TESTIMONY OF THE HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

The President's Commission reconvened at 3:30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary Dean Rusk, we wanted to ask you a few

questions about this matter in any particular detail you wanted to

answer. Mr. Rankin would you inform the Secretary the areas we intend

to cover before we ask the questions.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I think the particular area that we

would be interested in with the Secretary is just as to whether, or his

knowledge of whether there was any foreign political interest in the

assassination of President Kennedy?

We have been getting the information in regard to other matters

concerning the State Department from other of his associates and

colleagues and employees of the Department, and we are going to

complete that and it has been helpful to us and I think we can rather

limit the inquiry to that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; very well.

Mr. Secretary, would you rise and be sworn, please. Do you solemnly

swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall

be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you

God?

Secretary RUSK. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated, please, and Mr. Rankin will ask you

the questions, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chief Justice, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Secretary RUSK. I would like to be just as helpful as possible to

the Commission. I am not quite clear of testimony in terms of future

publication. There may be certain points that arise where it might

be helpful to the Commission for me to comment on certain points but

there--it would be a very grave difficulty about publication, so I

wonder what the Commission's view on that is.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, our purpose is to have available

for the public all of the evidence that is given here. If there is any

phase of it that you think might jeopardize the security of the Nation,

have no hesitation in asking us to go off the record for a moment, and

you can tell us what you wish.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir, I am at your disposal.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chief Justice, could I make a suggestion in that

connection?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Would it be feasible to have a discussion here of the

points that are vital from the point of view of our record, and so

forth, and maybe a little informal conversation afterward to cover the

other points.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a recess for a few moments then.

Mr. DULLES. I thought between the two wouldn't that be easier than put

the two together.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, will you give us your name and address,

please?

Secretary RUSK. Dean Rusk, 4980 Quebec Street, Washington, D.C.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are the Secretary of State for the United States?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. You have occupied that position for some time?

Secretary RUSK. Since January 22, 1961.

Mr. RANKIN. In that position you have become familiar with our foreign

relations and the attitude and interest in some degree of other

countries that we deal with?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; within the limitations of the possibilities, it is

at least my task to be as familiar as possible with those things.

Mr. RANKIN. In your opinion, was there any substantial interest or

interests of the Soviet Union which would have been advanced by the

assassination of President Kennedy?

Secretary RUSK. I would first have to say on a question of that sort

that it is important to follow the evidence. It is very difficult to

look into the minds of someone else, and know what is in someone else's

mind.

I have seen no evidence that would indicate to me that the Soviet Union

considered that it had an interest in the removal of President Kennedy

or that it was in any way involved in the removal of President Kennedy.

If I may elaborate just a moment.

Mr. RANKIN. If you will, please.

Secretary RUSK. As the Commission may remember, I was with several

colleagues in a plane on the way to Japan at the time the assassination

occurred. When we got the news we immediately turned back. After my

mind was able to grasp the fact that this event had in fact occurred,

which was the first necessity, and not an easy one, I then, on the

plane, began to go over the dozens and dozens of implications and

ramifications of this event as it affects our foreign relations all

over the world.

I landed briefly in Hawaii on the way back to Washington, and gave some

instructions to the Department about a number of these matters, and

learned what the Department was already doing. But one of the great

questions in my mind at that time was just that question, could some

foreign government somehow be involved in such an episode.

I realized that were this so this would raise the gravest issues of

war and peace, but that nevertheless it was important to try to get at

the truth--to the answer to that question--wherever that truth might

lead; and so when I got back to Washington I put myself immediately in

touch with the processes of inquiry on that point, and as Secretary of

State had the deepest possible interest in what the truthful answer to

those questions would be, because it would be hard to think of anything

more pregnant for our foreign relations than the correct answer to that

question.

I have not seen or heard of any scrap of evidence indicating that the

Soviet Union had any desire to eliminate President Kennedy nor in any

way participated in any such event.

Now, standing back and trying to look at that question objectively

despite the ideological differences between our two great systems, I

can't see how it could be to the interest of the Soviet Union to make

any such effort.

Since I have become Secretary of State I have seen no evidence of any

policy of assassination of leaders of the free world on the part of the

Soviets, and our intelligence community has not been able to furnish

any evidence pointing in that direction.

I am sure that I would have known about such bits of evidence had they

existed but I also made inquiry myself to see whether there was such

evidence, and received a negative reply.

I do think that the Soviet Union, again objectively considered,

has an interest in the correctness of state relations. This would

be particularly true among the great powers, with which the major

interests of the Soviet Union are directly engaged.

Mr. RANKIN. Could you expand on that a little bit so that others than

those who deal in that area might understand fully what you mean?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; I think that although there are grave differences

between the Communist world and the free world, between the Soviet

Union and other major powers, that even from their point of view there

needs to be some shape and form to international relations, that it

is not in their interest to have this world structure dissolve into

complete anarchy, that great states and particularly nuclear powers

have to be in a position to deal with each other, to transact business

with each other, to try to meet problems with each other, and that

requires the maintenance of correct relations and access to the

leadership on all sides.

I think also that although there had been grave differences between

Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, I think there were evidences

of a certain mutual respect that had developed over some of the

experiences, both good and bad, through which these two men had lived.

I think both of them were aware of the fact that any Chairman of the

Soviet Union and any President of the United States necessarily bear

somewhat special responsibility for the general peace of the world.

Indeed without exaggeration, one could almost say the existence of the

Northern Hemisphere in this nuclear age.

So that it would be an act of rashness and madness for Soviet leaders

to undertake such an action as an active policy. Because everything

would have been put in jeopardy or at stake in connection with such an

act.

It has not been our impression that madness has characterized the

actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years.

I think also that it is relevant that people behind the Iron Curtain,

including people in the Soviet Union and including officials in the

Soviet Union, seemed to be deeply affected by the death of President

Kennedy.

Their reactions were prompt, and I think genuine, of regret and sorrow.

Mr. Khrushchev was the first to come to the Embassy to sign the book of

condolences. There were tears in the streets of Moscow. Moscow Radio

spent a great deal of attention to these matters.

Now they did come to premature conclusions, in my judgment, about

what this event was and what it meant in terms of who might have been

responsible for it--and ideological effect has crept into that.

But I had the impression that the regret was genuine and that the

ordinary Soviet citizen joined with ordinary people in other parts of

the world in feeling the loss of the President in a very genuine sense.

Mr. RANKIN. There has been some suggestion that possibly the leadership

of the Soviet Union would not have been politically interested in the

death of the President but possibly a distant wing of the Party might

have been so involved.

Can you give us any light on that, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. By suggestion you mean rumor?

Mr. RANKIN. In the newspapers, and things of that kind, rumor.

Secretary RUSK. I haven't been able to put a rational structure behind

that possibility. If there are dissident elements their primary problem

is within the Soviet Union.

If these dissident elements were aiming to change the present

Government of the Soviet Union or its leadership or to return to an

early range of policy by the elimination of present leadership or

seizure of control, I don't quite see how the elimination of the

President of the United States could contribute to that purpose.

I would also suppose that in their kind of system such elements would

be under pretty close supervision and surveillance and they would have

limited opportunities for the kind of action that would be organized in

a way in this direction, although that is a matter of some speculation.

But, I would doubt very much that such dissident elements would have a

motive or very much of an opportunity. Again, I have seen no evidence

pointing in that direction.

Mr. RANKIN. How could you tell us in regard to Cuba in the same general

way, your opinion and knowledge of any information or credible evidence?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would again repeat that the overriding

consideration is to make every possible effort to find evidence and

follow the evidence to wherever it leads.

I think it is, at least for me, more difficult to try to enter into

the minds of the present leadership in Cuba than, perhaps, even of the

present leadership of the Soviet Union. We have had very few contacts,

as the Commission knows, with the present Government of Cuba.

But again, I have seen no evidence that seems to point in that

direction.

There were some exchanges, with which the Commission is familiar,

that seemed to be--seemed to come to another conclusion. But I would

think that objective considerations would mean that it would be even

greater madness for Castro or his government to be involved in any such

enterprise than almost for anyone else, because literally the issue of

war and peace would mean the issue of the existence of his regime and

perhaps of his country might have been involved in that question.

We were under the impression that there was very considerable concern

in Cuba as to whether they would be held responsible and what the

effect of that might be on their own position and their own safety.

But I have seen no evidence that points to involvement by them, and

I don't see objective facts which would seem to make it in their

interests to remove Mr. Kennedy.

You see, this embarks upon, in any event it would embark upon, an

unpredictable trail for them to go down this path, but I would think

again the Commission would wish to examine the evidence as it has been

doing with meticulous care and follow the evidence in these matters.

Mr. RANKIN. After the assassination, did you have direct communications

with Ambassador Thomas Mann while he was still Ambassador at Mexico?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; we had a number of exchanges with Ambassador Mann

connected with the presence in Mexico of Mr. Oswald.

I say those messages, and over a period of some days had daily

consultations about them with our Deputy Under Secretary for

Political Affairs, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson. Mr. Johnson is my principal

representative in our dealings with the various intelligence and

security agencies of the government and with the Pentagon, and he has

an office very near mine on the seventh floor of the Department of

State.

These exchanges raised questions of the most far-reaching character

involving the possibility of the implications of another government,

and so I had a very deep personal interest in that at the time.

Our principal concern was to be sure that the FBI and the CIA who were

the principal agencies investigating this matter would have every

possible facility at their disposal, and would--and that our Ambassador

would be given the fullest support from us in facilitating the

investigation at the Mexican end.

So I was for a period, until this particular trail ran its course, very

much involved in those exchanges.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any commentary that you want to make about

those exchanges other than what you have given us?

Secretary RUSK. I think not, sir. I think that the materials, the

information developed in those exchanges are before the Commission, and

I believe the Commission has had a chance to inquire into them both as

I understand both here and in Mexico with the appropriate agencies and

I would think that the Commission's conclusions on that would be more

valuable than mine because I have not put together all the pieces to

draw finished conclusions from them.

Mr. RANKIN. One of the Commissioners saw a newspaper story shortly

after the assassination saying "The Voice of America beaming its

message into Russia immediately blamed the reactionary rightwing

movements after Kennedy's death."

Do you know anything about that matter or what the source of it might

have been?

Secretary RUSK. No; I have not anticipated that question so that I

could have a chance to investigate it, but I will, if I may, Mr. Chief

Justice, file a report with the Commission on that point.

I can say now that there was never any policy guidance from the

Department of State or from the leadership of the Voice of America

suggesting that any broadcasters take that line.

It is possible, and this is purely speculative at the moment, that

the Voice of America in repeating a great many news accounts, as it

frequently does in its overseas broadcasts, may have repeated some

news accounts from this country, among which might have been a story

to that effect from one source or another, but I would like if I may,

sir, an opportunity to investigate that point and make a report to the

Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do that, Mr. Secretary.

Representative FORD. May I ask a question? Have we received in the

Commission all of the Voice of America broadcasts that were made over a

period of 2 to 7 days involved in this incident?

Mr. RANKIN. I don't know of any.

Representative FORD. I think the Commission ought to have them for our

own analysis as well as the analysis of the Secretary of State.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that under your jurisdiction?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; indeed I could provide that.

Mr. RANKIN. If you will, please.

Secretary RUSK. The Commission might also be interested in either

digests or the fuller materials on world reactions to the President's

assassination.

I have here, for example, a daily summary of the 26th of November

1963, on foreign radio and press reaction which gives some interesting

treatment about this behind the Iron Curtain.

I would be happy to furnish the Commission with any material of that

sort which you might wish.

Mr. RANKIN. We would appreciate having that.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Representative FORD. Would that include the Voice of Moscow or whatever

they call it over there?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. From the outset of the events that took place?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; you might just wish to look at the first two

or three paragraphs here to get a sample of the kind of summary that

that involves.

Mr. DULLES. Was that prepared in the Department or by the Foreign

Broadcast Information Service?

Secretary RUSK. This particular one is from the Foreign Broadcast

Information Service. We also have another one. We also have another one

from within the Department which is also available in terms.

Representative FORD. I think it would be useful to have both for a

period of about a week or so. I realize this is a summary covering

several days. I think I saw that at the time.

Mr. RANKIN. There was another statement in the paper apparently

purporting to be official that one of the Commissioners asked me to

ask about and that was the Washington Post, Sunday, November 24, 1963,

which was quoted by the Commissioner as, "Today in Washington State

Department officials said they have no evidence indicating involvement

of any foreign power in the assassination."

Do you know anything about that or can you give us any information?

Secretary RUSK. That was the view which we took at the time in

consultation with the investigative agencies. We did not then have

evidence of that sort nor do we now, and the implications of suggesting

evidence in the absence of evidence would have been enormous.

Representative FORD. I don't understand that.

Secretary RUSK. Well, for us to leave the impression that we had

evidence that we could not describe or discuss, when in fact we didn't

have the evidence on a matter of such overriding importance could have

created a very dangerous situation in terms of----

Representative FORD. Wouldn't it have been just as effective to say no

comment?

Secretary RUSK. Well, unfortunately, under the practices of the press,

no comment would have been taken to confirm that there was evidence. I

mean, that would have been the interpretation that many would have put

upon no comment.

But, Mr. Ford, I think the key thing is that at the time that statement

was made we did not have such evidence. I mean, this was a factual

statement at that time.

Representative FORD. But, at that time, this was 2 days after the

assassination, you really didn't have much time to evaluate all of the

evidence.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is correct. But if the evidence or the known

facts had changed certainly that type of statement would have changed.

In other words, such statements are based upon the situation as known

at the time the statements are made.

Representative FORD. This statement then appeared in the Sunday

morning, November 24 issue or edition of the Washington Post. That was

a statement issued certainly on the 23d of November because it had to

be in order to get in the Sunday edition of the Post. So, that is 24

hours after the assassination.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir, and this statement was made on

the basis of such information as was available to us in the first 24

hours.

Mr. RANKIN. I was also asked to inquire whether that was an official

statement if under your responsibility or if you could tell me who

would be responsible for it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would have to check the actual source of the

statement. But I would have no present doubt that it was an officer of

the Department who was authorized to make that and for which I would be

fully responsible.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all I have.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question in connection with that?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. There was some evidence presented here quite recently when

the district attorney of Dallas was here with regard to a message

from Washington, from the White House to the attorney general of

Texas, who was also here the other day before the Commission, on this

point: A rumor had reached Washington that in preparing the indictment

there, they were going to put in some reference to an international

conspiracy. As a matter of fact, when that was run down it was not

a correct rumor. But when that reached Washington, the reaction was

rather strong and I think entirely understandable, and word went

back to Dallas from high quarters that that should not, hoped that

that would not be included in the legal proceedings and papers that

were filed in connection with the assassination of the President and

charging----

Mr. RANKIN. Unless there was evidence to support it.

Mr. DULLES. Unless there was evidence to support it. And the district

attorney, who was here, testified that he had never considered adding

that into it, putting that in the proceedings because if you put it in

you had to prove it, and it is not necessary at all. All you need to do

is allege a murder with intent, and so forth, and so on. So that that

was all pretty well cleared up.

Mr. DULLES. Did that ever reach your attention, did you know anything

about that?

Secretary RUSK. I don't personally recall that particular message. I do

recall----

Mr. DULLES. That took place, I think before you got back, because that

took place on the evening of the 22d.

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