III. _The Postage Law of 1845._

The Postage Act, passed March 3, 1845, which went into operation on the

1st of July of that year, was called forth by a determination to destroy

the private mails; and this object gave character to the act as a whole.

The reports of the postmaster-general, and of the post-office committees

in both houses of congress, show that the end which was specially aimed at

was to overthrow these mails. The Report of the House Committee, presented

May 15, 1844, says:

“Events are in progress of fatal tendency to the post-office

department, and its decay has commenced. Unless arrested by

vigorous legislation, it must soon cease to exist as a

self-sustaining institution, and either be cast on the treasury

for support, or suffered to decline from year to year, till the

system has become impotent and useless. The last annual report of

the postmaster-general shows that, notwithstanding the heavy

retrenchments he had made, the expenditures of the department for

the year ending June 30, 1843, exceeded its income by the sum of

$78,788. The decline of its revenue during that year was $250,321;

and the investigations made into the operations of the current

year, indicate a further and an increasing decline, at the rate of

about $300,000 a year.”

“This illicit business has been some time struggling through its

incipient stages; for it was not until the year commencing the 1st

July, 1840, that it appears to have made a serious impression upon

the revenues of the department. It has now assumed a bold and

determined front, and dropped its disguises; opened offices for

the reception of letters, and advertised the terms on which they

will be despatched out of the mail.”

“The revenue for the year ending June 30, 1840, was $4,539,265;

for the last year it was $4,295,925; and indications show that for

the present year it will not be more than $3,995,925.”

“The number of chargeable letters in circulation, exclusive of

dead letters, during the year ending June 30, 1840, may be assumed

at 27,535,554. The annual number now reported to be in

circulation, is 24,267,552. Thus, 3,268,000 letters a year and

$543,340 of annual revenue, are the spoils taken from the mails by

cupidity.”

The Report of the Senate Committee has this remark:

“We have seen in the outset that something _must_ be done; that

the revenues of the department are rapidly falling off, and a

remedy must in some way be found for this alarming evil, or the

very consequences so much dreaded by some from the reduction

proposed, will inevitably ensue; namely, a great curtailment of

the service, or a heavy charge upon the national treasury for its

necessary expenses. It is believed that in consequence of the

disfavor with which the present rates and other regulations of

this department are viewed, and the open violations of the laws

before adverted to, that not more than, if as much as one half the

correspondence of the country passes through the mails; the

greater part being carried by private hands, or forwarded by means

of the recently established private expresses, who perform the

same service, at much less cost to the writers and recipients of

letters than the national post-office. It seems to the committee

to be impossible to believe that there are but twenty-four or

twenty-seven millions of letters per year, forwarded to distant

friends and correspondents in the United States, by a population

of twenty millions of souls; whilst, at the same time, there are

_two hundred and four millions_ and upwards of letters passing

annually through the mails of Great Britain and Ireland, with a

population of only about twenty-seven millions.”

The Senate Report recommended the reduction of the rates of postage to

five and ten cents, an average of seven and a half cents, with a very

great restriction of the franking privilege, on which it was confidently

estimated that the revenues of the department, for the first year of the

new system, would be $4,890,500; and that the number of chargeable letters

would be sixty millions. The House Report recommended stringent measures

to suppress the private mails, with the abolition of franking, without any

reduction of postage, except to substitute federal coin for Spanish. It

estimated the increase of letters to be produced by reducing the rates to

five and ten cents, at only thirty per cent. in number, thus reducing the

postage receipts at once to two and a half millions of dollars. It will be

seen that each of these calculations has been proved to be erroneous.

The great postage meeting in New York, held in December, 1843, had asked

for a uniform rate of five cents. After stating the advantages of the

English system, their committee still hung upon the length of the routes

in this country as a reason against the adoption of the low rate of

postage. They said,

“It is plain that a similar system may be introduced with equally

satisfactory results in the United States. On account, however, of

the vast distances to be traversed by the mail-carriers, and the

great difficulties of travel in the unsettled portions of our

country, our petition asks that the rate be reduced to five cents

for each letter not more than half an ounce in weight—which is

more than double the uniform postage in Great Britain. It is a

rate which would not only secure to the post-office the transport

of nearly all the letters which are now forwarded through private

channels, but it would largely increase correspondence, both of

business and affection.

“Above all, the _franking privilege_ should be abolished. Unless

this is done, nothing can be done. It will be impossible, without

drawing largely upon the legitimate sources of the national

revenue, to sustain the post-office by any rates whatsoever, if

this franking privilege shall continue to load the mails with

private letters which everybody writes, and public documents which

nobody reads.”

The bill was passed, but the franking privilege was continued, and yet the

Postmaster-General has told us that the current income of the department

is equal to its expenses. The predictions to the contrary were very

confident. Some of the gloomy forebodings then uttered, are worthy of

being recalled at this time.

“The post-office department estimates that the deficiency in the

revenue of the department, under the new law, will be about

$1,500,000, this year.”—_Boston Post._

“An additional tax of $1,500,000, to be raised to meet the

deficiencies of the department, in a single year, must principally

come from the pockets of farmers, (who write few letters, and are

consequently less benefited by the reduction of postage,) in the

shape of additional tariff duties upon articles which they

consume.”—_New Hampshire Patriot._

“A CAUTION.—Some people may be deceived on the subject of cheap

postage, unless they take a ‘sober second thought.’ A part of

those who are so strenuous for cheap postage are not quite so

disinterested as would at first appear. They are seeking to pay

their postage bills out of other people’s pockets. Look at this

matter. I am an industrious mechanic, for example, and I have

little time to write letters. My neighbor publishes school-books,

and he wishes to be sending off letters, recommendations, puffs,

&c., by the hundred and by the thousand. This is his way of making

money. Now, he wishes the expenses of the post-office department

to be paid out of the treasury, and then I shall have to help him

pay his postage, while he will only pay his national tax,

according to his means, as I do mine. If he is making his money by

sending letters, he should pay the whole cost of carrying those

letters. I ought not to pay any part of it, in the way of duties

on sugar, &c. Let every man pay his own postage. Is not this fair?

But this will not be the case if the post-office department does

not support itself. The cheap postage system may injure the poor

man, instead of helping him.”—_Philad. North American._

“As for the matter of post-office reform, and reduction of the

rates of postage, there are not _one thousand_ considerate and

reflecting people, in the Union, who desire or demand anything of

the kind.

“The commercial and mercantile classes have not desired ‘reform;’

and the rural and agricultural classes, the planters of the South,

and the corn and wheat growers of the West, the mechanics and

laboring classes, are not disposed to be _taxed_ enormously to

support a post-office department to gratify the avarice and

cupidity of a body of sharpers and speculators.”—_Madisonian._

“THE NEW POSTAGE LAW.—The following statement has been furnished

us of the amount of postage chargeable on letters forwarded by the

New York and Albany steamboats:

The last thirteen days of June, $99.66

First thirteen days of July, (same route,) 53.90

Decrease, $45.76.

_Albany Argus._

“I inquired at the post-office to-day for information. One of the

gentlemanly clerks of that establishment said to me, ‘Well, Mr.

Smith, I can’t give you all the information you desire, but I can

say thus much. I this morning made up a mail for Hudson; it

amounted to _seventy cents_; the same letters under the old law,

and in the same mail, would have paid _seven dollars_. Now you can

make your own deductions.’ I then inquired of the same gentleman,

if the increase of letters had been kept up since the 1st of July.

He replied ‘_no_,’ but added, ‘the increase of numbers is somewhat

encouraging, but not sufficiently so to justify the belief that

the new law will realize the hopes of its advocates.’ ”—_N. Y.

Correspondent of Boston Post._

“From the city post-office we learn that the number of letters,

papers, and packages, passing through their hands, unconnected

with the business of the government, has increased about 33 per

cent., when compared with the business of the month of June. The

gross amount of proceeds from postage on these has fallen off

nearly 66 per cent., while the postage charged to the government

for its letters, &c., received and sent, is enormous. For the

post-office department alone, it is said to reach near $40,000 for

the month just past.”—_Washington Union, Aug. 2._

“We observe in the Eastern papers some paragraphs about the

working of the new law, in which they suppose it will work well.

Unquestionably it will work well for those who have to pay the

postage; but as to the _revenue_, it will not yield even as much

as the opponents of the system supposed. We do not believe the

receipts will equal one half received under the old system. We are

told that the experience of the first week in Cincinnati does not

show more than _one quarter_ the receipts.

“Private correspondence is increased a little; but the falling off

in the mercantile increase is immense. It cannot be otherwise; for

many letters now pay 10 cents which formerly paid a dollar. Double

and treble letters pay no more than single letters. In large

cities three-fourths of the postage is paid by _business letters_.

These letters are nearly all double and treble. A double letter

from Cincinnati to New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, or

New Orleans, before, paid 50 cents; now it pays 10 cents. The

largest portion of postage is reduced to _one-fifth_ part of the

former postage.

“We are well pleased, however, that it will turn out as it will.

The law will be too popular with the people to be repealed; and it

will oblige Mr. James K. Polk’s administration to provide ways and

means out of the tariff to meet a deficiency of two millions in

the postage. This will work favorably to the tariff.

“All things will come right in the end. The lower the postage the

more economical the post-office department must be, and the more

money the government must raise from the tariff.”—_Cleveland

Herald._

“Mr. McDuffie is reported to have made the following correct and

just remarks, showing he understands well the operations of that

Department. If the bill shall become a law, our word for it, that

in less than six months one-fourth the offices in the Union will

be discontinued, because nobody will be found who will keep them.

But let the bill go into operation, and in less than twelve months

the very clamorers for low rates of postage will become so sick of

it, that they will be the first to unite in demanding its repeal.

If we supposed our advice would have any influence, we would

recommend to the Department and all Postmasters to hold on to the

old books, arrangements and fixtures, even if the bill does pass,

because in two weeks after Congress shall meet next year, it will

be repealed and the old order restored.”—_Kentucky Yeoman._

“ ‘Mr. McDuffie rose, evidently much excited, and after expressing

his regret that bodily infirmity disabled him to give the strength

of his convictions in regard to the evils which would flow from

the bill, he protested against its passage, as a measure more

radical and revolutionary than anything that had ever been done by

Congress. He denounced it as most unjust. It removes the burden

from those who ought to have it, the manufacturers and merchants

of the North, and throws it upon the farmers of the South and

West, who are already oppressed by the tariff, and who will have

to pay the expense by a tax on their necessaries.

“ ‘You will sacrifice the intelligence of the people to the

rapacity of the manufacturers. He could not imagine that the

agriculturist anywhere could feel postage as a burden; it is but a

moderate compensation for services rendered by the government. A

poor man pays $10 duty on his sugar, salt and iron, and now you

make him pay the postage. You will break up one half of the

smaller offices, you will in ten years make the post-office the

greatest organ of corruption the country has ever seen, and the

man who wields its patronage can command the sceptre. By throwing

it on the treasury, you destroy the responsibility of the head of

the department, and in ten years you will have it cost you ten

millions of dollars.’ ”

Instead of a revenue of nearly four millions, it is therefore

probable that the revenue of the first year of the experiment will

not much exceed a million and a half. It will be remembered that

Congress appropriated $750,000 to make up the expected deficiency;

but this will fall far below the necessities of the service; and

it is very probable that this sum will be consumed in the payments

of the contracts for the two first quarters. They are very busy at

the Department sending off letter balances, the postage of which

will of course constitute a charge on the Treasury; and as the

postage on each of these packets will amount to about three times

as much as the first cost of the balances, the Department will

make money out of this transaction.—_Charleston Mercury._

“I voted against this act. It is probable that a reduction might

have been made in the rates of postage which would not have

diminished the amount of revenue; but the reduction made by this

act is too great, and will have the effect of throwing the

Post-Office Department as a heavy charge on the general treasury,

which has not been the case heretofore. The post-office tax was

the only one in which the North and the East bore their share

equally with the South and the West. We would all like to have

cheap postage; and if that were the only consideration involved, I

would have voted for the act; but there were others which

influenced me to oppose it. The reduction of postage will cause a

diminution in the post-office revenue, which must be supplied by

the _general treasury_. The treasury collects the revenue which

must supply this deficiency, by a duty levied on imports; so that

the tax taken off of the _mail correspondence_ will have to be

collected on _salt_, _iron_, _sugar_, _blankets_, and other

articles which we buy from the stores. The manufacturing States

profit by this, because it aids the _protective_ policy. I might

add other objections, but deem it unnecessary at present.”—_Letter

of Hon. D. S. Reid, of ——, to his constituents._

The Postmaster-General, in his report made Dec. 1, 1845, says:

“So far as calculations can be relied on, from the returns to the

department, of the operation of the new postage law, for the

quarter ending 30th September last, the deficiency for the current

year will exceed a million and a quarter of dollars; and there is

no reasonable ground to believe that, without some amendment of

that law, it will fall short of a million of dollars for the next

year.”

The actual deficiency for the year ending June 30, 1846, was only

$589,837; and for the second year above alluded to, ending June 30, 1847,

it was but $33,677. And the Postmaster-General’s report for December,

1847, estimates the resources of the department for the year ending June

30, 1848, at $4,313,157, and the expenditures at $4,099,206, giving an

actual surplus of $213,951. If this expectation should be realized, (and

there is hardly a possibility but that it should be exceeded), the income

will exceed the annual average receipts for the nine years before the

reduction of postage, $51,467. The Postmaster-General ascribes the

increase solely to “the reduction in the rates of postage,” while nearly a

million of dollars are saved in the expenditures by the provision of the

law of 1845, directing the contracts to be let to the lowest bidder,

without reference to the transportation in coaches. So far, therefore, the

triumph of the law of 1845 has been complete. It has proved that the same

economic law exists here as in England, by which reduction of price leads

to increase of consumption.

On the other point, however, of meeting the wants of the people, so as to

bring all the correspondence of the country into the mails, its success is

very far from being equally satisfactory. The five and ten cents’ postage

does not have the effect of suppressing the private mails and illicit

transportation of letters.

The report of the House Committee in 1844, showed beforehand that such a

reduction could not have the effect here, just as the parliamentary report

had shown in 1838, that nothing but an absolute reduction to 1_d._ could

suppress the private mails in England. “Individuals can prosecute on all

the large railroad and steamboat routes between the great towns, as now, a

profitable business in conveying letters at three and five cents, where

the government would ask the five and ten cents postages.” Hill’s New

Hampshire Patriot said, shortly after the act went into operation:

“Private expresses _have not_ been discontinued in this quarter.

Far from it. They are now doing as large a business as ever,

carrying letters at half the government rates. And, strange as it

may appear, they appear to be sustained by public opinion. The new

postage act did not abate what is called ‘private enterprise,’ and

the act itself, it is thought, will soon be found to be

insufficient.”

The report of the Postmaster-General in 1845, speaks of a practice of

enveloping many letters, written on very thin paper, in one enclosure,

paying postage by the half-ounce, and thus reducing the postage on each to

a trifle.

“An incident recently occurred which will forcibly illustrate the

injurious effects of such a practice upon the revenues of the

department. A large bundle of letters was enveloped and sealed,

marked ‘postage paid, $1.60.’ By some accident in the

transportation, the envelope was so much injured as to enable the

postmaster to see that it contained one hundred letters to

different individuals, evidently designed for distribution by the

person to whom directed, and should have been charged ten dollars.

The continuance of this practice would, in a short time, deprive

the department of a large proportion of its legitimate income. The

department has no power to suppress it, further than to direct the

postages to be properly charged, whenever such practices are

detected. This has also introduced a species of thin, light paper,

by which five or six letters may be placed under one cover, and

still be under the half-ounce.”

He adds:

“The practice of sending packages of letters through the mails to

agents, for distribution, has not entirely superseded the

transmission of letters, over post roads, out of the mails, by the

expresses. The character of this offence is such as to render

detection very uncertain, full proof almost impossible, conviction

rare. The penalties are seldom recovered after conviction, and the

department rarely secures enough to meet the expenses of

prosecution. If the officers of the department were authorized in

proper cases to have the persons engaged in these violations of

the law arrested, their packages, trunks, or boxes, seized and

examined before a proper judicial officer, and, when detected in

violating the law, retained for the examination of the court and

jury, it is believed that the practice could be at once

suppressed.”

In his last report, December, 1847, he also says that, “Private expresses

still continue to be run between the principal cities, and seriously

affect the revenues of the department, from the want of adequate powers

for their suppression.” The complaint is continually, of a want of

adequate powers to suppress the practice. The law of 1845 has gone as far

as could be desired in the severity of penalties and the extent of their

application, involving in heavy fines every person who shall send or

receive letters; and every stage-coach, railroad car, steamboat, or other

vehicle or vessel—its owners, conductors and agents, which may knowingly

be employed in the conveyance of letters, or in the conveyance of any

person employed in such conveyance, under penalty of $50 for each letter

transported. What the post-office department would deem “adequate powers”

for the suppression of illicit letter-carrying, may be seen in the

following extract of a bill, which was actually reported by the

post-office committee of the House of Representatives, and “printed by

order of the House:”

“And it shall be lawful for the agents of the post-office, or

other officers of the United States government, upon reasonable

cause shown, to arrest such person or persons, and seize his or

their boxes, bags, or trunks, supposed to contain such mailable

matter, and cause the same to be opened and examined before any

officer of the United States; and if found to contain such

mailable matter, transported in violation of the laws of the

United States, shall be held to bail in the sum of five thousand

dollars, to appear and answer said charge before the next United

States Court to be held in said State, or district of said State;

and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined as aforesaid, one

hundred dollars for each letter, newspaper, or printed sheet so

transported as aforesaid, and shall be held in the custody of the

marshal until the fine and costs are paid, or until otherwise

discharged by due course of law.”

The report of 1845 thinks there is “no just reason why individuals engaged

in smuggling letters and robbing the department of its legitimate revenues

should not be punished, in the same way and to the same extent, as persons

guilty of smuggling goods; nor why the same means of detection should not

be given to the Post-office Department which are now given to the

Treasury.” That is, the power of detention and search in all cases of

suspicion by the agent, that a person is carrying letters. What would be

the effect of carrying out this system, in breaking up the practice

complained of, or what would be the amount of inconvenience to travellers

and to business, of a thorough determination in the department to execute

such a law in the spirit of it, all can judge for themselves. The British

government, as we have seen, dared not entertain such a proposition. I

have no hesitation in saying, that such a system of coercion can never be

successfully executed here. It is better to meet the difficulty, as the

British government did, in a way to make the post-office at once the most

popular vehicle of transmission, and the greatest blessing which the

government can bestow upon the people. The New York Evening Post said,

years ago:

“Congress yields, and passes such a law. What then? Is Hydra dead?

By no means, its ninety-nine other heads still rear their crests,

and bid defiance to the secretary and his law. In Pearl street,

there will yet hang a bag for the deposit of the whole

neighborhood’s letters,—at Astor House, and at Howard’s, at the

American, and at the City Hotels, still every day will see the

usual accumulation of letters,—all to be taken by some ‘private,’

trustworthy, obliging wayfarer, and by him be deposited in some

office at Boston, Philadelphia, Albany, Baltimore.”

I have no doubt that the cheap transmission of letters, out of the mails,

is now becoming systematized and extended between our large cities, and an

immense amount of correspondence is also carried on between the large

cities and the towns around. The Boston Path-Finder contains a list of 240

“Expresses,” as they are called, that is, of common carriers, who go

regularly from Boston to other towns, distant from three miles to three

hundred. Most of these men carry “mailable matter” to a great extent, in

their pockets or hats, in the shape of orders, memorandums, receipts, or

notes, sometimes on slips of paper, sometimes in letters folded in brown

paper and tied with a string, and not unfrequently in the form of

regularly sealed letters. If we suppose each one to carry, on an average,

ten in a day, a very low estimate, there are 750,000 letters brought to

Boston in a year by this channel alone. Everything which calls public

attention to the subject of postage, every increase of business causing an

increase of correspondence between any two places, every newspaper

paragraph describing the wonderful increase of letters in England, will

awaken new desires for cheap postage; and these desires will gratify

themselves irregularly, unless the only sure remedy is seasonably applied.

In the division of labor and the multiplication of competitions, there are

many lines of business of which the whole profits are made up of extremely

minute savings. In these the cost of postage becomes material; and such

concerns will not pay five cents on their letters, when they can get them

taken, carried and delivered for two cents. The causes which created

illicit penny posts in England are largely at work here, with the growth

and systematization of manufactures and trade; and they are producing, and

will produce the same results, until, on the best routes, not one-sixth of

the letters will be carried in the mail, unless the true system shall be

seasonably established. The evils of such a state of things need not be

here set forth. One of the greatest, which would not strike every mind, is

the demoralization of the public mind, in abating the reverence for law,

and the sense of gratitude and honor to the government.

In this respect, of bringing all the correspondence into the mails, in

furnishing all the facilities and encouragements to correspondence which

the duty of the government requires, in superseding the use of unlawful

conveyances, and in winning the patriotic regards of the people to the

post-office, as to every man’s friend, the act of 1845 has entirely

failed. It has not only falsified the predictions of us all in regard to

its productiveness, on the one hand, but it has even convinced the highest

official authority that it has failed to prove itself to be _the_ CHEAP

POSTAGE, which the country needs and will support. In his last annual

report, the Postmaster-General says:

“The favorable operation of the act of 1845, upon the finances of

this department, leads to the conclusion that, by the adoption of

such modifications as have been suggested by this department for

the improvement of its revenues, and the suppression of abuses

practised under it, the present low rates of postage will not only

produce revenue enough to meet the expenditures, but will leave a

considerable surplus annually to be applied to the extension of

the mail service to the new and rapidly increasing sections of our

country, or would justify a still further reduction of the rates

of postage. In the opinion of the undersigned, with such

modifications of the act of 1845 as have been suggested, an

uniform less rate might, in a few years, be made to cover the

expenses of the department; but by its adoption the department

would be compelled to rely upon the treasury for a few years. At

this time, during the existence of a foreign war, imposing such

heavy burdens upon the treasury, it might not be wise or prudent

to increase them, or to do anything which would tend to impair the

public credit; and, ON THIS ACCOUNT alone, recommendation for such

a reduction is not made.

“Postage is a tax, not only on the business of the country, but

upon the intelligence, knowledge, and the exercise of the friendly

and social feelings; and in the opinion of the undersigned, should

be reduced to the lowest point which would enable the department

to sustain itself. That principle has been uniformly acted on in

the United States, as the true standard for the regulation of

postage, and the cheaper it can be made, consistently with that

rule, the better.

“As our country expands, and its circle of business and

correspondence enlarges, as civilization progresses, it becomes

more important to maintain between the different sections of our

country a speedy, safe, and cheap intercourse. By so doing, energy

is infused into the trade of the country, the business of the

people enlarged, and made more active, and an irresistible impulse

given to industry of every kind; by it wealth is created and

diffused in numberless ways throughout the community, and the most

noble and generous feelings of our nature between distant friends

are cherished and preserved, and the Union itself more closely

bound together.”

Nothing can be more true than the position, that “postage is a tax,” and

that it is the duty of the government to make this “tax” as light as

possible, consistent with its other and equally binding duties. Nothing

more sound than the doctrine that it is utterly wrong to charge postage

with _anything more_ than its own proper expenses. Nothing more just than

the estimate here given of the benefits of cheap postage. The blessings he

describes are so great, so real, so accordant with the tone and beneficent

design of civil government itself, and especially to the functions and

duties of a republican government, that I do not think even the existence

and embarrassments of a state of war, such as now exists, are any reason

at all for postponing the commencement of so glorious a measure. If it

could be brought about under the administration of an officer who has

expressed himself so cordially and intelligently in favor of cheap

postage, and whose ability and fidelity in the economical administration

of affairs are so well known, it would be but a fitting response to the

statesmanlike sentiments quoted above.

I am now to show that, on the strictest principles of justice, on the

closest mathematical calculation, on the most enlarged and yet rigid

construction of the duty imposed on the federal government by our

constitution, two cents per half ounce is the most just and equal rate of

postage.

IV. _What is the just Rule to be observed in settling the Rates of

Postage?_

The posting of letters may be looked at, either as a contract between the

government and the individuals who send and receive letters, or as a

simple exercise of governmental functions in discharging a governmental

duty. The proper measure of the charge to be imposed should be considered

in each of these aspects, for the government is bound to do that which is

right in both these relations.

Viewed simply as a contract, or a service rendered for an equivalent, what

would be the rate to be charged? Not, surely, the amount it would cost the

individual to send his own particular letter. The saving effected by the

division and combination of labor is a public benefit, and not to be

appropriated as an exclusive right by one. In this view, the government

stands only in the relation of a party to the contract, just as a state or

a town would do, or an individual. No right or power of monopoly can enter

into the calculation. We can illustrate the question by supposing a case,

of a town some thirty miles from Boston, to which there has hitherto been

no common-carrier. The inhabitants resolve to establish an express, and

for this purpose enter into negotiations with one of their neighbors, in

which they agree to give him their business on his agreeing to establish a

reasonable tariff of prices for his service. If the number of patrons is

very small, they cannot make it an object for the man to run his wagon,

unless they will agree to pay a good price for parcels. And the more

numerous the parcels are, the lower will be the rate, within certain

limits, that is, until the man’s wagon is fairly loaded, or he has as much

business as he can reasonably attend to. This is on the supposition that

all the business is to come from one place. But if there are intermediate

or contiguous places whose patronage can be obtained to swell the amount

of business, there should be an equitable apportionment of this advantage,

a part to go to the carrier for his additional trouble and fair profits,

and a part to go towards reducing the general rate of charge. If, however,

the carrier has an interest in a place five miles beyond, which he thinks

may be built up by having an express running into it from Boston, although

the present amount of business is too small to pay the cost, and if, for

considerations of his own advantage, he resolves to run his wagon to that

place at a constant loss for the present, looking to the rise of his

property for ultimate remuneration, it would not be just for him to

insist, that the people who intend to establish an express and support it

for themselves, shall yet pay an increased or exorbitant price for their

own parcels, in order to pay him for an appendage to the enterprise, for

which they have no occasion, and as such he himself undertakes for

personal considerations of is own.

And if he should be obstinate on this point, they would just let him take

his own way, and charge prices to suit himself, while they proceeded to

make a new bargain with another carrier, who would agree to accommodate

them at reasonable prices adjusted on the basis of their patronage. And if

an appeal should be made to their sympathy or charity, to help the growing

hamlet, they would say, that it was better to give charity out of their

pockets than by paying a high price on their parcels; for then those would

give who were able and willing, and would know how much they gave. This

covers the whole case of arranging postage as a matter of equal contract.

The just measure of charge is, the lowest rate at which the work can be

afforded by individual enterprise on the best self-supporting routes.

Plainly, no other rate can be kept up by open competition on these routes.

And if these routes are lost by competition, you must charge

proportionably higher on the rest, which will throw the next class of

routes into other hands, and so on, until nothing is left for you but the

most costly and impracticable portions of the work.

The only material exception to this rule would be, where there is an

extensive and complicated combination of interests, among which the

general convenience and even economy will be promoted by establishing a

uniformity of prices, without reference to an exact apportionment of

minute differences.

It can be easily shown, that all these considerations would be harmonized

by no rate of postage on letters, higher than the English 1_d._, or with

us two cents for each half ounce. Considered as a business question,

unaffected by the assumed power of monopoly by the government, the

reasonings of the parliamentary reports and the results of the British

experiment abundantly establish this rate to be the fair average price for

the service rendered. A moderate business can live by it, if economically

conducted, and a large business will make it vastly profitable, as is seen

in the payment of four or five millions of dollars a year into the public

treasury of Great Britain, as the net profits of penny postage.

If we look at the post-office in the more philosophical and elevated

aspect of a grand governmental measure, enjoined by the people for the

good of the people, we shall be brought to a similar conclusion. The

constitutional rule for the establishment of the post-office, is as

follows:

“Congress shall have power to—

“Establish post-offices and post-roads.”

This clause declares plainly the will of the people of the United States,

that the federal government should be charged with the responsibility of

furnishing the whole Union with convenient and proper mail

privileges—according to their reasonable wants, and the reasonable ability

of the government. This is one point of the “general welfare,” for which

we are to look to congress, just as we look to congress to provide for the

general defence by means of the army and navy. It imposes no other

restrictions in the one case than the other, as to the extent to which

provision shall be made—the reasonable wants of the people, and the

reasonable ability of the government. It limits the resources for this

object to no particular branch of the revenue. It gives no sort of

sanction to the so oft-repeated rule, which many suppose to be a part of

the constitution, that the post-office must support itself. Still less,

does it authorize congress to throw all manner of burdens upon the mail,

and then refuse to increase its usefulness as a public convenience,

because it cannot carry all those loads. The people must have mails, and

congress must furnish them. To reason for or against any proposed change,

on the ground that the alternative may be the discontinuance of public

mails, the privation of this privilege to the people, and the winding up

of the post-office system, is clearly inadmissible. When the government

ceases to give the people the privileges of the mail, the government

itself will soon wind up, or rather, will be taken in hand and wound up by

the people, and set a-going again on better principles. The sole inquiry

for congress is, what is the best way to meet the reasonable wants of the

people, by means within the reasonable ability of the government?

The objects of the post-office system, which regulate its administration,

are well set forth in the Report of the House Committee in 1844: “To

content the man, dwelling more remote from town, with his homely lot, by

giving him regular and frequent means of intercommunication; to assure the

emigrant, who plants his new home on the skirts of the distant wilderness

or prairie, that he is not forever severed from the kindred and society

that still share his interest and love; to prevent those whom the swelling

tide of population is constantly, pressing to the outer verge of

civilization from being surrendered to surrounding influences, and sinking

into the hunter or savage state; to render the citizen, how far soever

from the seat of his government, worthy, by proper knowledge and

intelligence, of his important privileges as a sovereign constituent of

the government; to diffuse, throughout all parts of the land,

enlightenment, social improvement, and national affinities, elevating our

people in the scale of civilization, and binding them together in

patriotic affection.”

These are the objects for which congress is bound to maintain the

post-office, and it is impossible that congress should ever seriously

consider whether they will not abandon them. The maintenance of convenient

mails for these objects is therefore to be regarded as a necessary

function of the government of the United States. In the infancy of that

government, while the government itself was an experiment, when the

country was deeply in debt for the cost of our independence, and when its

resources for public expenditure were untried and unknown, there was

doubtless a propriety in the adoption of the principle, that the

post-office department should support itself. But that state of things has

long gone by, and our government now has ample ability to execute any

plans of improvement whatever, for the advancement of knowledge, and for

binding the Union together, provided such plans come within the

acknowledged powers conferred by the constitution.

The post-office being, then, like the army and navy, a necessary branch of

the government, it follows that the charge of postage for the conveyance

of letters and papers is of the nature of a tax, as has been well

expressed by the present Postmaster-General, in his last annual report,

quoted above. “_Postage is a tax_, not only on the business of the

country, but upon intelligence and knowledge, and the exercise of the

friendly and social affections.” The question before us is, How heavy a

“tax” ought the government of a federal republic to impose on these

interests? Every friend of freedom and of human improvement answers

spontaneously, that nothing but a clear necessity can justify any tax at

all upon such subjects, and that the tax should be reduced, in all cases,

to the very lowest practicable rate. The experience of the British

government, the prodigious increase of correspondence produced by cheap

postage, and the immense revenue accruing therefrom, demonstrate that TWO

CENTS is not below the rate which the government can afford to receive.

Let the people understand that all beyond this is a mere “tax,” not

required by any necessity, and they will soon demand that the government

look for its resources to some more suitable subjects of taxation than

these.

Another rule of right in regard to this “tax” is well laid down in the

Report of the House Committee, for 1844: “As the post-office is made to

sustain itself solely by a tax on correspondence, it should derive aid and

support from everything which it conveys. No man’s private correspondence

should go free, since the expense of so conveying it becomes a charge upon

the correspondence of others; and the special favor thus given, and which

is much abused by being extended to others not contemplated by law, is

unjust and odious. Neither should the public correspondence be carried

free of charge where such immunity operates as a burden upon the

correspondence of the citizen. There is no reason why the public should

not pay its postages as well as citizens—no sufficient reason why this

item of public expenses should not be borne, like all others, by the

general tax paid into the treasury.” These remarks are made, indeed, with

reference to the franking privilege, which the committee properly proposed

to abolish on the grounds here set forth. But it is plain that the

principle is equally pertinent to the question of taxing the

correspondence of the thickly settled parts of the country for the purpose

of raising means to defray the expense of sending mails to the new and

distant parts of the country. There is no justice in it. The extension of

these mails is a duty of the government; and let the government, by the

same rule, pay the cost out of its own treasury. “Postage,” says the same

report, “in the large towns and contiguous places, is, in part, a

_contribution_.” It is a forced contribution, levied not upon the property

of the people, but upon their intelligence and affections.

Our letters are taxed to pay the following expenses:

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