_Estimate of the number of chargeable Letters delivered in the United
Kingdom in each year, from_ 1839 _to_ 1847.(1)
Year. Number of Letters. Annual Increase. Increase per cent.
Millions. Millions. on the No. for 1839.
1839. 76(2)
1840. 169 93 123
1841. 196-½ 27-½ 36
1842. 208-½ 12 16
1843. 220-½ 12 16
1844. 242 21-½ 28
1845. 271-½ 29-½ 39
1846. 299-½ 28 37
1847. 322 22-½ 30
The most important of the tables contained in the parliamentary return
will be given in the appendix, either entire, or so as to present the
material results in their official form. The contents of that document
have not, to my knowledge, been in any manner brought before the people of
the United States.
It is humiliating to think, that while a system fraught with so many
blessings has been so long in operation, and with such signal success as a
financial measure, in a country with which our relations are so intimate,
I should now begin to prepare the first pamphlet for publication, designed
to give the American people full information on the subject; this
publication being the first effort of the first regularly organized
society, now just formed, for the purpose of securing the same blessings
to the citizens of this republic, which the British Parliament enacted,
after full investigation, nine years ago. If we look at the various
political questions which have already in those eight years grown
“obsolete,” after occupying the public mind and engrossed the cares of our
statesmen, to the exclusion of the great subject of cheap postage, and
consider their comparative importance, we shall be satisfied that it is
now high time for a determined effort to satisfy the people of the United
States with regard to the utility and practicability of cheap postage.
Prior to the year 1840 the postal systems of Great Britain and the United
States were constructed on similar principles, and the rates of postage
were nearly alike. Both were administered with a special view to the
amount of money that could be realized from postage. In Great Britain, the
surplus of receipts above the cost of administration was carried to the
general treasury. In the United States, the surplus received in the North
was employed in extending mail facilities to the scattered inhabitants of
the South and West. In Great Britain, private mails and other facilities
had kept the receipts stationary for twenty years, while the population of
the country had increased thirty per cent., and the business and
intelligence and wealth of the country in a much greater ratio. In the
United States, there was a constant increase of postage, although by a
less ratio than the increase of population, until the year 1843, when,
through the establishment of private mails, the gross receipts actually
fell off, and it became apparent that the old system had failed, and could
never be reinvigorated so as to make the post-office support itself,
without a change of system.
In Great Britain, the government, after full investigation, became
satisfied that it was impossible to suppress the private mails except by
under-bidding them, which they also ascertained that the government, by
its facilities, could afford to do. They also became satisfied that no
plan of partial reduction of postage could restore the energy of the
system, but the only hope of ultimate success was in the immediate
adoption of the lowest rate. And although the public debt presses so
heavily as to put every administration to its utmost resources for
revenue, they resolved to risk the whole net revenue then realized, equal
to above a million and a half sterling, as the best thing that could be
done. In the United States, the government, without extensive examination,
resolved to do what the British government dared not attempt, that is, to
put down the private mails by penal enactments. It also resolved to adopt
a partial reduction of the rates of postage; and without regarding the
mathematical demonstration of its futility, persevered in regarding
distance as the basis of the rates of charge.
A few extracts from the Debates in Parliament, will show several of these
points in a striking light:
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Francis Baring, on first
introducing the bill, July 5, 1839, declared his conviction that
the loss of revenue at the outset would be “very considerable
indeed.” He said the committee had considered that “two pence
postage could be introduced without any loss to the revenue,” but
he differed from them, and found “the whole of the authorities
conclusively bearing in favor of a penny postage.” And he
“conscientiously believed that the public ran less risk of loss in
adopting it.” Referring to the petitions of the people, he said,
“The mass of them present the most extraordinary combination I
ever saw, of representations to one purpose, from all classes,
unswayed by any political motive whatever, from persons of all
shades of opinion, political and religious, and from the
commercial and trading communities in all parts of the kingdom.”
Mr. GOULBURN, then one of the leaders of the opposition, opposed
so great a sacrifice of revenue, in the existing state of the
country, but admitted that it would “ultimately increase the
wealth and prosperity of the country.” And if the experiment was
to be tried at all, “it would be best to make it to the extent
proposed,” for “the whole evidence went to show that a postage of
two pence would fail, but a penny might succeed.”
Mr. WALLACE declared it “one of the greatest boons that could be
conferred on the human race,” and he begged that, as “England had
the honor of the invention,” they might not “lose the honor of
being the first to execute” a plan, which he pronounced
“essentially necessary to the comforts of the human race.”
Sir ROBERT PEEL, then at the head of the opposition, found much
fault with the financial plans of Mr. Baring, but he “would not
say one word in disparagement of the plans of Mr. Hill;” and if he
wanted popularity, “he would at once give way to the public
feeling in favor of the great moral and social advantages” of the
plan, “the great stimulus it would afford to industry and
commercial enterprise,” and “the boon it presented to the lower
classes.”
Mr. O’CONNELL thought it would be “one of the most valuable
legislative reliefs that had ever been given to the people.” It
was “impossible to exaggerate its benefits.” And even if it would
not pay the expense of the post-office, he held that “_government
ought to make a sacrifice for the purpose of facilitating
communication_.”
_July_ 12, the debate was resumed.
Mr. POULETTE THOMPSON showed the impossibility of making a correct
estimate of the loss of revenue that would accrue. One witness
before the committee stated that there would be no deficiency;
another said it would be small; while Lord Ashburton declared that
it would amount to a sacrifice of the whole revenue of the
post-office.
Mr. WARBURTON denied that the post-office had ever been regarded
as a mere matter of revenue; the primary object of its institution
was to contribute to the convenience of the people; its advantages
ought to be accessible to the whole community, and not be made a
matter of taxation at all.
VISCOUNT SANDON, of the opposition, said he had long been of the
opinion that the post-office was not a proper source of revenue,
but it “ought to be employed in stimulating other sources of
revenue.”
_July_ 22, another discussion came on.
Sir ROBERT PEEL admitted that “great social and commercial
advantages will arise from the change, independent of financial
considerations.”
_August_ 5, the bill was taken up by the peers.
VISCOUNT MELBOURN, in opening the debate, dwelt upon the
extraordinary extent of the contraband conveyance of letters, as
the effect of high postage, and said this made it necessary to
protect both the revenue and the morals of the people by so great
a reduction. The means of evasion were so organized, and resort to
them was so easy, and had even become a habit, that persons would,
for a very small profit, follow the contraband trade of conveying
letters. It was therefore clearly necessary to make the reduction
to such an extent as would ensure the stopping of the contraband
trade.
The DUKE OF WELLINGTON admitted “the expediency, and indeed the
necessity” of the proposed change. He thought Mr. Hill’s plan “the
one most likely to succeed.” He found fault with the financial
plans of the administration, but for the sake of the reform of the
post-office, he said, “I shall, although with great reluctance,
vote for the bill, and I earnestly recommend your lordships to do
the same.” His customary mode of expressing his opinions.
LORD ASHBURTON expected the cost of the department, under the new
system, would amount to a million sterling, which must be made up
out of several pence before you could touch one farthing of the
present income of a million and six hundred pounds. There could be
no doubt that the country at large would derive an immense
benefit, the consumption of paper would be increased considerably,
and it was most probable the number of letters would be at least
doubled. It appeared to him a tax upon communication between
distant parties was, _of all taxes, the __ most objectionable_. At
one time he had been of the opinion that the uniform charge of
postage should be two pence, but _he found the mass of evidence so
strongly in favor of one penny_, that he concluded the ministers
were right in coming down to that rate.
The EARL OF LICHFIELD, Postmaster-General, said the leading idea
of Mr. Rowland Hill’s book seemed to be “the fancy that he had hit
upon a scheme for recovering the two millions of revenue which he
thought had been lost by the high rates of postage.” His own
opinion was, that the recovery of the revenue was totally
impossible. He therefore supported the measure on entirely
different grounds from those on which Mr. Hill placed it. In
neither house had it been brought forward on the ground that the
revenue would be the gainer. He assented to it on the simple
ground that THE DEMAND FOR IT WAS UNIVERSAL. So obnoxious was the
tax upon letters, that he was entitled to say that “the people had
declared their _readiness to submit to any impost_ that might be
substituted in its stead.”
The proof is thus complete, that the British system was actually adopted
with sole reference to its general benefits, and the will of the people,
and not at all in the expectation of realizing, in any moderate time, as
much revenue as was derived from the old postage. The revenue question was
discarded, from a paramount regard to the public good, which demanded the
cheap postage, even if it should be necessary to impose a new tax for its
support. The extravagant expectations of some of the over-sanguine friends
of the new system, were expressly disclaimed, and the government justified
themselves on these other considerations entirely—considerations which
have been most abundantly realized. It will be easy to show that the
benefits and blessings anticipated from the actual enjoyment of cheap
postage, have fully equalled the most sanguine expectations of the friends
of the measure, and have far exceeded in public utility, the pittance of
income to the treasury, which used to be wrung out by the tax upon
letters. The same examination will also show, that there is no substantial
reason, either in the system itself, or in any peculiarity of our
circumstances, why the same system is not equally practicable and equally
applicable here, nor why we should not realize at least as great benefits
as the people of Great Britain, from cheap postage.
Mr. Rowland Hill published his scheme in a pamphlet, in 1837. In 1838, it
had attracted so much notice, that between three and four hundred
petitions in its favor were presented to Parliament, and the government
consented to a select committee to collect and report information on the
subject. This committee sat sixty-three days, examined the
Postmaster-General and his secretaries and solicitors, elicited many
important tabular returns, and took the testimony of about ninety other
individuals, of a great variety of stations and occupations. They also
entered into many minute and elaborate calculations, which give to their
results the value of mathematical demonstration. Their report, with the
accompanying documents, fills three folio volumes of the Parliamentary
Papers for 1838. Its investigations were so thorough, its deductions so
cautious and candid, and its accumulations of evidence so overwhelming
that they left nothing to be done, but to adopt the new system entire.
In this country, no such pains were taken to collect facts, no means were
used to spread before the people the facts and mathematical calculations
and irrefragable arguments of the parliamentary committee; little study
was bestowed on the subject even by our legislators but with a prejudged
conclusion that the reasonings and facts applicable to Great Britain could
not apply here, on account of the length of our routes and the sparseness
of our population, a partial reduction was resolved upon, which retained
the complication and the cumbersome machinery of the old system, while
affording only a small portion of the benefits of the new.
The effect has been, that while the British system has gone on gathering
favor and strength, the American system, after less than three years’
trial, has already grown old, the private mails are reviving, the
ingenuity of men of business is taxed to evade postage, and a growing
conviction already shows itself, that the half-way reduction is a failure,
and it is time to make another change. That is to say, the partial
reduction has failed to meet the wishes of the people, or the wants of the
public interest, or the duty of the government in discharging the trust
imposed by the constitution. Indeed, there ought not to be a great deal of
labor required to prove that there is only one right way, and that the
right way is the best way, and that it is better to adopt a scientifically
constructed machine, which has been proved to be perfect in all its parts,
than a clumsy contrivance, the working principle of which is contradicted
by mathematical demonstration. I propose to present several of the main
principles involved in the reduction of postage, illustrated by facts
drawn from the parliamentary papers, and from other authentic sources.