Mr. BELMONT. Legal attachés abroad?
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. No; they are under the direct supervision of our
headquarters.
Depending on the size of the division in the field, we will have a
supervisory staff in order to properly supervise the work of the agents
in the field.
Mr. STERN. Can you describe the establishment of a typical case,
indicating the meaning of the terms office of origin and auxiliary
office?
Mr. BELMONT. A case is opened by the FBI upon the receipt of
information indicating a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI.
We restrict our investigations to those matters which are within our
jurisdiction.
The office of origin is the office where the major part of the work
is to be done. Thus it should be the controlling office of the
investigation.
Normally, if an individual is under investigation, it will be the
office where he resides. There will be in many cases investigation to
be conducted by other offices. Those offices that have investigations
in that case are considered auxiliary offices, and will cover the
investigation sent to it, sent to them, by the office of origin or
by another auxiliary office if a lead develops within that area that
requires attention elsewhere.
I may say that the office of origin can be changed and is changed if
during the investigation it becomes apparent that the focus of the
investigation has shifted to another area.
It is logical, therefore, that that office which bears the brunt of the
investigation should be in possession of all the material pertinent
to the investigation and should be charged with the supervision and
running of the investigation and the direction of it.
In the event the office of origin is changed at any given time, the
previous office of origin will forward to the new office of origin all
material pertaining to the case so that it will have a complete file
and the necessary knowledge to run the case.
Mr. STERN. Can you tell us a bit more about how information is
maintained and how it flows through the system from headquarters to
office of origin, to the auxiliary office or in the other directions
that are possible?
Mr. BELMONT. Since the information is maintained in a standard and
uniform filing system in both our field offices and our headquarters
so that there is complete uniformity in the handling of information,
our main filing system is at headquarters. Consequently, we need here
all pertinent information in any case. Consequently, the reports and
information developed during a case are sent to our headquarters for
filing.
It is pertinent to observe that we conduct close to 2 million name
checks a year for other agencies and departments of the Federal
Government. Consequently, we must have here all pertinent information
so that a name check will reflect the information in possession of the
Bureau.
When a report is prepared in our field office--an investigation, and
there are leads or investigation to be performed in another office,
copies of this report are designated for that office, together with
the lead or the investigation to be covered. Upon receipt of that the
office gathers the background information from the report and proceeds
with the investigation.
Mr. STERN. This is the auxiliary office?
Mr. BELMONT. The auxiliary office.
If there is a matter of urgency rather than wait for an investigative
report, the information will be transmitted by more rapid means, such
as teletype. All of our offices have teletypes; radio, our offices have
a radio system; telephone.
Mr. DULLES. Is that teletype from the office to Washington only, or is
there some interoffice teletypes?
Mr. BELMONT. Each office is connected with each other office by
teletype.
Mr. DULLES. It is; all over the country?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; permitting rapid communication.
Mr. DULLES. That is, New Orleans and Dallas would have teletype between
these two offices?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. What kind of radio communication, Mr. Belmont, did you
say?
Mr. BELMONT. We have an emergency radio communication so that both for
normal use, in the matter of expense, to reduce expenses, and for an
emergency, our offices can communicate with headquarters and with each
other.
The CHAIRMAN. On your own transmission system?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; that is correct. We feel that in any type of an
emergency we must, because of our heavy responsibilities----
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Be able to communicate. As a matter of fact, during the
recent disaster in Alaska, one of the few means of communication with
the mainland was our radio system.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that so?
Mr. BELMONT. And we assisted in passing messages down from Alaska.
We have a communication called AIRTEL which is simply a communication
in letter form on a particular form which upon receipt is regarded as a
matter of urgency and requires special handling.
So that you will understand that, in an effort to cut expenses, we
determined that a matter which could not wait for a report or a letter
was normally sent by teletype, which is a relatively expensive means of
communication.
By sending an AIRTEL which would be recognized for special handling,
the office could receive the same information by mail with a delay of
perhaps 12 hours and it would still receive the urgent handling that we
require for that particular thing. That is the purpose of the AIRTEL.
Mr. STERN. I think we might turn now to a description of your role
in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, both before and after the
assassination.
Mr. BELMONT. As the individual in charge of all investigative
operations, the Lee Harvey Oswald investigation is my responsibility,
the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau.
Mr. STERN. Did you have any particular involvement that you can recall
in the investigation of his case before November 22--personally?
Mr. BELMONT. No; this case was not of the importance or urgency that it
was considered necessary to call to my personal attention for personal
direction. You must bear in mind that during the fiscal year 1963 the
FBI handled something in the nature of 636,000 investigative matters.
Necessarily, then, those matters which would be called to my personal
attention for personal handling would have to be on a selective basis.
Mr. STERN. Have you been personally involved in the investigation since
the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. I have indeed.
Mr. McCLOY. Before we get to this, how many cases of defections to the
Soviet Union would you be investigating in the course of a fiscal year?
Mr. BELMONT. I couldn't give you an exact figure on that. It is our
system to investigate any individual where there is information or
evidence that indicates a necessity for investigation within our
jurisdiction. I do know that we have investigated, and currently are
investigating, defectors not only to the Soviet Union but in other
areas of the world.
Mr. McCLOY. They also would not come per se to your attention, your
personal attention?
Mr. BELMONT. Depending on the case. If there is a matter which has some
urgency or there is a question of policy, it would and does come to my
attention, and indeed comes to the attention of Mr. Hoover.
I would not seek to give you any impression that I am not advised of
many cases, I am. I am kept daily advised, as is Mr. Hoover, of all
matters of policy or urgency or where there is a question of procedure.
That is inherent in our system of close supervision.
Mr. McCLOY. What I am getting at is, I think, is the matter of
defection just out of its own character of such significance that it
becomes a matter of out of the ordinary importance to the Bureau when
you learn of it.
Mr. BELMONT. Again, Mr. McCloy, I have no way of knowing the extent to
which those particular cases would be called to my attention.
As shown in the Oswald case itself, we do take cognizance of these.
Immediately upon the publicity on Oswald, there was a case opened. I
do know that I see many such cases and where there is an indication
of possible damage to the country through the leak of information,
classified or in some other instance where there is a question of
policy or urgency it is immediately called to my attention. I can only
say in general I do see many such cases.
Mr. McCLOY. Well, we had testimony here yesterday that in a
preassassination investigation of Oswald that they learned he was a
defector, they had interviews with him, and then they marked the case
closed.
At one stage it was reopened and then it was closed again because, as I
gather it, there was no indication other than his defection that would
lead to their, to the agents, feeling that this man was capable of
violence or that he was a dangerous character in any sense.
I gather that whether or not he was thought to be a dangerous character
or whether he was capable of violence would be settled by the man in
the field office, in the office that had charge, the man who was in
charge of the office that was dealing with that case locally, is that
right?
Mr. BELMONT. That is a judgment that he would render, but that judgment
would be passed on by our headquarters staff.
Mr. McCLOY. Passed on by Washington?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, indeed. In this instance by the domestic intelligence
division.
Mr. McCLOY. In this case then the decision to close that case, I am
talking always about the preassassination business, was approved or
tacitly approved by the Washington staff.
Mr. BELMONT. Not tacitly approved. Approved.
Mr. McCLOY. Approved. Well, you mark the paper approved or you just
accept it, accept the file with a notation "return for closing."
Mr. BELMONT. When the closing report comes to our headquarters, it is
reviewed by our supervisory staff, and if we do not agree with the
action then the field office is notified to continue the investigation.
That is a decision of substance.
Mr. McCLOY. Well, I can understand that but I gather when the report
comes in you simply let the report lie unless you feel from your
examination of it that it justified further action. You don't notify
the field office, do you, that the closing of the case is approved?
Mr. BELMONT. No, Mr. McCloy. With the volume of work that we have that
would be an unnecessary move.
Mr. McCLOY. I can understand that.
Mr. BELMONT. It is, however, thoroughly understood through our service,
through the system that we follow, that if that report comes in and
it is reviewed and it is filed here, if there is disagreement as to
the handling of the closing of the case or any other matter pertaining
to the investigation, the seat of government will then go out with
instructions to the field.
Mr. McCLOY. All right.
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question further on that point?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.
Mr. DULLES. As I recall from the testimony of your people yesterday,
with regard to the situation in Dallas and later in New Orleans, that
after the case was marked closed in Dallas, there was this incident in
New Orleans of the distribution of the Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets,
and then a case there, a live case, an open case was started.
Now, it wasn't quite clear to me yesterday from all the testimony, I
missed a bit of it, unfortunately, as to whether the opening of a new
case in New Orleans, because of the new incident, would operate to
reopen it or change the closed status of the case in Dallas, and the
case was then transferred from New Orleans to Dallas later. If you
could clear that up for us I think it would be helpful.
Mr. BELMONT. The agent, Fain at the time, who handled the case, closed
the case after two interviews with Oswald, arriving at the conclusion
that the purpose of our investigation of Oswald which was to determine
whether he had been given an assignment by Soviet intelligence, had
been served. He closed the case, as he felt there was no further action
to be taken. The purpose had been satisfied. Headquarters agreed.
In March 1963 Agent Hosty received information in Dallas to the effect
that Oswald had been in communication with The Worker, the east coast
Communist newspaper. He therefore reinstituted the case, and sent out a
lead to check Oswald's employment. He also received information, as I
recall it, that Oswald had been in communication with the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee, so there were two incidents that aroused his interest.
In June 1963 our New Orleans office likewise received information that
Oswald had communicated with The Worker or was on a subscription list
for The Worker. So that the case was revived in Dallas by Hosty.
Mr. DULLES. That was even before what we call the New Orleans incident?
Mr. BELMONT. Correct.
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. And he learned that Oswald had left Dallas, the residence
was then picked up in New Orleans, and the case was revived. So that
actually there was a joint revival of the case.
Then on August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested by the New Orleans police
in connection with a disturbance of the peace in passing out these
pamphlets, which further aroused our interest. So that the reopening
of the case after the closing was due to these incidents that I have
mentioned.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you. So that at the time of the assassination, this
was an open and not a closed case as regards the Dallas office.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. At the time that Oswald was found to be
living in New Orleans, and this was definitely established that he
was actually residing there, the Dallas office in accordance with the
procedure that I mentioned, transferred the case to New Orleans as
office of origin.
Subsequently, the case was again transferred back to Dallas when it was
determined that Oswald was again residing in the Dallas area.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Stern.
Mr. STERN. We were getting, Mr. Belmont, to the question of whether
you had been personally involved in the investigation since the
assassination.
Mr. BELMONT. I said I have indeed.
Mr. STERN. Yes. As a part of that you have reviewed in detail the
investigation made prior to the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. Have you participated in or supervised the preparation of
reports and other correspondence to the Commission in response to
questions from the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. I show you a letter with attached memorandum which has been
marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 833. Can you identify
this document, Mr. Belmont?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter transmitted on April 6, 1964, to Mr.
Rankin by the FBI with enclosure answering a number of questions which
the Commission posed to the FBI.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this letter?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. And you have reviewed it and are familiar with it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. We have covered in your answers to Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCloy
a good deal of the material in here.
I would like briefly to touch upon several of the questions, the more
important questions, regarding the nature of the FBI's interest in
Lee Harvey Oswald at various times, and I would like you to refer to
each question that I indicate but not read your answer. Paraphrase
it. I think we have had a good deal of the specific detail but what
I am interested in is a description from your examination of the
investigation as it was carried on, of the nature of the FBI interest
in Oswald.