THE IRISH REBELLION
The dark destiny of Ireland, as usual, triumphed.--T. MOORE,
_Mems. of Lord Edward Fitzgerald_.
Various orders of minds ascribe the Irish Rebellion of 1798 to widely
different causes. The ethnologist sees in it the incompatibility of Celt
and Saxon. To the geographer it may yield proofs of Nature's design to
make Ireland a nation. If approached from the religious standpoint, it
will be set down either to Jesuits or to the great schism of Luther. The
historian or jurist may trace its origins back to the long series of
wrongs inflicted by a dominant on a subject race. Fanatical Irishmen see
in it a natural result of the rule of "the base and bloody Saxon"; and
Whig historians ascribe it to Pitt's unworthy treatment of that most
enlightened of Lords-Lieutenant, Earl Fitzwilliam. Passing by the
remoter causes, I must very briefly notice the last topic.
The appointment of the Whig magnate, Fitzwilliam, to the Irish
Viceroyalty in 1794 resulted from the recent accession of the "Old
Whigs," led by the Duke of Portland, to the ministerial ranks. That
union, as we have seen, was a fertile cause of friction. Fitzwilliam was
at first President of the Council; but that post did not satisfy the
nephew and heir of the Marquis of Rockingham. He aspired to the
Viceroyalty at Dublin; and Portland, who, as Home Secretary, supervised
Irish affairs, claimed it for him. Pitt consented, provided that a
suitable appointment could be arranged for the present Viceroy, the Earl
of Westmorland. This was far from easy. Ultimately the position of
Master of the Horse was found for him; but, long before this decision
was formed, Fitzwilliam wrote to the Irish patriot, Grattan, asking him
and his friends, the Ponsonbys, for their support during his
Viceroyalty. This move implied a complete change of system at Dublin,
Grattan and the Ponsonbys having declared for the admission of Roman
Catholics to the then exclusively Protestant Parliament. True, this
reform seemed a natural sequel to Pitt's action in according to British
Catholics the right of public worship and of the construction of schools
(1791). Further, in 1792, he urged Westmorland to favour the repeal of
the remaining penal laws against Irish Catholics; but the Dublin
Parliament decisively rejected the proposal. Nevertheless, in 1793 he
induced Westmorland to support the extension of the franchise to
Romanists, a measure which seemed to foreshadow their admission to
Parliament itself. There is little doubt that Pitt, who then expected
the war to be short, intended to set the crown to this emancipating
policy; for even in the dark times that followed he uttered not a word
which implied permanent hostility to the claims of Catholics. His
attitude was that of one who awaited a fit opportunity for satisfying
them.
Unfortunately, the overtures of Fitzwilliam to Grattan and the Ponsonbys
became known at Dublin, with results most humiliating for Westmorland.
The exultation of the Ponsonbys and the Opposition aroused the hopes of
Catholics and the resentment of the more extreme Protestants. Chief
among the champions of the existing order was the Irish Lord Chancellor,
Baron Fitzgibbon, afterwards Earl of Clare. A man of keen intellect and
indomitable will, he swayed the House of Lords, the Irish Bar, and the
Viceregal councils. It was he who had urged severe measures against the
new and powerful organization, the United Irishmen, started in Ulster by
Wolfe Tone, which aimed at banding together men of both religions in a
solid national phalanx. Scarcely less influential than Fitzgibbon was
Beresford, the chief of the Revenue Department, whose family connections
and control of patronage were so extensive as to earn him the name of
the King of Ireland. Like Fitzgibbon he bitterly opposed any further
concession to Catholics; and it was therefore believed that the
dismissal of these two men was a needful preliminary to the passing of
that important measure. Rumours of sweeping changes began to fly about,
especially when Grattan came to London, and had interviews with the Lord
Chancellor. The frequent shifts whereby the Scottish Presbyterian,
Wedderburn, became the reactionary Lord Loughborough were notorious; and
it is one of the suspicious features of the Fitzwilliam affair that he,
now Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, should urge Pitt to treat
Fitzwilliam with the confidence due to his prospective dignity. The
Attorney-General, Sir Richard Pepper Arden, sent to Pitt the following
caution:
_September 1794._[476]
... My wife says she dined the other day with Grattan at the
Chancellor's. I am sadly afraid that preferment in Ireland will
run too much in favour of those who have not been the most
staunch friends of Government; but, pray, for God's sake, take
care that the new Lord Lieutenant does not throw the Government
back into the hands of Lord Shannon and the Ponsonbys, nor turn
out those who behaved well during the King's illness to make way
for those who behaved directly the reverse. Excuse my anxiety on
this head but I fear there is good reason for it.
Arden was correctly informed. Now or a little later, Fitzwilliam formed
the resolve to dismiss Fitzgibbon and Beresford. On the other hand, the
lowering outlook in Holland in the autumn of 1794 induced in Pitt the
conviction that the time had not yet come for sweeping changes at
Dublin. Accordingly, late in October, or early in November, he and
Grenville thoroughly discussed this subject with the newly appointed
Ministers, Portland, Fitzwilliam, Spencer, and Windham. Grenville's
account of this conference, which has but recently seen the light,
refutes the oft repeated statement,[477] that Pitt accorded to
Fitzwilliam a free hand at Dublin. On the contrary, it was agreed,
apparently with the full consent of the Viceroy-elect, that he should
make no change of system.[478] Fully consonant with this decision was
the reply of Pitt to Sir John Parnell, Grattan, and the two Ponsonbys,
who in the third week of November 1794 begged him to lower the duties on
inter-insular imports. While expressing his complete sympathy with their
request, he declared the present critical time to be inopportune for a
change which must arouse clamour and prejudice.[479] The conduct of
Fitzwilliam was far different. Landing near Dublin on 4th January 1795,
he on the 7th sent Daly to request Beresford to retire from office.
Beresford refused, and sent off an appeal to his old friend, Auckland,
with the result that the Cabinet soon met to consider the questions
aroused by this and other curt dismissals. It being clear that
Fitzwilliam was working with the Ponsonbys for a complete change of
system, he was asked to modify his conduct. He refused to do so.
The King now intervened in an unusually incisive manner. He informed
Pitt that it would be better to recall Fitzwilliam than to allow further
concessions to Catholics, a subject which was "beyond the decision of
any Cabinet of Ministers." Accordingly, Fitzwilliam was recalled, his
departure from Dublin arousing a storm of indignation which bade fair to
overwhelm the Administration of his successor, Earl Camden.
Such is a brief outline of the Fitzwilliam affair. No event could have
been more unfortunate. It led Irish patriots and the Whigs at
Westminster to inveigh against the perfidy and tyranny of Pitt. He was
unable to publish documents in his own defence, while Fitzwilliam
crowned his indiscretions by writing two lengthy letters charging the
Cabinet with breach of faith and Beresford with peculation. Nominally
private, they were published at Dublin, with the result that Pitt and
Camden were held up to execration and contempt. On reviewing this
question, we may conclude that Pitt erred in not procuring from
Fitzwilliam a written statement that he would make no sweeping changes
at Dublin, either in regard to men or measures, without the consent of
the Cabinet. It is, however, clear that Ministers regarded the verbal
understanding with Fitzwilliam as binding; for Grenville, Portland,
Spencer, and Windham sided with Pitt in this painful dispute, Portland's
chilling behaviour to the Earl on his return marking his disapproval of
his conduct.
Never did a Lord-Lieutenant enter on his duties under auspices more
threatening than those besetting the arrival of Camden on 31st March
1795. After the swearing-in ceremony the passions of the Dublin mob
broke loose. Stones were flung at the carriages of the Primate and
Fitzgibbon. The rabble then attacked the Speaker's residence and the
Custom House, and not till two of their number fell dead under a volley
of the soldiery did the rioters disperse. The rebellion which
Fitzwilliam predicted on his departure seemed to be at hand.
Camden, on whom this storm was to burst three years later, was not a
strong man. He entered on his duties doubtfully and before long sent
requests for his recall on account of his family concerns. He might
well quail at the magnitude of his task. His instructions bade him by
all available means discourage the claims of the Catholics, and rally
the discouraged Protestants. Thereafter he might conciliate the
Catholics by promising relief for their parochial clergy, the foundation
of a seminary for the training of their priests, and some measure of
education for the peasantry. The instructions ended thus: "Moderate,
soothe, conciliate these jarring spirits. We have great confidence in
your judgment, firmness, discretion."[480] The despatch refutes the
oft-repeated assertion that the Ministry sought to inflame the
animosities of Protestants and Catholics in order to force on the Union.
That was the outcome of the whole situation; but in the spring of 1795
Ministers hoped to calm the ferment, which they rightly ascribed to the
imprudence of Fitzwilliam. Their forecast for a time came true. In the
first debates at Dublin the lead given by Camden's able Secretary,
Pelham, served to close the schism in the Protestant ranks. Despite the
vehement efforts of Grattan, his Bill for the admission of Catholics was
thrown out by a majority of more than one hundred; and Ireland entered
once more on the dreary path of reaction.
In the hope of softening the asperities of Irish life, Pitt favoured the
plan of founding a seminary for the training of Catholic priests in
Ireland. The proposal was alike one of justice and expediency; of
justice, because the expense of training Irish priests in foreign
seminaries had been a sore burden to their co-religionists; and of
expediency, because the change promised to assuage the anti-British
prejudices of the priests. Moreover, amidst the sweeping triumph of
secularism in France and Belgium, most of the seminaries frequented by
Irish youths had disappeared. The chief objections urged against the
scheme were the narrowness of view certain to result from the curriculum
of a semi-monastic institution, and the desirability of educating
priests at Trinity College along with Protestants. On these grounds we
must regret Pitt's decision to found a separate training college, albeit
at first intended for the education of lay youths as well. The
considerations above set forth, however, prevailed; and the chief
legislative result of the year 1795 at Dublin was the charter
establishing Maynooth College. Undoubtedly it was the outcome of Pitt's
desire to pacify Catholic Ireland; but the unhappy conditions of the
ensuing period told heavily against success. Indeed, as Wolfe Tone
predicted, that institution fostered insular patriotism of a somewhat
narrow type.
The trend of things in the years 1795-7 set steadily towards rebellion.
The discontent was most threatening among the sturdy Presbyterians of
Ulster, chafed as they were by the exaction of tithes by the Protestant
Established Church. The founders and the ablest leaders of the League of
United Irishmen were Protestants. For a time they aimed merely at a
drastic measure of Parliamentary Reform similar to that advocated by
English Radicals. But the disappointment of the hopes of Grattan and
Irish Whigs in the spring of 1795 exasperated all sections of reformers
and impelled the League towards revolutionary courses. Sops like
Maynooth they rejected with scorn; and at the close of that year, after
the passing of certain repressive measures, their organization became
secret; they imposed an oath on members and gradually devised means for
organizing the whole of Ireland in brotherhoods, which by means of
district and county delegations, carried out the behests of the central
committee at Dublin.
Yet their system was far from absorbing the whole of the nation. The
vivacity of the Celt and the hardness of the Saxon tell against close
union; and where the two races dwell side by side, solidarity is a
dream. Now, as always, in times of excitement the old animosities burst
forth. The Catholic peasantry banded together in clubs, known as
Defenders, to glut their hatred upon Protestant landlords and
tithe-reaping clergy. Their motives seem in the main to have been
agrarian rather than religious; but, as in Leinster, Munster, and
Connaught the dividing lines between landlords and peasants were almost
identical with those between Protestants and Catholics, the land feud
became a war of creed. The ensuing horrors, midnight attacks,
cattle-maiming, and retaliation by armed yeomanry, exerted a sinister
influence upon Ulster, where the masses were fiercely Protestant.
Certain of the Catholic villages were ravaged by Protestant Peep o' Day
Boys, until the Irishry fled in terror to the South or West, there
wreaking their vengeance upon squires and parsons. By degrees the Peep
o' Day Boys became known as Orangemen, whose defiant loyalty sometimes
caused concern to Camden and Pitt; while the Defenders joined the
better drilled ranks of United Ireland, which therefore became a
preponderatingly Catholic body.
Thus affairs revolved in the old vicious circle. Feuds, racial,
religious, and agrarian, rent Ireland asunder. Disputes about land have
ever sunk deep into the brooding imagination of the Celt; and the
memories of holdings absorbed, or of tithes pitilessly exacted in lean
years, now flashed forth in many a deed of incendiarism or outrage. To
Camden there appeared to be only one means of cure, coercion. An
Indemnity Act was therefore passed to safeguard squires and yeomen who
took the law into their own hands. Then followed the Insurrection Act,
for disarming the disaffected, and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus
Act for strengthening the arm of the law.
The outcome was that the United Irishmen turned towards France. Even in
the year 1793 the Republic sent agents into Ireland to stir up revolt.
Nothing definite came of those efforts, except that a section of Irish
patriots thenceforth began to strive for separation from Great Britain.
Early in 1796 Wolfe Tone proceeded to Paris to arrange for the despatch
of a French auxiliary corps. On 20th April General Clarke, head of the
Topographical Bureau at the War Office, agreed to send 10,000 men and
20,000 stand of arms. The mercurial Irishman encountered endless delays,
and was often a prey to melancholy; but the news of Bonaparte's
victories in Italy led him to picture the triumph of the French
Grenadiers in Ireland.[481]
Another interesting figure is that of Lord Edward Fitzgerald. Sprung
from the ancient line of the Geraldines, and son of the Duke of
Leinster, he plunged into life with the gaiety and bravery of a Celt.
After serving with distinction in the British army in America he
returned, became a member of the Irish Parliament, and in 1790 during
the acute friction with Spain, received from his uncle, the Duke of
Richmond, an introduction to Pitt, who offered him the command of an
expedition against Cadiz. Nothing came of the proposal; but the incident
reveals the esteem in which the chivalrous young officer was held. He
soon married Pamela, the reputed daughter of the Duke of Orleans and
Mme. de Genlis, whence he himself was often dubbed "Egalité." The
repressive policy of Camden made him a rebel; and in May 1796 he made
his way to Hamburg, hoping to concert plans for a French invasion.
There he was joined by Arthur O'Connor, who impressed Reinhard with a
sense of ability and power. Together the two Irishmen travelled to
Basle, where they induced Barthélemy to favour their scheme. Meanwhile
the French Directory entered into the plan of Wolfe Tone; the mission of
Fitzgerald had no direct result, apart from the revelation of his plan
to a travelling companion, who had been the mistress of a British
Minister, and now forwarded a description of it to London.[482]
Meanwhile Wolfe Tone had sketched the outline of the enterprise to
Clarke and General Hoche, predicting to the latter, the commander-elect,
that he would "amputate the right hand of England for ever."[483] As is
well known, Hoche's expedition to Bantry Bay at the close of the year
1796 was an utter failure; and the sterner spirits in Ulster believed
that the French had designed that it should end so. The malcontents
therefore relaxed their efforts for a time, until, in the spring
following, the mutinies in the British fleet aroused new hopes. It seems
probable that their intrigues had some effect on events at the Nore. In
quick succession United Ireland despatched to Paris two delegates, named
Lewins and McNevin, to concert plans for another landing. The Directory
sent an agent to treat with the League. Fitzgerald met him in London,
and declared that the Irish Militia and Yeomanry would join the French
on their landing. The United Irishmen also sought help from Spain.[484]
In Ireland the organisation went on apace until Camden struck sharp
blows through the military. In the middle of May 1797, when the
malcontents were excited by news of the second mutiny at Portsmouth,
they rose in the North, but in three or four engagements the loyal
Militia and Yeomanry broke up their bands. The South remained quiet, and
the efforts to seduce the army and Militia were fruitless; but Lord
Clifden, writing to Abbot on 15th May, predicted a general rising when
the French attempted a second invasion, as they certainly would.[485] On
19th June Beresford wrote from Dublin to Auckland, stating that, but for
the repressive measures and wholesale seizures of arms, not a
loyalist's head would have been safe.[486] The spring of 1797 was
indeed a time of great risk. But for the weakness of the Dutch and
French navies, a landing in Ireland could have taken place with every
chance of success. As it was, Camden's vigorous measures so far cowed
the malcontents that the rebellion was deferred for a year. This respite
probably saved the British Empire. Amidst the financial and naval
difficulties of the first half of the year 1797, a telling blow struck
at Ireland could scarcely have failed of success. Rarely were the
enemies of England so formidable; never were her means of defence so
weak. Fortunately, no blow was aimed at her until the month of October;
and then, when the Dutch fleet set out to convoy an expedition to
Ireland, it was utterly crushed by Duncan at Camperdown. There was
therefore little risk of an invasion in force after October 1797, the
very month which saw Napoleon Bonaparte set free from his lengthy
negotiations with Austria. Verily, if Fortune pressed hard on Pitt at
Toulon and in Flanders and Hayti, she more than redressed the balance by
her boons at sea in the year 1797.
Camden's letters to Pitt reveal the imminence of bankruptcy in Ireland
throughout that year; and it is noteworthy that the loan raised for the
Irish Government in January and February was the final cause of the Bank
crisis in London. Even so, the Irish Exchequer was in dire need. On 25th
April Camden informed Pitt that only £8,000 remained in the Exchequer,
and he had no means for equipping the troops if the French should land.
The sum of £200,000 must be sent at once. Such a demand at that time was
impossible; and not until the end of May could Pitt forward the half of
that sum, Camden meanwhile borrowing money in Dublin at 8 3/8 per cent.
On 1st June he wrote to Pitt a confidential letter, laying bare his real
aims. He urged him to do all in his power to procure peace from France.
He had recommended this step in April; but now his language was most
insistent. Assuming that it would be sheer madness to tempt fortune in
another campaign, he suggested that, if the French terms were too
onerous, Pitt should leave it to another Prime Minister to frame a
peace. But whatever happened, Pitt must not lower his dignity by
conceding Reform and Catholic Emancipation in Great Britain and Ireland.
If those measures were inevitable, others must carry them. The latter
would only satisfy the Irish Catholics for a time, their aim being to
rule the country. The only way of escaping these difficulties was a
Union of the Parliaments; but he (Camden) could not undertake to carry
it, still less Catholic Emancipation. Finally he declared the
Presbyterians of Ulster to be Republicans who would rise _en masse_ if
the French landed; but if Cornwallis were sent over to lead the troops,
even that crisis might be overcome.[487]
Pitt received this letter at the height of the mutiny at the Nore. He
seems to have sent no answer to it: indeed, silence is the best reply to
such an effusion. Camden's letters to Pitt show that he longed for his
recall. In that of 16th November 1796 he concluded with the significant
remark that he looked forward to the time when they would once more live
as country gentlemen in Kent. Pitt had the same longing; but he never
wrote a line expressing a desire to leave the tiller at the height of
the storm. Obviously Camden was weary of his work. Fear seems to have
been the motive which prompted his proclamation of martial law in
several counties and the offer of an amnesty to all who would surrender
their arms before Midsummer 1797. Those enactments, together with the
brutal methods of General Lake and the soldiery in Ulster and Leinster,
crushed revolt for the present but kindled a flame of resentment which
burst forth a year later. As the danger increased, so did the severities
of the Protestant Yeomanry and Militia. Thus, fear begot rage, and rage
intensified fear and its offspring, violence. The United Irishmen had
their revenge. In the summer of 1797 their two delegates, Lewins and
McNevin, did their utmost to defeat the efforts of Pitt to bring about
peace with France; and the former had the promise of the Director,
Barras, that France would never sheathe the sword until Ireland was
free.[488]
Again Camden begged Pitt to seek the first opportunity of freeing him
from his duties in order to disentangle his private affairs which were
in much confusion, the excess of expenditure over income at Dublin being
a further cause of embarrassment. In fact nothing but a sense of public
duty, in view of a hostile invasion, kept him at his post. So far from
the truth are those who, without knowledge of the inner motives of
statesmen, accuse them of delight in cruelty and of intriguing to
provoke a revolt.
Early in the year 1798 the hopes of malcontents centred in the naval
preparations progressing at Brest and Toulon.[489] Bonaparte also seemed
about to deal a blow at London. In February he surveyed the flotilla at
Dunkirk and neighbouring ports; and the hearts of English Jacobins beat
high at the thought of his landing in Kent or Sussex. The London
Corresponding Society, after a time of suspended animation, had now
become a revolutionary body. On 30th January its new secretaries,
Crossfield and Thomas Evans, issued an encouraging address to the United
Irishmen. Somewhat later Evans and Binns formed a society, the United
Englishmen, which imposed on its members an oath to learn the use of
arms, its constitution in local, or baronial, committees being modelled
on that of the United Irishmen. A society of United Scotsmen was founded
about the same time; a society of United Britons also came to being, and
issued a fraternal address to the United Irishmen on 5th January.
Most significant of these effusions is one, dated 6 Pluviôse An VI [25th
January 1798], by "the Secret Committee of England" to the French
Directory, containing the assurance that Pitt had come to the end of his
borrowing powers and that the people were ready to throw off his yoke.
"United as we are," it concluded, "we now only await with impatience to
see the Hero of Italy and the brave veterans of the great Nation.
Myriads will hail their arrival with shouts of joy: they will soon
finish the glorious campaign." This address was drawn up fourteen days
before Bonaparte set out for Dunkirk. It is clear, then, that its
compilers were not so ignorant as that consequential tailor, Francis
Place, represented them. Their chief mistake lay in concluding that
Bonaparte intended to "leap the ditch." As we now know, his tour on the
northern coast was intended merely to satisfy the Directors and
encourage the English and Irish malcontents to risk their necks, while
he made ready his armada at Toulon for the Levant.[490] Meanwhile the
United Britons and United Irishmen sought to undermine Pitt's Government
so that it might fall with a crash at the advent of the hero of Italy.
They knew not that the chief efforts of the "soldiers of liberty" were
then being directed to the pillage of Rome and of the cantonal
treasuries of Switzerland in order to provide funds for Bonaparte's
oriental adventure.
Already Irish, English, and French democrats had been fraternizing. In
January 1798 the United Englishmen sent over two delegates to Dublin to
concert action, and about the same time a priest of Dundalk, named
O'Coigly (_Anglicé_ Quigley), came over from Ireland as a delegate from
the United Irishmen to Evans's Society. Place asserts that his plan of
proceeding to France was not known. But, as Place habitually toned down
or ridiculed the doings of that Society, this is doubtful. Owing to
secret information (probably from Turner, a British spy at Hamburg) the
Government arrested Quigley, Arthur O'Connor, and Binns, a leading
member of the London Corresponding Society, at Margate as they were
about to board a hoy for France (28th February). A little later Colonel
Despard, Bonham, and Evans were arrested. The evidence against all but
Quigley was not conclusive, and they were released. The case against
Quigley depended on a paper found by a police officer in his pocket,
urging a French invasion of England. He was therefore condemned for high
treason and was hanged on 7th June 1798. Probably Quigley had that paper
from a London Society; but if so, why were not its officials seized? In
some respects the Quigley affair still remains a mystery. Certainly it
added fuel to the hatred felt for Pitt by British and Irish
Jacobins.[491]
The evidence against O'Connor was weighty. It was proved that he was the
leader of the party and that he knew Quigley well. He had a cipher in
his possession, which was surely superfluous if, as he stated, he was
travelling on private business. Probably his acquittal was due to his
relationship to Lord Longueville, an influential Irish peer. Fox,
Sheridan, and the Duke of Norfolk also proceeded to Maidstone to answer
for the virtuous and patriotic character of O'Connor, a fact which
probably led the judge to give a strangely favourable summing-up. The
conduct of the Opposition leaders in this matter led their former
comrade, the Earl of Carlisle, to declare that they had now sunk to a
lower political hell than any yet reached. The Government, however, had
not done with O'Connor. He was at once arrested at Maidstone on another
charge (22nd May), and was in prison in Dublin during the rebellion. He
then confessed that he had done more than any one to organize Leinster
for revolt, also that he had had conferences with French generals with a
view to invasion so far back as 1793; and he stated that he knew the
member of the United Irishmen who in the winter of 1796 advised the
French not to come until the spring of 1797.[492] There certainly was
some misunderstanding between the Irish rebels and their would-be
helpers; but the full details are not known. Finally O'Connor was
allowed to retire to France; he became a French general, and helped
Napoleon to concert plans for the invasion of Ireland, assuring him
that, after the work of liberation was done, 200,000 Irishmen would help
him to conquer England.
Meanwhile further news respecting the Franco-Irish plans reached Pitt
through a man named Parish at Hamburg. An American friend of his at
Brussels, while waiting at the municipal office for passports, saw those
of two young Irishmen, named O'Finn, delegates of the United Irishmen of
Cork. They had a large packet for the Directory at Paris, which
contained the plans of the United Irishmen, the numbers and positions of
the British troops and of the British warships between Dungeness and the
North Foreland. The O'Finns stated this to the commissary of the
Brussels bureau, who heard it with joy. The American secretly forwarded
the news to Parish. The fact that the O'Finns had a list of the forces
on the Kentish coast implied information from the English malcontents.
Accordingly, on 19th April, Government seized the papers of the London
Corresponding Society. They contained nothing of importance except the
constitution of the Society, the oath to learn the use of arms, and the
address to the United Irishmen. The Parliamentary Committee of Secrecy
also believed that a plan was afoot for bringing to London a band of
Irish fanatics to strike a blow which would paralyse Government while
the French landed and Ireland revolted. This inference seems
far-fetched; but the evidence at hand warranted the suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act, which Pitt procured from Parliament on the following
day. Place, with his usual perverse ingenuity, argued that Pitt nursed
the conspiracy in order to be able to create alarm and govern
despotically.[493]
Events were now moving fast in Ireland. Chief among the exciting causes
were the repressive measures of Camden and the licence of the Militia
and Yeomanry. So able and active a commander as General Abercromby
failed to keep discipline and prevent military outrages. Not long after
his return from the West Indies he reluctantly accepted these thankless
duties (November 1797). His dislike of the work appears in the following
letter, addressed probably to one of Pitt's colleagues:
Bantry, _Jan. 28, 1798_.[494]
DEAR SIR,
... I have found the country everywhere quiet, but there exists
among the gentlemen the greatest despondency: they believe, or
affect to believe, that there is a plot in every family, and a
conspiracy in every parish, and they would abandon the country
unless the troops were dispersed over the face of it for their
protection. I believe the lower ranks heartily hate the
gentlemen because they oppress them, and the gentlemen hate the
peasants because they know they deserve to be hated. Hitherto
rents have been paid, tithes have not been refused or taxes
withheld. No arms or ammunition have anywhere been introduced,
and there are no tumultuous assemblings of the people. I have
often heard of disaffection among the militia; it may perhaps
exist among a few individuals; but it cannot exist to any
considerable amount. My inquiries have been unremitted in this
particular. Were, however, a landing of the enemy to take place,
I cannot say what might happen to a people dissatisfied with
their situation and naturally of great levity; the new doctrines
would give activity. We are preparing for whatever may happen
and no labour or exertion shall be wanting.
Abercromby soon proclaimed his disgust at the excesses of his troops in
unmeasured terms. True, he had much provocation. The militia officers
under him were a loose swaggering set, whose cruelties to the peasantry
during the prolonged search for arms were unpardonable. Further, their
powers had been enlarged by Camden's order of May 1797, allowing them to
use armed force without the requisition of magistrates, a step deemed
necessary to screen the civil authorities from outrage or murder. Seeing
that officers often put these powers to a brutal and arbitrary use,
exasperating to the peasants and demoralizing to the soldiery,
Abercromby determined publicly to rescind the viceregal mandate. The
language in which he announced his decision was no less remarkable than
the decision itself. On 26th February 1798 he stated in a general order:
"That the frequency of courts-martial, and the many complaints of
irregularities in the conduct of the troops in this kingdom having too
unfortunately proved the army to be in a state of licentiousness which
must render it formidable to everyone but the enemy, the
commander-in-chief" forbids officers ever to use military force except
at the requisition of magistrates.
That the army and militia did not assault their commander after this
outrageous insult shows that their discipline had not wholly vanished.
In face of the vehement outcries of the Irish loyalists against
Abercromby, Camden showed much forbearance. He issued a guarded
statement that Abercromby had been accustomed to command troops abroad,
and did not realize the impression which would be caused in Ireland by
his censure of the soldiery. Portland, however, openly blamed the
commander-in-chief. Pitt's letter of 13th March to Camden shows that,
had he seen Portland's censure before it went off, he would have toned
down some of its expressions; but on the whole he heartily disapproved
of Abercromby's indiscriminate rebuke to the army as not only unjust,
but calculated to depress its spirits and encourage those of the French
and the Irish malcontents. Portland's reprimand brought about
Abercromby's resignation, which Camden sought to avert. Thus again
events took the worst possible course. Abercromby was an able and
energetic man; and his resignation, at the time when the arrival of the
French was expected, undoubtedly helped to raise the hopes of
malcontents. Well might Camden write to Pitt on 25th April that
Abercromby had done much harm. With that commander's desire to repress
the outrages of the soldiery everyone must sympathize. The manner in
which he sought to effect it was incredibly foolish.
Meanwhile, the work of the conspirators had been undermined by
treachery. One of the conspirators, named Reynolds, took fright and
revealed the secret of the plot to an official at Dublin Castle (26th
February), adding the information that the Dublin committee would hold a
secret meeting on 12th March. The police, bursting in, seized eighteen
members, including McNevin, along with their papers, amongst which were
some incriminating O'Coigly. Lord Edward Fitzgerald escaped for a time;
but an informer gained knowledge of his movements, and those of two
brothers named Sheares. On his warning the Castle that they were about
to arouse Dublin to revolt, Camden resolved to anticipate the blow. Two
police officers, Swan and Ryan, tracked Fitzgerald to his lair on the
19th of May. They found him in bed. At once the fierce spirit of his
race surged up. He sprang at them with the small dagger ready by his
side and struck at Swan. The blow went home, while the pistols aimed by
the officers missed fire. Turning on Ryan, he dealt thrust upon thrust.
The two wounded men clung to him while he struggled and struck like a
wild beast. He was dragging them towards the door when Major Sirr rushed
in and shot him in the shoulder. Even then his convulsions were so
violent that two or three soldiers, who ran upstairs, scarcely
overpowered him. Swan soon died. The wounds of Ryan were not mortal.
That of Fitzgerald was not deemed serious, but it mortified, and he
passed away on 4th June, mourned by all who knew his chivalrous daring
spirit.[495]
The fury of Fitzgerald is intelligible. He was the one necessary man in
the plot then coming to a head for the capture of Dublin on 23rd May.
Among his effects were found a green uniform, the seal of the Irish
Union, the line of route for the Kildare rebels in their advance,
together with a plan for the seizure of the chief officials. The triumph
of the Castle was completed by the capture of Neilson and the Sheares.
Their papers showed that no quarter was to be given. Irish historians
(among them Plowden) maintained that Pitt and Camden all along knew of
the plot and allowed the conspirators to drive on their mine in order at
the right moment to blow them up. There is no evidence to this effect,
except during the few days preceding the blow. Camden's efforts were
uniformly directed towards disarmament and coercion, so much so that he
is reproached for his cruelty by the very men who accuse him of playing
with the conspiracy. It is clear that he sought to prevent a rising,
which was expected to coincide with a French invasion. In fact the only
prudent course was to repress and disarm at all possible points.
The severity of the crisis appears in the letters which Beresford,
Cooke, and Lees, officials at Dublin Castle, wrote to Auckland. In
answer to Lord Moira's reckless charge in the Irish Parliament, that
they were pushing on the country to rebel, Beresford on 10th April asks
Auckland how can they, who are daily exposed to murder, push on a nation
to deeds of violence which must fall on them? On 1st May he writes: "We
think the Toulon squadron will join the expedition against Ireland....
Pikes are making in numbers, and the idea of a rising prevails. Kildare
and Wicklow are armed, organized, and rebellious. Dublin and the county
are very bad. The rebels expect the French within a month. Such is their
last Gazette." On 7th May Lees writes to Auckland: "Lord Camden must
steel his heart. Otherwise we are in great jeopardy." On 9th May
Beresford states that it would be a good plan to seize a number of
malcontents, threaten them with flogging and induce them to turn
informers. He adds: "At present the quiet which prevails in some parts
is deceptive. Where the country is organized, quiet appears. Where the
organization is going on there is disturbance. In Kildare there are
complete regiments, with large quantities of arms in their possession."
On 10th May Lees writes that Galway is arming for revolt, and, nine days
later, after the arrest of Fitzgerald, he states that they expect a
rising in Dublin on the morrow. On 21st May after the arrest of the
Sheares, Cooke writes: "A rising is not given up; but I think it will
not take place. Parts of Kildare will not give up arms.... A search for
arms will commence. We are in good spirits." On 20th May Beresford
informs Auckland of the receipt of news at the Castle from three
different quarters that there would be a rising on the 21st, owing to
the vigorous measures now taken by the Government.[496]
This is not the language of men who are nursing a plot. It evinces a
resolve to stamp out disaffection before the Brest and Toulon fleets
arrive. As for Pitt, his letters show a conviction of the need of
continuing the repressive measures whereby Camden had "saved the
country." He approved the plan of allowing officers to act without the
orders of magistrates, seeing that the latter were often murdered for
doing their duty. The thinness of his correspondence with Camden is
somewhat surprising until we remember that his energies mainly went
towards strengthening the army and navy. His letter to Grenville early
in June shows that he expected news of the arrival of the French off the
Irish coast, since they had got out from Toulon on 19th May.
It is not surprising that Ireland was thought to be their goal.
Bonaparte and the Directory had kept the secret of their Eastern
Expedition with far more care than Pitt displayed in worming it out.
Certainly Pitt's spy system was far less efficient than has been
imagined.[497] With ordinary activity the oriental scheme could have
been found out from one of Barras' mistresses or from some official at
Toulon. The fact that Bonaparte had some time previously engaged Arab
interpreters might surely have enlightened an agent of average
intelligence. So far back as 20th April French engineers in uniform,
accompanied by interpreters, had arrived at Alexandria and Aleppo in
order to prepare for the reception of large forces. The interpreters, it
is said, "collect all possible information respecting Suez and the
navigation of the Red Sea, as also particularly whether the English have
any ships in the Persian Gulf. It is supposed that General Buonaparte
will divide his army, one corps to be embarked from the Red Sea and pass
round to the Gulf of Persia, the other part to proceed from Syria
overland to the Euphrates, by which river they are to advance and join
the remainder near the mouth of this river; from thence to make,
_united_, the grand descent on the coast of Malabar or Deccan."[498] In
these days it is difficult to imagine that this news did not reach Pitt
until about 5th July.
The Irish malcontents were as ill informed as Pitt. Basing their hopes
on the arrival of the French fleet, they prepared to rise about the end
of May. But the arrests in Dublin hurried on their plans. The men of
Kildare and Westmeath received orders from the secret Directory in
Dublin to take arms on 23rd May, on the understanding that the whole of
Ireland would revolt. They were to seize the towns and villages on the
roads to Dublin, while the rebels in the city murdered the authorities
and captured the chief positions. But on the 22nd the Government seized
quantities of arms, and the presence of General Lake's garrison of 4,000
Yeomen daunted the United Irishmen; on the night of the 23rd-24th only
the more daring of them stole about the environs, waiting for a signal
which never came; and by dawn their bands melted away. In Meath also the
rising failed miserably. A large concourse assembled on the historic
slopes of Tara Hill, whence 400 Fencibles and Yeomen drove them with
ease (25th May).
In Kildare and the north of Wicklow, where the influence of the
Fitzgeralds made for revolt, large throngs of men assembled on the night
of 23rd-24th May, and made desperate attacks on Naas and Clane,
important posts on the roads leading to the capital. Their headlong
rushes broke in vain against the stubborn stand of the small garrisons.
But at a village hard by, named Prosperous, the rebel leaders fooled the
chief of a small detachment by a story of their intention to deliver up
arms. Gaining access to the village, they surprised the soldiers in the
barracks, girdled them with fire, and spitted them on their pikes as
they jumped forth. That night of horror ended with the murder of the
Protestant manufacturer, whose enterprise had made their village what it
was. A few days later General Ralph Dundas somewhat indiscreetly granted
an armistice to a large body of Kildare rebels at Kilcullen on the
promise that they would give up their arms and go home. Nevertheless a
large body of them were found on the Curragh and barred the way to
General Duff, who courageously marched with 600 men to the aid of
Dundas. Duff was informed that these rebels would be willing to lay down
their arms. His men were advancing towards them when a shot or shots
were fired by the rebels, whether in bravado or in earnest is doubtful.
The troops, taking it as another act of treachery, charged with fury and
drove the mass from the plain with the loss of more than 200 killed.
Thus, here again, events made for animosity and bloodshed. Protestants
remembered the foul play at Prosperous; the rebels swore to avenge the
treachery at the Curragh.
* * * * *
News of the first of these events sped across the Irish Sea on 25th and
26th May. They reached Pitt just before or after his Whitsunday duel on
Putney Heath. Thick and fast came the tales of slaughter. On 29th May
Camden wrote in almost despairing terms--The rebellion was most
formidable and extensive. It would certainly be followed by a French
invasion. It must be suppressed at once. The Protestants and the
military were mad with fury, and called aloud for a war of
extermination. The strife would be marked by unheard-of atrocities. For
the sake of human nature, Pitt must at once send 5,000 regular troops.
Camden added that cavalry were useless against lines of pikemen, a
phrase which tells of the dogged fury of the peasantry. Nevertheless,
his assertion that the rebellion was extensive proves his lack of
balance. The saving facts of the situation were that the Ulstermen had
not yet moved; that Connaught and Munster were quiet; and of Leinster,
only Kildare, Wexford, and parts of Carlow and Wicklow were in arms. In
Dublin murder was rife, but the pikemen did not muster.
Pitt's reply of 2nd June to Camden is singularly cool. In brief and
businesslike terms he stated that, despite the difficulties of the
situation, he had already prepared to despatch 5,000 men; but Camden
must send them back at the earliest possible moment in order not to
disarrange the plans for the war. Still more frigid was the letter of
George III to Pitt. The King lamented the need of sending troops to
Ireland, as they would thereby be cut off from "active service." Camden
(he wrote) must really not press for them unnecessarily. However, as the
sword was drawn in Ireland, it must not be sheathed until the rebels
submitted unconditionally. Eleven days later the King wrote to Pitt that
the new Lord Lieutenant "must not lose the present moment of terror for
frightening the supporters of the Castle into an Union with this
country; and no further indulgences must be granted to Roman Catholics,
as no country can be governed where there is more than one established
religion."[499] The thinness of the King's thought is in part redeemed
by its tenacity. His mind resembled an elemental two-stringed
instrument, which twanged forth two notes--Church and State.
In strange contrast to the calculations of the King and Pitt were the
effusions of Camden. On 7th June he referred plaintively to Portland's
despatch, stating that only 3,000 men could be sent. He warned Pitt that
it was a religious war; priests marched at the head of the rebels, who
swept together and drove at their head the reluctant. For the sake of
humanity Pitt must send larger reinforcements. He added that Lake was
unequal to the emergency. Fortunately, on that day Pitt received the
consent of the Marquis Cornwallis to act as Lord Lieutenant and
Commander-in-Chief in Ireland. As Camden had more than once pointed out
the urgent need of that appointment, it is surprising to find him on
16th June upbraiding Pitt with the suddenness of the change. Surely it
was no time for punctiliousness. Already the Ulstermen were rising, and
30,000 rebels were afoot in Wexford. But, as it happened, the worst of
the trouble was over before Cornwallis could take the field. Landing on
20th June near Dublin, he heard news portending a speedy decision in
Wexford.
It is not easy to account for the savagery of the revolt in that county.
The gentry resided among their tenants on friendly terms; and the search
for arms had been carried out less harshly than elsewhere. Gordon, the
most impartial historian of the rebellion, admits that the floggings and
half-hangings had been few in number, yet he adds that the people were
determined to revolt, probably from fear that their turn would come.
Neither is the religious bigotry of the rebels intelligible. The
Protestants were numerous in Wexford town, Enniscorthy, and New Ross;
but there seems to have been little religious animosity, except where
tales were circulated as to intended massacres of Catholics by
Orangemen. The Celt is highly susceptible to personal influence; and,
just as that of the Fitzgeralds largely accounts for the rising in
Kildare, so does the personality of Father John Murphy explain the
riddle of Wexford. The son of a peasant of that county, he was trained
for the priesthood at Bordeaux, and ardently embraced the principles of
the French Revolution and the aims of United Ireland. His huge frame,
ready wit, and natural shrewdness brought him to the front in Wexford;
and he concerted the plan of establishing an Irish Republic on a
strictly Romanist basis, a programme incompatible with that of Wolfe
Tone and the United Irishmen.
Murphy, marching with his flock to the house of a neighbouring
Protestant clergyman, bade him and his terrified friends surrender.
Meeting with a refusal, they fired the outbuildings; and when the flames
gained the house, they granted the prayers of the occupants for mercy if
they came out. On coming out the adult males were forthwith butchered.
Meeting with large reinforcements from the hills, Father John's pikemen
beat off a hasty attack by 110 men of the North Cork Militia, only seven
of whom escaped to Wexford. Such were the doings on that Whitsunday in
Wexford (27th May). Next, the rebels swept down upon Enniscorthy; and
though beaten back from the very heart of the town by the steady valour
of the defenders, these last were yet fain to fall back on Wexford. But
for the plundering habits of the peasantry, not a man could have reached
that town. The priest and his followers now took post on Vinegar Hill, a
height east of the River Slaney, which overlooks Enniscorthy and the
central plain of the county. There on successive days he and his council
dealt out pike-law to some four or five hundred Protestants and
landlords. Meanwhile, as no help drew nigh, Maxwell, the commander at
Wexford, deeming that town untenable, beat a timely retreat westwards to
Duncannon Fort on Waterford Harbour (30th May).
Master of Wexford county, Murphy and his colleague, Father Michael,
proposed to raise Wicklow and Waterford. If these efforts succeeded, it
was probable that Dublin and Munster would rise. Ulster might then
revolt; and the advent of the French would clinch the triumph. In full
confidence, then, the masses of pikemen moved against the loyalists at
New Ross, an important position on the River Barrow. Parish by parish,
the priests at their head, they marched, some 30,000 strong. At dawn of
5th June, when near the town, they knelt during the celebration of
Mass. Then they goaded on herds of cattle to serve as an irresistible
vanguard, and rushed at the old walls. General Johnstone and the 1,400
defenders were at first overborne and had to retreat over the bridge;
but the plundering habits of the victors were their ruin. The soldiery
re-formed, regained their cannon, and planting them skilfully, dealt
such havoc among the disorderly mass, that finally it surged out into
the plain.[500] After their defeat the rebels deposed Harvey, a
Protestant, from his nominal command.
This success of the loyalists saved Waterford and Kilkenny from anything
more than local riots; and Moore, moving up from Fermoy and Clonmel,
soon threatened the rebel county from the west. The beaten peasants
glutted their revenge on Protestant prisoners near New Ross; and a
general massacre of prisoners at Wexford was averted only by the rapid
advance of Moore. Meanwhile, Father John, moving into County Wicklow
with a force some 30,000 strong, sought to break down the defence at
Arklow. But that important post on the River Avoca was stoutly held by
General Needham with some 1,500 men, mostly militia and yeomen. There,
too, the priests led on the peasants with a zeal that scorned death. One
of the peasant leaders rushed up to a gun, thrust his cap into it, and
shouted, "Come along, boys; her mouth is stopped." The next moment he
and his men were blown to pieces. Disciplined valour gained the day (9th
June), and John and his crusaders retired to Vinegar Hill. His
colleague, Father Michael Murphy, who had claimed to be able to catch
Protestant bullets, was killed by a cannon-shot; and this may have
decided the rebels to retreat.
The British Guards had now arrived, to the inexpressible relief of
Camden and his advisers. Beset by reports of a general rising in Ulster
and by the furious protests of loyalists against the inaction of Pitt,
the Lord Lieutenant had held on his way, acting with energy but curbing
the policy of vengeance, so that, as he informed Pitt, he was now the
most unpopular man in Ireland. Nevertheless, before he left her shores,
he had the satisfaction to see his measures crowned with success. The
converging moves of Lake, Needham, Dundas, and Johnstone upon Vinegar
Hill cooped up the rebels on that height; and on 21st June the royal
troops stormed the slopes with little loss. The dupes of Father John no
longer believed in his miraculous powers. The survivors broke away
southwards, but then doubled back into the mountains of Wicklow. The war
now became a hunt, varied by savage reprisals. Father John was hanged on
26th June. By his barbarities he had ended the dream of United Ireland.
Few of the malcontents of Antrim and Down obeyed the call to arms of the
United Irishmen early in June; and the risings in those counties soon
flickered out. Religious bigotry enabled Dublin Castle once more to
triumph.
Pitt was vehemently blamed by Irish loyalists for his apathy at the
crisis. The accusation, quite natural among men whose families were in
hourly danger, was unjust. As we have seen, even before the arrival of
Camden's request, he took steps to send off 5,000 men. As the Duke of
York and Dundas cut down that number to 3,000, and endeavoured to
prevent any more being sent, they were responsible for the despatch of
an inadequate force. If the French detachments intended for Ireland had
arrived early in June, they must have carried all before them. But it
was not until 22nd August that General Humbert, with 1,100 men, landed
at Killala. Even so his little force was believed to be the vanguard of
a large army, a fact which explains the revival of rebellion at the end
of the summer.
Not until 1st September did Pitt hear this alarming news. At once he
ordered all possible reinforcements to proceed to Ireland. There was
need of them. The Irish militiamen under Lake and Hutchinson who opposed
the French at Castlebar rushed away in wild panic from one-fourth of
their numbers (27th August). Such were "the Castlebar Races." Probably
the Irishmen were disaffected; for many of them joined the enemy.
Cornwallis proceeded to the front, and with 11,000 men made head against
the rebels and the French. The latter were now but 800 strong, and after
a most creditable stand finally surrendered with the honours of war (8th
September). Cornwallis issued a tactful bulletin,[501] commending his
troops for their meritorious exertions and trusting to their honour not
to commit acts of cruelty against their deluded fellow subjects. In
point of fact 11,000 men with difficulty brought 800 to surrender and
then gave themselves up to retaliation on the rebels. Fortunately the
French Directory sent only small parties of raiders. A month later,
Wolfe Tone, with a squadron, appeared off Lough Swilly; but the French
ships being overpowered by Sir John Warren, Tone was captured, taken to
Dublin, and cut his throat in order to escape the ignominy of a public
hanging. Another small French squadron entered Killala Bay late in
October, but had to make for the open. Thus flickered out a flame which
threatened to shrivel up British rule in Ireland.
What causes contributed to this result? Certainly not the activity and
resourcefulness of Pitt and his colleagues; for their conduct at the
crisis was weak and tardy. The Duke of York and Dundas must primarily be
blamed for the despatch of inadequate reinforcements; but Pitt ought to
have overruled their decision. Perhaps the Cabinet believed England to
be the objective of Bonaparte and the fleet at Brest; but, thanks to the
rapid growth of the Volunteer Movement, England was well prepared to
meet an invading force and to quell the efforts of the malcontent
Societies. In Ireland the outlook was far more gloomy. After the
resignation of Abercromby, Camden and the officials of Dublin Castle
were in a state of panic. Pitt did well finally to send over Cornwallis;
but that step came too late to influence the struggle in Leinster. In
truth the saving facts of the situation were the treachery of informers
at Dublin and the diversion of the efforts of Bonaparte towards the
East. The former event enabled Camden to crush the rising in Dublin; the
latter left thousands of brave Irishmen a prey to the false hopes which
the French leaders had designedly fostered, Barras having led Wolfe Tone
to believe that France would fight on for the freedom of Ireland. The
influence of Bonaparte told more and more against an expedition to her
shores; but the Irish patriots were left in the dark, for their rising
would serve to distract the energies of England, while Bonaparte won
glory in the East. To save appearances, the French Government sent three
small expeditions in August to October; but they merely prolonged the
agony of a dying cause, and led that deeply wronged people to ask what
might not have happened if the promises showered on Wolfe Tone had been
made good.
It is recorded of William of Orange, shortly before his intended landing
in England, that, on hearing of the march of Louis XIV's formidable army
into the Palatinate, he serenely smiled at his rival's miscalculation.
Louis sated his troops with plunder and lost a crown for James II.
Similarly we may imagine the mental exultation of Pitt on hearing that
Bonaparte had gone the way of Alexander the Great and Mark Antony.
Camden and he knew full well that Ireland was the danger spot of the
British Empire, and that the half of the Toulon force could overthrow
the Protestant ascendancy. Some sense of the magnitude of the blunder
haunted Napoleon at St. Helena; for he confessed to Las Casas: "If,
instead of the expedition to Egypt, I had undertaken that against
Ireland, what could England have done now?" In a career, illumined by
flashes of genius, but wrecked by strange errors, the miscalculation of
the spring of 1798 was not the least fatal. For of all parts of the
British Empire Ireland was that in which the Sea Power was most helpless
when once a French _corps d'armée_ had landed.
FOOTNOTES:
[476] Pitt MSS., 108. See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies," for a fuller
investigation of the Fitzwilliam affair in the light of new evidence.
[477] Lecky, vii, 41-4.
[478] "Dropmore P.," iii, 35-8.
[479] Pitt MSS., 331.
[480] Quoted by Froude, "The English in Ireland," iii, 158-61.
[481] "Autobiography of Wolfe Tone," ii, chs. iv-vi; Guillon, "La France
et l'Irlande."
[482] "Mems. of Ld. E. Fitzgerald," ch. xx.
[483] Tone, "Autob.," ii, 99.
[484] "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), 22, 25; W. J.
Fitzpatrick, "Secret Service under Pitt," ch. x; C. L. Falkiner,
"Studies in Irish History," ch. iv; "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 270-88.
[485] "Lord Colchester's Diary," i, 103.
[486] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[487] Pitt MSS., 326. Quoted with other extracts from Camden's letters,
in "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[488] Tone, "Autob.," ii, 272.
[489] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 165-8.
[490] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799),
App. x; "Nap. Corresp.," iii, 486-92. For Place see _ante_, ch. vii.
[491] W. J. Fitzpatrick, "Secret Service under Pitt," ch. iii; "Report
of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), App. xxvi. For Despard, the plotter of
1802, see "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 306, 326; ii, 4.
[492] "Auckland Journals," iv, 52. I have published the statements of
O'Connor, etc., and the news sent by a British agent at Hamburg, in the
"Eng. Hist. Rev." for October 1910.
[493] Pitt MSS., 324; B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Dropmore P.," iv, 167. On
24th May 1798 Thelwall wrote to Thos. Hardy from Llyswen, near
Brecknock, describing his rustic retreat, and requesting a new pair of
farmer's boots for "Stella." He hopes that O'Connor has returned in
triumph to his friends. Tierney's vote in favour of suspending the
Habeas Corpus Act does not surprise him, for he is vulgar and a
sycophant. Hardy is too angry with Sheridan, whose chief offence is in
going at all to the House of Commons. Sheridan surely does well in
encouraging the people to resist an invasion. "I remain steady to my
point--'no nation can be free but by its own efforts.' As for the French
Directory and its faction, nothing appears to me to be further from
their design than to leave one atom of liberty either to their own or to
any nation. If, however, Mr. Sheridan supposes that all his talents can
produce even a temporary unanimity while the present crew are in power,
even for repelling the most inveterate enemy, he will find himself
miserably mistaken. No such unanimity ever can exist: I am convinced,
nay, the Ministers themselves seem determined, that it _shall_ not. The
only way to produce the unanimity desired is to stand aloof, and let
these ruffians go blundering on till our most blessed and gracious
sovereign shall see that either Pitt and Co. must bow down to the will
of the people or his British crown bow down to five French shillings....
But what have we to do with Directories or politics? Peaceful shades of
Llyswen! shelter me beneath your luxuriant foliage: lull me to
forgetfulness, ye murmuring waters of the Wye. Let me be part farmer and
fisherman. But no more politics--no more politics in this bad world!"
(From Mr. A. M. Broadley's MSS.)
[494] Pretyman MSS. See, too, "Diary of Sir J. Moore," i, ch. xi.
[495] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 458-67; "Life and Letters of Lady Sarah
Lennox," ii, 299-302; "Mems. of Lord E. Fitzgerald," chs. 27-30.
[496] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[497] "Dropmore P.," iv, 230, 239.
[498] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454. News received through Sir F. d'Ivernois.
[499] Pretyman MSS. The King also stated that Pitt had "saved Ireland"
by persuading Pelham to return and act as Chief Secretary. Pelham was a
clever man, but often disabled by ill health.
[500] J. Alexander, "... Rebellion in Wexford" (Dublin, 1800).
[501] "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 395-404. For the panic in Dublin see
"Dropmore P.," iv, 289 _et seq._ Cooke wrote to Castlereagh on 28th
September that the Bishop of Killala and his family were saved from
slaughter by a few French officers, "who execrate our savages more than
they whom they have plundered." He adds that though the United Irishmen
began the plot the Catholics are turning it solely to their own
interests (Pitt MSS., 327). See, too, H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M.
Broadley, "The War in Wexford" (1910).