the Northern
prisons until the close of the war. That portion of his command which
had remained in Tennessee became disintegrated; the men either were
incorporated in other organizations, or, attracted by the fascinations
of irregular warfare, were virtually lost to the service. Morgan, after
four or five months' imprisonment in the Ohio penitentiary, effected an
escape which has scarcely a parallel for ingenuity and daring. He was
received in the South enthusiastically. The authorities at Richmond
seemed at first to share the popular sympathy and admiration. But it
soon became apparent that his infraction of discipline in crossing the
Ohio was not forgiven. Placed for a short time in practical command of
the Department of Southwestern Virginia, he was given inadequate means
for its defense, and bound with instructions which accorded neither with
his temperament nor with his situation. The troops he commanded were
not, like his old riders, accustomed to his methods, confident in his
genius, and devoted to his fortunes. He attempted aggressive operations
with his former energy and self-reliance, but not with his former
success. He drove out of West Virginia two invading columns, and then
made an incursion into the heart of Kentucky--known as his last Kentucky
raid--in the hope of anticipating and deterring a movement into his own
territory. Very successful at first, this raid ended, too, in disaster.
After capturing and dispersing Federal forces in the aggregate much
larger than his own, he encountered at Cynthiana a vastly superior
force, and was defeated. Two months later, September 4, 1864, he was
killed at Greeneville, Tennessee, while advancing to attack the Federal
detachments stationed in front of Knoxville.[5]
[Footnote 5: E.W. Doran of Greeneville, Tenn., gives the following
particulars of General Morgan's death: