Now let us advance a generation or so and question our frien

Transcriber’s Note

Italic text displayed as: _italic_

MY DEAR CORNELIA

_My dear Cornelia_

BY

STUART P. SHERMAN

[Illustration: Decoration]

THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS

BOSTON

COPYRIGHT 1924 BY STUART P. SHERMAN

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_My dear Cornelia:_

_You and I have discovered many little differences of opinion; but

we have always had so much in common, so many tastes and quite

elementary convictions, that, years and years ago, I tried to

persuade you that we ought to take a stand together. On that point we

failed to reach an agreement; and which of us was right is a question

that you have never since been willing to debate with me._

_There is another point, however, which I have long desired to

discuss with you: that is our common liking for dedicated things. I

wish to dedicate this little book to you—my share in it. The task

embarrasses me; for, wherever in these pages I find anything that

seems to me blithe or charming or wise, instantly I recognize that

it is not mine but yours. Here then, in justice, I restore to you

these feebly recorded memories of our walks and talks in sunlight and

moonlight._

_While I am confessing, I will tell you what perhaps I haven’t

mentioned before, that it was Mr. M. A. De Wolfe Howe who urged me

to draw you into our conversation on religion. And I really ought to

mention Mr. Ellery Sedgwick; but, the fact is, I have been just a

bit jealous of him since he sent that telegram—I showed it to you,

did I not?—shortly after he made your acquaintance, saying, “I am

desperately in love with Cornelia.”_

_Of course I don’t mind your being admired, afar off, by anyone who

pleases, no matter how dangerous he may be at close range; but this

page, you must understand, exists only to record that I am_

_Ever faithfully yours,

S._

_Santo Espiritu, Midsummer, 1924_

CONTENTS

BOOK ONE: CHALLENGING THE IDEA OF CHASTITY

PAGE

I. WE DISCUSS THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARENTS AND CRITICS 3

II. I MEDITATE, IN FRONT OF A BOOKCASE, ON SCOTT, JANE AUSTEN,

CHARLOTTE BRONTË, AND THE GOOD VICTORIANS 17

III. H. G. WELLS, GALSWORTHY, MAY SINCLAIR, J. D. BERESFORD 27

IV. SEVEN REASONS FOR MR. HERGESHEIMER, D. H. LAWRENCE, AND THE

EMETIC SCHOOL 35

V. WE DISCUSS MARRIAGE AND THE HOPE OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION 48

BOOK TWO: AN ELIGIBLE YOUNG MAN

I. CORNELIA’S CHILDREN REACT TO A SUITABLE MATCH 61

II. “LET’S WALK” 67

III. PREREQUISITES OF A DECENT MARRIAGE 73

IV. CORNELIA APPRECIATES HER HUSBAND 80

V. WE DISCUSS THE INNER LIFE 86

VI. A THEORY OF HAPPINESS 91

VII. THE REAL THING 97

BOOK THREE: TREATING OF MODERN GIRLS

I. THE EDUCATION OF DAUGHTERS 103

II. FLAGS OF REVOLT 118

III. BLOOM 120

IV. CAREERS FOR WOMEN 129

BOOK FOUR: CORNELIA AND DIONYSUS

I. ENNUI IN THE PROVINCES 139

II. NEW YEAR’S EVE IN NEW YORK 150

III. HIS EXCELLENCY ON ECONOMIC NECESSITY 162

IV. VERNON WILLYS ON BACCHIC ECSTASY 171

V. I EXPLAIN THE POSITION OF CÆSAR’S WIVES 184

VI. I DISCUSS THE ETHICS OF AN AUTOMOBILING CIVILIZATION 203

VII. THE VENGEANCE OF DIONYSUS 211

BOOK FIVE: APPROACHING RELIGION AND OTHER GRAVE MATTERS

I. WE MEET IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 223

II. OLIVER JUNIOR DISCUSSES HIS PARENTS, THEIR RELIGION, AND

HIS OWN 230

III. TABLE TALK AT SANTO ESPIRITU 245

IV. A SILENCE BY THE SEA 253

V. CORNELIA’S RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 267

BOOK ONE

CHALLENGING THE IDEA OF CHASTITY

I

WE DISCUSS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENTS AND CRITICS

When I am in doubt, I talk with Cornelia; and while I am with her, my

uncertainties disappear. But this subject she herself broached, at

her home in one of those paradises of wood and water where Americans

of her class have learned to hide their lives—for the summer.

She is a young woman of forty-five, with what Hazlitt somewhere calls

a “coronet face,” finely cut and proudly borne, and it gives one a

feeling of distinction merely to be in her presence. My memory holds

like a piece of radiant sculpture the image that she left there at

her wedding, twenty years ago, when she turned at the altar after

the episcopal benediction and paced down the aisle, clear-eyed and

fearless, to the thunder of organ music: it seemed to me then that

the young chevalier of the diplomatic service on whose arm her hand

had alighted was leading the Samothracian Victory into the holy state

of matrimony. It was an excellent alliance, with high sanctions and

distinguished witnesses, auspiciously begun and with a constantly

felicitous continuation. She has walked ever since, so her friends

declare, between purple ribbons: her ways have gone smoothly and

well in delectable regions far above the level of the rank-scented

multitude.

When one talks with her, her hands lie still in her lap. She does

not think with her hands, nor does any other emphasis of her body

intrude its comment upon the serene and assured movements of her

intelligence. So remote she seems from the ignominious and infamous

aspects of existence, that one wonders how she becomes aware of them.

Yet such unpleasant things, verminous or reptilian, as creep within

range of her vision she inspects sharply and with intrepidity; for

she knows precisely how to deal with them.

As I sat there, blissfully receiving a sense of the security and

perfection which emanate from her, it just flickered into my

consciousness that, if a mouse could have entered that impeccably

ordered room, she would not for a moment have been at a loss. She

would quietly have summoned a maid. Then she would have said: “There

is a mouse in the room. Take it out.” She likes everything to be

right; and she knows so absolutely what is right, that any shade of

uncertainty in conversation with her seems a kind of baseness and

disloyalty. Yet, as much as a superior being can be troubled, she was

troubled about the state of current fiction. She was troubled in that

high and spirited sense of responsibility which certain fine women

feel for the tone of the Republic.

“You have shown,” she said, “some understanding of the immense

influence exerted by literature upon the minds of our young people.

But your discussion of ‘unprintable’ books is up in the air. You must

meet peril definitely, perilously, or your readers won’t even believe

that it exists. In a prairie fire, you must fight with fire; water,

the flames snuff up like a perfume, and sweep on. You don’t come to

grips with the facts. You asperse them with rosewater.”

“You mean,” I replied, fencing feebly, “that I did not furnish a

guide to those new books which no young person should read? I had

thought that would rather please you. The suppressive societies will

supply the information which I omitted. I am not specially interested

in the circulation of any questionable books—except my own.”

“Your innuendo is nasty and your tone is flippant,” she said. I bowed

in acknowledgment of my entire agreement. “But the subject,” she

continued, “is grave. It is very grave to those of us who have boys

and girls of eighteen and twenty. We wish them in these formative

years to be subject only to the finest influences. How can they be,

when they read such books? How can any one who is interested in

moulding the characters of the younger generation not desire to keep

such books as you know they are reading out of their hands? When I

think of my son or my daughter, with their clean sweet young minds,

wading into the filth of our popular fiction, I repeat to myself

those lines of Heine—you remember:—

‘Mir ist, als ob ich die Hände

Aufs Haupt dir legen sollt,

Betend dass Gott dich erhalte

So rein und schön und hold.’”

“Try it,” I suggested with studious brutality. “Call in the children.

Lay your hands on their heads, and pray that God may keep them

in their beauty and purity and sweetness. How will they take it?

Demurely, I fancy—while they are in your presence. But when they

meet in the garden afterward, they will exclaim, ‘Isn’t mother an

old dear!’ And then they will laugh softly, and think of—all sorts

of things. Heine’s prayer, you know, doesn’t hit off the aspirations

of contemporary youth. Beauty is still ‘all right.’ But the quality

of ‘sweetness,’ though it is not yet wholly unmarketable, is held in

greatly diminished esteem. And as for purity—‘What is purity?’ asks

the jesting younger generation, and will not stay for an answer.”

“Young people ask many foolish questions,” said Cornelia

dismissively. “What troubles me is rather the changing attitude of so

many parents and teachers. Have they lost that beautiful desire to

shield the years of innocence? Have they quite lost their sense of

responsibility?”

“No,” I conjectured, “they haven’t altogether lost their sense of

responsibility. But they haven’t known quite what to do with it;

and just now it seems temporarily to have slipped from their hands.

They didn’t know how to use it when they had it; or they were afraid

to use it, and cast the responsibility for the innocence of their

children upon God; and now the children, sick of that evasion, are

acting for themselves. And I am afraid that we have rather lost

contact with the younger generation. It has experienced so much, it

has read so much, it is so accustomed to the free discussion of all

sorts of topics which we thought ominous even to mention—that I often

suspect we have more to learn from it than it has to learn from us.”

“That is a false and vicious humility.”

“No, I assure you, very genuine, however vicious. It came over me

in the spring several years ago in a vision. I happened one day to

observe in my garden a large white cat stalking with soft experienced

tread under the lilacs, on the lookout for young robins making their

trial flight. Being of a somewhat analogical turn of mind, and having

then a high conceit of the wisdom of our generation, I said to

myself: ‘The garden is a symbol of the world. The wise cat is the old

professor. The fledgling robin is the young student.’ As I murmured

the last word, the white cat made a flying leap for the nestling. It

proved to be, however, an adult wren, pert and elusive, which hopped

just one spray higher and twittered derision. The cat walked off

crestfallen, muttering: ‘Such wise birds! I have never known a season

when birds were wise so young.’”

“Well?”

“Well, I really trust these ‘wise birds’ nowadays much further than

you do.”

“Won’t you explain why?” said Cornelia.

“Let me tell you another story. At a neighborhood party recently,

where there was dancing, and the very youngest generation was

present, I was greatly flattered by receiving from Adelaide, a young

lady of five years, marked attentions which on previous occasions had

been directed to Bertram, a far more plausible person than I in all

respects, and, moreover, only thrice the age of Adelaide. I said, ‘I

thought you were devoted to Bertram.’ Instantly she replied: ‘I was.

But I am not interested in Bertram any longer. I know all about him.’

At the age of five, don’t you see, she has already begun to ‘sip the

foam of many lives.’ I happened to be, shall I say, the coca-cola of

the evening. But I know that I shall be sipped and discarded. Already

Adelaide has become critical, fastidious, wary; she will not for long

be taken in.”

“Well?” again from Cornelia, with a hint of irritation.

“I mean to insist,” I explained cautiously, “that such

sentimentalists as you and I seldom do justice to the hard,

clear-eyed maturity—of a sort—which our young people have attained by

pooh-poohing our sentimentality and subjectivity and adopting what

Santayana calls a simple ‘animal faith’ in the material surfaces of

things.”

“Just what do you mean?” Cornelia inquired,—sharply and

scornfully,—“by ‘hard, clear-eyed maturity’? I have no such feeling

about my own children. My own son and daughter are being brought

up as I was brought up. Well-bred young people to-day differ in no

essential respect from well-bred people twenty years ago. What some

idiots try to make us believe is a change of standards is not a

change of standards. It is merely a horrid confusion, due to the fact

that a great many ill-bred people are expressing themselves.”

“That in itself,” I said, “implies a change in conditions, if not

in standards. There is, as you say, a ‘horrid confusion.’ The

confusion is due to the fact that the well-bred young people are now

applauding the ill-bred old people. That is really significant. When

the well-bred young people begin to desert, it is all up with the

Old Guard. That indicates either a revolt or a revolution. You must

remember, Cornelia, that one half of history is an account of the

struggle made by your class to keep the rest out; and the other half

of history is an account of how the rest are getting in. If you are

now in the presence of a revolt by a weak body of outsiders, you may

still effectively oppose it. But if it is a revolution including

your own household, you had better prepare to support the best

elements in the _de facto_ government—in the literary no less than in

the political republic.”

“There are no best elements,” Cornelia retorted, “in what you call

the _de facto_ government. There are no good elements. There are no

decent elements. It is an insurrection of hoodlum and bedlam. It is

all vile. The situation,” she continued, with the clear precision

of a cookie-cutter, “demands drastic action. You, instead of

strengthening the hands of those who attempt to act, amuse yourself

with philosophical futilities, and virtually throw the weight of your

levity against all action.”

“Suppose I desire an antecedent action of the mind?”

“But you are so ambiguous that you have no force. One can’t really

tell on which side you are.”

“I should like,” I hurriedly replied, “to be on the side of the

angels. You know that I should like to be on your side. If I am ever

driven from your side, it will be by the fine high-bred incuriosity

of angels. It will be by the applause of angels, accompanied by some

fresh demonstration of their immitigable hostility to thought.”

“You are rude.”

“And you—just faintly provoking. I am not sure, Cornelia, that you

quite understand the limits of a writer’s power. I have a friend,

long experienced in a public library, who assures me that critical

articles have no real effect. Readers either agree with them from the

outset and are pleased, or disagree with them from the outset and

are displeased. This, she tells me, is especially true of lawyers,

clergymen, professors, and all nice people. Perhaps that is so. Let

us suppose that it is. Suppose also that I were returning to the

discussion of ‘unprintable’ books. What treatment of the subject

would please _you_? You are a ‘conservative’ of definite convictions,

and you demand drastic action. Exactly what is the situation and what

the appropriate action? Are you prepared to say?”

“Certainly,” she replied. “And I will tell you also the stand which I

believe should be taken by a critic who professes to have the public

welfare at heart.”

“Before you do that,” I interposed, “you must pardon me one more

flippancy. Isn’t it true that people often ‘take a stand’ to watch

something that is going on and that will continue to go on whether

they remain in their ‘stand’ or not?”

“If you mean to ask whether I am a moral futilitarian, I am not.

People of character take a stand in order to prevent obnoxious things

from going on. If the obnoxious things continue to go on in spite of

them, people of character are glad to be left behind, or even to be

trampled underfoot, when that is the only way to make their protest

effective.”

“You speak like yourself, Cornelia,” I said, “and no higher

compliment is possible. Your image interests me. I seem to see an

invading army with leveled spears, and you dauntlessly flinging

yourself upon them. Opposition interests me as long as it is

effective—as long as the opposing breast checks the leveled spears.

Sniping from the housetop at the postman, after the revolution

has actually taken place—in that, there is a kind of unpalatable

futility. But how do you apply your figure to the duty of the critic

in the face of current fiction?”

“I apply it in this way. You yourself have admitted that it would

be very easy to make a list of popular writers who, however varied

their art and method, have running through their work an insistent

preoccupation with sex of quite a different character from its

occasional romantic treatment in the novels that you and I were

brought up on. The heart of the matter is this: the minds of young

people are being gravely affected by a group of writers who, in their

several ways, definitely challenge the idea of chastity. Now, what a

really serious critic should do is to call a halt in the production

and reading of that sort of literature.”

“My dear Cornelia,” I exclaimed,—I always exclaim “My dear” when I am

about to express impatience; it introduces the note of suavity,—“My

dear Cornelia, do you read the magazines? Do you attend church? Do

you see the newspapers? Did you not observe that the form, ‘It is

time to call a halt,’ was first employed on the tenth of August,

1914, by an editor in Oshkosh with reference to the German advance on

Paris? In the following week it was applied by a clergyman of Tulsa,

Oklahoma, with reference to the consumption of chewing-gum in the

United States. Since that time, it has been in continuous employment

by all serious critics, lay and clerical, with reference to the

output of the leading English and American novelists.”

“Well,” she replied, “what if it has? So much the worse for the

leading English and American novelists. If they are all running

amuck, is that any reason why the rest of us should lose our heads?

If the novelists are going definitely wrong at the point which I have

indicated, a critic could not be better employed than in standing at

that point and calling a halt.”

“You assign to criticism,” I said, “a task which appeals but faintly

to the critic—a task like that of a traffic policeman without

authority or power. If I had all the authority in the world, I would

not cry ‘stop’ to the novelists, even to those that I have criticized

most harshly.”

“And why not?”

“Because I learn too much from what they are doing to desire to

dam the stream of information. The realistic novelists to-day

are extraordinarily copious, candid, and illuminating confessors

of private morals. I have, to be sure, been troubled by the fact

that the lives of respectable people are so seldom revealed in

these confessions. I have even allowed myself to wonder faintly

at times whether unwillingness to confess may not be, as our

direful Mid-Western school contends, the chief distinction

between respectable people and the other sort. It is a horrid

doubt, concerning which no one but the novelist betrays much

curiosity or provides much light. And so, for novelists, I wish

freedom to confess, and, for myself, freedom to comment on their

confessions—though, since they have become so desperately confessive,

it seems frequently indelicate to do so. If they are, as you assert,

definitely challenging the idea of chastity, the matter is indeed of

more than merely literary interest. I should like to know whether our

standards are undergoing revolutionary change. Won’t you please go

out and ‘call a halt,’ while I go home and inquire in my own fashion

whether anything is going on; whether the idea of chastity has

actually been challenged; if so, what idea of chastity, why, where,

when, in what manner, and with what results?”

“You are hopeless,” said Cornelia, rising. “I shall ask the Bishop to

make this the subject of one of his Lenten discourses.”

“That will be just the thing,” I rejoined, “to induce profound

reflection in our novelists.”

II

I MEDITATE, IN FRONT OF A BOOKCASE, ON SCOTT, JANE AUSTEN,

CHARLOTTE BRONTË, AND THE GOOD VICTORIANS

When I returned to my study, I dropped into a chair which frequently

invites meditation, before a case containing current fiction. My

eyes glanced swiftly along the rows of Wells, Galsworthy, Bennett,

Beresford, and Walpole, lingering an extra moment on _Ann Veronica_,

_The Dark Flower_, and _The Pretty Lady_; visited with slow

interrogative scrutiny the “colorful” assemblage of Hergesheimer, D.

H. Lawrence, Rebecca West, May Sinclair, W. L. George, James Joyce,

Cabell, Sinclair Lewis, Sherwood Anderson, Charles G. Norris, Ben

Hecht, and Waldo Franck; then fluttered to rest upon a half-dozen

miscellaneous recent arrivals—Meredith Nicholson’s _Broken Barriers_,

Mrs. Gerould’s _Conquistador_, Maxwell’s _Spinster of This Parish_,

Willa Cather’s _The Lost Lady_, G. F. Hummel’s _After All_, and _West

of the Water Tower_.

Here, I said to myself, is material enough to prove Cornelia’s case,

if she has a case. Among this company I shall find the challengers,

if there is a challenge. What are they calling in question? The idea

of chastity—whose idea of chastity? Cornelia’s idea, the idea of all

nice people—What is the idea of all nice people regarding chastity?

Look in the Dictionary, the record of good usage—Here it is:

“Innocence of unlawful sexual intercourse.” As a history of usage,

the Dictionary should add in parenthesis: “This is a virtue assumed

to be present in all members of the female sex in good and regular

standing.”

Here we have a simple and definite idea to work upon: Chastity is

a virtue assumed to be present in all members of the female sex in

good and regular standing. Who first gave currency to that idea? Our

friends the Victorians? Oh, no! It is astonishing how many so-called

Victorian ideas, delicate and fragile, can be found thriving in

manlier ages, in old robust books like _Don Juan_ and _Tom Jones_,

and in the drama of that “den of lions,” the Renaissance. How they

valued this virtue—those “lions” of the Renaissance! How they

valued this virtue in their wives! What praise they had for its

possessors—“chaste as the icicle that’s curded by the frost from

purest snow and hangs on Dian’s temple”! Shakespeare valiantly

assumed the presence of that virtue in all members of the female sex

in good and regular standing—except Cleopatra.

But we must not be too historical. The idea of chastity exists

full-blown in Goldsmith, in those two famous stanzas which inquire

what happens when lovely woman stoops to “folly” and learns too late

that men “betray,” that is, fail to legalize the “folly.” We remember

what follows, for the lines were in every anthology employed in our

formative period to give to our young minds a relish for virtue and

a lively apprehension of the consequences of departing from it.

Cornelia still thinks we should prescribe Goldsmith rather than Mr.

Galsworthy for the collateral reading of her daughter. Goldsmith

declares very firmly that when lovely woman stoops to folly, no art

can wash her guilt away.

The only art her guilt to cover,

To hide her shame from every eye,

To give repentance to her lover,

And wring his bosom—is to die.

Several distinct elements appear in our fully developed idea: first,

chastity is the virtue of a legal status; second, women are naturally

law-abiding; third, if they lose their status, it is by the natural

perfidy of predatory man; fourth, the disaster is irretrievable.

There is no salvation for the woman but death, the cloister, exile,

or, occasionally, a shamefaced return to “chastity” under the

horsewhip or at point of the pistol.

This idea flourished in the “good old” novels of Sir Walter Scott;

it is fairly well illustrated in the case of Effie Deans in _The

Heart of Midlothian_. Scott was a romancer. His contemporary, Jane

Austen, was a realist. She was far less chivalrously certain than he

that lovely women who are neglectful of legal status are by nature

virtuous. She looked at them hard; she inclined strongly to believe

that such women are by nature vain, sentimental, and ignorant—like

Lydia Bennett in _Pride and Prejudice_. But Jane Austen is at one

with Scott in treating unlawful passion austerely. In the fiction of

both these worthies the erring woman is unmistakably a “victim”; the

man, however plausible his manners, is a profligate and unprincipled,

if not a designing, villain; the consequences of departure from

legal status are depicted in strongly deterrent colors. Our idea of

chastity is fortified by them.

Now let us advance a generation or so and question our friends the

Victorians: do they accept our idea and loyally enforce it? Yes—now

and then. Familiar cases? There is the case of little Em’ly in _David

Copperfield_. She is the typical victim of the typical seducer;

and Dickens punishes them both in approved traditional fashion. He

drowns the wicked lover—which is, of course, a logical consequence

of departure from legal status. He sends the victim with her “soft

sorrowful blue eyes” to Australia, where she attempts to expiate

her guilt by a life of self-sacrifice. She has many a good offer of

marriage; “‘But, uncle,’ she says to me, ‘that’s gone for ever.’”

Here we have the doctrine of the irretrievable. That doctrine is

sternly proclaimed by George Eliot in the graver case of Hetty Sorrel

in _Adam Bede_. The repentant lover tries to do something for Hetty.

His last words are that it is no use: “You told me the truth when

you said to me once, ‘There’s a sort of wrong that can never be made

up for.’” Neither Scott nor Jane Austen could have handled these

elementary cases in a more strictly orthodox fashion. Our idea is

again fortified.

But the great Victorian novelists pushed their speculations beyond

the elementary problems raised by the victim-villain situation. They

had, several of them, personal reasons for reflecting thoughtfully

upon the social utility of the stout bulwarks with which the English

law attempted to fortify the idea of chastity and the related

doctrine of the irretrievable. Dickens is said to have fallen in

love with all the Hogarth daughters and to have married the wrong

one. Thackeray married at twenty-five a woman who half a dozen

years later became insane and who outlived him. Bulwer-Lytton was

legally separated at twenty-three from a woman who outlived him.

Meredith’s _Modern Love_ discusses an incompatibility of temper

from which a death divorced him. And George Eliot, high priestess

of Victorian morality, was actually living in a kind of solemn and

almost officious virtue with another woman’s husband. These were

circumstances arranged to liberate speculation and to set it playing

a little skeptically about the one way out—the sole dark exit which

Goldsmith had so glibly offered to lovely women who are unfortunate

in love.

In a novel of the mid-nineteenth century, which used to be thought

very dangerous reading,—_Jane Eyre_,—Charlotte Brontë considered one

of these more difficult cases, and almost presented it. Jane, an

eager, self-reliant, self-supporting, and fairly hard-headed young

woman, first of our modern heroines, is loved with a grand passion

by Rochester, who is enchained by marriage to a hopeless lunatic.

Now the novelist permits Jane to fall deeply in love with Rochester,

thus perilously illustrating the possibility that a truly great and

two-sided passion may come into existence outside legal status.

Charlotte Brontë, however, intervened twice to save the situation.

She wasn’t fastidious about the chastity of Rochester: chastity is

a female virtue. But she was fastidious about the chastity of Jane.

And so, of course, she makes Jane ignorant at first of the fact that

Rochester is married; and she makes Jane tell him that it is all up,

when she learns that he is married. That was the perfectly correct

thing for Jane to do.

But it created a dilemma. Charlotte Brontë knew that it created a

dilemma—a dilemma with unchastity for one horn and the frustration

of a grand passion for the other. (It should perhaps be explained

that a grand passion, in those illiberal days, was thought of as an

experience that befell a girl but once in a lifetime.) Charlotte

Brontë did not quite dare to treat this dilemma. She faced it for

a moment. She let her readers face it for a moment. Then she

intervened again: she destroyed the dilemma. She made it all come

right. She restored both hero and heroine to chastity by pitching the

lunatic wife headlong into the flames of the house of Rochester.

A happy thought—so it must have seemed to the author. Yet, as one

reflects upon it, this solution appears a little dangerous. To pitch

a superfluous wife into the flames—well, it would not quite serve

as a Kantian basis for the solution of all such problems. Under the

English law, the dilemma reasserted its actuality. _Jane Eyre_ stands

there early in the Victorian Age as a challenge, rather evasively

presented, to the idea of chastity. In W. B. Maxwell’s _Spinster of

This Parish_, 1923, a modern heroine is placed in almost precisely

Jane’s situation, except that her lover does not think it necessary

to lie to her about his lunatic wife. Without a moment’s hesitation,

she accepts the grand passion. Since she accepts it with all the

fortitude and fidelity of an old-fashioned wife, she seems to-day a

quite safe, old-fashioned character; and it is hard to conceive of

any one’s thinking of her as “unchaste.”

Other Victorians, usually with much circumspection, returned to the

dilemma; and they returned to it in such numbers that to challenge

the idea of chastity as a legal creation may be regarded as a rather

distinctively Victorian contribution. From the question what to do

when you are united to an undivorceable insane wife, the Victorians

proceeded cautiously to consider the demands of virtue in analogous

sets of circumstances. What is the point at which the maintenance

of legal chastity involves the loss of ethical integrity? What is

right conduct for a young girl whose parents or relatives have united

her in a “suitable marriage” to a repellent brute of means and

good family? That is a question which interested Thackeray in _The

Newcomes_; and it will be remembered that the wife of Barnes Newcome

answers the question in her own case by giving her husband occasion

for divorce under the English law. It is not always observed that to

Hester Prynne in _The Scarlet Letter_ right conduct, to the last page

of the book, consists in fidelity to her lover, not to her fanatical

husband; and Hawthorne, perhaps indecently, places the lovers in

adjacent graves of a Boston burying-ground. Isabel Archer, in Henry

James’s _Portrait of a Lady_, is begged by her lover to desert her

husband and come to him, and to disregard the “bottomless idiocy”

of what other people will think or say about them. Though, on the

last page, Isabel is still clinging to legality, one is left in some

doubt whether she will cling indefinitely. Meredith’s Diana is a

standing challenge to the doctrine of irretrievable marriage. Hardy’s

Tess is a defiance to the idea of chastity entertained by the Angel

Clares; and the obscene relation in _Jude the Obscure_ is obviously

that between him and his wife, not that between him and Sue, except

as it is smirched by his return to his wife and by her return to her

husband.

But why multiply instances? Here are enough to show that the good

Victorians repeatedly solicited our sympathy and our support for

heroines whose ethical integrity was afflicted by their legal

chastity. The idea of illicit love as an affair of victim and

villain, has been largely jettisoned or given over to melodrama, as

of an interest too primitive or too banal for extended consideration.

To their successors, the Victorian realists bequeath, as matter of

far higher artistic and general human concern, their rather cautious

essays upon the evaded dilemma of _Jane Eyre_.

III

H. G. WELLS, GALSWORTHY, MAY SINCLAIR, J. D. BERESFORD

Let us now enter fearfully upon the burning ground of contemporary

fiction. The territory is immense, and unexplorable here in detail.

All that one can do is to stand upon the smoky borderland, and

comment briefly upon some conspicuous spots in the conflagrant area

and upon the general direction of the wind.

One cannot, on every occasion for mentioning him, reread the entire

works of Mr. Wells. I retain a strong impression that most of his

novels of contemporary life challenge the idea of indissoluble

marriage. In this respect Mr. Wells is no innovator. I retain

also the impression that one tends to derive from these novels

a conviction that everyone’s first marriage is a mistake. This

indicates the direction of the wind. Now Mr. Wells is a long way from

accepting Goldsmith’s idea that death is the only way out of a bad

situation. He has no patience with the doctrine of irretrievability.

But as long as unlawful relations furnish the only available

alternative way out, his works naturally disquiet Cornelia, and

challenge her idea of chastity.

His works disquiet me, because I think the defect which his heroes

and heroines find in their first marriage they will find also in

their second, and their third, and their fourth; they will find that

neither the second nor the third nor the fourth marriage is capable

of sustaining indefinitely the sense of ecstasy which the tired

business man experiences the first time he notices how pretty his

stenographer is. Tedium is three fourths of life. Sensible men settle

quietly down to endure it, sustained by their fortitude and their

twenty-five per cent of creature comforts and incidentals. The others

imagine that by Babbittian adventures they can change the proportions

and get something better than tedium. There is nothing that is even

“just as good.” Thackeray knew this and admitted it. Mr. Wells hasn’t

admitted it. That constitutes one distinction between the author of

_The Newcomes_ and the author of _The New Machiavelli_.

Mr. Galsworthy told us in _The Dark Flower_ about the quest of

ecstasy, and in _Saint’s Progress_ he confessed something of the

extraordinary disregard of legality in sexual relations on the part

of well-bred young people, occasioned in part by the stresses of

the war. Mr. Galsworthy, like Mr. Wells, inclines to make ecstasy

rather than legality the test of right relations between men and

women, though I think most of his heroes and heroines are somewhat

less incorrigibly expectant than those of Mr. Wells. In _The Forsyte

Saga_, his prime achievement and a rich and various and notable

work, he makes his most significant study of that Victorian dilemma

upon which _Jane Eyre_ was so nearly impaled. In the case of Soames

Forsyte and Irene and Jolyon, he brings, with great circumstantiality

and seriousness, a fine woman face to face with the choice of

illegal status or the substantial frustration of life; and Irene

unequivocally accepts the illegal status. The entire treatment of

the theme indicates, I think, Mr. Galsworthy’s belief that she

was ethically justified, as she was also justified by the general

consequences, in her union with Jolyon. The one high crime in the

book, as Mr. Galsworthy conceives it, is Soames Forsyte’s exaction of

marital rights from a wife who is in love with another man.

I wonder whether Cornelia has read _The Forsyte Saga_. I wonder

whether, if she should enter imaginatively into the circumstances,

she would not consider Soames’s act a crime. If so, she would

challenge the idea of chastity. Perhaps she would call the act “a

heinous unchastity”; but that would be to abandon our definition.

I was a bit shocked last spring when someone remarked that May

Sinclair had joined the ranks of those who are writing primarily to

engage the attention of Mr. Sumner; and that _Ann Severn and the

Fieldings_ is an “immoral book.” I recalled her _Divine Fire_ as

one of the keen delights of twenty years ago, and I remembered her

recently published _Mr. Waddington of Wyck_ as the most exhilarating

and remorseless flaying alive of the philanderer that I had ever

witnessed.

I read _Ann Severn and the Fieldings_, and I found it, especially

in its last two or three chapters, a love story of poignant and

thrilling beauty. Compared with many of the physiologically and

pathologically introspective novels of the day it is, despite

its exhibition of a neurosis resulting in false angina pectoris,

almost an old-fashioned love story. It is almost old-fashioned in

presenting, in the case of Ann, a passion as straight, as single,

as unswerving, as unflinching as that of Shakespeare’s Juliet.

Ann, brought up with the three Fielding brothers, loves one of

them, Jerrold, from childhood till the end, with the “divine fire.”

Jerrold, on leave from the front, intends to ask Ann to be his

wife; but by the connivance of circumstances with the lying of

interested persons, he is persuaded that Ann is living with his

shell-shocked brother. Jerrold, thereupon, in the recklessness of the

hour, expecting to be killed in the next attack, abruptly marries

Maisie. When the conspiracy of lying and ambiguous circumstances is

dispelled, Ann claims Jerrold as her own, and he gives himself to her

“without a scruple.”

Now the ethical points, as exhibited by the author, are these: first,

Jerrold has shown male recklessness regarding his virtue, by marrying

one woman when he loved another; second, he displays an awakened

ethical sensitiveness when he rejoices at the termination of his

intimate relations with his wife; third, Ann has never for an instant

swerved from her virtue; Maisie proves her virtue in the beautiful,

if impossible, scene in which she surrenders her husband to Ann,

saying: “I can’t think of anything more disgusting than to keep a man

tied to you when he cares for somebody else. I should feel as if I

were living in sin.” Of course the major contention is, that Ann,

though without legal status, was “chaste”; but that is a paradox and

a challenge to our idea.

Let us take one more case in this group: Mr. J. D. Beresford with

the Jacob Stahl trilogy. In this rather drab yet impressive work,

one finds the “emancipative” ideas of Mr. Wells assimilated by a

much less buoyant nature. Jacob muddles into a bad marriage with an

unquestionably unsuitable person, from whom he separates, though he

is not divorced. He falls in love with one of the keepers of his

lodging-house and asks her to live with him without legal sanction

till his wife shall die. After months of consideration she freely and

resolutely joins him. From that point, Mr. Beresford exerts himself

to prove that their relation is just as grave and permanent and full

of labor and anxiety and humdrum and gray days as marriage itself.

I suspect there is a kind of grim truthfulness in the relation of

this adventure. It reminds one, in the third volume, of George Eliot

and of accounts given by sundry visitors of the slightly dreary

decorum of her ménage. There is no expectation of ecstasy on the part

of either of the adventurers. They merely look, outside marriage,

for the alleviations of the ultimate human solitude afforded by a

satisfactory marriage. They are tolerably successful. But when

the death of Stahl’s wife clears the way, they return, for various

reasons of expediency, to a legal status.

Mr. Wells, Mr. Galsworthy, May Sinclair, and Mr. Beresford are all,

I think, seriously interested in morality. On the whole, their

work does not contemptuously and explicitly challenge the idea of

monogamous marriage. At least, it does not flout the possibility of

arriving, by freedom of readjustment, at some reasonably satisfactory

and permanent relationship between one man and one woman. And

so, in a sense, their point of view begins to appear relatively

conservative. If they could be questioned regarding their moral

purposes or tendencies, they would profess sincere respect for

virtue. But they would add that they are concerned, as novelists,

with reflecting the revision which the idea of virtue is undergoing

in our time. They are generally willing to admit that society and the

state are related in necessary and vital ways to the customary form

of sexual alliance. But they repudiate the notion that mere legality

can set the seal of virtue upon any such alliance. Less firmly, yet

pretty clearly, they repudiate the notion that mere illegality can

remove the seal of virtue which individual adventurers may set upon

their alliance. Because chastity has been traditionally identified

with legality, they hold the word in some contempt; they incline to

discard it as the name of any recognizable virtue. The important

ideas which it has obscured are these: to maintain permanent

relations with one who is thoroughly agreeable to you is virtue; to

maintain permanent relations with one who is thoroughly disagreeable

to you is vice.

There is quite a bit of ground between.

IV

SEVEN REASONS FOR MR. HERGESHEIMER, D. H. LAWRENCE, AND THE EMETIC

SCHOOL

Among the novelists who have arrived within the last ten years, it

is more difficult to discover any community in constructive ethical

intention or tendency. One can no longer feel sure that marriage

is regarded as the normal condition, for which fidelity in illegal

relations is a substitute. One recalls numerous heroines who collect

erotic adventures like female Don Juans, and others who stoutly and

“conscientiously” refuse marriage to lovers to whom they refuse

nothing else. And here is George F. Hummel’s _After All_, advertised

as follows: “Its analysis of the inherent self-destructiveness

of marriage is carried to a conclusion which, however opposed to

accepted standards of morality, has in it the logic and compelling

force of a thinking man’s profoundest conviction.” Here are D. H.

Lawrence’s Lost Girl and Arnold Bennett’s Pretty Lady, and W. L.

George’s Ursula Trent, and Willa Cather’s Lost Lady, and Joseph

Hergesheimer’s Cytherea, and the heroine of Mr. Masters’s _Domesday

Book_—a whole troop of damsels who meander where they will in

quest of rosebuds. Here is Robert Herrick’s Lilla deliberately and

successfully discarding marriage for an unsanctioned union. Here is

Margaret Prescott Montague’s Julie (in _Deep Channel_) finding in an

illicit relationship the effective key to a larger and more spiritual

life. Here is even Mrs. Gerould permitting a grave and thoughtful

illegal relationship to the hero of _Conquistador_, whom she would

apparently have us regard as the very pink of essential purity. No

single explanation will account for the community in “destructive”

tendency discernible in the latest phase of the movement; or for

the fact that there is hardly one in a dozen recent novels which

Cornelia would care to see in the hands of her daughter; or for the

more alarming fact that, if there were one such novel in a dozen,

Cornelia’s daughter probably would not care to read it.

Since, in the United States, marriage has been by no means a legally

irretrievable disaster, it would be absurd to point to the rigor of

our law as a very important occasion of the widespread indifference

or disrespect for chastity exhibited or reflected by many American

writers. The occasions of our revolt lie deeper than that, and many

causes conspire to give to our current fiction its unwonted aspect of

levity and license.

First, as a literary inheritance, the Wells-Galsworthy group of the

elder novelists bequeathed to their successors a profound skepticism

about the legal touchstone of chastity, together with a pleasant rule

of virtue which tends, as a social regulation, to be unworkable,

since it is incapable of objective and public application. Their

“rule,” developed a little, lands one in an anarchical moral

individualism; and their successors developed it by omitting the word

“permanent” from the definition of virtue.

Secondly, the appearance of a good many rather frothily wanton

pictures of frothily wanton younger sets may still be attributed to

reaction from the austerities of war; the writers of the futilitarian

school take chastity lightly because they take everything lightly:

for examples, Mr. Carl Van Vechten and Mr. F. Scott Fitzgerald—though

it must be admitted that the latter, in _The Beautiful and Damned_,

has written the most impressive temperance tract of our time. (I

wonder whether Cornelia noticed that it is a temperance tract.)

Thirdly, women are discovering various means of avoiding the

inevitable penalties which the earlier novelists inflicted upon

sorrowful blue-eyed girls who stooped to folly: they don’t, in

fiction at least, so often have to abandon a baby (_Adam Bede_), or

to lose their job (_Esther Waters_), or to be barred from marriage

(_Tess of the Durbervilles_), or to suffer ostracism or exile (_David

Copperfield_).

Fourthly, as in the use of cocktails and tobacco, the double standard

is manifestly giving ground before a single standard, and that a

masculine standard: see any novel of the literary and artistic

“villages” of New York or Chicago—for example, those of Mr. Floyd

Dell. In Meredith Nicholson’s _Broken Barriers_, an extraordinary

disclosure from the Indiana school, unchastity is almost blandly

presented as, for a considerable group of young business women,

something like the accepted avenue to social advancement and as a

preliminary to a good marriage.

Fifthly, chastity, legal and spiritual, has for a dozen years

been under fire in this country as a distinctive aspect of that

“Puritanism” which, as we know, must be destroyed, root and branch,

before we shall have any art, letters, or society that are really

worth mention.

Sixthly, the idea of sex as a sacred mystery, under protection of

Church and State, has given ground before an interesting series of

competing ideas: the idea of sex as a chapter in physiology; the idea

of sex as a social asset and a contribution which every good mixer

makes to the occasion; and the idea of sex as a horrible nuisance.

Seventhly, there is appearing here and there in current literature

evidence of the growth among us of an æsthetic philosophy which

rejects the moral valuations of life. Its doctrine is briefly

this:—You can’t be sure that any act will yield you happiness. You

can’t be sure that any act will be virtuous. You can be sure that

every act will yield you experience. Let us go in for experience,

and value our acts according to the quantity and intensity of the

experience which they yield.

Mr. Hergesheimer at present, I think, best represents the æsthetic

point of view. I am afraid that Mr. Hergesheimer is just a little bit

of a _poseur_. He pretends to feel surprised that many people regard

his books as of immoral tendency. I myself am not one of those who

are much worried by the moral aspects of his work. If he were content

to let the novels speak for themselves, few people would guess how

unorthodox the author is. As a matter of fact Mr. Hergesheimer is

a renegade Presbyterian. He is a Presbyterian turned artist. He is

proud of his apostasy and he likes to talk about it. He has shaken

off his patrimonial “Puritanism”; he finds life more delectable

since; and he delights to find a cool spot in a Havana hotel, and

to stretch out his legs and discourse somewhat expansively, for

the benefit of his fellow citizens north of the Gulf, upon his

“emancipation,” with frequent pointed references to his informal

dinner-jacket of Chinese silk, the orange blossoms in his buttonhole,

the flourished Larrañaga cigar in his fingers, and the frigid mixture

of Ron Bacardi, sugar, and vivid green lime at his elbow.

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