THE SUGAR FACTORY AND COURCELETTE
When the Canadians came up to join the struggle on the Somme, they
arrived under happy auspices. There was a sense of victory in the air.
This is not less true literally than as a figure of speech; for on
every hand the clear sky of early autumn in Picardy was dotted by our
stationary observation balloons, and threaded by our darting 'planes,
which scouted confidently far over the enemy lines or methodically
registered for the massed ranks of our guns. Just at this period the
supremacy of our Air Service was hardly ever disputed. The German
'planes rarely explored beyond our lines, and the German "sausages"
seldom ventured aloft, having learned that such a venture was
equivalent to speedy suicide. Moreover, here on the Somme Front our
Battalions realised at once that, upon whatsoever hard undertaking they
might be launched, they would have the support of an overmastering
weight of artillery. Shell-fire, however murderous, loses half its
effect upon the men's spirit when they feel that what they are enduring
is mild compared to the avalanche of destruction which their own
batteries, close behind them, are at the same moment letting loose upon
the enemy. Altogether it was a tonic change for our Battalions, after
their long gruelling in "the Salient," where at times they had felt
themselves in much the position of the toad under the harrow, ground
down into the Flanders mire by bombardments from three sides at once,
and ceaselessly overlooked by an adversary holding superior positions.
Here at last they marched up into the fight over ground wrenched from
the enemy in spite of his most deliberate and desperate efforts to hold
on to it. Here they felt that they would have a chance to "get a bit
of their own back"--and, as the event will show, they got it, full
measure and running over.
The terrain over which the attack was to be made is a gently undulating
expanse of farm lands stripped naked by the incessant storm of
shell-fire and closely pitted with shell-holes and craters. Of grass
or herbage not a blade remained, of trees but here and there a bald and
riven stump. Dividing this unspeakable waste runs the straight highway
from Albert to Bapaume, thick strung with ruined, or rather
obliterated, villages. Of these the most advanced in our possession
was Pozières, with the great road running directly through it. A mile
and a half further on the road runs midway between the twin villages of
Courcelette (on the left) and Martinpuich (on the right), which lie
about three-quarters of a mile apart. A little nearer our line, and
flush with the left of the road--just about a mile from the eastern
limit of Pozières--stood a mass of partly demolished brick buildings
which had been a great sugar factory, and now, heavily entrenched and
fortified by all the arts of the German engineers, constituted the most
formidable outpost of Courcelette as well as an important flank defence
to the position of Martinpuich. From the western extremity of
Martinpuich a strong trench known as Candy Trench ran north-west to the
Bapaume Road, skirted the west side of the Sugar Factory, continued in
the same direction for a couple of hundred yards past that stronghold,
and joined, at right angles, another deeply entrenched and strongly
held line called Sugar Trench, which ran south-west for a distance of
about twelve hundred yards and ended at McDonnell Road, a second-class
thoroughfare almost parallel to the Bapaume highway. It was these two
great trenches, each nearly three-quarters of a mile in length, forming
two sides of a triangle with the Sugar Factory Fort in the apex, which
constituted the grand obstacle to any advance on Courcelette itself.
It was an obstacle of the first order, lavishly supported by bombing
and machine-gun posts, its flanks fully guarded by trench-works outside
of Martinpuich and along McDonnell Road. Such and so formidable was
the objective which the 2nd Division set itself out to gain on that
memorable morning of the 15th.
The troops detailed for the attack were the 4th and 6th Brigades, the
5th being held in reserve. The position from which the attack was
ordered to start was a line of trench covering the front of Pozières,
and something under half a mile in advance of the edge of the village.
This line, roughly speaking about a mile in extent, ran south-west and
north-west across the Bapaume Road, which divided it at right angles
into two almost equal sectors, the major sector being that to the north
or left of the road. The extreme left of the line rested on McDonnell
Road, and joined up at that point with the 3rd Canadian Division. The
right connected with the 15th British Division, which lay facing
Martinpuich and kept the enemy force there fully occupied. The sector
to the right of the Bapaume Road was in the hands of the 4th Brigade,
under Brigadier-General R. Rennie, M.V.O., D.S.O., while the left
sector was allotted to the 6th, under Brigadier-General H. D. B.
Ketchen, C.M.G. The attacking line of the 4th Brigade was made up as
follows:--On the right the 18th Battalion (Western Ontario), commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Milligan; centre, the 20th Battalion (Northern
and Central Ontario), commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Rogers; and
on the left the 21st Battalion (Eastern Ontario), under
Lieutenant-Colonel Elmer Jones. In Brigade Reserve was the 24th
Battalion (Victoria Rifles of Canada), under Lieutenant-Colonel J. H.
Gunn. The attacking line of the 6th Brigade consisted of the 27th
Battalion (City of Winnipeg), commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel P. J.
Daly, D.S.O.; the 28th (North-West), commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J.
F. Embury, C.M.G.; and the 31st (Alberta), under Lieutenant-Colonel A.
H. Bell, with the 29th (Vancouver), familiarly known as Tobin's Tigers,
under Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Tait, in Brigade Reserve. The field
guns covering the attack consisted of the 1st Brigade of the 1st
Canadian Divisional Artillery and four Brigades of the 18th Divisional
Artillery, under Brigadier-General Metcalfe, D.S.O., on the right, and
on the left three Brigades of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery and
one Brigade of the Lahore Artillery, under the command of
Brigadier-General Thacker. The barrage work of both these groups
throughout the attack was of a closeness and accuracy which left
nothing to be desired. It covered both the advance and the
consolidation so effectually that our casualty list, though serious,
was much smaller than the difficulties of the operation and the
strength of the forces opposed to us had permitted us to hope.
The artillery preparation for the attack was begun, by the heavy guns
and howitzers, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of September 14th. From
that hour until 3 o'clock in the morning of the 15th the enemy's
position was subjected to a deluge of high explosive. At 3 o'clock
this fire diminished in intensity. At 4 o'clock it ceased abruptly. A
sudden calm fell upon the opposing lines--a calm as full of menace in
its sinister suggestiveness, like the core of silence at the heart of
the cyclone, as the devouring roar of the bombardment. At the highest
pitch of expectation our Battalions waited for the fateful hour of
"zero time" creeping up with the dawn.
During this slow hour of waiting, always so stern a test to the nerve
of the most seasoned troops, "occurred an incident which"--to quote
from Major F. Davy's spirited and picturesque account of the
battle--"had it not been promptly met by the vigour and resolution of
the Canadians, might have marred, perhaps prevented, the whole attack.
A determined attack by a strong enemy bombing party was made upon the
right sector of the 4th Brigade front. A portion of the attacking
party had actually reached our trenches at the time the attack started.
It was overcome by vigorous bombing and rifle fire. A bombing officer
in the disputed section, Lieutenant Hugh H. Sykes, 18th Battalion,
promptly organised his defence and effectually maintained his position.
Lieutenant Gidley, of the 19th Battalion, and parties of bombers from
that unit and the 20th Battalion also took part, and frustrated what
might have developed into a formidable attack had the initial attempt
been successful. The enemy's preparations for this attack eventually
told against him, for the strong force he placed in his front trenches
to exploit any initial success suffered heavily as our barrage came
down upon it."
At dawn of the 15th the air was dry, crisp, and clear--the bite of
autumn in it. Patches of pale sky glimmered abundantly between driven
fleeces of cloud with promise of fine fighting weather--high
visibility, and no baffling obstruction to the work of our airmen. The
ground, tossed and furrowed though it was in every direction by the
demoniacal ploughshares of the high explosive, gave firm footing--for
the curse of the Somme mud had not yet fallen upon our operations. It
was such an autumn morning indeed, as to turn men's hearts, with a
homesick pang, to the remembrance that this was the date when the
hunting season would open in far Canadian woods and swales and coverts.
But it was other hunting that opened this day for Canadians on the
Bapaume Road--the hunting of the dragon-spawn of treachery and rape.
"Zero hour" had been set for 6.20. At last it came. On the
minute--nay, on the second, so exact is now the synchronising of all
watches for this work--with a wide-flung, sky-splitting roar our
barrage-fire opened. At the same instant all along our front appeared
the round, basin-like helmets of the men of our first wave as they
climbed over the parapets of the "jumping-off" trenches. Their
appearance in itself marked an appreciable gain of ground already
secured, for these jumping-off trenches had been dug, with infinite
toil and secrecy and at heavy risk, at a distance of 100 to 150 yards
in advance of our established front-line trench, by so much shortening
the perilous path across the open to our objectives. This arduous and
valuable work had been carried out by the 19th Battalion (Toronto and
Hamilton) on the right, and by the 29th (Vancouver) on the left.
At four minutes past zero time the barrage lifted to a line about 100
yards farther on, and in another minute our first waves (the attack was
ordered in four waves) was in possession of the first of the German
trenches. This trench, which ran (as will be seen by the map) close
along our whole attacking front, was not very strongly held, and the
resistance offered by its defenders was no more than enough to warm our
men up for what was to follow.
From this point it is necessary to trace the progress of the battle
Brigade by Brigade rather than as a whole, for the problems confronting
the 4th Brigade, on the right (as will be seen from the map), were
different from those which the 6th Brigade, on the left, had to deal
with. Suffice it to say here, by way of clamping the two sections of
the movement together, that by 8 o'clock both Brigades were receiving
the congratulations of the Divisional Commander, General Turner, upon
their swift success. By 8.30 the last of our objectives was completely
in our hands and being consolidated, while the enemy, dazed by the
swiftness of their overthrow and demoralised to the point of panic by
the implacable onslaught of the Tanks, had fled behind the inner
defences of Courcelette. The way into the stronghold lay wide open.
The waves of an attack, under the latest conditions of warfare, go
forward not in one long sweep, but in a succession of short advances
strictly regulated by the successive steps of the barrage fire. Each
time the barrage lifts forward--which it does according to a scheme
previously worked out to the minute and the yard--the attacking lines
must instantly move up behind it, as close as possible to the shelter
of the appalling curtain of flame and death which it lets down before
them. The progress of the wave being thus so strictly scheduled, it
must often leave small enemy posts in its rear, or dug-outs sheltering
furtive bands of machine-gunners. To deal with these
"remainders"--which might easily become a serious menace, or even bring
about complete disaster--behind the waves come the "mopping-up"
parties, whose job it is to ferret out the hidden posts, clear the
dug-outs, and gather in prisoners. The advance of the 4th Brigade on
all its fronts, and in spite of desperate opposition, was so rapid and
irresistible that it left behind plenty of work for its mopping-up
parties.
Within fifteen minutes of going over the Brigade was in possession of
another line of German trench, from three to four hundred yards behind
the first line, running south-east from the Bapaume Road towards the
Martinpuich Road. In the deep bays of this trench the contention was
bitter and severe, and here occurred one of those instances of
treachery for which the German has shown such peculiar aptitude. A
party of the enemy threw up their hands, with, the customary cry of
"Kamerad! Kamerad!" and surrendered to a company of the 18th
Battalion, under the command of Captain S. Loghrin. As Captain Loghrin
was accepting their surrender one of the party threw a bomb at him and
blew him to pieces. The Captain's followers flung themselves forward
in a fury, and not one German in that sector of the trench escaped the
steel.
Throughout the advance the three assaulting Battalions of the Brigade,
in spite of varying obstacles, succeeded in maintaining an even
frontage. When the 18th, on the right, and the 20th, in the centre,
fighting their way forward through the storm of shell and shrapnel and
the deadly sleet of the machine-guns, had reached and taken Candy
Trench, the final objective set them, it was still scarcely more than 7
o'clock. Three or four minutes in advance of them the 21st Battalion
on the left, had reached the Sugar Factory and gained a footing there.
The Factory, though a redoubtable stronghold, had already been badly
knocked about by our big guns. Now, within a very few minutes, it was
surrounded on three sides by our exultant troops, who were not to be
denied. After a mad half-hour of hand-to-hand struggle in a hell of
grenade and machine-gun fire, from the dreadful turmoil of grunting,
cursing, and shouting, the blood and the sweat of savage bodily combat,
victory suddenly emerged, and the heap of ruins remained securely in
our hands--along with 125 prisoners, of whom 10 were officers. One of
the companies which distinguished themselves in this Homeric bout--"B"
Company of the 21st Battalion--was commanded and most efficiently
handled throughout the crisis of the affair by its senior
non-commissioned officer, Sergeant-Major Dear, every one of its
officers having fallen during its hard-fought advance along the Bapaume
Road.
The unexpectedly swift collapse of this stronghold of the Sugar
Factory--which the enemy had thought to make impregnable--was hastened,
no doubt, by the intervention of one of the "Tanks." This monster,
apparently eyeless, its carapace a daub of uncouth colours, squat and
portentous as one of those colossal saurians which we picture emerging
from the Eocene slime, had wallowed its slow, irresistible way up over
the trenches and shell-holes, belching fire from its sides and its
dreadful, blind, blunt snout. Bullets and shrapnel fell harmlessly as
snowflakes upon its impervious shell. Bombs exploded thickly upon it,
and, though wrapping it in flame, did no more than deface the fantastic
patterns of its paint. Its path, wherever it moved, was spread with
panic. In the teeth of the most concentrated fire it waddled
deliberately up to the barriers of the Sugar Factory, trod them down
without haste or effort, and exterminated a defending machine-gun with
its crew. Then, crashing ponderously through or over every kind of
obstacle, made a slow circuit of the Factory, halting stolidly here and
there to blot out a troublesome nest of machine-gunners or to preside
over the submission of a bunch of horror-stricken Huns. Its work done
at this point, it lumbered off to seek adventure elsewhere, its
grotesque--and, unfortunately, vulnerable--little tail bobbing absurdly
over the shell-holes.
The 4th Brigade, having gained all its objectives, was now in no mood
to rest content. The task of consolidation being well in hand, the
20th Battalion, in the centre of the line, sent forward a patrol under
Captain Heron, M.C., the Battalion scouting officer. With great
audacity and skill, Captain Heron worked his way along parallel to the
Bapaume Road for a distance of 800 yards, and broke into the trench
known as Gun Pit Trench. This was an important work, protecting, and
in part coinciding with, the sunken road which forms the link between
Courcelette and Martinpuich. Greatly daring--and profiting, no doubt,
by the demoralising effect of the Tank's peregrinations in the
neighbourhood--the little party bombed several dug-outs, and returned
with two captured machine-guns and two prisoners to show for their
splendidly insolent exploit. They reported the trench lightly held,
whereupon the Brigade, promptly grasping the occasion, swept forward in
a new--and thoroughly impromptu attack. Before 10 o'clock the trench
was in our hands, with 50 prisoners (including two officers), a
machine-gun, and three trench-mortars. Still unwearied, still unsated
with success, the exultant Battalions pushed on and gained a line along
the eastern side of the sunken road, where by 1 o'clock they had
securely dug themselves in. This handsome and unpremeditated gain
greatly simplified the consolidating of our position at Candy Trench
and the Sugar Factory, and immediately made practicable the main
operation against Courcelette itself.
With no less brilliancy and determination, meanwhile, the 6th Brigade,
on the left, had been carrying out its share of the enterprise. From
the first of the attack, or at least from its first objective (the
first German trench) onward, it encountered a more stubborn resistance
than that with which the 4th had to contend. Diagonally across the
path of their advance, from the point on the right where the first
German trench joined the Bapaume Road northwards to a juncture with
McDonnell Road on the westernmost edge of Courcelette, ran a sunken
road which had been strengthened by deep entrenching. It is shown on
the map as Taffy Trench--and was so named by the troops doubtless in
recognition of its complete harmony with the system of Sugar Trench,
Candy Trench, and the Sugar Factory fitly presiding over all.
Furthermore, the Brigade's advance was flanked throughout by strong
enemy posts strung along McDonnell Road. The Battalion on the left
(the 31st of Alberta) had not only to reduce these as it went, and to
accomplish the reduction rapidly so as not to delay the main advance,
but it had also to establish a defensive flank at the same time and
thoroughly secure it in order to cover the advance against an
enfilading assault from the network of German trenches spreading
towards the north and north-west.
The attacking line of the 6th Brigade was somewhat differently
organised from that of the 4th. Instead of being divided into three
sectors, one for each of the three Battalions involved, it was divided
into two sectors only. The 27th Battalion formed the attacking waves
on the right half of the line, the 28th took the left half, while the
31st supplied the "mopping-up" parties to both sectors. The frontage
allotted to the Brigade was about 1,800 yards, and the extreme depth of
its attack, from the jumping-off trenches to the farthest objective,
was something over a mile.
As with the 4th Brigade, the first objective (the original German front
line) was carried swiftly and with little difficulty, and the whole
line swept forward behind our barrage as coolly and according to book
as if on the parade-ground. The German fire, both artillery and
machine-gun, was fierce and effective, but as our bayonets came through
it the enemy, as a rule, either fled, or threw up their hands, or
scurried like rabbits into the dug-outs, refusing to face the cold
steel. But on the left the wave of the 28th Battalion presently
encountered a rock of sterner substance in the form of a machine-gun
stronghold which had survived unscathed both our preliminary
bombardment and our barrage. The little garrison here fought
stubbornly in the effort to stay our onrush. The heart of their
defence was an officer who both fought and directed magnificently and
inspired his followers with his own courage. Our line was in some
danger of being dislocated. As Canadian river-men would say, it had
run up against a "snag" at this point. But one of our officers,
Captain Bredin, of the 28th. perceiving a worthy foeman, ran out of
the line and around the flank, and engaged him with a revolver. The
German fell, and with his fall the spirit went out of his followers.
The post was carried almost at once. Among the prisoners taken was a
machine-gunner who was chained to his gun. It was a strange enough
sight to our men, this highly-trained soldier fettered to his duty like
a criminal, a steel stake driven into the ground on either side of him,
one chain around his waist and another locked to an iron ring on his
leg. The psychology of a race which discerns in such treatment an
incentive to heroic endeavour is not unlikely to elude our apprehension.
By this time the German guns had realised the formidable nature of our
advance and the depth of our penetration into the outer defences of
Courcelette. The storm of shell and shrapnel that swept our line
suddenly redoubled its fury. But our men went straight on through it,
ignoring their casualties. The deadly diagonal of the sunken road was
crowded with German troops, but our men flung themselves into it with
the bayonet, and left it packed with German dead.
The course of this savage hand-to-hand struggle was thronged with
incidents of individual heroism, so numerous as to make even a partial
chronicling of them impossible in these pages. A couple of instances,
however, may be cited as showing that the huge development of the
mechanical element in modern warfare has not robbed the personal
element of its opportunity or of its decisive influence. The case of
Private Stevens, of the 28th Battalion, is one in point. His story may
be quoted as follows from the Brigade Report:--"Just prior to the
assault a party of six snipers from the 28th Battalion was posted in
the shallow jumping-off trench to keep busy an enemy detachment of
about 20 men which had been troubling our lines. All the members of
this small party, except Private Stevens, were either killed or
wounded, and Stevens himself had two holes through his steel helmet, a
deep wound in his left shoulder, and a gash in his forehead. Nothing
daunted, he kept on sniping and killed several of the enemy. His rifle
was smashed by a shell just as the assault went forward. He picked up
a rifle with fixed bayonet, and, dashing forward with the assault,
entered an enemy's strong point, and single-handed captured five Boches
and brought them back to our lines." The exploit of Lieutenant
Clarkson, of the 27th Battalion, is, in another fashion, equally
significant by reason of the unquenchable dominance of spirit which it
displays. To quote again from the same Report:--"Lieutenant Clarkson
was severely wounded in the knee, at the sunken road, and just as he
fell four Germans came out of a deep dug-out. He at once covered them
with his revolver, and, ordering them to improvise a stretcher out of a
couple of rifles, made them carry him to our lines, and there handed
them over prisoners. On the way in, as soon as his bearers showed the
least sign of any opposition to his wishes, he quelled it with his
revolver."
By a quarter to eight, in spite of all opposition and an unexpected
addition to its task, the Brigade had gained its final objective and
set itself strenuously to the work of consolidation, anticipating
energetic counter-attacks. The addition referred to was an enforced
extension to the left of about three hundred and fifty yards, which was
found necessary in order to secure the flank. This operation, which
was stubbornly resisted by strong German detachments in the Courcelette
Road, was carried out with a rush by the 28th Battalion. Immediately
the new line was secured three patrols were sent out beyond the line by
the 31st Battalion. These patrols succeeded in establishing
themselves, for purposes of observation, close to the southern edge of
the village, and several of their scouts made their way into the
village itself. The reports which they brought back were so sanguine
that the Brigade, its blood being up, begged permission to pursue its
success by an immediate assault upon the village. This proposal,
however, was promptly vetoed, the Higher Command having already in view
the plans for the afternoon. The impetuous 6th was obliged, therefore,
to content itself with its very handsome achievement, which was not
only so brilliant in itself as to deserve far more attention than it
has received, but was also of vital importance to the unfolding of our
final operations against Courcelette. The great advance of the 5th
Brigade in the afternoon, with its swift success in bringing the whole
village permanently within our lines, was a more outstanding exploit by
reason of the conspicuousness of the goal gained thereby. But it must
not be forgotten that Courcelette was fully half-won by the victories
of the 4th and 6th Brigades in the early morning. The honours of the
2nd Division are fairly shared among all three Brigades. It was wholly
because the morning triumph of the 4th and 6th Brigades went well
beyond the utmost that had been expected of it that the afternoon
attack was undertaken--and that September 15th became, in the Canadian
War Calendar, COURCELETTE DAY.