AT THE INDIA OFFICE
[Greek: archhê andra deixei. ἁρχἡ ἁνδρα δεἱξει]
‘Great command proves the man.’
The reader, having persevered so long amid the intrigues of party and
the warfare of Parliament, may now be glad to escape for a while into
the calm atmosphere of a public department. The India Office rejoices in
a character and constitution of its own. The cost of its maintenance and
the salaries of its officials, from the Secretary of State downwards,
are defrayed by India and do not appear upon the votes of the House of
Commons. The opportunities of debating the policy or conduct of the
responsible Minister, except upon formal votes of censure, are therefore
perhaps inconveniently few. Any apparent laxity of control by Parliament
is, however, corrected by the Council of India--a body consisting of
gentlemen of long and distinguished service in the East--with whom the
Secretary of State is by law compelled to act and by whose decisions he
is in many matters of the highest importance absolutely bound. Under
these restrictions the Minister brings the opinion of his colleagues and
of Parliament and his own personal influence to bear upon the majestic
organisation of the Government of India.
Modern conditions increasingly enhance the power of the political chief
over all officials, military and civil. If the Secretary of State is
possessed of sufficient personal authority to enforce his will upon the
Cabinet, no hierarchy, however glittering, no Constitution, however
venerable, can withstand him. He has it in his power to change the
hierarchy and to remould the Constitution till the implement is
convenient to his hand; and his decisions will in almost every case be
acclaimed by the party press and ratified by driving a party majority
through the division lobbies of the House of Commons. But to employ
methods so costly and even ruinous, in their violence, is in itself
usually a confession of failure on the part of the Minister. His
business is to exert his authority by modes of persuasion, patience, and
adjustment which may secure in the end the triumph of his opinions
without the sensible abasement of others.
The Council of India is for all such purposes an invaluable instrument
to a wise Secretary of State. Having in subordination to him officers as
great and independent as the Governor of nearly three hundred million
persons and perhaps as intractable as a Commander-in-Chief at the head
of nearly three hundred thousand soldiers, he should naturally fortify
himself with the unique authority of his Council, now in his dealings
with the Cabinet and now with the Viceroy. At the time at which Lord
Randolph became Secretary of State the Council of India consisted of
fifteen men, nearly all of whom had spent their lives, whether as
soldiers or as civilians, in India; nearly all were old or elderly men,
and many of them were men of very high distinction and reputation. In
these circumstances it was not an easy task for a Secretary of State
thirty-six years of age and absolutely devoid of all official
experience, to preside over their meetings and to bring to bear on them
the personal influence which, for the proper conduct of business, should
be exercised by the responsible head of the office. Lord Randolph
himself, after his first experience of a meeting of Council, said to a
friend that he had felt ‘like an Eton boy presiding at a meeting of the
Masters.’
‘Yet it is probable,’ writes Sir Arthur Godley (who was then, as now,
Under-Secretary of State for India) in a memorandum for which I am much
indebted to him, ‘that no Secretary of State ever showed greater skill
and address in the discharge of this part of his duties. His treatment
of it was characteristic and in a degree peculiar to himself. For some
time and until he had mastered the methods of procedure and the
idiosyncrasies of the individual members, he took no part whatever in
the debates, but sat in his Presidential chair absolutely silent. As
soon, however, as he began to feel at home, he adopted a method to which
he strictly adhered as long as he was at the India Office. Having gone
carefully through the list of agenda, he would decide some days
beforehand which were the subjects as to which he desired to use his
influence. He would then send for the papers on these subjects and would
study them most thoroughly. Then, when the day of meeting arrived,
having thus mastered his brief, and possessing the immense advantages of
his natural readiness, his powers of speech and his Parliamentary
training, he would intervene with decisive effect, and rarely, if ever,
failed to carry his point. The other subjects--those which he had
deliberately left unstudied--he never touched, relying entirely upon
those members of Council who were specially qualified to deal with them.
He treated his Council with great consideration and with marked
politeness; but he nevertheless spoke always with confidence and
decision and occasionally with a touch of vehemence and of “the personal
note” which, though natural enough in the House of Commons, came as a
slight surprise in the serener regions of the India Council room.’
Railway construction was one of the first subjects which commanded his
personal attention. The opinion had been for some time gaining ground in
the Railway Department that the necessary development of Indian lines
could only be attained if private enterprise were enlisted to supplement
the efforts of the State. Bargains between public departments and
limited companies are subject to such severe scrutiny in Parliament that
hitherto the India Office had not ventured to offer sufficient
inducement to attract commercial interests. Lord Randolph Churchill had,
however, no fear of the House of Commons and always believed in his
power to persuade them to any reasonable proposal. The construction of
the Indian Midland and Bengal-Nagpur Railways had been recommended as
famine-protective lines by a select committee which sat in 1884. Under
his hand both projects moved forward at once. The stimulus of a four per
cent. guarantee on capital, together with one-fourth of the amount by
which the net receipts might exceed the guarantee, led to the formation
of the Indian Midland Railway Company in July 1885. The railway was 589
miles in length; it connected the Great Indian Peninsula with the East
Indian Railway system by continuous broad-gauge lines, opened out a
populous and fertile country, and shortened the distance by rail from
Bombay to Cawnpore by 134 miles. The Bengal-Nagpur Railway, though,
owing to financial considerations, not actually floated till 1887, was
eventually founded on the same conditions. The transfer of the Mysore
State Railway to the Southern Mahratta Railway Company for extension and
working was another important railway scheme arranged while Lord
Randolph was in office.
Nothing pleased the officials of the India Office more in their new
chief than his total freedom from anything like humbug. On one occasion
the Finance Committee were to deal with the question, then so vital to
India, between bimetallism on the one hand, and a gold standard on the
other. Before going into the committee he said to the Permanent
Under-Secretary, who happened to be in his room: ‘I’ve asked Arthur
Balfour to come across and sit with us at this Committee: he knows all
about bimetallism, but I’m as ignorant about these things as a calf.’
Accordingly Mr. Balfour came and a very interesting discussion took
place, at the end of which Lord Randolph (though he probably had not
greatly exaggerated his own previous ignorance) delivered an admirable
summing-up, worthy of an experienced Chancellor of the Exchequer.
‘He was, in fact,’ Sir Arthur Godley continues, ‘an excellent head of a
great department. He occupied himself instinctively and naturally with
the great questions and kept his work upon a high plane, leaving petty
matters to his subordinates, but always maintaining his own ultimate
control. He was, as everyone knows, exceedingly able, quick, and
clear-sighted. Besides this, he was very industrious, very energetic and
decided when once his mind was made up and remarkably skilful in the art
of devolution--that is to say, in the art of getting the full amount of
help out of his subordinates. He had the gift of knowing at once whether
a given question was worth his attention or should be left to others. If
he took it up, he made himself completely master of it; if he left it
alone, he put entire confidence in those to whom he left it, endorsed
their opinions without hesitation, and was always ready to defend them
or to further their wishes. This quality, it is needless to say, was
invaluable both to himself and to those who worked with him. His perfect
candour and straightforwardness were not only admirable in themselves
but were a great assistance to business. What he said, he meant; and if
he did not know a subject he did not pretend to know it. Few high
officials can ever have been his superior, or indeed his equal, in the
magical art of _getting things done._ Those who worked under him were
sure of a friendly and favourable hearing and they felt that, if they
had once convinced him that a certain step ought to be taken, it
infallibly would be taken and “put through.”’
Lord Randolph enjoyed his official work greatly, and made no secret of
it. His tenure of the post was brief but it would be safe to say that
there was not a single individual among those who had worked with him
who was not sorry to lose him. He, on his side, was extremely sorry to
go, and freely said so. Just before Christmas, when it was known that
the Government would be turned out as soon as Parliament met, he was
talking to one of his Under Secretaries and said: ‘I suppose you are
going away for a holiday?’ ‘Yes,’ was the reply; ‘I am going away for a
week; what holiday are you going to take?’ ‘I shall take none,’ he said;
and then, with the air of one who is making a confession, ‘The fact is,
you know, it is all very well for you: but I’m new to office: I enjoy it
thoroughly; and I’m going to be kicked out very soon. So I mean to stay
here and get as much of it as I can.’
Lord Salisbury in after-years distinguished as perhaps Lord Randolph
Churchill’s greatest quality his power of commanding the personal
devotion of his subordinates. In coming to the India Office the new
Minister was lucky in finding available as his Private Secretary a
remarkable man, who rendered invaluable service to him, to the India
Office, and (it is hardly too much to say) to the two Governments of
which Lord Randolph was a member. Mr. A. W. Moore had come at an early
age to the India Office as a clerk, with no special reputation for
industry or ability, and, being placed in the Finance Department, was
soon regarded as a somewhat idle and not very efficient member of the
establishment. After some years, however, he was by a lucky chance
transferred to the Political Department, which is concerned with Indian
Foreign Affairs and with the relations between the Government of India
and the Native States and conducts the correspondence which is
constantly passing between the India Office and the Foreign Office. No
more important work could be found; but it requires special
qualifications which are not very commonly met with. ‘Mr. Moore,’ writes
Sir Arthur Godley, ‘as soon as he was transferred, was a new man: he set
to work with extraordinary energy and zeal and in a very short time
acquired the reputation, which he never lost, of being among the most
valuable servants of the Crown. His industry was immense, possibly
excessive; his knowledge of his work, and of everything connected with
it, was unrivalled: he had it always at his finger-ends; and his gift of
rapid but clear, lucid and effective conversation and writing was hardly
to be surpassed. When Lord Randolph came to the Office, it happened
fortunately that, owing to some changes in the Department, Moore’s
services were available, though his age and position were by this time
such as might have been expected to debar him from the office of Private
Secretary. In this capacity he was exactly the man Lord Randolph needed;
he supplied whatever was at first wanting to his chief, who treated him
not only with the most complete confidence but really more as a
colleague than as a subordinate; and it may safely be said that he
contributed in no small degree to the success with which Lord Randolph
discharged the duties of the two great offices which he successively
held.’
Moore followed his chief from the India Office to the Treasury when Lord
Salisbury’s Administration of 1886 was formed, and Lord Randolph
Churchill’s resignation of the Chancellorship of the Exchequer seems to
have struck him a fatal blow. In a sense it may be said to have broken
his heart. His health had for some time suffered from the amount of work
he imposed upon himself. He was an active, athletic man, a great hero in
the annals of the Alpine Club; but he had undoubtedly over-tasked both
his mind and his body in the service of a master to whom he was not only
personally but politically devoted. Fortunately, as it seemed, an
opportunity occurred just then of offering him the headship of his old
branch, the Political Department, in the India Office. He accepted it,
and went abroad to the Riviera for a few weeks’ rest. But he never
recovered from his exhaustion and depression, caught a fever at Cannes
and died there two months later (February 2, 1887) at the age of 46.
‘The Home Civil Service,’ writes Sir Arthur Godley, ‘has not, for very
many years, sustained a greater loss.’
When Lord Randolph Churchill became Secretary of State for India on June
24, 1885, the imminent danger of war with Russia had been dispelled by
the agreement of May 4. Under this it was arranged that Penjdeh should
be neutralised till the boundary on that section of the frontier had
been settled and that negotiations should be resumed at once in London
as to the main points of the line of delimitation, the details of which
alone would be examined and settled by Commissioners on the spot. Some
progress had also been made towards defining the general line of the
frontier by an agreement arrived at on May 22. That agreement, however,
left open what was then the crucial question of how to reconcile the
full possession by the Afghans of the Zulficar Pass, on which we
insisted with the maintenance of the existing communications between
points on the Russian side of the frontier which the Russian Government
considered essential. This difficulty had declared itself before the
change of Government took place and the negotiations on the subject were
resumed by Lord Salisbury from the point at which they had been left by
Lord Granville.
Little progress was made for some considerable time and the situation
again became somewhat critical owing to the local excitement on both
sides of the border and recollections of what had taken place at
Penjdeh. Finally, however, an agreement was arrived at and embodied in
a Protocol signed on September 10, which stated, in sufficient detail to
ensure the completion of the work, the conditions under which the
Commissioners on the spot were to carry out the actual demarcation. The
agreement was one which, though it necessarily involved mutual
concessions, enabled both parties to it to claim that they had made no
sacrifice of vital points. From the British point of view the really
important objects attained by the settlement were the maintenance of
British credit with the Amir, whose interests had been successfully
guarded, the escape from what for a long and anxious period had seemed a
diplomatic impasse and the establishment of a frontier which has
remained unaltered to this day.
The actual demarcation commenced on November 10, when Sir Joseph West
Ridgeway met the Russian Commissioner at Zulficar. The work proved long
and difficult; and the position of the British Agent, forced to winter
with a small escort in that wild country, was full of peril to himself
and caused constant anxiety at home. It was not until July 1887 that a
Protocol was signed at St. Petersburg completing the delimitation of the
whole frontier between the Hari Rud and the Oxus.
Lord Randolph’s letters to the Queen throw a clear light on his views
and temper during this critical time. The dignified and ceremonious
style which flowed so naturally from his pen may surprise the reader who
is familiar with his platform speeches and his private letters.
India Office: July 11, 1885.
Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty,
and begs to submit the accompanying telegrams which have passed
between the Viceroy of India and himself.
There can hardly be any doubt, in view of the remarkable
expressions made use of by Mr. Gladstone on Tuesday last in the
House of Commons, giving such strong confirmation as to the
absolute pledge given by the Government of Russia, that the pass of
Zulficar should be ceded to the Amir. Your Majesty’s Government is
in an exceptionally favourable position for taking up an unyielding
attitude on this question. Parliament as a body is practically
committed to the policy of faithful observance of pledges given to
the Amir, and it may well be that so much Parliamentary unanimity
on any large question of foreign policy may not occur again for a
very long time. It is most earnestly to be hoped that this dispute
with the Government of Russia, which really involves the whole
Afghan Question as far as Russia is concerned, may be definitely
decided one way or another before Parliament separates for the
recess.
The negotiations have been extremely protracted. Troops are being
massed, both by Russians and Afghans, near the frontier; the strain
on the finances of India, caused by the obligation of keeping our
military preparations in a very advanced state, is evidently
causing the Viceroy uneasiness; and the character and credit of
this country cannot well sustain any further concessions to Russia
at the expense of our ally the Amir.
If this matter is not resolutely treated and definitely settled
now, before Parliament separates, not only does the state of
military emergency, so trying both to this country and to India,
continue indefinitely, but there is great reason to believe that in
September or October the Russians will make a further advance or
aggression, just before the General Election here, causing the
greatest alarm, confusion, excitement, and party feeling among the
people, and consequently the greatest possible danger to the
interests and security of India. Lord Randolph Churchill would
humbly submit that no possible precaution should be neglected now
in order, if possible, to obviate such an eventuality.
Lord Randolph Churchill humbly submits to your Majesty a memorandum
he has drawn up on the subject of proposing to the Government of
Russia and, if possible, concluding a comprehensive and to some
extent permanent treaty, providing generally for the integrity of
Afghanistan and the regulation of all frontier matters, and having
appended to it a rough draft of the possible clauses of such a
treaty.
India Office: July 13, 1885.
Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty,
and begs to submit that, as is pointed out by your Majesty, it
would be in the highest degree desirable to have some information
as to the manner in which a proposal for a comprehensive treaty on
the Afghan Frontier Question would be received by the Government of
Russia.
Lord Randolph Churchill has never supposed that a proposal of this
kind would be favourably received by the Government of Russia
unless it was known to that Power that such a proposal was
favourably received by other European Powers, or that a refusal to
view it in a friendly manner would place so singular an
interpretation on Russian policy that the continuation of
negotiations might become very difficult.
Such a state of things, favourable to the proposal for a treaty the
rough draft of which has been humbly submitted to your Majesty,
does not exist at the present moment. Whether such a state of
things may be brought into existence Lord Randolph Churchill would
not venture to determine positively, but he has often expressed to
Lord Salisbury the opinion that an effort in this direction could
not well be at variance with sound policy, and would in no way
conflict with public opinion.
The observation which your Majesty graciously records, that under
such a treaty as has been sketched your Majesty’s Government would
become responsible for the acts of the Amir, is profoundly
accurate; and it may well be that such a policy is liable to most
searching criticism, and might lead to serious evils. The whole
policy which is best known as ‘the buffer State policy’ is herein
called in question, and Lord Randolph Churchill is possessed by the
gravest doubts as to whether that policy is the best which could be
adopted for the security of your Majesty’s Indian Empire.
In its defence it may be urged, [1] That that policy has been
adopted by this country for very many years; with short and abrupt
intervals it was the policy pursued when Dost Mahomed and when
Shere Ali Khan ruled in Afghanistan. [2] That it is a policy to
which both political parties in this country are deeply committed,
and therefore it is a policy which, if it does not actually unite
public men, perhaps divides them the least. [3] Under that policy
pledges of a very binding character have been given to the present
Amir, on several occasions, that as long as he is guided by the
advice of your Majesty’s Government in the conduct of his foreign
relations your Majesty’s Government will hold themselves
responsible for, and will protect him from, any dangers and evils
arising from that advice being followed. [4] It is a policy which,
if it can be carried out (a very large and wide assumption),
undoubtedly has the merit of keeping Russian influence very remote
from actual contact with India.
The great danger of the policy alluded to is that it is dependent
upon the caprice or the design of the Amir; that it may be upset at
any moment by the revolt of the Governor of Badakshan in the north
and of the Governor of Herat in the south-west of Afghanistan, by
the escape of Ayoub Khan from Teheran, or by a decidedly aggressive
movement of the Russian forces.
It may be doubted whether there is any real solution of our
difficulties and dangers except in the breaking-up by force of arms
of the Russian Asiatic Empire, an enterprise far less hazardous and
doubtful, in Lord Randolph Churchill’s opinion, than is generally
supposed, but nevertheless an undertaking the responsibility of
which would, except under extraordinary circumstances, terrify an
Administration which at the present day has to face a House of
Commons.
Lord Randolph Churchill humbly submits that in acknowledging the
great force of your Majesty’s observations graciously conveyed to
him he has ventured to offer for your Majesty’s consideration views
and opinions which have for long been upon his mind, and Lord
Randolph Churchill earnestly hopes that he may not have
transgressed your Majesty’s pleasure by too diffuse an exposition.
No further action could well be taken with regard to a treaty until
the opinion of the Viceroy has been fully ascertained.
India Office: July 15, 1885.
Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty,
and begs to submit that there can be little doubt that your
Majesty’s apprehension that the Government of Russia will try to
evade the half-promise they gave to cede the pass of Zulficar to
the Afghan Amir is well founded. Lord Randolph Churchill would
humbly submit to your Majesty whether the original pledge given by
the Russians was not very full and unreserved, the difficulty about
communications being raised subsequently. In the note to M. de
Staal Lord Salisbury has taken this view very plainly. Colonel
Ridgeway’s telegrams cannot well be regarded as at all reassuring,
though there is reason to hope that the news in No. 97 may not be
altogether so grave as at first seemed to appear. The sequence of
events from day to day does not at all weaken the views on the
whole boundary question which Lord Randolph Churchill has from time
to time humbly submitted to your Majesty, and Lord Randolph
Churchill is more than ever of opinion that a firm and resolute
insistence on the faithful fulfilment of Russian pledges is not
only vital to your Majesty’s interests, but perhaps in reality the
best method of averting an eventual rupture of negotiations.
While Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office was rapidly gathering into
his skilful hands the tense and tangled threads of British diplomacy,
the Secretary of State for India took pains to secure an effective
defence upon the spot. Until the advance of Russia had reached the
borders of Afghanistan, the functions of the military forces of India
had been limited to maintaining internal peace or to frontier operations
against adversaries of limited power. Now that a great European Power,
liable at any time to become hostile, was in close proximity to the
Afghan border, it was evident that the existing military establishments
must be strengthened. The British troops in India were accordingly
increased by 11 batteries of artillery (30 guns and 1,373 men), by the
addition of a fourth squadron to each British cavalry regiment (1,332
men), and by the addition of three battalions of infantry and the
augmentation of each of those already serving by 100 rank and file,
amounting to 196 officers and 10,567 men. The increase of the British
garrison allowed an expansion--in recognised proportion--of the native
army. Most of the cavalry regiments were raised to four squadrons each
and three new native cavalry regiments were formed, making an increase
of 56 British officers and 4,572 natives of all ranks. Nine new native
infantry battalions were enlisted and the strength of the existing
regiments was increased--a total addition of 63 British officers and
11,968 natives of all ranks. Various improvements were made in the
position of the native soldier and a native Army Reserve was formed of
23,000 men. The Ordnance and Commissariat Departments were reorganised
and an Army Transport Department was formed. The construction of
strategical railways, roads and bridges on the North-West Frontier was
undertaken, and Karachi harbour was improved as part of a general scheme
of defence. Although all these military preparations were rapidly pushed
forward, this substantial increase of power was secured at an initial
cost of about one and a half millions sterling and maintained at an
annual charge of not much more than one million pounds a year. Lord
Randolph also approved, shortly before he left the India Office, of a
proposal for arming the native army with the best rifle available and
placing it in this respect on an equal footing with British troops. This
change, however, was long delayed.
Scarcely anything that Lord Randolph Churchill did as a Minister gave
him more pleasure than the appointment of Sir Frederick Roberts to be
Commander-in-Chief in India. It was almost the first important step
which he took on coming into power. Very powerful influences supported
the high claims of Lord Wolseley and, as the appointment of the Indian
Commander-in-Chief rested according to practice with the Secretary of
State for War, the matter hung for some days in suspense. But Lord
Randolph was insistent. His long and friendly talks with Sir Frederick
Roberts during his visit to India had made a great impression upon him.
All his life he continued to assert that Roberts was the first soldier
of his age. The Russian crisis and Sir Frederick’s unequalled service
and experience in the theatre of possible war constituted in his eyes
overwhelming qualifications. He won the agreement of Lord Salisbury; he
persuaded the Queen. In less than five weeks after the Government had
taken office, the appointment was announced and was received with
general assent and satisfaction.
In conjunction with this appointment and with the military preparations,
orders were given and money supplied for a Camp of Exercise to be
prepared upon a much larger scale than had ever been held in India
before. The troops were mobilised early in 1886 in two Army Corps. They
assembled at Umballa and Gurgaon--towns 150 miles apart--and after a
fortnight of brigade and divisional tactics, the opposing forces came
into contact near the famous battle-ground of Panipat. This was the
first occasion on which representatives from foreign armies had been
invited to be present at Indian manœuvres. Lord Randolph Churchill
arranged that the invitations should be sent through the Foreign Office;
and Lord Dufferin, who was present during the closing days of the
operations, was accompanied by twelve officers from the principal armies
of Europe and America.
On August 6 the Secretary of State for India laid the Indian Budget
before the House. This statement, coming as it does during the ‘Dog
Days,’ at the end of the Session, is usually heard in its ponderous
complexity with apathy by an empty and exhausted House. But the
importance of public departments varies with the authority of the
Minister who directs them. The Chamber was filled with members in all
the interest and eagerness of a great Parliamentary occasion. Nor were
they disappointed. Lord Randolph had no difficulty in holding their
attention for upwards of an hour and three-quarters while he unfolded in
stately language, but with the utmost simplicity and clearness, the wide
scroll of Asia. Intricate and unfamiliar figures, facts and problems
tangled with strange names and novel conditions, submitted themselves
willingly to his interesting narration. The account was not cheering in
its character. The confusion of Indian finances had permitted an
astounding error in the Budget calculations of Lord Ripon’s Government
and the new Minister had to announce to Parliament a heavy deficit,
largely unforeseen. The Russian crisis, moreover, imposed upon India the
necessity of extensive military preparations. Before he had spoken very
long the House realised that Lord Randolph was developing an elaborate
indictment of the late Viceroy.
‘The most unpardonable crime,’ he said, ‘of which the Governor-General
of India can be guilty, is not to look ahead and make provision for the
future. The Government of England cannot from its very nature look far
ahead; its policy is always one of month to month, of week to week and
sometimes of day to day; it is always more or less a policy of hand to
mouth. The reason is, that our Government in England depends upon a
Parliamentary majority which is violently assailed and swayed by an
enlightened, but at the same time by a capricious public opinion. The
Government of England has to think, in shaping its policy, of the state
of Europe, of the Colonies and of Ireland; of the state of England; and
last, not least, of the state of business in the House of Commons. It
has to think of all those subjects, and the result is, that although we
in England possess an unrivalled Constitution and unexampled freedom,
yet for the purpose of that freedom we have to put up with the
disadvantage of little stability and little continuity in our Government
and hardly any forethought in our policy. The Government of India is
exempt from all these disadvantages. It is a Government in its nature
purely despotic, but it is not an hereditary despotism. We do our best
to supply India from time to time with statesmen who shall exercise this
tremendous power of government, but who shall at the same time be wise,
experienced and courageous. In India it is not as in England. In India
there is no public opinion to speak of, no powerful press, and hardly
any trammels upon the Government of any sort or kind. For that reason I
say that if the Governor-General of India does not look ahead and
provide for the future, he not only commits a blunder but is guilty of a
crime.
‘I am compelled to apply this general statement to the Government of
Lord Ripon. Lord Ripon went out to India with a full knowledge of the
state of affairs; he knew of all the events which had occurred--of the
Russo-Turkish War which led to the Treaty of San Stefano and the
Congress of Berlin; he knew of all the events which had caused the great
preparations of Russia for advancing on India. He must have had
knowledge of the gradual but sure extension of the Russian Empire in
Asia.... I say nothing of the abandonment of Candahar. I say little of
the destruction of the Quetta Railway. I come rather to the acts of Lord
Ripon’s Government which seriously affected the finances of this year.
Lord Ripon had prosperous times to deal with and an increasing revenue.
The sky overhead, to the careless observer, seemed very blue. All
dangers apparently had passed away so far as foreign affairs were
concerned and so far as they had any bearing upon Indian finances, and
Lord Ripon and his counsellors laid themselves down and slept. All
indirect taxation of any value was remitted, the Customs duty was almost
totally abolished and the salt duty was reduced. In 1882-3 the Indian
army was reduced by five cavalry regiments and sixteen infantry
regiments. The British army was allowed to fall to 10,000 men below its
proper strength. To bring it up to its full strength, which it has now
nearly attained, has cost the Indian Government 100,000_l._ No frontier
railways were commenced; no roads were begun; no preparations were made
for the defence of a long and difficult frontier. Surely in prosperous
times a wise man would have provided for the event of a rainy day. But
Lord Ripon slept, lulled by the languor of the land of the lotus. Yet
there was much which ought to have warned and to have roused him. In
1882 the Russian Government, with the frankest candour, called our
attention to their proceedings in Central Asia and invited us to delimit
the frontier of Afghanistan; but the only reply they received was a dull
and sullen reply, as of a man under the influence of a narcotic. Our
ally, the Amir of Afghanistan, also sent many warnings. It is most
curious to observe, in the account of the interview of the Amir with
Lord Dufferin at Rawul Pindi, how frequently we come across that
familiar saying “I told you so.” All this time the cloud grew bigger,
the distant darkness nearer and blacker and the great military Power
loomed larger and more distinct upon our borders; yet Lord Ripon and his
counsellors slumbered and slept, never dreaming that any foreign danger
could by any possibility come nigh those dominions which had been
entrusted to their watchful care, taking no thought for the morrow,
heedless and ignorant of the future which was shaping itself with the
utmost clearness under their very eyes. Then, sir, there came a sharp
and sudden awakening. Russia’s hosts absorbed the territory of Merv,
rapidly filled up the vacuum to the south which had been so blindly left
unprovided for by us, and Lord Ripon and his counsellors were found,
like the foolish virgins, with no oil in their lamps. Then followed the
fruitless frontier negotiations and Lord Ripon came home and Lord
Dufferin went out, not one hour too soon for the safety of India and the
tranquillity of the East. Next we see the lonely and unsupported
British Commissioner endeavouring to stay the advance of the Russian
troops--troops flushed with success and animated by the highest hopes of
glory and of booty. Then came the incident of Penjdeh and, following
that, the vote of credit of eleven millions. Next we see the hasty and
hurried recommencement of the Quetta Railway which had been so foolishly
abandoned. Then came the announcement of the frontier railways and roads
too fatally postponed. And then came the additional military
expenditure, from three to four millions; and the result of it all is
now before the House in the deficit in the Indian accounts of a million
and a half and in the permanent extra military charge of no less than
two millions a year.[40] The good time has gone; the advantages which we
had, have been thrown away. No economy whatever was practised by that
Government. The expenditure on civil buildings was allowed to be
increased by over one million a year. The Famine Insurance Fund, on
which we prided ourselves, has been proved in time of trial to be
illusory. I declare that I endeavoured to contemplate the action of the
late Government of India without party passion. I found in it not one
redeeming feature. Indian interests were so clumsily, so stupidly,
handled that progress has been thrown back almost for a generation; and
having to place those results before the House of Commons in the
practical and matter-of-fact form of figures and finance, I disown and
repudiate on behalf of the present Government all responsibility of any
sort or kind for that policy and I hold up that Viceroyalty and the
Government responsible for it to the censure and the condemnation of the
British and Indian peoples.
‘This Parliament,’ he concluded, after a survey of many matters
interesting in themselves, but too specialised for quotation here, ‘has
done little or nothing for India. It would appear as if members of
Parliament of the present generation considered Indian affairs to be
either beneath their attention or above their comprehension, and India
is apparently left to pursue its destiny alone--some might even think
uncared for--as far as Parliament is concerned. That was not always the
case. In the last century, when our Indian Empire was forming, the
greatest men--Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox--did not disdain to
apply their minds to the most careful examination and exposition of the
difficult and complicated Indian questions, and with great advantage. At
the present time, when everything around is changing fast and when
nothing seems secure or firm or free from assault and danger, as far as
India is concerned, we shall act wisely if we revert to the more
patriotic practice of earlier days. I would ask those who have been so
kind as to listen to me, and those who possibly may not have concurred
in many remarks I have made, to join with me in what I would call an
appeal, or even, almost, a command, to those who will be our successors,
some faint echo of which may possibly linger around these walls and
influence the new Parliament so shortly to meet here: I would ask those
who hear me to join in an appeal to the members of the new Parliament to
shake themselves free from the lassitude, the carelessness, the apathy,
which have too long characterised the attitude of Parliament towards
India. I would appeal to them to watch with the most sedulous attention,
to develop with the most anxious care, to guard with the most united and
undying resolution, the land and the people of Hindostan, that most
truly bright and precious gem in the crown of the Queen, the possession
of which, more than that of all your Colonial dominions, has raised in
power, in resource, in wealth and in authority this small island home of
ours far above the level of the majority of nations and of States--has
placed it on an equality with, perhaps even in a position of superiority
over, every other Empire either of ancient or of modern times.’
With this impressive harangue the ‘Ministry of Caretakers’ may be said
to have brought the Session and the Parliament to a close.
Upon Lord Randolph’s acceptance of office begins a constant, intimate
and candid correspondence with Lord Salisbury, which ranges over the
whole field of politics at home and abroad, continues with almost equal
fulness in Opposition and in Government and ends abruptly in January
1887. Their letters were never more frequent than when Lord Randolph was
at the India Office. The fortunes of India were at this time inseparably
interwoven with the conduct of the Foreign Office--at first in regard
to Russia and Afghanistan, and later on in regard to France and China on
account of Burma--and Lord Randolph was always most particular to
consult the Prime Minister on any matter of importance and to take no
serious step without his concurrence. Lord Salisbury, on the other hand,
had much to give to an Indian Secretary. He possessed a vast knowledge
of Indian affairs, gained during his prolonged administration of that
department; and in all matters of official method, of procedure and
etiquette, his guidance was especially valuable to a Minister altogether
unversed in the details of administration.
Lord Salisbury was, like Lord Randolph Churchill, a prodigious
letter-writer, and he seems to have written no fewer than 110 letters to
his lieutenant--many of them very long ones--all in his beautiful
running handwriting, during the seven months of his first Ministry. How
he ever found time to write so many to a single Minister is a marvel.
Often three letters passed between them in a day. On July 25, for
instance, Lord Salisbury wrote four times to Lord Randolph on different
subjects, all of considerable importance. Two of these letters cover
between them five separate pieces of closely written notepaper. To a
later generation, accustomed to shorthand writers and anticipating a
time when it will be regarded as inconsiderate to address a person on
business otherwise than in type, such manual energy is astounding.
Whether elaborate letter-writing between Ministers is conducive to the
facile conduct of public affairs is doubtful. Strength and time are
consumed, difficulties are multiplied and differences only look wider
and more formidable when marshalled by ink and paper. Many of the
questions laboriously discussed on both sides of this correspondence
could have been despatched immediately at an interview or even upon a
telephone. But Lord Salisbury did not like political conversations. He
felt that he could not do so much justice to himself or his opinions in
an informal discussion as he could either in a letter or a speech. He
belonged, moreover, to a formal, painstaking, old-fashioned school; and
in Lord Randolph Churchill he had a pupil unexpectedly apt and
energetic.
Whatever may have been lost at the time has been gained by posterity,
for Lord Salisbury’s letters have a character and interest apart from
and even superior to the important matters with which they deal. A wit
at once shrewd and genial; an insight into human nature penetrating,
comprehensive, rather cynical; a vast knowledge of affairs; the quick
thoughts of a moody, fertile mind, expressed in language that always
preserves a spice and flavour of its own, are qualities which must exert
an attraction upon a generation to whom the politics of the ‘85
Government will be dust.
Throughout their association the letters of both men--whether in
agreement or in sharpest dispute--are marked by personal goodwill; and
Lord Randolph never for a moment drops the air of respect and deference
with which he invariably treated Lord Salisbury and which is never more
pronounced than in moments of stress. Lord Salisbury’s counsels and
comments are always instructive and so often amusing that I may be
allowed to transcribe a few at random: ‘My dear Randolph,’ the letters
begin (June 25), ‘(if I may venture to address a Secretary of State in
such familiar fashion!),--So much has been made of Herat, that we must
do more than is possible to defend it’ (July 25). ‘I quite agree with
your doctrine that it is better to go at the principal offender rather
than the instrument--with one important qualification--_if you can_’
(August 4). ‘It is curious to notice how the “buffer State” policy has
gone down in the world. When first I had to do with India, nineteen
years ago, it was the supremest orthodoxy: you might as well have
impugned one of the doctrines of Free Trade’ (August 4). Upon a curious
little question of Portuguese ecclesiastical establishments in India he
writes (August 24): ‘I am glad to see you take the same view as on the
first blush I was inclined to take. The Government of India by its
nature must ignore religious questions, except so far as they take the
secular form of furnishing a pretext for either robbery or riot.’ ‘I am
inclined to think you underrate H----. He knows these odd people in a
way we cannot do. I should be as much inclined to set up my opinion
against that of the keeper of an asylum on the best way of keeping
lunatics quiet’ (November 24). Again, in another letter on the same
day: ‘I am afraid F.O. and I.O. have hopelessly divergent opinions on
H----’s trustworthiness. But I think that when Departments differ on a
point which is not worthy of reference to the Cabinet, the best rule is
that the Department should prevail which will have the trouble of
dealing with the consequences of a mistake if a mistake is made. The
India Office view should therefore prevail.’
‘Honours’ and promotions of various kinds prove a thorny business to
handle, more especially after an episode soon to be recorded. ‘I was not
aware that Mr. * * * had been disappointed. He bears a high character in
the service, and I shall be glad to assist him if I have the
opportunity. But it is perilous to go out of the beaten track in matters
of promotion. I remember doing it in 1878, and I had a vote of censure
moved on me in the House of Commons by a Conservative’ (January 8,
1886). ‘I am afraid that in the matter of honours I am as destitute as
you are. The C.B.’s are all exhausted’ (June 20). And again (November
13): ‘My Baths are all run dry.’ ‘There can be no doubt that * * * is a
very fit candidate for the Privy Council and I will submit his name at
once. We may take more time to consider over the other two--who are less
distinguished: it will be time enough to settle whenever a
much-to-be-regretted accident befalls us. Unless * * * is very much
changed, I doubt your getting him to resign for a Privy Councillorship.
If I might follow the precedents of the early Church I should like to
make * * * a Bishop’ (December 5). ‘That fountain which you desire to
have turned on for the benefit of Birmingham is frozen up--and only runs
with a dribble. It is very difficult to restore it to activity’
(November 13).
The pleasant flow of this correspondence was very soon disturbed by an
interlude which might have broken up many other things as well. The
Bombay command, which at that date was a post of much dignity and
importance, carrying the title of Commander-in-Chief and giving the
holder a seat on the Governor’s Council, became vacant about the same
time that the new Government took office. In the prevailing uncertainty
upon the frontier Lord Randolph Churchill desired that it should be
filled at once. He agreed with Mr. Smith at the War Office upon an
officer. The Queen, however, was anxious that the Duke of Connaught
should serve in high command in India and Lord Salisbury strongly urged
her wishes upon the Secretary of State. ‘Though I am quite ready to
accept the responsibility of your decision,’ he wrote (July 25), ‘I
cannot, speaking confidentially, take quite your view. I hold that in
India the monarchy must seem to be as little constitutional as possible;
that it is of great importance to obtrude upon the native Indian mind
the personality of the Sovereign and her family; and that, therefore,
the policy of giving high military command to one of the Queen’s sons is
a step of political importance; and that its value is far from being
outweighed by the more restricted considerations attaching to military
susceptibilities or the details of military administration.... However,
though my opinions on it are clear, the matter is one for your
decision.’
Lord Randolph Churchill resisted the appointment with an obstinate
determination. It need scarcely be said that his reasons were not based
on any suggestion that the Duke of Connaught was not fully qualified to
discharge the military duties of the office. They consisted entirely in
the grave constitutional objections which exist to the employment of
Royal Princes in positions, such as the Bombay command then was, which
carry with them the necessity of speaking and voting constantly in
Council, and where numerous and important _political_ functions, apart
from military duty, may at any moment devolve upon the General officer
in command. These reasons were unanimously accepted as decisive by the
Cabinet on October 9. While the matter was still in suspense there
occurred an incident which is, on various grounds, indispensable to the
completeness of this story. The letters tell their own tale:--
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._
(_Very Confidential._)
Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts:
August 14, 1885.
My dear Randolph,--About ten days ago the Queen wrote to me and
told me to send a private telegram to Lord Dufferin in the
following words:
‘How would it be for the Duke of Connaught to succeed to the
command at Bombay? I wish for your opinion by telegraph after you
have consulted Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts, both
of whom, I know, think very highly of the Duke of Connaught’s
qualifications.’
As it is quite regular for the Queen to communicate directly with
the Viceroy, I simply cyphered and sent the telegram without note
or comment on my part.
At the beginning of this week I received from the Viceroy and
forwarded to the Queen, also without any comment, the following
reply:
‘Secret and Personal. Please submit following to Her Majesty. Both
Sir Frederick Roberts and the Commander-in-Chief entirely approve
of the idea of the Duke of Connaught’s appointment to the command
of the Bombay army. The Commander-in-Chief observes that the Duke
was the best of his General officers, and he considers that he
possesses great tact in dealing with the natives. Speaking from a
political point of view, I have always considered it a very good
thing that one of H.M.’s sons should be in India. The presence of
the Duchess of Connaught also exercises a very wholesome effect
upon Indian society. Personally I should welcome H.R.H.’s return
with the greatest satisfaction.’
The next day there came the following from the Viceroy, which was
also sent on to the Queen:
‘I conclude you know that in a despatch which will go home next
week, or the week following, we are reiterating the proposals
already made by the Indian Government for the amalgamation of the
Presidential armies, in which case the command at Bombay would be
that of a Lieutenant-General. Perhaps you will mention this to Her
Majesty.’
I then requested the Queen that I might be allowed to communicate
these telegrams to you, which I have received permission to do.
I have not offered her any advice on this matter since I last wrote
to you about it--except to defer any public decision till after the
election.
My advice to you, however, would be to give way, so far as the
Lieutenant-Generalship is concerned; that is to say, subject to
the last telegram. It is probable that these three men are sincere
in substance in what they recommend; and, if so, there is no doubt
they are probably right--and our position (if we oppose them) will
be a very difficult one to maintain. On the other hand, I think no
declaration should be made before the elections.
Believe me
Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._
Carlton Club: August 14, 1885.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--I have just received your two letters; one
about the succession to the Bombay Command, and the other about
giving Mr. Gorst[41] a nomination for the examination for the F.O.
I am very greatly obliged to you for your kindness in this latter
matter.
The first subject is very serious, to my mind. I cannot continue to
hold with any advantage the high position which H.M. the Queen has
conferred upon me unless I feel I have the confidence of the
Sovereign and her principal advisers. This elementary qualification
I am without. Some time ago I placed you in possession of the
objections which I and others saw to the Bombay Command being
conferred upon the Duke of Connaught. I was not aware that it was
possible, under such circumstances, that communications should pass
between the Prime Minister and the Viceroy, at the instance of H.M.
the Queen, without the knowledge of the Secretary of State, on a
matter on which the latter held very strong and deliberate
opinions.
I have for some time felt that the India Office, while I was there,
had little influence with respect to other matters of great
importance. But from what has passed between yourself and the
Viceroy about the Duke of Connaught, it must be obvious to the
Viceroy that I no longer possess either the confidence of the
Sovereign or of yourself, and, under these circumstances, I
respectfully ask you to submit to H.M. the Queen my resignation of
the office which I have now the honour to hold.
Yours very sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._
_Private._
Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 14, 1885.
My dear Randolph,--I am sorry you take such a view of a
correspondence that is perfectly regular. The Queen has always
written private letters to the Viceroy, and has always received
private answers from him, both received and sent without any
knowledge of any of her Ministers. She would have telegraphed in
the same way, only the Viceroy did not happen to have her cypher. I
did nothing else but cypher and decypher the message for her. I
could no more inform you of her private telegram, without her
leave, than I could inform you of a private letter, if I had been
asked to copy it for her, without her leave.
I regret very much that you should think I have not shown you
confidence. I have done my best to give effect to your wishes as
far as I possibly could. In this case I think you are really under
a misapprehension. What has passed does not pledge your liberty of
action, or decide the question in issue. The question is exactly
where it would have been if the Queen, instead of telegraphing, had
written to Lord Dufferin. It would still have remained to be
decided by her responsible Ministers. The only effect of the
telegraphing has been to ante-date the issue by five or six weeks.
I trust I have removed from your mind all misapprehension of the
character and effects of the Queen’s correspondence with Lord
Dufferin.
Believe me
Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
_Lord Randolph Churchill to Mr. Moore._
Dear Mr. Moore,--Will you copy the enclosed letter to Lord S., and
send it to Hatfield? A special messenger is not necessary.
Yours very truly,
RANDOLPH S. C.
_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._
2 Connaught Place, W.: August 15.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--You write to me, as usual, very kindly, for
which I am indeed grateful; but the impressions with which I
received your letter of yesterday remain as strong as ever. God
forbid that I should allow myself for one moment to throw a shadow
of a doubt upon the right of the Sovereign to communicate with the
utmost freedom on any conceivable matter with any one of her
subjects; but I submit that a very different question arises when a
communication from the Queen to so high an official as the Viceroy
of India on a matter of high State importance passes through the
Prime Minister. Such a communication, so sent, acquires a character
of responsibility which it would not otherwise possess.
Moreover, the matter becomes complicated indeed when it happens to
be the fact that it is in the knowledge of the Prime Minister that
the Royal communication which he forwards contains a suggestion--or
rather, I may say, makes a proposal--to which the responsible head
of the Department chiefly concerned entertains the strongest
possible objections.
The communications from the Queen direct to the Viceroy may be
frequent--I can see no reason why they should not be; but it would
appear that telegraphic messages on matters of a very confidential
and important nature have not been usual hitherto; otherwise surely
the Viceroy would have been provided with a copy of the Queen’s
cypher.
Generally, I would further submit to you the following: My
position in relation to Lord Dufferin is in many ways anomalous. He
is old enough to be my father, has been all his life in public
affairs, has acquired an immense reputation. Clearly, therefore, it
is curious that I should be placed in a position of superiority
over him--I who have had no experience of official life, a very
short experience of public life, and have not acquired any
reputation worth speaking of.
Under the circumstances the relations between the Secretary of
State and the Viceroy can be attended with no advantage to the
public service, on the contrary must be attended with the utmost
disadvantage, unless it is, more than usually even, obvious to the
latter that the former possesses the full, complete and perfect
confidence of the Prime Minister.
Lord Dufferin is no ordinary man. He has a greater faculty for
putting two and two together than most men. I have not the smallest
doubts as to the nature of the impression left upon his mind by the
Royal communication on the subject of the Duke of Connaught as it
has reached him. In about a week he will get a letter from me in
which I gave at great length, and with all the arguments that had
occurred to me, my strong objections to the appointment in
question. He will find that he has committed himself somewhat
lightly, and after the manner of a courtier--influenced, no doubt,
by the fact that the inquiry came through you--to an opinion
diametrically at variance with that of the Secretary of State, and
he will know that in so doing the Prime Minister is on his side. If
you follow my argument and concur in the premises on which it is
based, I think you will easily see that satisfactory and
advantageous relations between me and Lord Dufferin, which under
the best circumstances were difficult, will now have become
impossible.
The superiority of the Secretary of State over the Viceroy, as
intended by the Constitution of the Indian Government, will exist
only in name as far as I am concerned, and this must have a most
unfortunate effect on all questions of Indian administration. I
shall never know, moreover, what communications may not be passing
between the Queen, the Prime Minister and the Viceroy on matters of
great and small importance; and this element of uncertainty and
ignorance of events will prevent me from being of the smallest
utility.
The appointment of the Duke of Connaught to a high and very
responsible military command in India is, as it appears to me, a
question of the utmost importance. It is not my business to point
out how largely is raised by it the constitutional position of
Royal Princes in these days; though I infer that you are aware of
the existence of objections of very considerable weight, from the
stipulation which you make with the Queen that no public
declaration of the appointment should be made till after the
elections. I am concerned only with the matter as it affects India
generally, and the Indian Army in particular. Although the
Secretary of State is not solely responsible for such an
appointment, he practically is the person most identified with it
in the public mind: and if it was not for my inexperience of
official life, I should have thought that it was absolutely
impossible that the freedom of action of the Secretary of State on
so important a matter could be so absolutely demolished as it has
been in this case.
I may add, to show the extreme inconvenience of allowing matters of
this kind to be prematurely settled without the knowledge of the
Department chiefly concerned, that the Viceroy’s proposal that the
Duke of Connaught should have the command of a Corps d’Armée with
the rank of Lieutenant-General is absolutely impracticable at the
present time. Even assuming that the new proposals of the
Government of India for the amalgamation of the Bombay and Madras
Commands were approved of by the Secretary of State in Council, and
this is very uncertain, they would require, before they could be
entered upon, an Act of Parliament. A Bill introduced into the
House of Commons for this purpose would lead to much debate; it
would necessarily raise very large questions of Indian government,
military and political; might easily fail to pass into law, and at
the best would hardly receive the Royal Assent till the early
autumn of next year. It cannot be supposed that all this while the
Bombay Army could be left without a responsible chief.
Under all these circumstances I remain of the opinion which I
expressed to you yesterday. From the first I always had great
doubts whether my being in the Government would be any advantage to
the Government or to the party. All doubts on the point are now
removed from my mind. A first-class question of Indian
administration has been taken out of my hands, and at any moment
this action may recur, and it is clear to the Viceroy that I do not
occupy towards himself the position which the Secretary of State
ought and is supposed to occupy.
I therefore with much respect adhere to the views which I put
before you yesterday.
Believe me to be
Yours very sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
P.S.--I enclose for your consideration an extract from my letter to
Lord Dufferin of July 31.
His advice, which I asked for, will not be worth much now.
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._
_Private._
Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 15, 1885.
My dear Randolph,--I had no intention of taking any decision out of
your hands, and I think in attributing it to me you do not put
fairly the position in which I was placed. The Queen’s desire for
privacy was very natural. The question she was asking about her son
might have had an unfavourable answer: and then she would naturally
wish that as few should know it as possible. I could not,
therefore, do otherwise than I did--send the message, and urge her
to communicate it to you as soon as I knew it could be done
satisfactorily. It would not have been honourable to communicate it
before. Perhaps I might, if I had thought of it, have sent the
cypher to Ponsonby--but that would hardly have been civil; and it
did not occur to me that you would take this objection. As a matter
of fact I did not communicate with the Viceroy otherwise than by
transmitting that which was sent to me. But if I had done so I
should not have done anything unusual. Lord Beaconsfield used to do
it occasionally: and Lord Dufferin wrote to me and asked me to
correspond with him. The Viceroy is nominated by the Prime
Minister, not by the Secretary of State. I only say this because I
am concerned to show that I have not behaved unfairly to you, or
taken anything out of your hand. But I do not hold to this power of
corresponding either by letter or wire with the Viceroy: and if you
really feel that ‘you will never know what communications are
passing between the Queen, the Prime Minister, and the Viceroy,’ I
am quite ready to give up for myself the right of communicating
with him.
Of course, you must take what course you think right. I should be
sorry if, out of mere suspicion of me, you took a step which will
tend to break up the party at a critical time: and still more that
you should do it on a matter which can hardly fail to make the
Queen’s name and actions matter of public controversy. But, at all
events, before you take any definite step I trust you will talk to
me about it. I shall be going through town on Tuesday to Osborne.
If you are still there, would you come to me at two o’clock?
Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._
2 Connaught Place, W.: August 16.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--I feel I cannot persist easily in urging my
view upon you after your letter received this morning, though it
does appear to me that you have not allowed yourself to appreciate
with perfect justice the consideration which I tried to convey to
you. It can be no satisfaction to me to be the means of depriving
Lord Dufferin of the advantage, instruction and pleasure which
correspondence direct with you cannot fail to afford him, and I do
not quite understand how you can think me capable of such a
purpose.
Further, I am much distressed that you should suppose that the step
which I was anxious to take (and which I still firmly believe would
be for the advantage of all concerned) could be animated by so
unworthy a motive as ‘suspicion of you.’
My argument was that, viewing all the surrounding circumstances
together, the peculiar occurrence about which I wrote had
seriously, if not irreparably, impaired my power of being useful to
your Government.
Perhaps, before finally putting aside what I have pressed upon you,
you will kindly give Mr. Moore an interview. He understands and can
explain the position as I regard it much better than I can make it
clear by letter.
I shall be happy to wait upon you on Tuesday in accordance with
your desire, if I am allowed to leave the house, to which for the
last two days I have been kept a prisoner.
Yours very sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
_Note by Mr. Moore._
I went to Hatfield on Sunday August 16, and saw Lord Salisbury. The
result was that he spontaneously proposed to send the subjoined
telegram to the Viceroy, which he thought would remove any
misapprehension on the part of Lord Dufferin. I took the draft to
Lord Randolph, who quite concurred. The matter was thus
settled.--A. W. M.
_Lord Salisbury to Mr. Moore._
_Private._
Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts:
Sunday, August 16, 1885.
Dear Mr. Moore,--I am not sure that the last phrase in the draft
telegram I gave you is sufficiently accurate. It should run:
‘My own view--_though inclining towards the proposal_--is not very
decided on the subject.’
That is very much what Lord R. C. said in his letter.
Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
DRAFT TELEGRAM.
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Dufferin._
Most secret. Your telegraphic correspondence with the Queen. It may
be as well to put upon record that the telegram I sent you was from
the Queen and that I merely transmitted it. The Cabinet have not
considered the question; there is much difference of opinion on the
subject, and my own view, though inclining to the proposal, is not
very decided.
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._
_Private._
Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 16, 1885.
My dear Randolph,--I was very glad to receive your letter, for it
would have been very painful if we had ‘come in two’ over this
matter. I saw Mr. Moore, whose power of exposition I knew of old. I
gave him a draft telegram which, if you approve, I will send, and
which will prevent any possible misapprehension in Dufferin’s mind.
I do not the least fear any such misapprehension--for he is an old
public servant, and knows the Queen’s ways well. You need not have
the least anxiety about your authority with Dufferin. I shall be
very glad if your health is sufficiently restored to enable you to
come about two on Tuesday to my house. I can explain any point you
wish explained, and I can tell you what Staal has said.
Ever yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
Opinions vary on the merits of this dispute. Some of those who have held
great office have informed me that the Secretary of State for India had
no choice but to tender his resignation after such an incident: and it
is certainly curious that so high an authority upon Ministerial
propriety as Lord Salisbury should have allowed the difficulty to arise.
On the other hand, it may be urged that personal slights, however
provoking, ought never to be allowed to compromise a great political
situation. Probably Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in his dry way, summed the
question up correctly:--
_Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Lord Randolph Churchill._
Many thanks for sending me the correspondence, which I return. I am
the more glad of its conclusion, because I think there is reason on
both sides. The Queen put Salisbury in an almost impossible
position by asking him to forward the telegram. He could not tell
you of it and it would have been very difficult, perhaps
impossible, for him to interfere with her _private_ correspondence
by suggesting that she should reconsider it. But, on the other
hand, I agree with you that the very fact of _his_ forwarding it
must have suggested to Dufferin that it was something more than the
Queen’s private opinion.
Salisbury has written to tell me what has passed and I have
therefore ventured to suggest to him that Ponsonby should have the
cypher, so that what has occurred should not happen again. So far
as I know, the Queen exercises her right of private correspondence
with great care, to avoid anything that would affect the decisions
of Ministers; and this exception to the rule was obviously due to
the personal nature of the question, which Dufferin (had the
telegram been sent by Ponsonby) would have quite appreciated.
But please forgive me for saying that I think you looked at this
matter rather too seriously last Friday. I think I should have been
more inclined to laugh at the story of the telegram than to treat
it as a proof of want of confidence on the part of the Queen and
Prime Minister. If you had not been ill you would never have said
of yourself in your letter to me that ‘I have no longer any energy
or ideas, and am no more good except to make disturbance.’ And I
suspect the same reason has influenced your view of this telegram
affair.
The sequel, so far as concerned the Bombay command, was simple. Lord
Dufferin perceived from Lord Salisbury’s second telegram that grave
differences had arisen in the Cabinet and that the matter would not be
settled with easy and deferential good-humour. Upon receiving Lord
Randolph’s despatch on the subject, the Viceroy, while seeming to
re-iterate his opinion, ranged himself with the Secretary of State in
the following dexterous sentence: ‘The fact of our having proposed the
abolition of the Presidential Commanderships-in-Chief has got rid of
what otherwise would have been _an insuperable objection_[42]: namely,
the political responsibilities of the Bombay Commander-in-Chief as a
member of Council’ (August 21). As this proposal involved the carrying
of a Bill through the House of Commons, the ‘insuperable objection’ must
have held good until the autumn of 1886--even had the Government
survived. The Cabinet, to whom the matter was referred, unanimously
decided (October 9) ‘that the political position of the
Commander-in-Chief of a presidency army could not be filled by a son of
the Queen’;[43] and the Bombay command remained vacant during the
remaining tenure of the Government. It should, however, be added, lest
anything in the foregoing correspondence should seem to reflect upon the
Duke of Connaught, that under Lord Salisbury’s second Administration,
the ‘insuperable objection’ being removed by the abolition of
Presidential Commanders-in-Chief with their customary political
functions, he was appointed to the Bombay command and discharged its
military duties with conspicuous advantage to the public.
But the consequences were more lasting outside the actual subject of
dispute. Although the correspondence between Lord Randolph and the Prime
Minister ripples on as pleasantly as ever, although in the next few
months their comradeship became increasingly cordial, it cannot be
supposed that such a conflict could pass away without leaving scars.
Lord Salisbury could not forget, Lord Randolph Churchill could not but
remember, what the result of a resignation had been.
Last in chronology, first in importance, among Lord Randolph Churchill’s
enterprises at the India Office came the conquest and annexation of
Burma. When Lord Randolph Churchill had travelled in India in the
winter of 1884, he had consulted a native fortune-teller and thought it
worth while to keep a note of what he said. The astrologer, after
saying, perhaps ambiguously, ‘that he had never seen so good a star
since Lord Mayo’s (for during his Viceroyalty Lord Mayo was assassinated
in the Andaman Islands), repeatedly asserted that his visitor would
‘return to India shortly in connection with a warlike expedition,’ and
that he was ‘about to go on a warlike expedition.’ The prediction may
perhaps in a sense have come more nearly true than many others of its
class. When the Conservatives came into power, the British
administration in Burma was confined to the maritime province at the
mouth of the Irrawadi and the strip of sea-coast bordering on the Bay of
Bengal. The inland country up to the confines of China still remained an
independent State under its native ruler, the King of Ava. The relations
of the British Government with that State had long been unsatisfactory.
By the Treaty of Yandaboo, which terminated the first Burmese War in
1826, the right of a British representative to reside at Mandalay had
been secured, and until 1876 this agent of the Imperial Government had
from time to time--sitting on the ground and barefooted, according to
the inflexible ceremonial of the Burmese Court--endeavoured, with small
success, to safeguard the ever-growing commercial interests of British
and British-Indian subjects.
In 1878 the old King of Burma died, leaving behind him thirty sons with
families on the same generous scale. A palace intrigue secured the
throne to Prince Theebaw and the new reign was inaugurated by an
indiscriminate massacre of the late King’s other sons, with their
mothers, wives and children. Eight cart-loads of butchered princes of
the blood were cast, according to custom, into the river. The less
honourable sepulchre of a capacious pit within the gaol was accorded to
their dependents. Two of the thirty sons had had the prudence to take
refuge with the British Resident, who not only stoutly refused to
surrender them but addressed a strong remonstrance to the Burmese
Government. The Burmese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied tartly that
the procedure followed was in accordance with precedent and that under
the existing treaties of ‘grand friendship’ the two great Powers were
bound to respect each other’s customs. With this answer the Government
of India were forced to be content, though Ministers at home seem to
have had some difficulty in persuading Queen Victoria to sign the
necessary message of cousinly congratulation to the new monarch.
The unpleasant feelings which had been aroused were not readily allayed.
Since 1876 the British representative had been instructed not to sit
upon the ground barefooted when enjoying the honour of a royal audience
but to sit upon a chair, clothed in the ordinary manner. The etiquette
of the Burmese Court could not, however, be relaxed. The King refused to
countenance the innovation and all direct access to the Sovereign
ceased. Forced now to deal only with the Minister of State, the British
representative found his personal influence vanishing and his personal
safety impaired. For nearly a year the British Residency remained
guarded by a scanty escort, wholly indefensible in itself, within a mile
of the palace where ‘the ignorant, arrogant, drunken boy-king,
surrounded by a set of parvenu sycophants, the men of massacre and
bloodshed, ignorant and savage enough to urge him on to any further
atrocities,’[44] disposed of a body of two thousand soldiers. It was
therefore decided in 1879 to recall the whole Residency and the
Government of India, whose patience was inexhaustible, were left without
a representative at the Burmese capital.
For the next five years disorder and misgovernment gripped the land of
Upper Burma. In 1883 a hideous massacre was perpetrated upon three
hundred prisoners in the gaol. Outrages upon British subjects and upon
British vessels on the Irrawadi were frequent. The protests of the
Viceroy were treated with disdain. Innumerable vexations arose. Trade
was strangled. The life and property of a large European-Indian
community were insecure. So threatening was the Burmese attitude that a
considerable addition, involving much expense, had to be made in the
garrison of the maritime province, and this necessary precaution
aggravated the prevailing uncertainty. To complete the tale of
grievances, Burmese Missions were found in March 1885 to be negotiating
treaties of commerce in various foreign capitals. Such was the
situation when Lord Randolph Churchill became Secretary of State.
Events were now to force a crisis. The Burmese Mission had already
negotiated in Paris a Franco-Burmese Convention. The French Consul at
Mandalay, an energetic man, had acquired great authority. French
influence was rapidly becoming predominant and ousting British
interests, both diplomatic and commercial. Banks, railways, mining and
timber concessions were falling almost daily into their hands. The long
procession of facts which advanced upon the British Government in July
1885, left no room to doubt the imminence of a dominant foreign
influence in Upper Burma, involving the most serious and far-reaching
consequences to the British province of Lower Burma and to the Indian
Empire. The whole question at once became urgent.
While these considerations were causing Her Majesty’s Government the
utmost anxiety, a lucky incident occurred. King Theebaw, partly from
want of money, partly in a spirit of sheer bravado, imposed a fine of 29
lacs of rupees upon an important British company trading in his
dominions, on a pretext that certain Customs duties had not been paid,
and with the intention of ruining the company and transferring their
concession to a French firm. With this final and definite provocation
Lord Randolph Churchill considered the case for action complete both as
regards Parliament and the country. He threw himself into the enterprise
with characteristic vigour. The official papers show on almost every
page the driving power which he exerted. As early as July 25 he drew
Lord Salisbury’s attention to the rumours of a new Franco-Burmese
Convention. Lord Salisbury’s reply was terse: ‘The telegram, if not a
_canard_, is painfully important. The King of Burma must not be allowed
to conclude any such convention.’ Unofficial remonstrances having
produced no effect, Lord Randolph addressed the Foreign Office formally
on August 28, urging that a communication should be made to the French
Government stating that any further prosecution of the commercial
projects in contemplation ‘will necessitate such prompt and decided
measures as may most effectually satisfy the paramount rights of India
in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula.’ The French Government recognised frankly
that the British interest in Burma was much more intimate and
substantial than their own. Their Ministers temporised politely and
deprecated, while they did not arrest, the activities of the Consul.
Meanwhile King Theebaw, in his great unwisdom, rejected almost
insolently the remonstrances of the Government of India and their
proposal that the case should be referred to arbitration. On October 16,
therefore, Lord Dufferin transmitted to the India Office the draft of an
ultimatum insisting that a special envoy of the British Government
should be received at Mandalay to settle outstanding disputes and that a
British Resident, suitably guarded, should be permanently admitted,
without being forced to submit to any humiliating ceremony, to the
Court of Ava. It was further intimated to King Theebaw that he would be
required in future to accept the same position in regard to his foreign
relations as the Amir of Kabul and to regulate them in accordance with
British advice. Lord Randolph Churchill, in approving the despatch of
the ultimatum, telegraphed as follows:--
The terms of your ultimatum are approved. But I am strongly of
opinion that its despatch should be concurrent with movement of
troops and ships to Rangoon. If ultimatum is rejected, the advance
on Mandalay ought to be immediate. On the other hand, armed
demonstration might bring Burmese to their senses. Also, on account
of security of many British subjects and Europeans in Upper Burma,
it is of vital importance that Burmese should feel that any injury
to them or their property would be followed by rapid punishment.
Under all the circumstances of the case, and in view of public
opinion here, I do not think that considerations of expense should
deter you from these precautions. Lord Salisbury concurs. I would
suggest that you should demand an answer within a specified time.
Overwhelming force was employed. An expedition, consisting of a naval
brigade of 433 seamen and marines, with 49 guns and machine-guns, and
3,029 British and 6,005 native soldiers, with 28 guns, was ordered to
assemble, together with a flotilla, at Thyetmyo by November 14, under
command of General Prendergast, with Colonel White (afterwards Sir
George White) and Colonel Norman as Brigadiers. These troops were
collected swiftly and unostentatiously. No sufficient reply having been
received by the appointed date--November 10--General Prendergast was
ordered to advance. The strength of the force employed, prevented any
effectual opposition in Burma. Its rapid movement allowed no time for
serious complications to develop either with France or China. The
Burmese army was routed at Minhla on November 17, at a cost of one
officer and three men killed and five officers and twenty-four men
wounded. On the 27th Mandalay was occupied and King Theebaw was a
prisoner. Injuries and embarrassments tolerated for fifty years were
swept away in a fortnight. General Prendergast’s advance was pressed
forward to Bhamo, on the Chinese frontier, which was soon occupied
without any serious fighting.