Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not.
Mr. STERN. This liaison function.
Mr. BELMONT. This is something we have done for years on the basis that
we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President
goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy
relative to other high officials when it appears desirable.
Mr. STERN. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your
instructions to special agents in this respect?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional
instructions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other
dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the
President.
The CHAIRMAN. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr.
Belmont?
Mr. BELMONT. They appear as an attachment--working from the back, I
think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of
Instructions Section 83."
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have it.
Mr. BELMONT. The first page is the same information that we previously
furnished to Secret Service involving threats.
The CHAIRMAN. The first page is intact, as it was before.
Mr. BELMONT. There may be some slight changes in wording but
essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the
Commission's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a
certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without
referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the
instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the
present date?
Mr. BELMONT. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to
do it with the staff, or can I help you here?
Mr. DULLES. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would
be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in
studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the
attachments.
Mr. BELMONT. Very good.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
Mr. BELMONT. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir,
the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security
of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion
in our manual, and it extends the dissemination to "subversives,
ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (_a_) possessing emotional
instability or irrational behavior, (_b_) who have made threats of
bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local
government or officials of a foreign government, (_c_) who express
or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who
have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct
indicates tendencies toward violence, and (_d_) whose prior acts or
statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized
government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and
a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information
that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November
22, 1963.
Mr. STERN. This did not come about, this change did not come about,
through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the
Secret Service?
Mr. BELMONT. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to
provide any additional information in the light of what happened that
might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting
the President.
Mr. DULLES. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly
changing in section (_d_) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or
statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and
hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe,
where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the
hatred of organized government has.
Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change that.
Mr. DULLES. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to
rewrite it.
Mr. BELMONT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.
Mr. STERN. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr
Belmont, should that "and" before (_d_) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean
these----
Mr. BELMONT. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled
together if that is your thought.
Mr. STERN. That is right.
Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an "or".
Mr. STERN. This means any of the broad classifications of people,
subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these
four tests.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in
volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By
volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that
more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under
these criteria.
The CHAIRMAN. In what period of time?
Mr. BELMONT. Since we put them out.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Mr. BELMONT. Which was December 26.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. McCLOY. Have you included defectors in this list?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.
Mr. STERN. You mean as of December 26, 1963?
Mr. BELMONT. Correct.
Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or
difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem
or difficulty under the expanded criteria?
Mr. BELMONT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance
security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws
and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the
increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual
and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is
a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase
security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In
some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much
difficulty. Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous
are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the
country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries
there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are
detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of
security--I am not boring you with this, am I?
The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.
Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its
tremendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the
country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our
work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law
that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy.
It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly,
and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire
security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is
handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the
terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the
country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security
as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these
controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward
the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.
We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all
Communists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that
if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group
of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by
power-hungry or unscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which
inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or
later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this
action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and
carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately
on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis,
any and all information that in any way was indicated to be a possible
threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take
such action as was required against these individuals who had by
their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation
based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position
to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set
in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since
the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of
dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question
that we could have said, "No; we won't go any further." But we felt
that it was our responsibility to do whatever we could do and, hence,
we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of
pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.
(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the
hearing room.)
We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these
broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have
not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed
beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe
in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless
such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous.
For example, we know that in one city when the President recently
visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in
the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with
you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys,
have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that
this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats
against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we
give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something
with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the
police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this
picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed
of threats against the President, and you go into the broader area of
what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat,
and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a
danger.
That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional
information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I
may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach
of the FBI to the security field. We go as far in our investigations
as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people.
We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be
thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out
this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics
of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue
a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our
responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of
our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I
have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative
field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and
I know the policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care
with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.
Mr. McCLOY. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret
Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have
been used to having.
Mr. BELMONT. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.
Mr. McCLOY. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that
the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it
something that you feel----
Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required
to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President
visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of
Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization.
Mr. McCLOY. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their
procedures to cope with this, won't they?
Mr. BELMONT. I do not know.
Mr. McCLOY. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All
investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of
subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (_a_) possessing
emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a
good many people in the United States and maybe some members of this
Commission--I am speaking for myself. There is irrational behavior that
I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean you
are going to send everybody over there, but the names that--all those
under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that
classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason
behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport
to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the
names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you
indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who
knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior.
You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be
as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our
best judgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people
and the number of people who go to the Secret Service.
Mr. McCLOY. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are
not saying that all those people that you characterize here under
this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service
every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all
investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right
in that?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say,
"If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly
furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the
information.
Mr. McCLOY. So without any further ado all the people in your list who
are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service
when there is an occasion, when the President travels?
Mr. BELMONT. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during
our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or
category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret
Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has
that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been
referred to them.
Mr. McCLOY. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally
made. This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on
the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had
placed on their shoulders.
Mr. BELMONT. I think you are correct.
Mr. McCLOY. The reason I am asking these questions is because by
implication, at least, one of our directives is to look into this
situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to
see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious.
Mr. DULLES. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit
indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the
procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change
has been made, how it has been extended?