THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT
‘Of this, however, I am well persuaded, that it is better to be
impetuous than cautious. For Fortune is a woman who to be kept
under must be beaten and roughly handled; and we see that she
suffers herself to be more readily mastered by those who treat her
so, than by those who are more timid in their approaches. And
always, like a woman, she favours the young, because they are less
scrupulous and fiercer, and command her with greater
audacity.’--MACHIAVELLI: _The Prince_, chapter XXV.
[Sidenote: 1885 ÆT. 36]
This account, which has hitherto been concerned with the doings of Lord
Randolph Churchill and the steps by which he attained power in his party
and in Parliament, must now for a time be greatly extended. However
strictly the thread of personal narrative be followed, biography
broadens insensibly into history, and the career of a private member
becomes a recognisable part of the fortunes of the nation. We enter upon
a period of tumult and change. Within little more than a year two
General Elections were fought and four separate Administrations took
their seats on the Treasury Bench. In order to find an equal convulsion
it is necessary to go back almost exactly a hundred years, to the time
between the fall of Lord North’s Administration in 1782 and the final
triumph of Mr. Pitt after his dissolution in 1784. In each period
Ministries were constructed and fell like houses of cards; in each a
new, young figure sprang suddenly into universal attention; in each, one
of the historic parties in the State entered into a disastrous
coalition; and the other, after taking office in a minority, secured a
predominance which lasted for a generation.
The Administration of 1880 tottered to its fall in tragedy and disaster.
General Gordon perished and Khartoum fell in February. The expeditionary
columns recoiled in sorrow and failure from the desert and the Nile. The
Queen telegraphed her displeasure openly to the Prime Minister; and on a
vote of censure the Government escaped only by a majority of fourteen
(February 27). Few more critical divisions have been taken in modern
times; for the defection of eight more discontented Whigs or Liberals
would have procured a dissolution before either the Reform or
Redistribution Act could have come into operation. In the temper of the
moment, upon the votes of the old electorate, the Conservative party
could hardly have failed to gain a clear majority. With such a prize in
view the attacks of the Opposition increased in vehemence, bitterness,
and effect. Votes of censure succeeded each other with almost
bewildering rapidity. Early in the year Mr. Chamberlain began to
proclaim the new demands of Radicalism in a series of crudely impressive
speeches. Nationalist Ireland struggled in the grip of Dublin Castle.
The menace of Russian aggression towards the Indian frontier grew into
reality. Dynamite explosions tore up the Treasury Bench and shook the
structure of Westminster Hall. A momentous General Election drew near.
It was indeed, as Mr. Gladstone noted in his diary, ‘a time of _Sturm
und Drang_.’
Lord Randolph Churchill returned from India in March, to find himself in
a position of unusual importance. He had won no battle, negotiated no
peace; he had passed no great measure of reform; he had never held
public office; he was not even a Privy Councillor; yet he was welcomed
on all sides with interest or acclamation. The political temperature was
steadily rising with the approach of the General Election. The Fourth
Party received him with joy and the House of Commons with satisfaction.
Mr. Gladstone in his courtly way walked across the House to shake hands
with him. His absence had been felt on his own side. He was looked to as
a man who would infuse a belligerent energy into the Opposition and
range their lines for the impending battle. It was evident to all men
that he occupied a position in which he might turn the balance of many
great things. ‘What place will you give him when the Government is
formed?’ Sir Stafford Northcote was asked by a friend. ‘Say rather,’
replied the leader of the Opposition, ‘what place will he give me?’ ‘I
had no idea,’ said Lord Randolph calmly when this was repeated to him,
‘that he had so much wit.’
The passage of a year had wrought important changes. Birmingham, divided
by the Reform Bill into seven seats, was no longer the great
three-member constituency which had invited him to stand. Colonel
Burnaby, his good comrade, had been killed at Abu Klea.[28] But the
Central Division sent a pressing requisition. Although the acceptance
involved a direct contest with Mr. Bright himself, Lord Randolph
considered himself bound by his former promise to come forward; but,
lest fortune should be adverse in Birmingham, Mr. Kerans voluntarily
withdrew from the candidature of South Paddington, so that that seat
also might be at his disposal.
It is not easy to estimate, and quite impossible to explain, the
personal ascendency which he had by this time acquired in the House of
Commons. The Conservative Opposition almost instinctively yielded to his
decisions. His authority seemed to have grown in his absence. On the
motion to go into Committee on the Egyptian Loan Bill (April 16) Sir
Richard Cross moved an amendment urging that the Suez Canal Convention
should be submitted to the House before it was finally settled. The
ground was ill-chosen and the occasion inauspicious. The speech of the
mover could not fully surmount these disadvantages. But the amendment
was moved with all the sanction and authority of the official
Opposition, and the party Whips had summoned their followers from far
and near to support it. Lord Randolph Churchill made a short speech,
suave and friendly in substance, elaborately polite in form, but with
just a suspicion of irony. He deprecated the amendment. He persuaded
both sides of the House that it was unfortunate. The debate came
abruptly to a conclusion. All determination of dividing oozed out of
the Opposition. The amendment was withdrawn. This was a typical
incident.
Lord Randolph had returned from India at a time when Indian problems
occupied all minds. The turbulence of English politics was hushed for a
space by a perilous interlude. In the year 1884, after the occupation of
Merv, the Russian Empire attained the limits of its expansion southwards
and came at last into contact with the territories of the Amir, to whom,
by the engagements of 1880, Great Britain had given a pledge of
protection against external aggression. A joint demarcation of the
northern boundary of Afghanistan was decided on by the British and
Russian Governments, from the Persian border eastwards to a point on the
Oxus, beyond which that river had been recognised by the agreement of
1873 as constituting the limits of Afghan territory. The Commissioners
of the two Powers had met on the frontier in November 1884, and devoted
themselves to their task with that air of leisurely diligence
inseparable from international undertakings. On March 30 the tangled
negotiations were torn to pieces by an act of violence. While
diplomatists were groping for scientific frontiers upon imperfect maps
and amid unfamiliar names, General Komaroff advanced, ‘covenant’
notwithstanding, collided with the Afghan pickets upon the debatable
ground, and in a short but bloody action at Penjdeh drove the Amir’s
forces from the field. All England was stirred. The newspapers were hot
to counsel war. A wave of double panic swept across the country. The
national temper rose and the funds fell. A period of acute suspense
followed.
On all that concerned the safety of India Lord Randolph spoke in
picturesque and thoughtful language. ‘Our rule in India,’ he said at the
Primrose League banquet in the St. James’s Hall on April 18, ‘is, as it
were, a sheet of oil spread out over the surface of, and keeping calm
and quiet and unruffled by storms, an immense and profound ocean of
humanity. Underneath that rule lie hidden all the memories of fallen
dynasties, all the traditions of vanquished races, all the pride of
insulted creeds....’ He spoke of the advance of Russia on the North-West
Frontier--‘that sometimes stealthy, sometimes open, always gradual,
always sure advance of countless hosts, now resembling the gliding of a
serpent, now the bound of a tiger’--as a perpetual injury to stability
and progress in the Government and people of India. And his counsels,
like those of Lord Salisbury, seemed full of the menace of war.
On April 27 Mr. Gladstone asked the House of Commons for his vote of
credit of 11,000,000_l._ He unfolded the ‘case for preparation’ in an
impressive harangue. Tory blood, long chilled, stirred in his veins. The
eloquence and authority of his great war speech covered everything
behind it--even the total abandonment of the Soudan, which was
foreshadowed almost incidentally--and carried everything before it. He
sat down while the House was ringing with the united acclamations of
Radicals who hated war and of Tories who hated him. The debate
collapsed. Notices of motion and amendment disappeared as if by magic.
The vote was carried without a single protest.
But it was no part of the policy of the Opposition to allow Mr.
Gladstone to obtain personal triumphs of this character. Though for the
time they were dazzled by his rhetoric, they felt no confidence that the
honour of the country was safe in his hands; and the parlous condition
to which British relations with Russia had come, only made them more
anxious to get possession of the Government. Lord Randolph, who had
freed himself altogether from the Gladstone spell, saw in the collapse
of the debate only another proof of that feeble and ineffective
leadership of the Opposition against which he had warred so ruthlessly.
Hitherto his communications with Lord Salisbury had been scanty and
formal. Since the settlement of the National Union dispute no letters
had passed between them; and although they were supposed to be working
in harmonious agreement, they hardly knew each other at all. But Lord
Randolph’s vexation prompted him to write with much more freedom than he
had yet allowed himself; and this proved the beginning of an intimate
correspondence and association only to cease after the crisis in British
politics was over.
_Private._
Turf Club, Piccadilly: April 27, 1885. 11 P.M.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--The Opposition cannot be conducted to any
other goal but smash if things are to go on as they did to-night.
At first all went well. We divided, and were only beaten by 43--a
respectable position, the only unpleasant feature of which was the
slack attendance of our party. A four-line whip had been out for a
week. Many telegrams had been despatched yesterday, and yet only
about 160 Tories came up to the scratch. The worst was to come, and
I blame myself as much as anyone for what happened. Mr. Gladstone
was evidently much annoyed by the opposition to his vote of credit
arrangements and commenced his statement in Committee by the most
wanton, outrageous, violent, and yet wretchedly weak attack upon
the late Government. He then went on into a very elaborate and
easily exposed apology for the evacuation of the Soudan, and
finally wound up (and this part I did not hear) with a very warlike
denunciation of Russian aggression, which H. Fowler of the Home
Office told me he thought was too strong. Would you believe it? The
whole Front Opposition Bench sat as mute as mummies--though, after
all, it was they who had been flouted--and the Prime Minister got
his 11,000,000_l._ at one gulp, without a remark of any sort or
kind. I have not really the right to complain or criticise, as I
went away in the middle of his speech to dine; but it never
occurred to me for a moment that Sir S. N. would allow his
intemperate remarks to pass unnoticed, or that the debate would
collapse in such an ignominious manner for the Opposition.
It is quite possible that the Metropolitan Press may not notice
this so strongly, but the Liberal provincial Press will; and the
fact remains that at this time of day Gladstone has the audacity to
revive in their worst form all the stale and exploded charges
against the Beaconsfield Government, and that Northcote, the man
most concerned, has not a word to say in reply. The effect in the
House of Commons has been deplorable. All the Liberals are
cock-a-whoop, and Gladstone has been allowed to obtain,
gratuitously, an unparalleled Parliamentary triumph. It is probable
that in the next few weeks crisis and sensation will follow each
other closely. You know that under these circumstances, in the
House of Commons, if the leader of the Opposition does not move,
no one else can; and if to-night’s proceedings are to be repeated,
we are done. Excuse, I pray you, a hurried scrawl. I thought you
might like to have an account fresh from the House of Commons.
Yours very sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
The reply was prompt and friendly.
‘I sympathise with you very heartily,’ replied Lord Salisbury late the
same night. ‘But what can I do? It is not a case where advice would be
of any service. In fact, I sometimes think my advice does more harm than
good; for, if only partially followed, it may produce exactly the
reverse of the intended effect. I hope the papers will attribute the
collapse to our exalted patriotism. At least, that is the only hope with
which one can console oneself.’
Lord Randolph wrote again:--
_Private and Confidential._
Carlton Club: April 28, 1885.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--I have been thinking of nothing else but the
events of last night in the House of Commons and, encouraged by
your kind note received this morning, I venture to inflict upon you
another letter.
The tone of the Metropolitan Press this morning is not unfavourable
to us; but the Metropolitan Press is most misleading. I see every
day the provincial Press, and I know well how in their London
correspondence and in their articles they will magnify the personal
triumph of Mr. Gladstone. He had been running down for some time,
but has now, _for the time_, completely recovered his old position
by the extraordinary and unprecedented _coup_ he carried off last
night. That _coup_ has done us, as a party, more real harm with the
constituencies than any event in this Parliament which I can
remember. This sort of thing did not matter in 1880; but we are now
within six months of a General Election, and any event which
greatly elevates the Liberals and depresses our own people has a
terrible effect. That triumph of last night will be repeated unless
very decided and energetic steps are taken now. The personal
ascendency of Mr. Gladstone is our great difficulty. If we can
destroy or mitigate that, we gain adherents. I know what the little
Fourth Party did in ‘80 and ‘81 and what support and sympathy they
acquired in the country on that account. That old Fourth Party has
disappeared; but the time has come when another body of the same
nature, but on much better and weightier lines, might be formed,
and might effect astonishing Parliamentary success.
I quite perceive that anything in the nature of open revolt against
Sir S. N. would be fatal in every way. At the same time _it is
madness_ to blind yourself to the fact that whatever abilities he
once possessed for guiding a party are utterly gone and that his
influence upon the vigour and vitality of the party now enervates
and enfeebles; and _that_ at a moment when the greatest possible
party life and vigour is a matter of life and death.
I have suggested to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach that he should remain
permanently in town for the remainder of the Session and should be
always in the House of Commons when it is sitting; and I have told
him that if he can pledge himself to this, I believe a certain
number of M.P.’s would pledge themselves to be always at his back.
I allude principally to the old Fourth Party, to Raikes and
Chaplin, to Dyke and Gibson, and to one or two more very talented
and ambitious young members of the party. The effect of the
constant attendance and skilful action of such a body night after
night upon the Government cannot be over-estimated. It might lead
them to throw up the sponge, either by one or more unexpected
defeats. But, in any case, it would keep our party in the country
alive and in good heart and should supply them with endless topics
for local controversy. It is absolutely essential that some member
of real position and influence upon the Front Bench should be at
the head of such a combination. The weakness of the old Fourth
Party was that they had no _point d’appui_; they were always a body
of skirmishers altogether _en l’air_. And yet House of Commons
history would be altogether misread if their disintegrating effect
upon the Liberal party was underestimated or ignored. To show you
what might have been done last night, I have ascertained from so
reliable a source as Lord R. Grosvenor that all the elements of the
Courtney faction and the Labouchere faction might have been let
loose last night, if only Sir S. N. had not weakly yielded to an
evanescent impression created by Gladstone’s gingerbread rhetoric,
and allowed the debate to collapse. I think under high persuasion
Sir M. Hicks-Beach would be prepared to make great sacrifices and
run some personal risks, and it is for that reason that I bring all
these matters to your notice. I may, without overmuch presumption,
claim some little authority on these party interests. My letters to
the _Times_ in 1882 and my article in the _Fortnightly_ clearly
foretold the ultimate effect of Sir S. N.’s leadership. They
brought much odium upon me at the time and may indeed have
embarrassed persons I wished not to embarrass, but my word has been
justified by events and by present public opinion.
I pray you not to allow yourself to imagine that either then or now
was I or am I actuated by much, or indeed any, personal ambition.
My only desire is to see the game properly and scientifically
played, and the Conservative party fairly strong in the next
Parliament; and I do not care a rap who carries off the laurels or
the credit. The plan I propose for efficient Parliamentary action
during the remainder of the Session may be skilfully carried out
without any formal communication to Sir S. N. But not only does it
depend upon Sir Michael being supported by a certain number of
M.P.’s; that body will have to be inspired by yourself and will
have to show that in their action they are receiving and deserving
your support and approval.
I am ashamed of myself for worrying you with this interminable MS.
It is only the critical condition of our party prospects which
enables me to do it.
Yours very sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
‘I concur very much,’ wrote Lord Salisbury in answer to this lengthy
appeal, ‘in your estimate of the evil; and your idea of surrounding the
Sultan with a body of Janissaries under Sir M. Beach is likely to be
very effective if vigorously carried out. I will gladly do anything I
can to help, but always with one reservation. I am bound to Sir S.
N.--as a colleague--by a tie, not of expediency, but of honour; and I
could not take part in anything which would be at variance with entire
loyalty to him. But what you propose will rather take the form of
assistance than supersession. I think that, properly managed, your
_jeune garde_ may do great things and acquire considerable practical
authority. I will talk the matter over with Beach whenever I can see
him. But he must abandon agriculture.’
The Conservative party had repented of their enthusiasm by May 4, when
the Committee stage of the vote of credit was again set down for
discussion. The decision to abandon the Soudan altogether and admit
defeat in that quarter of the world had soaked in. They now learned,
besides, that--vote of 11,000,000_l._ notwithstanding--Anglo-Russian
differences were to be submitted to arbitration--‘surrender disguised as
arbitration,’ as Lord Randolph Churchill called it. They were indignant
at what they considered a betrayal. But how to show their displeasure?
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach protested against the vote of credit being
proceeded with in the altered circumstances without further delay. Lord
Randolph, who had a speech all ready, intimated meekly that, unless the
vote of credit was forthwith debated, he would obstruct the passage of
Supply. The Government, anxious to get their business through, and
uncertain which section in the Opposition would prove the more
recalcitrant, proposed a compromise. Lord Randolph waved it aside and
remained obdurate. The vote of credit came on at once.
The speech which he then delivered was a speech of minute detail, but of
accurate detail. In twenty-four hours he had mastered an enormous Blue
Book. No one could contradict him at any point. ‘So far as I know,’ said
Lord Salisbury later, ‘that description [of Russian proceedings] is
historically unimpeachable.’ Into the entanglements of General
Komaroff’s action, of the strategic value of Merv, of the opinions of
Baron Jomini, or of the territorial rights of the Amir in the disputed
regions of the Murghab and Khushk rivers it is not, fortunately,
necessary to enter. But one episode in Lord Randolph’s second speech on
May 11 is worthy of record. The complacency with which the Government,
and particularly the Prime Minister, had abandoned, in the Soudan,
enterprises for the sake of which so many lives, British and Arab, had
been sacrificed, had excited general wonder and even disgust.
‘I was reading in the _Times_ this morning,’ said Lord Randolph,
dropping his voice and buttoning up his coat--‘does the Prime Minister
ever read the _Times_?’ Mr. Gladstone tossed his head disdainfully. ‘It
is a pity, because if the Prime Minister had read the _Times_ this
morning he could not have failed to notice the review of a very
interesting book--“The Home Letters of Lord Beaconsfield”--edited by Mr.
Ralph Disraeli, who is, I believe, a friend of the Prime Minister’s.’
(‘Nothing of the sort,’ said Mr. Gladstone.) ‘Lord Beaconsfield, it
appears, went many years ago to Yanina, where he had an interview with a
very celebrated Minister--Redschid Pasha. There had recently been a
great insurrection in Albania which had been put down by the Turks. This
is Lord Beaconsfield’s account of the interview: “I bowed with all the
nonchalance of St. James’s Street to a little, ferocious-looking,
shrivelled, careworn man, plainly dressed, with a brow covered with
wrinkles and a countenance clouded with anxiety and thought. I seated
myself on the divan of the Grand Vizier (‘who,’ the Austrian Consul
observed, ‘has destroyed in the course of the last three months--not in
war--upwards of four thousand of my acquaintance’) with the
self-possession of a morning call. Our conversation I need not repeat.
We congratulated him on the pacification of Albania. He rejoined that
the peace of the world was his only object and the happiness of mankind
his only wish.”’ Here there was a long pause, intensified by the hush
with which the House awaited the delayed conclusion. ‘There,’ cried
Lord Randolph, raising his voice suddenly, hissing his words and
pointing savagely across the House at Mr. Gladstone--‘there, upon the
Treasury Bench, is the resuscitated Redschid Pasha.’
I have tried to revive the spirit of this attack as some of those who
listened describe it, for _Hansard_ reduces it to a very bald account.
But, although Lord Randolph Churchill never commanded the surge and
majesty of Mr. Gladstone’s oratory, he held the House docile and
responsive in his grip. Whatever liberties he chose to take, they chose
to cheer. So through a speech of an hour and a half, all devoted to a
pitiless reproach of ‘that policy of base and cowardly surrender to
Russia which marks your daily life.’ Was it wonderful that party
newspapers and party men rallied to this bold champion of their
grievances? ‘Why was it left to Lord Randolph Churchill,’ they asked,
‘alone to raise a protest against Mr. Gladstone’s treacherous conduct?
Where were the occupants of the Front Opposition Bench? Have they
resigned their functions? If so, let them resign their position’; and so
forth. The next day Lord Granville took occasion to refer to this speech
at length in the House of Lords. He declared that he had marked no less
than nine passages, ‘some of them inaccurate and some exactly opposed to
the truth.’ Lord Randolph rejoined, through the columns of the _Times_,
in a celebrated--or perhaps I should write ‘notorious’--letter. He
accused Lord Granville, among other things, of showing ‘the petty
malice of a Whig’; ‘of his usual shamelessness’; and of ‘sneaking down
to the House of Lords to make without notice a variety of deliberate
misrepresentations, deliberate misquotations, and false assertions which
were quite in accordance with the little that was known about the public
career of Earl Granville, Knight of the Garter, and, to the misfortune
of his country, Her Majesty’s principal Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.’ The _Times_ was so horrified at this that, not content with
printing the letter in a column of its largest type, it devoted another
column and a half to repeating, for the purpose of dissociating itself
from, its insults, and rebuking the bad taste of the author.
But the fate of the Government was not to be settled by anything arising
out of the stormy events in the East. Another cause, nearer home and
more intimately affecting party politics, was to operate decisively. The
Crimes Act was to expire in August. Lord Spencer insisted upon its
renewal and his demand was backed by most of the Whig Ministers. The
Radical representatives, however, refused to associate themselves with
such legislation and moderate Liberals were scarcely less reluctant to
tar their hands with Coercion before presenting themselves to the
electors as the champions of liberty. On May 15 Mr. Gladstone gave
notice that the Government would propose what was, at any rate, a
partial continuation of the measure. Five days later Lord Randolph
Churchill, at the St. Stephen’s Club, struck what was, according to Mr.
Morley, a mortal blow. He intimated that a Conservative Government would
not think it necessary to renew the Act. His language was guarded and
carefully chosen. He had to carry his audience with him and he knew with
what satisfaction many of his colleagues in the House of Commons would
repudiate his words if they thought their repudiation would be
effective. He said, in short, that he was shocked that so grave an
announcement as the renewal of a Coercion Bill should be taken as a
matter of course. The state of Ireland must be much worse than was
commonly supposed for the Radical members of the Cabinet to assent to
such a proposal. What a comment it was on Liberal administration, and on
the boasted Viceroyalty of Lord Spencer, that the Liberal party could
not govern Ireland without that arbitrary force ‘which all their
greatest orators have over and over again declared is no remedy for
lawlessness!’ ‘I believe most firmly,’ he concluded, ‘that this ought to
be the attitude of the Tory party--that while they are ready and willing
to grant to any Government of the Queen whatever powers may be
necessary, on evidence adduced, for the preservation of law and order,
they ought to be anxious and careful beyond measure not to be committed
to any act or policy which should unnecessarily wound and injure the
feelings and the sentiments of our brothers on the other side of the
Channel of St. George.’ That was all, but it was enough. The speaker was
not disavowed. The Tory party remained mute. The words were observed
and weighed both by the Irish Nationalists and the English Radicals.
Within a few days Mr. Morley gave a notice of motion to oppose the
renewal of the Crimes Act. The Radical members of the Cabinet stiffened
their backs, and the days of the Ministry were numbered.
As the weakness and embarrassments of the Government and the dissensions
in the Cabinet became glaring, it was evident the end could not be
distant. But no one could tell when the moment would come; and the
imminent possibility of a transference of power forced grave
considerations into the minds of the chiefs of the Opposition. They
hated the Government. They believed its continuance to be deeply
injurious to the country. They were mortified by the dishonour which had
been inflicted on British arms and British reputation. The cry of their
supporters in the country for unceasing Parliamentary attack was
vehement. They were bound to fight their hardest. But, upon the other
hand, what if they succeeded? They could not dissolve, because of the
Reform Bill. Until the new registers for the reconstructed
constituencies had been prepared, and other indispensable mechanical
details settled, a General Election was physically impossible. Could
they, then, take office? Even if some Ministers were anxious to escape
from power, willing to ride for a fall--and this was certainly not the
disposition of the Prime Minister--the Government majority was enormous.
The only chance of overturning the Gladstone Administration was by a
division on some issue which should at once divide the Liberals and
secure the Irish vote. No mere lukewarmness on the part of
Ministerialists would suffice.
It was quite plain that an incoming Government, in a minority, without
the power of dissolution, brought into office by Nationalist votes,
could never carry a Coercion Bill through Parliament. But was a Coercion
Bill necessary? Mr. Gibson on whom the Conservatives relied as their
Irish authority, was of opinion that it would not be necessary. But
certainly Mr. Parnell could make it necessary! The question was long and
painfully debated. Clearly they had to fight. Not to do so was to
discourage the whole party on the eve of the election. Clearly they
might win. To refuse then to undertake the task, to admit that the
Conservative party had neither the men nor the cohesion to carry on the
Government, would equally injure them in the national estimation. It was
a grim dilemma. But the decision did not lie altogether in the hands of
particular men. Had it been possible for any one man to give orders
which would be obeyed with military discipline, he could not have
failed, were he a Conservative, to decide against any attempt to turn
out the Government; and, conversely, a Minister must have sought for any
decent pretext to resign. But the forces at work were not to be so
nicely governed. It is in the nature of Ministries to survive in spite
of their inclinations. It is in the nature of Oppositions to strive to
win, even in spite of their interests. Borne along by the stream, the
Conservative leaders determined to overthrow the Government if they
could, and they solaced themselves with Mr. Gibson’s assurances that the
state of Ireland did not require the renewal of the Crimes Act to
protect the lives and liberties of Her Majesty’s lieges.
Lord Randolph Churchill made a regular practice of preserving every
letter he received. He made notes of many important interviews. Nothing
that related to politics, whether creditable or not, whether important
or petty, seems to have been excluded from his archives. Had any
agreement been made with Mr. Parnell sufficiently definite or formal to
be called a ‘compact,’ it is most unlikely that no written record would
have been preserved. No scrap of paper referring directly or indirectly
to this subject can, however, be traced. On the other hand, it is
certain that he had more than one conversation with the Irish leader;
that he stated to him his opinion of what a Conservative Government
would do should it be formed; and that he declared that he considered
himself precluded by public utterances from joining a Government which
would at once renew the Crimes Act. No bargain could, in the nature of
things, have been made. The chances of Lord Randolph joining a
Conservative Administration were undetermined. The Conservative party
would certainly not have ratified such a bargain. Lord Randolph
Churchill could not presume to speak in their name; and even if their
official leaders had bound themselves, their action might well have been
repudiated by important sections of their followers both in Parliament
and in the country. ‘There was no compact or bargain of any kind,’ Lord
Randolph said to FitzGibbon a year later, ‘but I told Parnell when he
sat on that sofa [in Connaught Place] that if the Tories took office and
I was a member of their Government, I would not consent to renew the
Crimes Act. Parnell replied, “In that case, you will have the Irish vote
at the Elections.”’
So far as the vote in the House was concerned, the Nationalists wanted
little temptation to turn out a Coercionist Liberal Administration. They
had long been looking for an opportunity of revenge. They shared the
general expectation that the lowering of the franchise would give a
great advantage to the Liberal party. Their interest was clearly, and
their intention was notoriously, to play for an equalisation in party
strength by supporting the weaker side at the dissolution. If the
Conservatives would give them any reasonable excuse for preferring them
to the Liberal Government, if they would avoid studied causes of
offence, the Irish party would be content to support them in the House
and to throw their vote--so far as it could be thrown--for the
Conservative candidates in the election. On some such tacit
understanding as this Lord Salisbury’s first Administration came into
power and held sway. Neither party gave away any point of practical
importance, or entered into any confidential relationship. Both Tories
and Nationalists pursued their own ends. They used each other for their
own purposes; and in the end the Conservatives came off the winners.
All suggestions of a more definite compact belong to the regions of
romance.
Within the space of a single year both great English parties were
supported by the votes of the Irish members and were to some extent
dependent on their good-will. But there was an important difference
between the relations which respectively existed. The Conservatives,
consciously or unconsciously, used the Irish party. The Liberals,
willingly or unwillingly, were used by them. And whereas the former
moved on through that association to prosperous years of power, the
latter sank into paralysis and decay. But it should not be inferred from
these unedifying reflections that Lord Randolph Churchill in his
declarations against the re-enactment of the Crimes Act in 1885 was
animated solely by a hard desire to effect a political combination. His
views on Irish men and Irish matters were very different in character
from the general opinion of his party. He knew Ireland well and liked
her people. He had been in former days the friend of Mr. Butt. For five
years of hard Parliamentary fighting he and his associates had sat in
front of the Irish Nationalists, and many a reciprocal service or
manœuvre had built up a House of Commons comradeship. ‘You can always
trust them,’ he used to say, ‘if you know them and understand them.’ In
office or Opposition, in good fortune or defeat, he detested the use of
special legislation in Ireland; and, although he remained an unwavering
opponent of Repeal, these pages will show that he at least did not
approach Irish questions in a spirit of selfish opportunism.
Lord Randolph’s votes and speeches during all the Coercion struggles of
the Parliament were, moreover, upon record. The Irish members, on their
part, knew that he had often supported them, to the detriment of his
reputation among his own friends, while the most brilliant
representatives of the Liberal Cabinet were scourging them without pity.
They remembered that he had always been civil and friendly to them in
days when scarcely any other English member would speak to them. They
were attracted by his stormy, rebellious nature. They delighted in his
attacks upon the Government. Parnell, we are told, liked him personally,
though their acquaintance was scanty. Among prominent English
politicians, he was at that time the best friend, and the only friend,
Nationalist Ireland could find. Any Government in which he was powerful
must be better than the Ministry from which Irish members had received
so much ill-usage. It was upon the opinion they had formed of him during
several years as a man, and upon their estimate of his influence with
his party, and not on any compact or bargain, that they acted in 1885.
In some fashion or another, however, Cabinet and Administration had held
together till the Whitsuntide holidays. The third period of the session
is dangerous to Governments. Most of the measures of the year, and
usually the Budget, are in the Committee stage and liable at any moment
to be challenged by a vote. At the same time, when vigilance is most
needed, a feeling of languor or exhaustion steals over the House of
Commons. With the advent of hot weather weary members seek escape from
London. Divisions are frequent; majorities precarious; an accident
always possible. Rumours had, however, gained acceptance that Cabinet
differences on Irish policy were not incapable of adjustment, and many
Liberal members thought that for the session at least the danger of
defeat was passed. But meanwhile a third and, as it proved, a fatal blow
had been aimed against the Ministry. An amendment to the Budget had been
framed at a meeting in Mr. Balfour’s house in Carlton Gardens, at which
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Fourth Party, and Mr. Raikes alone were
present. It was approved by Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote
and placed upon the paper in the name of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach. To a
casual observer the amendment might have appeared unimportant. It
condemned the proposed increase of the beer and spirit duties in the
absence of a corresponding increase in the duties upon wine, and
declined to add to the duty on real property without relief to the
rates. But it was, in fact, artfully and deliberately contrived to unite
the Opposition on an issue easily defensible in the country and likely
to secure support from the Irish and from the liquor interest in the
House. It acquired significance from a rumour that the Radical section
of the Cabinet had severely criticised Mr. Childers’s increase of the
beer duties and wished to substitute therefor an additional duty on
spirits.
The debate was not remarkable and until late in the evening neither in
the House nor outside it was there any expectation of the actual result.
But after the dinner-hour a feeling of apprehension seemed to pervade
the air. When the division was about to be taken, the ranks of the
Ministerialists were unusually thin. Suddenly it was realised that the
result must be narrow. A thrill of excitement swept through the House.
The doors were closed, and the counting proceeded. When the tellers
advanced to the table it was seen that Lord Richard Grosvenor, the
Government Whip, stood at the left instead of at the right of the line.
For a moment the significance was not appreciated; then the Opposition
burst into exultant cheering, renewed again and again. Four Liberals and
42 Irishmen had voted against Ministers: 74 Liberals were absent, mostly
unpaired: the Government was defeated by 12.
It had come, after all. The mighty Government which had towered up
august and formidable in 1880, which during five long years, in spite of
disastrous enterprise and so many evil turns of fortune, had presented
an unbroken front to all attacks, was overthrown at last. So often had
good and careful plans miscarried; so often had skill, patience, and
courage led only to disappointment that, although a dark curtain of
perplexity obscured the future, this at least was triumph now. Lord
Randolph had seen the shot strike home. The aim was shrewd and sure. His
famous antagonist was down at last and he did not care, or was not able,
to contain his joy. He jumped on his seat below the gangway and, waving
his handkerchief, led the cheers of the astonished and delighted
Conservative party. Well might they have cheered if they had only known
that events would follow from that June division which should lead in
direct and unbroken sequence to their long supremacy in the State; and,
having regard to the repression and firmness which the next few days
would require of Lord Randolph Churchill, his jubilation may be
pardoned.
A threefold crisis now supervened: first, the national emergency,
arising from grave affairs in Egypt and with Russia, and the political
fermentation at home and in Ireland; secondly, a constitutional
situation peculiar and unprecedented in character; and thirdly, the
struggle within the Conservative party. All these operated
simultaneously and sympathetically affected each other. The Liberal
Administration was defeated on June 8. On the 9th Mr. Gladstone tendered
his resignation to the Queen. The Queen expressed surprise that he
should make his defeat a vital question and inquired whether, if Lord
Salisbury were unwilling to form a Government, the Cabinet would remain.
Mr. Gladstone replied that they would not remain. The Queen thereupon
accepted the resignations, which were announced to Parliament on the
12th, and sent for Lord Salisbury. Anticipating, or having private
notice of, the formal summons, Lord Salisbury had already approached
Lord Randolph Churchill through Sir Michael Hicks-Beach:--
June 10, 1885.
My dear Lord Randolph,--Lord Salisbury has asked me to tell you
that he would be very glad to talk to you on the general position,
if you would call on him: and I very much hope that no such ideas
as those which you seemed to entertain this afternoon will prevent
you from doing so.
I feel convinced (though I am not authorised to give you more than
my own belief) that he has asked no one to call on him, and that
his reason for not doing so is that he thinks that to do so would
be to usurp the position of leader, which no one has as yet
conferred on him.
It would be simply ridiculous that this idea on his part, combined
with your idea as to ‘place-hunting,’ should keep you two apart
just now.
Yours sincerely,
MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH.
And the next day, on the eve of his departure to Balmoral, Lord
Salisbury himself wrote:--
_Confidential._
20 Arlington Street, S.W.: Thursday, June 11, 4.45.
My dear Churchill,--I have just received a communication which
makes me anxious to see you. Could you call on me to-night after
dinner, or to-morrow morning?
Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
Lord Randolph thought it better to defer his visit until after Lord
Salisbury had seen the Queen. His opinion had already been given as to
the conditions under which it would be desirable for the Conservatives
to take office, and was involved in the decision to try to turn out the
Liberal Government by means of the Irish vote on the Beach Amendment. He
had nothing new to say about that. If Lord Salisbury should decide not
to undertake the commission, there would be no necessity to raise the
thorny and painful questions connected with Sir Stafford Northcote.
In ordinary circumstances Lord Salisbury’s course would have been
simple. He would have advised a dissolution of Parliament. This solution
was, however, impossible until November, owing to the Franchise and
Seats Acts. Therefore his legal and constitutional right of recommending
a dissolution was in abeyance; and, upon the other hand, the party of
which he was the head would be compelled, if he took office, to carry
the Budget, Supply, and other indispensable business of the year through
a House of Commons in which they were in a minority of nearly 100. Lord
Salisbury was so impressed by the difficulty of the situation that he
went to Balmoral with the intention of declining to form a Government.
At Balmoral, however, the Queen persuaded him to make the attempt if Mr.
Gladstone would not resume; and several attempts to induce Mr. Gladstone
to resume having failed, Lord Salisbury accepted the duty and returned
to London to discharge it. His first care was to seek from Mr. Gladstone
an assurance of support in the measures absolutely necessary to bring
the session to a close. The negotiations were protracted for many days;
but eventually Mr. Gladstone agreed that facilities for expediting
Supply might reasonably be provided, so long as the liberties of the
House of Commons were not placed in abeyance; and he added the
assurance that there was no idea on the part of the Opposition of
withholding the Ways and Means required for the public service. During
this discussion Lord Salisbury addressed himself to the formation of a
Government. He forthwith invited Sir Stafford Northcote to become
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons; and Sir
Stafford Northcote agreed. He asked Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to be
Colonial Secretary; and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach agreed. Lord Salisbury
then applied to Lord Randolph Churchill, whom he desired to take the
India Office. But Lord Randolph refused to join the Government if Sir
Stafford Northcote continued to lead in the House of Commons.
From this position nothing could move him. He remained silent and
stubborn. While Lord Salisbury was still undecided whether to go on
without him or not, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach intervened. He was, in his
own words, ‘deeply impressed with the conviction that Lord Randolph
Churchill’s active assistance as a member of the Government was vital to
any hope of Conservative success at the General Election, for his
popularity with the new electorate was greater than that of any other
member of the party’;[29] and therefore, as soon as he learned that Lord
Randolph had refused to join, he told Lord Salisbury--though without
Lord Randolph’s knowledge, and entirely without pre-arrangement of any
kind--that in the altered circumstances he could not join either. The
dead-lock was again complete.
The narrative must here be somewhat interrupted, so far at least as
chronology is concerned, to admit Lord Randolph Churchill’s own account
of his action. He left behind him a considerable memorandum from which I
quote all that is relevant to this situation.
‘In the events,’ he wrote (as I should judge, early in 1889, though the
paper is undated), ‘which led to the formation of the Conservative
Government in June 1885, I bore a part, and am induced to record my
recollection of their nature; for one reason among others, that in my
belief they were the main cause which led to the adoption by Mr.
Gladstone of the policy of Repeal.
‘In the spring of 1885 it was a matter of notoriety among well-informed
and studious politicians that the question as to the expediency of the
renewal by the Government then in power of the Irish Crimes Act--which
was to expire in September[30]--was one on which the Cabinet could come
to no agreement. In the speeches which I made in the month of May at the
St. Stephen’s Club and at Bow I endeavoured by diffuse examination of
the question to do what I could to add to the difficulties which in
connection with this subject embarrassed the Ministry.
‘My remarks at the former place were followed by a decisive intimation
from Mr. J. Morley that he would oppose any measure for the renewal of
any portion of the Crimes Act. This intimation practically terminated
the duration of Mr. Gladstone’s Government. Agreement in the Cabinet on
this question became impossible. The Ministers determined to court
defeat in Parliament as a method of escape from the dilemma by
resignation. A General Election was impending and the Opposition eagerly
clutched at any opportunity of discrediting and defeating the Liberal
party, and with this eagerness I was in thorough accord. Two attempts to
place Ministers in a minority failed--one arising out of the events in
the Soudan, the other out of a dispute concerning election expenses and
local rates. A third attempt, against the Budget, met with unexpected
success. The hostility of the licensed victuallers, who considered
themselves aggrieved by Mr. Childers’s financial proposals, and the
almost admitted connivance of Lord Richard Grosvenor, then the Head Whip
of the Liberal party, secured the absence from the division of some
sixty or more members of the Ministerial forces. The Government was
placed in a minority and resigned.
‘The Opposition now found themselves in a position of immense
difficulty, and though the difficulty had been foreseen by the leaders
it was not on that account in any degree diminished.
‘The difficulty was twofold: personal and political.
‘1. For a long time there had been a division of opinion in the
Conservative party on the question of the leadership--on the question as
to whether Lord Salisbury or Sir Stafford Northcote ought to be the
head of any Conservative Administration which events might bring into
existence. While, on the one hand, there was a unanimous recognition by
the party of the sterling worth and high character of the latter, there
was, on the other, an equally unanimous but certainly not equally
expressed opinion that he was indisposed by nature and training to place
himself in entire harmony with the intense and acute party polemics of
the moment; that he was, as he once admitted in a public speech,
“deficient in go”; and that Lord Salisbury, though he was much less
personally known to members of the House of Commons and much less
popular than Sir Stafford, was more qualified for the conduct of a
pitched battle such as we had to face.
‘I had identified myself with this latter opinion, and had expressed it
publicly and privately in one way and another since the year 1883. In
that year I had committed myself to such an extent that my action was
much resented by the party in the House of Commons, who adopted and
presented to Sir Stafford an address expressing their full confidence in
and great admiration of him. My belief is that in this controversy, the
existence of which was notorious, the principals had no share; that Sir
Stafford and Lord Salisbury behaved with the utmost loyalty to each
other, and remained throughout on the most intimate and friendly terms.
‘In June 1885, the crucial moment came. Mr. Gladstone resigned. “Whom
would the Queen send for?” was a question in everyone’s mouth. Lord
Salisbury was sent for. His intention was, if he formed a Government,
that Sir Stafford should become Leader of the House of Commons. To this
proposition, when proper opportunity offered, I declined to agree,
adhering to my former opinions as to the indisposition of Sir Stafford
for acute party warfare. Whether I was right or wrong I do not argue;
public opinion in the party and outside was certainly not with me, and
soon after, and since, I have been strongly drawn to the conclusion that
I was in error. The fact remains for record: I declined to take office
unless there was a change in the leadership of the party in the House of
Commons.
‘My conviction is that Lord Salisbury was most reluctant to attempt to
form a Government. It was most distasteful to him to be brought into any
conflict with Sir Stafford, to be preferred above him--thus shattering
what had been Sir Stafford’s great and honourable ambition. Finally,
when it was demanded of him that he should put a slight upon Sir
Stafford, and depose him from the leadership of the party in the House
of Commons, Lord Salisbury almost determined to renounce the duty
imposed upon him by the Sovereign. For days the matter was in suspense.
Conversations, suggested arrangements, even intrigues were rife in the
Carlton and in the Lobby. I have only a general and second-hand
knowledge of what then went on. I kept entirely aloof, saw hardly
anyone, and took no part in the controversy beyond what I had originally
taken. Ultimately representations were made to Sir Stafford--how and by
whom I do not know--which induced him to consent to accept the sinecure
office of First Lord of the Treasury and a peerage with the title of
Earl of Iddesleigh and Viscount St. Cyres. All I do know is that in
these _pourparlers_ Lord Ashbourne (then Mr. Gibson) was very busy and
prominent and that he constantly and to many expressed his astonishment
and displeasure that the susceptibilities or predilections attributed to
Sir Stafford should form any obstacle to the formation of a Conservative
Government. At that time Mr. Gibson exercised considerable influence
with the Conservative party in the House of Commons.’
Lord Randolph seems to have overrated the importance of the part played
in these negotiations by Mr. Gibson, though there is reason to believe
that his influence was, so far as it was effective, exerted--and
properly exerted--in the direction described. It is probable that Mr.
Smith was the principal agent. Like other colleagues who sat beside him
on the Bench, he knew, perhaps better than Sir Stafford Northcote’s
family, how often the progress of heart disease incapacitated the Leader
of the Opposition from Parliamentary work, and sometimes even reduced
him to a lethargic condition. Mr. Smith had recently taken Sir Stafford
for a long cruise in his yacht, the _Pandora_, and had the best reasons
for judging his true condition, as well as the best right to make
representations to him about it. But to return to Lord Randolph.
‘The second part of the difficulty,’ proceeds the memorandum, ‘which
confronted Lord Salisbury was political and arose entirely out of the
question whether it was or was not essential and necessary to seek from
Parliament a renewal of the expiring Irish Crimes Act. This question had
been more than once discussed in small conciliabules before the fall of
Mr. Gladstone’s Government, and a sort of decision arrived at. I alluded
publicly to the subject in a speech I made at Sheffield in the following
September. But the former semi-decision did not help Lord Salisbury much
when the actual crisis came. The whole question was again gone over with
great care. Mr. Gibson in this difficulty was the real arbiter. He was
the principal, and indeed the only, adviser to whom Lord Salisbury and
his friends could have recourse for Irish information. In all the
recurring debates on the state of Ireland and on the Irish land
legislation which had marked the preceding sessions since 1880 he had
been the real leader, and with him naturally it rested now to decide
practically this grave and difficult question. I use the adjective
“grave” because I believe that the decision not to attempt to renew the
Crimes Act, more than any other event, finally determined Mr. Gladstone
no longer to resist Repeal, and by some process or calculation not open
to ordinary persons led Mr. Gladstone to the conclusion that there was a
real working alliance arrived at between the Tories and the party of Mr.
Parnell, the legitimate results of which would be proposals by the Tory
Government in the nature of very large concessions to the Irish in the
direction of Repeal.
‘My own part in the matter was to express no opinion beyond what was
contained in the following formula, from which I never departed, and
which was accepted by Lord Salisbury and his friends: If it is decided
that the state of Ireland is such as to require the further continuance
of the Crimes Act, then the Conservative party cannot accept office, as
the period of the session and the Parliamentary weakness of the party
preclude the possibility of their passing through the House of Commons
the necessary measure. If a contrary decision is arrived at--viz. that
the Act may be allowed to expire--then the Conservative party might
succeed the Liberal Government with safety and advantage. It was well
known that personally I would not have taken office had it been thought
necessary by a Conservative Government to attempt to renew the Crimes
Act.
‘Such was the nature of the difficulty which Lord Salisbury had to
solve. I repeat my impression that he was most reluctant to form a
Government. The personal difficulties alluded to above deterred him, and
the recollections of Lord Derby’s Ministries of 1852, 1858, and 1866
were heavily against an attempt to carry on the business of the country
without the support of a majority in the House of Commons. The pressure,
however, from the local organisations in the country was strong to cause
him to undertake the unattractive duty, and the prevalent feeling of
the party in Parliament was in accord with this pressure.
‘For the decision he ultimately arrived at I can claim little
responsibility and in it I had little or no share. I had no
prepossession one way or the other, unless it was that the precedent set
by Mr. Disraeli in 1873 under similar circumstances, and the apparent
results of Mr. Disraeli’s action, were very vividly before my mind. I
would have consented with equal cheerfulness to one decision or the
other; nor do I believe that either decision would have affected
numerically the results of the General Election which took place in
November.
‘Looking back on those events after January 1886, and after the
resolution arrived at by Mr. Gladstone to introduce a measure for the
Repeal of the Union, I came to the conclusion that in June 1885, we had
been most unfortunately inspired. I can trace a clear connection of
cause and effect between Lord Salisbury’s accession to office in 1885
and Mr. Gladstone’s new departure in 1886.’
For five days uncertainty and rumour were supreme. Lord Randolph
maintained an unbroken reserve. Good friends who had knowledge of what
was going forward pressed him hard. Those who cared about his career
thought he was ruining himself. Even Sir Henry James, a political
opponent, but a personal friend, was provoked to address him.
The letter is interesting for its frank recognition that ‘Tory
Democracy’ was a faith of its own.
_Sir Henry James to Lord Randolph Churchill._
Temple: Saturday Morning.
My dear Friend,--I am so afraid that you are about to make a grave
mistake, most injurious to your interests, that I _must_ intrude my
thoughts upon your breakfast.
I assume Salisbury ‘accepts the commission’; of course he will
offer you office. If there be any definite measure--say the Crimes
Act--which he insists upon and you object to, you will be quite
justified in refusing office. For you will have a justification
which you can make public, and everyone will give you credit for
having acted according to your principles and conscience. But if
your reasons are indefinite--say, for instance, because you cannot
obtain a declaration in favour of a Liberal Toryism--you will have
no explanation to give which the public will ever be able to
understand. Between this and November no policy can be carried into
effect by legislation, and so it is scarcely possible that any
difference existing between the Salisbury Tories and yourself could
be brought to a practical issue. And so, if you now refuse office
on theoretical grounds which you can never explain, you will obtain
the credit amongst the whole Tory party of having plotted against
Salisbury and of having prevented him and them from coming into
office. It will be time enough for you to fight the battle of Tory
Democracy when some action (by way of legislation or
administration) is taken adverse to the principles you hold.
Surely you ought to be catholic _now_, and let all shades of
Toryism enjoy a gleam of success. If you do not, you will much
endanger the cause of ‘Tory Democracy’; for although you can at any
time be the leader of a Democracy, your power with the Tory element
will be sadly shaken.
Ever yours,
H. J.
Men who presume to deal with great affairs must cultivate an unyielding
disposition. It is easy to withstand the reproaches or attacks of
opponents; but the honest advice of a friend and well-wisher at once
disinterested and experienced saps the foundations of judgment. There
was one appeal which must have greatly disturbed Lord Randolph. Nothing
in his private life was more striking and constant than his affection
for his mother and his respect for her opinion. ‘I have been thinking,’
she wrote (June 14), ‘very quietly and calmly over your position, and I
think you might go to see Lord Salisbury before his meeting, to show him
your friendly feeling while you maintain your own position. You see, in
the winter you felt acutely he did not consult or notice you. He may say
on this critical occasion he came to you before anyone else and offered
you one of the highest places in his Cabinet, and you refused your
assistance. Yesterday he sends his secretary to bid you to go to his
meeting. This, from reasons, you are obliged to decline. But do you not
think you owe him some explanation?... He told you to consider his
offer; so that, it seems to me, you are almost in duty bound to go to
see him; and if you simply refrain from going, he will think you
decidedly hostile. There is no doubt he is in a very difficult position,
and may say you require _not_ any policy or special measure, but simply
that he should _kill_ an old friend whom _all_ respect.... I do hope you
may be guided rightly.’
But Lord Randolph Churchill remained unresponsive. No communication of
any kind passed between him and Lord Salisbury until the crisis was
ended.
‘At this time,’ writes a Bencher of the Middle Temple, ‘an event
occurred which strangely evidenced the strength of Lord Randolph’s
popularity. But a description of the scene needs some explanation.
Amongst the Inns of Court the Middle Temple is fortunate in the
possession of a Hall grand in its construction and rich in evidence of
associations extending over seven centuries. In this Hall, during Term
time, the barristers and students dine. From amongst the barristers a
governing body, called the Benchers, is selected. On the Grand Day of
the summer Term the Benchers entertain distinguished guests at a
sumptuous banquet held in the Hall. On these occasions Benchers and
guests enter the Hall walking two and two, in procession, to the Daïs,
upon which they dine. After the dinner is concluded, in like procession
they leave the Hall, walking throughout its full length from the Bar to
the door which leads to the Parliament Chamber.
‘A Grand Day of the Middle Temple occurred on June 10, 1885. Never
before or since has so remarkable a company gathered within that Hall.
‘Nearly every Bencher was present, for fifty-five were there. Amongst
them were the Prince of Wales and his eldest son, Prince Albert Victor,
who on that day was called to the Bench. But many distinguished visitors
were also present, for amongst the guests were the Archbishop of
Canterbury, Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, Lord Derby, Lord Cranbrook,
Sir Stafford Northcote, Mr. John Bright and other leading politicians;
and yet it seemed as if there was only one of whom the gathering was
thinking--and he was Randolph Churchill. The first sign of the great
interest was shown when the loving-cup was being handed round; for when
it was placed in Lord Randolph’s hands and he stood up to drink from it,
the whole assemblage in the body of the Hall sprang to their feet and
cheered him vociferously. No such demonstration had ever occurred in the
Middle Temple Hall. And, again, when the dinner was concluded and the
Benchers and their guests, walking two and two, proceeded to leave the
Hall, a still more marked demonstration took place. The Royal Princes
passed almost unheeded, whilst the Hall rang with shouts of “Randolph!”
“Randolph!” “Churchill!” “Churchill!” No other name was uttered. It
seemed as if all present wished to show that they regarded him--and him
alone--as being the political victor of the hour.’
Yet, in contrast with these signs of triumph, what inward misgivings
darkened Lord Randolph Churchill’s mind! In the presence of a trusted
friend he dropped with relief his mask of unconcerned reserve and
revealed himself plunged for a while in one of those fits of despondency
which so often followed or preceded the crisis and action of his life.
‘I am very near the end of my tether,’ he said to this friend who met
him at the Turf Club in these anxious days. ‘In the last five years I
have lived twenty. I have fought Society. I have fought Mr. Gladstone
at the head of a great majority. I have fought the Front Opposition
Bench. Now I am fighting Lord Salisbury. I have said I will not join the
Government unless Northcote leaves the House of Commons. Lord Salisbury
will never give way. I’m done.’ To the remark that Lord Salisbury could
not form a Ministry without him he answered drily, ‘He can form a
Ministry if necessary with waiters from the Carlton Club.’ His companion
on this proceeded amiably to suggest that if all was really over with
the Conservative party, Liberalism offered a wide field for the
activities of a Tory Democrat. ‘Ah, no!’ said Lord Randolph in utter
pessimism, ‘Chamberlain and the Birmingham Caucus will swallow you all.
It is they who will govern the people of England for the future.’ ‘The
working classes must have leaders.’ ‘Yes, but they will not want
aristocrats.’
The whole country was agog about the political interregnum and busy in
the fascinating employment of Cabinet-making. Two main opinions were
focussed by the newspapers--one was for a Cabinet of ‘old and tried
public servants,’ to maintain an orderly and decorous Government during
the few months that must elapse before the election; the other for a
‘Cabinet of Compromise,’ which should include the Tory Democrats and
secure their powerful aid in the coming fight. But meanwhile the
business of the House of Commons was not wholly interrupted and a
curious Parliamentary incident occurred. On the evening of the 15th Mr.
Gladstone proposed to consider, before adjourning, the Lords’
amendments to the Seats Bill. He moved accordingly; but on the question
being put Sir Henry Wolff at once moved the adjournment of the debate.
He pointed out that the Lords’ amendments were matters of substance and
importance--as, indeed, they were--and ought not to have been inserted
by them into the Redistribution Bill. He declared that such matters
could not be decided upon in the absence of a responsible Government or
a responsible Opposition. Sir Charles Dilke replied on behalf of the
Government that the insertion of these amendments in the Redistribution
Bill had the approval of Lord Salisbury himself, and was, in fact,
adopted to avoid inconvenient delay. Sir Stafford Northcote thought it
right to confirm the statement that it had been agreed that the matter
should be dealt with in the Redistribution Bill instead of by a separate
Bill. But the Fourth Party were not inclined to change their minds on
that account. Mr. Gorst argued against haste without good reason for
haste. Lord Randolph also spoke sharply in favour of the adjournment.
What were the leaders of the so-called constitutional party about that
they should tolerate the transaction of important business connected
with reform under prevailing conditions? He also accused the Government
bluntly of having produced the difficulty by procuring defeat.
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach then got up from the Front Opposition Bench and,
to the astonishment of his colleagues on the Treasury Bench, spoke in
favour of the adjournment and against his leader. In the division the
Conservative party split into puzzled fragments, and persons who thought
they might be Under-Secretaries--and in such circumstances they are a
respectable body--suffered acutely. Thirty-five members voted with Sir
Michael and Lord Randolph for the adjournment. Sir Henry Wolff and Mr.
Gorst were their tellers. The rest, with Sir Stafford Northcote at their
head, went into the Government lobby to support Mr. Gladstone. Sir Henry
Wolff’s colleague in the representation of Portsmouth was a venerable
member of the orthodox Conservative party. As he passed the Front
Opposition Bench on his way to vote with Lord Randolph Churchill, Sir
Stafford Northcote said reproachfully: ‘These are the times when one can
tell one’s friends.’ ‘At such a crisis,’ replied the old gentleman
ruefully, ‘and with such an election before us, the representation of
Portsmouth must be undivided.’
This was the end. Two days later it was formally announced that Sir
Stafford Northcote would retire to the House of Lords and that Sir
Michael Hicks-Beach would lead the House of Commons. It has been
asserted that this division settled the struggle and that Lord
Salisbury, confronted with this plain proof that Sir Stafford
Northcote’s leadership would not be accepted by a powerful and active
section of his party, capitulated to Lord Randolph Churchill. This is
not quite true. No doubt the division clinched the issues; but the
personal negotiations which resulted in Sir Stafford’s elevation were
already far advanced; and he himself notes in his diary of June 15:
‘This has apparently been my last night in the House of Commons.’
Indeed, there seems to have been less design in the affair than is
commonly supposed. Few people--even among the most intelligent and
informed--will believe how much in modern English politics is settled by
the accident or caprice of the hour. Lord Randolph Churchill had often
voted and spoken against the leader of the Opposition before. He thought
the acquiescence in Mr. Gladstone’s wishes on this occasion stupid, and
he said so. He thought the House should adjourn without transacting
business and he voted in that sense. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach was party
to no plot. He did not enter the House until late and had not heard Sir
Stafford’s speech. He gathered from the debate that the Fourth Party and
the ‘Janissaries’ were attacking the Government and he supported them on
general principles. Not until he sat down did he learn what he had done.
Moreover, before the division had taken place Lord Salisbury’s hopes of
a settlement were already so good that he had sent the following letter
to Lord Randolph Churchill:--
_Private._
20 Arlington Street, S.W.: June 15, 1885.
My dear Churchill,--I was very sorry you were not able to come to
our meeting this morning. The general sense of those present, with
one or two exceptions, was that we could not well refuse to take
office, after all that has happened this year, if the Government
have finally determined not to resume it. Still I think everyone
present recognised that in a party sense this obligation was a
misfortune.
Though I fear I must draw an unfavourable inference from your
absence, I still venture to express a hope that you will allow me
to put down your name for the Indian Secretaryship on the list
which I must submit to the Queen on Wednesday.
I should be very glad to talk these matters over if you like to
come and see me. I shall be in all the morning.
Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
Lord Randolph replied as if nothing had happened:--
2 Connaught Place: June 16, 1885.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--I am deeply sensible of the extreme kindness
towards myself which you show me by your letter received this
morning, and if not inconvenient to you I will do myself the honour
of waiting upon you about eleven o’clock to-day.
Believe me to be
Yours most sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
That the interview was friendly and in the main satisfactory may be
inferred from the following letter written later in the day, which
shows, among other things, that in the hour of victory Lord Randolph
Churchill was not inclined to desert those who had worked with him:--
2 Connaught Place: June 16, 1885.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--I do hope you will not be annoyed if I add to
your many difficulties by these few lines. Of course, since I saw
you this morning I have thought about little else than all that you
were kind enough to say to me on many subjects. I do feel very
uneasy indeed about Wolff and Gorst, and I cannot think that I have
submitted to you their position as regards myself with the urgency
which they are entitled to expect from me. If it were possible for
you to consider whether it might not be in your power to recommend
Wolff for the high dignity of a Privy Councillor I should be easy
in my mind about him, and I venture to press this desire of mine
upon you.
Gorst ... knows his powers, his position in the House, his hitherto
barely recognised claims, and it makes me perfectly wretched to
feel that it must occur to his mind that his failure to obtain that
for which so many persons of knowledge consider he is fitted in
every way is due to lukewarmness on my part. If I did not know what
the general feeling of the House of Commons will be as regards
myself on this point, I would have hesitated to trouble you; but I
am certain that if with respect to these two cases things remain in
the position you gave me to understand this morning they would be,
I shall be considered to have failed my friends, and my powers,
whatever they may be, of being useful to your Government will be
impaired.
Yours most sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
Lord Salisbury, thus appealed to, consented to submit Mr. Gorst’s name
to the Queen for the office of Solicitor-General and Sir Henry Wolff’s
for a Privy Councillorship. When the lavish hand with which high
appointments were distributed among persons who had borne no share in
the battle is remembered, it cannot be said that these rewards were
disproportioned to services or talent.
The difficulties within the Conservative party were now settled; but the
delays in the formation of the Government and consequent uncertainty
were prolonged in order to extract from Mr. Gladstone further
assurances in regard to the passage of necessary public business while
the Government were in a minority in the House of Commons; and meanwhile
Lord Salisbury retreated to Hatfield. Of the interviews and negotiations
incidental upon this, a complete account was afterwards given to
Parliament; and on June 23 the acceptance of office by Lord Salisbury
and the composition of the Ministry, the main features of which had
become generally known, were formally announced, and the constitutional
and party crisis came to an end.
‘What a triumph!’ wrote Mr. Chamberlain on June 18, when the issue
became apparent. ‘You have won all along the line. _Moriturus te
saluto_.’ And with this an important chapter in Lord Randolph
Churchill’s life may be conveniently closed.