Mr. HOOVER. Well, I, at the request of----

The CHAIRMAN. Director, before you get into that question, and may

I ask something that I would like to hear you discuss in this same

connection?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have told us that you had no jurisdiction down there

in Dallas over this crime.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Because there is no Federal crime committed. And I assume

that that caused you some embarrassment and some confusion in doing

your work?

Mr. HOOVER. It most certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. Because of the likelihood of your being in conflict with

other authorities. Do you believe there should be a Federal law?

Mr. HOOVER. I am very strongly in favor of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Against an attempt to assassinate the President?

Mr. HOOVER. I am very strongly in favor of legislation being enacted

and enacted promptly that will make a Federal crime of attempts upon

the life of the President and the Vice President, and possibly the next

two persons in succession, the Speaker and the President pro tempore

of the Senate. In the Oswald case, we could not take custody of him.

If we had had jurisdiction we would have taken custody of him and I

do not believe he would have been killed by Rubenstein. The failure

to have jurisdiction was extremely embarrassing. I think the killing

of Oswald has created a great fog of speculation that will go on for

years, because of the things that Oswald might have been able to tell

which would have been of assistance in pinning down various phases of

this matter. This must be done now by collecting evidence from third

parties, and not from Oswald himself.

Now, as to the publicity that took place in Dallas, I was very

much concerned with that. We have in the FBI a crime laboratory

that furnishes free service to all law enforcement agencies of the

country. Any law enforcement agency can send to our laboratory here

in Washington any evidence--blood, dirt, dust, guns, anything of

that kind--and our laboratory examines it and then reports back to

the contributing police department. This was being done in the early

stages of the Oswald case, and almost as soon as the report would

reach the Dallas Police Department, the chief of police or one of the

representatives of the department would go on TV or radio and relate

findings of the FBI, giving information such as the identification of

the gun and other items of physical evidence.

Now, that concerned me for several reasons. In the first place, I don't

think cases should be tried in the newspapers. I think a short and

simple statement can be made when a person is arrested, but the details

of the evidence should be retained until you go into court to try the

case. Secondly, it creates a great deal of speculation on the part of

the press. There was very aggressive press coverage at Dallas. I was

so concerned that I asked my agent in charge at Dallas, Mr. Shanklin,

to personally go to Chief Curry and tell him that I insisted that he

not go on the air any more until this case was resolved. Until all

the evidence had been examined, I did not want any statements made

concerning the progress of the investigation. Because of the fact the

President had asked me to take charge of the case I insisted that he

and all members of his department refrain from public statements.

There was an officer in his department who was constantly on the

radio or giving out interviews. The chief concurred in my request and

thereafter refrained from further comment but of course by that time

the identification of the gun was known, the caliber of the gun, where

it had come from, where it had been bought and the information we had

run down in Chicago and had furnished to the Dallas Police Department.

If the case had been in the hands of the FBI none of that information

would have been given out. Because of the publicity you had to face the

charge that the prejudice of the community would require a change of

venue. With the publicity, I don't know where you could have changed

the venue to, since newspapers all over the State covered it. I think

a Houston reporter was the first one who wrote that Oswald was an

informant of the FBI. We went to the newspaper reporter. He refused to

tell us his source. He said he had also heard it from other persons.

We asked him the names of these persons and we interviewed them but

none of them would provide the source. In other words, I was trying

to nail down where this lie started. That, of course, is always the

result where you are daily giving out press interviews because the

press wants stories desperately. We have always adopted the policy in

the Bureau of no comment until we have the warrant and make the arrest.

Then a release is prepared briefly stating what the facts are, what

the written complaint says, the fact. The complaint was filed with the

Commissioner, and that ends it. We don't try to run it out for a week

or 10 days. It is up to the U.S. attorney thereafter and the court to

try the case.

I was concerned about the demand for change of venue, because all the

evidence was being given out. At that time, of course, we didn't know

that Oswald was going to be killed, and there was a possibility that

he might be confronted with some of this evidence. If it had been kept

secret and used in the interrogation of him, just confronting him

with what was found, such as his picture with the gun might have been

helpful.

A small thing can often make a man break and come forward with a full

confession. If he knows in advance that you have certain evidence he

will be on guard against answering questions. Of course, he is always

advised of his rights and that he can have an attorney. We always

make a point of this. We generally have a reputable physician of

the community present in our office while the prisoner is there, to

administer to him and be able to testify that he has not been subjected

to third degree methods. He is examined when he comes in and he is

examined before we take him to the commissioner. Taking him before the

commissioner in a case like Oswald's would probably have been done

within 4 or 5 hours. Generally we try to arraign a prisoner within an

hour.

That makes it more difficult; you have to work faster. But again I say

I am in favor of having the procedures of law enforcement officers as

tightly bound down as we can, with due respect for the interests of

society.

Of course, there must be an equal balance. For years we have had a rule

against third degree methods, but years ago many police departments

used the third degree. I think very few of them use it now because if

they use it they violate the civil rights statutes and we investigate

them for having brutally handled a prisoner. Many allegations are made

unfairly against police officers that they have used third degree

methods and we are able to prove they haven't in our investigations.

That is particularly true where civil rights matters are involved. We

have such cases in many areas where civil rights agitation is going on.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, to remind you of my question, any suggestions

that you may have concerning the protection of the President, and

the information that the Commission has that you have a special

appropriation in that connection for the Bureau?

Mr. HOOVER. We do not have a special appropriation for the

protection of the President. The Secret Service, of course, has that

responsibility. On December 2, I prepared this memorandum for the

President, and for the chief of the Secret Service at the request of

the President, outlining suggestions that I felt should be considered

to tighten up on the security of the President. If the Commission

desires I will be glad to leave this or I will be glad to read it to

the Commission.

Representative BOGGS. Why don't you ask the Director just to summarize

it.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you summarize it?

Mr. DULLES. Can we have a copy of it?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes.

Representative FORD. Could the copy be put in the record as an exhibit?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir; that is all right with me. I have no objection to

it.

Regarding travel, first, advise the Secret Service as far in advance as

possible of the President's travel plans and proposed itinerary. The

reason for that is there have been Presidents who suddenly decide they

are going somewhere and the Secret Service does not have the chance

always to cover the area and check the neighborhood and check the hotel

or place where it may be.

Representative BOGGS. You have one like that right now, Mr. Director.

Mr. HOOVER. I know from experience.

Second, avoid publicizing exact routes of travel as long as possible.

Again, it has been the practice in the past to announce the President

is going along a certain route and, therefore, great crowds will gather

along that route. And, therefore, I thought that was something that

should not be given out and the President should be taken along some

routes which are not announced. At the present time, he goes to cities

and he wants to see people and the crowd wants to see him. In Dallas,

the route was publicized at least 24 hours before so everybody knew

where he would be driving.

Third, use a specially armored car with bulletproof glass and have such

cars readily available in locations frequently visited. The President,

as I observed earlier in my testimony, had no armored car. He has one

now which I supplied to Secret Service and they will have one made no

doubt in due time for the President's use. But if it had been armored,

I believe President Kennedy would be alive today.

Fourth, avoid setting a specific pattern of travel or other activity

such as visiting the same church at the same time each Sunday.

Regarding public appearances. First, use maximum feasible screening of

persons in attendance including use of detection devices sensitive to

the amount of metal required in a firearm or grenade.

Second, use a bulletproof shield in front of the entire rostrum in

public appearances such as the swearing in ceremony at the Capitol on

inauguration day, the presidential reviewing stand in front of the

White House on the same day and on the rear of trains.

Third, keep to a minimum the President's movements within crowds,

remain on the rostrum after the public addresses rather than mingling

with the audience. Again, there is great difficulty in that field.

Fourth, in appearances at public sporting events such as football

games, remain in one place rather than changing sides during half-time

ceremonies.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. About the armored car you said if Kennedy had an armored

car that might have saved him. Would the back of the armored car have

some protection to protect his head?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes.

Warren Commission (05 of 26): Hearings Vol. V (of 15) · 第 85 / 470 题