REGINA (_continued_)
The 4th Division, commanded by Major-General David Watson, C.B.,
C.M.G., entered the Somme area on October 10th and 11th, 1916, during
the lull between the operations of October 8th and those of October
21st.
Though a new Division, which had never as yet taken part in any
concerted major operations, it soon proved itself no whit inferior to
the senior Divisions. It had had practical experience in holding the
line in the Ypres salient in September, and it had already been
blooded, for on the night of September 16th it had carried out a
well-planned series of simultaneous raids which reflected the greatest
credit on the new Division. There were seven raiding parties.
The first party consisted of one officer and forty men of the 22nd
Battalion. Leaving the trenches at 11.22 p.m., the party moved
cautiously forward, great care being necessary owing to the bright
moonlight. The scaling ladders and chicken wire were left behind, as
it was feared they might be seen too easily. As soon as the enemy
trench was rushed the party split into two, working to the right and
left. The enemy bolted so swiftly that only two were caught. Dug-outs
were bombed and as much wire as possible destroyed by the covering
party. At 12.25 a.m. the raiders left the enemy trench and found their
way back without difficulty by means of the white tape laid for that
purpose.
The 46th Battalion party of one officer and thirty-one other ranks
carried out the second raid against the Hollandscheschuur Salient. At
12.20 a.m. the raiders crawled over the intervening space of forty
yards, rushed the trench, and worked down to a supposed strong point.
This proved to be merely a large hole, unstrengthened in any way.
Explosives which had been brought to blow up this post were used
against an occupied dug-out, 62 lb. of guncotton being touched off for
the purpose. Fifteen Germans were killed during the raid and one
captured. No difficulty was experienced in penetrating the wire.
The third raid was entrusted to the 47th Battalion. The raiding party
of one officer and twenty-eight other ranks had further to go than the
preceding parties and started five minutes earlier. Complete success
was attained. The party bombed south after entering the enemy trench,
making for a supposed strong point which turned out to be similar to
the one above. Nine Germans were killed and ten taken prisoners.
The fourth raid was also undertaken by the 47th Battalion. A
comparatively long distance separated the two trench lines, some 200
yards. On this account an early start was imperative. Scarcely any
resistance was encountered. Six Germans were killed, and others were
pursued but not caught. The artillery preparation, under
Lieutenant-Colonel McNaughton, and the trench-mortar work were all that
could be desired.
The 75th Battalion carried out the fifth raid. Three officers and
thirty-one other ranks constituted the raiding party. They moved out
just after midnight, formed up outside our wire, and were within twenty
yards of the German trench while it was still being bombarded. Rushing
in as soon as the barrage lifted, they divided up into two parties,
which bombed right and left for fifty yards. Some resistance was
encountered by the right party, but five of the enemy were killed,
three captured, and the rest escaped over the parados under fire from
the covering party. The left party also experienced resistance, but
reached their objective in spite of opposition. Dug-outs were bombed
and the enemy forced to escape over the parados. After a successful
withdrawal the artillery was again turned on to the front line. Of the
six prisoners taken four bolted on the way back and came to an untimely
end. The 7th Belgian Field Artillery supporting the raid, rendered
excellent service, which earned the warm commendation of all concerned
in the operation.
The sixth raid, by the 54th Battalion was the most elaborate of all.
Four officers and fifty-eight other ranks took part. The objective was
No. 2 Crater at St. Eloi. Almost at the start the officers in charge
were wounded. An unavoidable loss of direction and control naturally
resulted, though the parties succeeded in reaching their objectives.
An unfortunate _contretemps_ arose from the fact that the bugler who
was to have sounded the signal to retire fell into an exceedingly muddy
and unsavoury shell-hole and lost his bugle! "A" party, on the left,
captured three prisoners and bombed several inhabited dug-outs. A
machine-gun was also captured. "B," "C," and "D" parties met with
little resistance, and saw nothing of the enemy. "E" party bombed
northwards towards No. 3 Crater, met with little opposition and
captured one prisoner. "F" party had a harder task to the south on the
far side of No. 3 Crater, but captured three prisoners and an automatic
rifle, which was unfortunately lost when the man carrying it was
wounded. "G" party, also moving south, unsuccessfully chased a number
of the enemy towards the 75th raiding party.
As soon as the retirement began an undiscovered machine-gun opened up
unexpectedly. Fifteen of the enemy were killed, including an officer
and two men who resisted all attempts to bring them back after capture.
Six prisoners were brought in.
The seventh raid, undertaken by the 87th Battalion, was unsuccessful.
The three officers and forty-seven other ranks who made up the party
got well away close under the barrage, but on reaching the parapet two
small mines were exploded beneath them. In some way the enemy had
become aware of the approaching raid, probably owing to an attack
carried out by the Division on the left; the element of surprise, the
great factor in all successful raids, was thus lost. Heavy fire was
directed against the attackers; and after a brisk exchange of bombs it
became evident that nothing could be accomplished. The party
accordingly withdrew.
These raids, with the one exception noted, were eminently successful.
This success was due in no small measure to the very careful
preparation made beforehand. The parties involved were withdrawn from
the line a week before the raid, all details were carefully worked out,
trenches dug to scale, the ground constantly patrolled, and the raiding
parties taken over it by night in small groups. The excellent
artillery support and the thorough work of the covering parties all
contributed to the satisfactory result.
On their arrival in the Somme area the 4th Division was fortunate
enough to experience a few days of comparative quiet, with little more
than shell-fire and sniping to incommode them while getting themselves
shaken down into their new lines. Owing largely to the wretched
weather, the conditions underfoot, and the state of the trenches, the
operations pending, major and preliminary, were from day to day
postponed. In fact, the three senior Canadian Divisions were withdrawn
from the area before another attack in force was launched against the
blood-drenched barrier of Regina. On October 17th the 4th Division,
remaining behind, came under the orders of the II Corps for the purpose
of future operations. These operations, in so far as the 4th Division
was concerned, began on October 21st.
The general plan of operations was as follows. The II Corps[1] was to
attack on the front between Courcelette Trench and the River Ancre in
order to capture Petit Miraumont, Grandcourt, and at Pierre Divion.
Afterwards the passages of the Ancre were to be forced and the II Corps
would co-operate with the V Corps by pushing north. There were three
Divisions in line, the 18th, 19th, and 39th, from right to left. The
dual _rôle_ of the 4th Canadian Division was to protect the right flank
of the 18th Division of the II Corps and to safeguard the left flank of
the III Corps on the right.
A preliminary operation was assigned to the II Corps before the general
action began. This preparatory task was the capture of the Regina
Stuff line of trenches, to be undertaken by the 18th, 25th, and 39th
Divisions, from right to left. In this operation the 4th Canadian
Division would co-operate by effecting the capture of Regina Trench
from Courcelette Trench to a point just before the intersection of the
Pys Road, thence approximately along an old German trench to join up
with the sapheads which were being built by the 10th Canadian Infantry
Brigade, under Brigadier-General William Hughes, D.S.O.
The 11th Brigade, on the left, under Brigadier-General V. W. Odlum,
D.S.O., undertook the capture of the portion of Regina Trench assigned
to the Division. Meanwhile, the 10th Brigade was to co-operate by
pushing forward its saps so as to be able to support the 11th Brigade
by an enfilading fire. Each Brigade, by the 19th, had completed a very
useful sap, close to the junction of their respective lines, up old
German trenches to within two-thirds of the distance to Regina. The
11th Brigade placed the 87th and 102nd Battalions in the line, the
former on the right, each Battalion having two companies of the 75th in
support.
At noon on the 21st the attack began. The whole operation was an
unqualified success. Before the afternoon was far advanced the
objectives had all been gained and consolidated, blocks established in
Regina and up the Pys Road, and contact effected with the equally
successful 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division on the left. The
co-operation of the 10th Brigade on the right was all that could be
desired. Altogether the result of the action was a welcome change from
the disappointments attending the hard-fought and determined attempts
against Regina earlier in the month. The new and comparatively raw
Division had won its spurs with _éclat_.
On the 25th of the month a second preliminary operation was undertaken.
In preparation for this attack the right of the 10th Brigade was
extended to the Chalk Pit.
At 7 a.m. the attacking Battalion, the 44th, advanced to the assault,
supported by the 46th. Early reports seemed to indicate that the
operation had been entirely successful. It soon became evident,
however, that this was not the case. The enemy was enabled to hold his
trenches in great force and to bring a devastatingly effective
enfilading machine-gun fire to bear upon the 44th from the vicinity of
the quadrangle. There was nothing for it but to take such cover as was
available--old disused trenches and shell-holes, where many remained
until dark. The Battalion suffered very heavily, having 3 officers
killed and 7 wounded, and of other ranks 29 killed, 152 wounded, and 23
missing. The work of the stretcher-bearers in this action was
especially commendable.
A long period of very bad weather compelled the postponement of further
operation from day to day. Numerous operation orders and amending
orders were issued, but nothing could be attempted until better weather
conditions prevailed. It was decided that an attack on the remaining
right section of Regina Trench would be made as soon as the weather
should allow of two days' successful bombardment. On November 9th and
10th fine weather permitted good shooting. The plan of attack had been
ready for some time in anticipation, and accordingly an assault was
determined for the night of November 10th-11th.
From right to left the attacking line consisted of the 46th and 47th
Battalions of the 10th Brigade and the 102nd Battalion of the 11th
Brigade, attached for the purpose to the 10th Brigade. The aim was to
capture and consolidate Regina Trench from the block established in
Regina on the right flank of the 11th Brigade attack of October 21st to
Farmer's Road. The 46th Battalion, on the right, attacked the line
from the right boundary of the objective to the intersection of the
Practice Road. The 47th Battalion was responsible for the central
section. The 102nd Battalion, on the left, advanced against the
remaining portion of Regina and also from the right extremity of the
part of Regina already held in a north-easterly direction against the
new enemy line running north and north-west from Regina to the Pys Road.
The 46th and 47th Battalions attacked at zero hour, midnight, with two
companies each in line, in four waves. The company of the 102nd which
advanced against Regina went forward in two waves, as did also the
three platoons which attacked from Regina north-easterly towards the
new German line.
The operation as a whole was very successful. The enemy's barrage was
over the heads of the attacking troops, who stole a march on their
opponents, for zero hour found them 150 yards in advance of their front
trench, so that they were in amongst the Germans almost before the Huns
realised what was happening. In the centre success was immediate and
complete, though the 47th suffered more severely than the other
Battalions for the reason that they were the only Battalion to run into
heavy machine-gun fire. On the right the 46th was equally victorious,
but they encountered a stiffer resistance. Good fortune also favoured
the attack of the 102nd Battalion on the left. The specified portion
of Regina was captured, and the northern attacking party was also, at
first, completely successful; later, however, they were bombed back
some distance, and established a block about 85 yards in advance of
Regina. This post was stoutly held against a number of determined
counter-attacks.
By 1.20 a.m. the 46th and 47th had overrun their objective, and dug in
some 100 yards beyond it. Unfortunately, this new line came under our
own protective artillery fire, and had to be abandoned. By 2.20 a.m.,
however, consolidation was well advanced. The required posts were
established, and work started on new connecting saps and trenches. The
working party which the O.C. 46th had been ordered to detail came up on
time, and everything was rapidly rounding into shape, including the new
connecting trench between Regina and Kling Trenches.
At daybreak a concentration by the enemy in Below and New Gallwitz
Trenches was dispersed by our artillery. Conditions rapidly became
normal, and it was now possible to take stock of the position.
Altogether it had been a notable success for the 4th Division.
The casualties in the 10th Brigade were 3 officers killed and 4
wounded, and 41 other ranks killed, 156 wounded, and 26 missing. The
majority of these were of the 47th Battalion.
The 102nd Battalion of the 11th Brigade had 4 officers wounded, 10
other ranks killed, 34 wounded, and 8 missing.
Three officers and 84 other ranks were captured, also 4 machine-guns.
About 50 German dead were found in the trench; and, in addition, they
lost a number of men who endeavoured to escape across country.
Regina Trench itself proved a disappointment. It was knee-deep in mud,
and some of the dug-outs had only been commenced. In addition to the
capture of Regina, the advanced salient shown on the map was pushed out
in order to secure observation of Coulée and Below Trenches.
All concerned in the operation received the congratulations of the
Higher Command. The whole of Regina Trench, which had defied the
Canadian Corps for over a month, was now in British hands; and the 4th
Canadian Division had earned an enviable reputation for a young
Division---a reputation which was to be further enhanced by the
achievement of the 11th Brigade a week later.
On November 18th this Brigade, taking part in the resumed general
offensive, carried out its task of capturing and consolidating Desire
Trench. The whole operation, which is described in the succeeding
chapter, was executed with dash and thoroughness, and brought to a
fitting conclusion the strenuous campaign of the Canadian Divisions on
the Somme.
[1] The II Corps consisted of the 18th, 19th, 25th, 39th British
Divisions, and 4th Canadian Division.