library; "unhappy Paul! Burdened with the hopes of immortality; what an
impediment he must have found it in his Christian course! I wonder he
did not throw aside 'this weight, which so easily beset him.' Pity
that when he became a Christian, and ceased to be a Pharisee, he did
not, like so many 'spiritual' Christians of our day, know that, when
he became a Christian, he might still remain in one of the Jewish
sects, and turn Sadducee."
"Be it so," said Fellowes, "a Christian Sadducee, caeteris partibus,
might perhaps be a more virtuous man having no hopes of heaven by
which he can possibly be bribed."
"Religious love and hope," said I, "will with difficulty exist in
such an atmosphere as you create. It is a sublime altitude, doubtless,
but no ordinary 'spiritual' beings can breathe that rarefied air. It
is for the honor of Shaftesbury and some few other Deists, that they
aspired to this transcendental virtue! You are imitating them. I fear
you will not be more successful. Once leave a man to conclude, or even
to suspect, that he and his cat end together, and, if a bad man, he
will gladly accept a release from every claim but that of his passions
and appetites (the effects being more or less philosophically calculated
according to his intellectual power); while the best man would be
liable to contemplate God and religion with a depressed and faltering
heart. He would be apt to lose all energy; he would feel it impossible
to repress doubts of the infinite wisdom and benignity of Him (whatever
he might think of His power) who had given him the soul of a man and
the life of a butterfly; conceptions and aspirations so totally
disproportioned to the evanescence of his being! If, however, you
really think that the hopes of an immortality of virtuous happiness
will stand in the way of a sublime disinterestedness of spirituality,
you ought to recollect that any expectation of happiness, even for a
day, will, in its measure, have the same effect. So that the only way
in which you can accommodate so 'spiritual a piety,' and absolutely
insure yourself against 'spiritual bribery,' is to deprive yourself
of all possibility of being so misled. If your piety would be
absolutely sure that it loves God on these sublime terms, it should
take care to neutralize the happiness which that love brings with it;
so that, if God has not made you miserable, you should never fail, like
the ascetics, to make yourself so. I fear you never can be perfectly
'spiritual' till you have made yourself supremely wretched. But to quit
this point," I continued; "if immortality be a delusion, I fear we
say that it covers the divine administration with an penetrable
cloud,--one which we cannot hope will removed. The inequalities of
that administration not be redressed."
"But do you not recollect," replied Fellowes, reason Mr. Newman gives
for despising any such mitigation? Does he not say, that it is a
strange argument for a day of recompense, that man has unsatisfied
claims upon God? He says, 'Christians have added an argument of their
own for a future state, but, unfortunately, one that cannot bring
personal comfort or assurance. A future state (it seems) is requisite
to redress the inequalities of this life. And can I go to the Supreme
Judge, and tell Him that I deserve more happiness than He has granted
me in this life?' Do you not recollect this?--or has this sarcasm
escaped you?"
"It has not escaped me,--I remember it well; but it seems to have
escaped you, that it is a very transparent sophism. For what is it
but a pretence that the Christian in general is confident enough of
his virtue to think that he has not been sufficiently well treated,
and that his Creator and Judge cannot do less than make amends for
his injustice, by giving him compensation in another world?"
"And is not that the true statement of the case?"
"I imagine not; whether men be Christians or otherwise. The generality,
when they reason upon this subject, (you and I, for example, at this
very moment,) not at all considering the aspect of such a day upon
themselves; how much they will lose if there be none; perhaps the
bulk would wish that it could be proved that it would never come! It
has been from a wish to escape great speculative perplexities, connected
with the divine administration, and not in relation to man's deserts,
that the question has been argued. When dictated by other feelings,
the conviction of a future state has been quite as generally the
utterance of remorse and fear, the response of an accusing conscience,
as of hope and aspiration; and derives, perhaps, a terrible significance
from that circumstance. But it has certainly not been, in the Christian,
the result of any absurd expectation of virtues to be rewarded, or rights
to be redressed. As to the Christian, though he feels that he would not,
and dare not, go to the divine tribunal with any such absurd plea as
Mr. Newman is pleased to put into his mouth,--though he cannot impeach
the divine goodness,--he none the less feels that that goodness, if
this scene be all, is open to very grievous impeachment in relation to
millions who have suffered much, and done no wrong, and to multitudes
more who have inflicted infinite wrong, and suffered next to nothing;
and they would fain, if they could, get over difficulties which
Mr. Newman chooses, from the mere exigencies of his theology, to
represent as no difficulties at all. To escape them or to solve them is
the thing principally in the minds of those who contend for a day
of recompense; not the imaginary compensation of individual wrongs. I do
contend that, if this world be all, the divine administration in many
points is more hopelessly opposed to our moral instincts, and to all
our notions of equity and benevolence, than any thing on which you
spiritualists are accustomed to justify your censure of Scripture.
You ought, as Harrington says, to go further."
____
July 30. I was much interested yesterday morning by a conversation
between Harrington and two pleasant youths, acquaintances of Mr.
Fellowes, both younger by three or four years than either he or
Harrington. They are now at college, and have imbibed in different
degrees that curious theory which, professedly recognizing
Christianity (as consigned to the New Testament) as a truly
divine revelation, yet asserts that it is intermingled with a large
amount of error and absurdity, and tells each man to eliminate
the divine element for himself. According to this theory, the
problem of eliciting revealed truth may be said to be indeterminate;
of the unknown x varies through all degrees of magnitude; it is equal
to any thing, equal to every thing, equal to nothing, equal
to infinity.
The whole party thought, with the exception of Harrington, who knew
not what to think, that the "religious faculty or faculties" (one or
many,--no man seems to know exactly) are quite sufficient to decide
all doubts and difficulties in religious matters.
Harrington knew not whether to say there was any truth in Christianity
or not; Fellowes knew that there was none, except in that "religious
element," Which is found alike essentially in all religions; that
its miracles, its inspiration, its peculiar doctrines, are totally false.
The young gentlemen just referred to believed "that it might be admitted
that an external revelation was possible," and "that the condition of
man, considering the aspects of his history, has not been altogether
felicitous as to show that he never needed, and might not be benefited,
by such light." I could cordially agree with them so far; superabundance
of religious illumination not being amongst the things of which humanity
can legitimately complain.
But then, as they both believed that each man was to distil the "elixir
Vitrae" for himself from the crude mass of truth and falsehood which
the New Testament presents, Harrington, with his interrogations, soon
compelled them to see how inconsistent they were both with themselves
and with one another. One of them believed, he said, that the Apostles
might have been favored by a true revelation; but not in such a sense
"as to prevent their often falling into serious errors," whenever the
distinctly "religious element" was not concerned; this was the only
truly "divine" thing about it; but he saw no particular objection to
receiving the miracles; at least some of them,--the best authenticated
and most reasonable; perhaps they were of value as part of the complex
evidence needful to establish doctrines which, if not absolutely
transcendental to the human faculties,--as the doctrine of a future life,
for example,--yet, apart from revelation, are but matter of conjecture.
The other was also not unwilling to admit the miraculous and inspired
character of the revelation, but contended, further, that the "religious
element" was to be submitted to human judgment as well as the rest;
and that, if apparently absurd, contradictory, or pernicious, as judged
by that infallible and ultimate standard, it was to be rejected.
It was amusing to think that, in this little company of three devout
believers in the "internal oracle," no two thought alike! After the two
youths had frankly stated their opinions, Harrington quietly said,
"I should much like to ask each of you a few questions. There are
certain difficulties connected with each hypothesis just stated,
on which I should be glad to receive some light. I frankly confess
beforehand, however, that I fear that that curiously constructed
book, which gives us all so much trouble,--which will not allow me
to say positively either that it is true or false,--will still less
permit you to reject a part or parts at your pleasure. It is, I must
admit, a most independent book in that respect, and treats your spiritual
illumination most cavalierly. It says to you, "Receive me altogether,
or reject me altogether, just as you please"; and when men have
rejected it altogether, it leaves them certain literary and
historical, and moral problems, in all fairness demanding solution,
which I doubt whether it is in our power to solve, or to give any
decent account of."
"What do you mean," said the younger of the two youths, "by affirming
that we are compelled to receive the whole book, or to reject it all?"
"Let us see," said Harrington, "whether there is any consistent
stopping-place between. It appears to me, that, whether by the most
singular series of 'coincidences,' or by immense subtlety of design,
this book, evidently composed by different hands, has yet its
materials so interwoven, and its parts so reciprocally dependent,
that it is impossible to separate them,--to set some aside, and say,
'We will accept these, and reject those': just as, in certain textures,
no sooner do we begin to take out a particular thread, than we find it
is inextricably entangled with others, and those again with others; so
that there immediately takes place a prodigious 'gathering' at that
point, and if we persevere, a rent; but the obstinate part at which
we tug will not come away alone. Whether it is so or not, we shall
soon see, by examining the results of the application of your theories.
I will begin with you," (addressing the younger,) "because you believe
least; you say, I think, that you admit the records of the New Testament
contain a real revelation,--a religious element,--and that it has been
authenticated to you by miracles and other evidence; but that the
human mind is still the judge of how much of that revelation is to
be received, 'and sit in judgment' on the 'religious element as well
as the rest.'"
The other assented.
"You admit, probably, the doctrine of the soul's immortality as a part
of that revelation,--perhaps even the doctrine of a resurrection?"
"I do,--both these doctrines."
"But perhaps you reject the idea of an 'atonement,' though you admit
it to be in the Book?"
"Yes. At the same time it is contended by many (as you are aware) that
such a doctrine is not there."
"I am aware of it, of course; but with them we have no controversy here.
They are consistent, so far as the present argument goes; as consistent
as the orthodox themselves. They do not allege a liberty of rejecting
what they admit the book does contain, but only deny that it does contain
some things which they reject. They would admit that, if those doctrines
be there, then either they must concede them because authenticated
by the miracles and other evidence, which proves what else they concede,
or they must reject the said evidence altogether, because it authenticated
what they found it impossible to concede. The controversy between them
and the orthodox is one of interpretation, and is quite different from
that in which we are now engaged."
"I must admit it."
"They may go, then?" said Harrington.
"They may."
"You admit, then, the miraculous authentication of such an event as
the resurrection of man, but deny the doctrine of the atonement,
though equally found in the said records?"
"I do."
"May I ask why?"
"Because the one doctrine does not seem to me to contradict my
'spiritual consciousness,' and the other does."
"You receive the one, I suppose you will say, on account of the
miracles, and so on; since, while not contradicting your impressions
of spiritual truth, it could not be authenticated without external
evidence?"
"Exactly so."
"But is not the other doctrine as much authenticated by the miracles
and so forth? or have you any thing to show that, while all those
passages which relate to the former are true assertions, as well as
truly the assertions of those who published the revelation, those
which relate to the latter are not?"
"I acknowledge I have not," replied the youth.
"Or supposing they are not their sayings at all, have you any evidence
by which you can show that they are not, so as to separate them from
those that are?"
"I must admit that I have no criterion of this kind."
"For aught you know, then, since you know nothing of Christianity
except from those documents in which the miracles and the doctrines are
alike consigned to you, the said miracles, together with the other
evidence, do equally establish the truths which you say are a part
of divine revelation, and the errors which you say your 'spiritual
faculty,' 'moral intuitions,' or what you will, tells you that you
are to reject. You believe, then, in the force of evidence, which
equally establishes truth and falsehood?"
"You can hardly expect me to admit that."
"But I expect you to answer a plain question?"
"Why," said the youth, with a little flippancy, but with a good-humored
laugh too, "the proverb says 'Even a fool may ask questions which a
wise man cannot answer.'"
"I acknowledge myself to be a fool" said Harrington, with a half
serious, half comic air; "and you shall be the wise man who does not
--for I will not say cannot--answer the fool's question."
"I beg your pardon," said the other. "I acknowledge that it was an
uncourteous expression."
"Enough said," replied Harrington; "and now, since you are not pleased
to answer my question, I will answer it myself; and I say, it is plain
that the evidence to which you refer does affirm equally the truths
you declare thus revealed to you, and the errors you declare you must
reject. Now either the evidence is not sufficient to prove the one, or
it is sufficient to prove both. So far, then, I think we may say, and
say justly, that the supposed revelation is so constructed that you
cannot accept a part and reject a part, on such a theory. But to make
the case a little plainer still, if possible. There have been men, you
know, who have taken precisely opposite views of the two doctrines you
have mentioned; who have declared that the doctrine, not of man's
immortality, but of the resurrection, so far from being conceivable,
is, in their judgment, a physical contradiction; but who have also
declared that the doctrine of atonement, in some shape, is instinctively
taught by human nature, and has consequently formed a part of almost
every religion; that it is in analogy with many singular facts of this
world's constitution, and is not absolutely contradicted by any principle
of our nature, intellectual or moral. Such a man, therefore, might take
the very opposite of the course you have taken. He would proceed upon
your common basis of a miraculously confirmed revelation, grossly infested
with errors and falsehoods; he might say that he believed the
authentication of the doctrine of 'atonement' in virtue of the evidence,
because, though transcendental to his reason, it was not repugnant to
it; but that he rejected the doctrine of the 'resurrection,' though
equally established by the evidence, because contrary to the plainest
conclusions of his reason."
"I cannot in candor deny," said the other, "the possibility of such a
case."
"And in such a case, we might say, he does the very opposite of what
you do."
"Neither can I help admitting that."
"The miracles, then, and other evidence, not only play the part of
equally supporting truth and falsehood, but, what is still more
wonderful, convert the same things, in different men, into truth and
falsehood alternately. Miracles they must verily be if they can do
that! A wonderful revelation it certainly is, which thus accommodates
itself to the varying conditions of the human intellect and
conscience, and demonstrates just so much as each of you is pleased
to accept, and no more. No doubt the whole 'corpus dogmatum,' so
supported, will, by the entire body of such believers, be eaten up;
just as was the Mahometan hog, so humorously referred to by Cowper;
but even that had not all its 'forbidden parts' miraculously shown
to be 'unforbidden' to different minds! I do not wonder that such
a revelation should need miracles; that any should be sufficient, is
the greatest wonder of all; if indeed we except two;--the first, that
Supreme Wisdom should have constructed such a curious revelation, in
which he has revealed alternately, to different people, truth and
falsehood, and has established each on the very same evidence; and
the second (almost as great), that any rational creature should be
got to receive such a revelation on such evidence as equally applies
to which he says it does not prove, and to points which he says it
does; these points, however, being, it appears, totally different
in different men! But I will now go to your friend, who has got a
point further in his belief, and graciously accepts all the 'religious
elements' in this revelation."
"Excuse me," said the last; "before you go to him, permit me to mention
a difficulty which occurred to me while we were speaking."
"By all means; but I do not promise to solve it. Perhaps I on this
occasion shall prove the 'wise man,' though I am sure you will not be
the fool."
"You recollect," said the other, blushing, "our dismissing those who,
while contending, like myself, that such and such doctrines are to be
rejected, differ from me in this, that they contend that the said
doctrines are not contained in the records of the supposed revelation
at all; while others contend that they are. Now, if, while the two
parties admit the general evidence which is to substantiate all that
is in the records, they arrive by different interpretation at such
very different results as to the supposed truth which it supports,
are they in any better condition than I? There is the same difference,
though arrived at in different ways; and the revelation still remains
indeterminate."
"Your objection is ingenious," replied Harrington. "First, however, it
is rather hard to ask me to solve a difficulty with which I am in no
way concerned, who profess to be altogether sceptical on the subject.
Secondly, it certainly does not at all mend your case to prove that
there are other men who possibly are as inconsistent as yourself. It
makes your theory neither better nor worse. But, thirdly, if I were a
Christian, I should not hesitate to contend that there was an obvious
and vital difference in the two cases."
"Indeed! If you can show that."
"I should attempt it, at all events I should say that in the latter case
the evidence to which the appeal was made did not equally serve to
establish truth and falsehood, or, what is still worse, alternately
to make falsehood truth, and truth falsehood, to different minds;
that it was designed to establish all that was really in the records,
though what that all was might give rise to different views, from the
prejudices and the ignorance, the different degrees of intelligence and
candor, on part of those who interpreted the records; that they made the
falsehoods, and not the records or the evidence. I should, therefore,
have no difficulty in relation to what, on your theory, is so
incomprehensible; namely, that God should have given man so peculiarly
constructed a revelation. That men should differ or err in its
interpretation is not, I presume, very wonderful, because man, they
say, is a creature of prejudice and passion as well as reason."
"But God would still have given the revelation, and yet it is capable,
it appears, of being variously interpreted!" said the other.
"Very true, and it is very plain to me that, supposing him to have
given any, he could have given no other, unless his omnipotence
had been immediately exerted separately upon each individual of the
human race, and then in such a way as to supersede all the moral
discipline which Christians affirm is involved in its reception.
Supposing this discipline (as those who believe in a revelation
contend) to be an essential condition, I cannot conceive God himself
to give a document which man's ingenuity cannot easily misinterpret.
You see man plays the same trick equally well with that faculty of
'spiritual insight,' which some say is the sole source of religious
truth, and which you say is the sole arbiter of an external revelation!
We cannot find two of you who think alike, or who will give us the
same transcript of religious truth. Similarly, we see the same
ingenuity manifested by man whenever it is his interest to find in
a document a different meaning from that which it apparently carries
on its face. Does not the endless controversy, the perpetual
litigation of men, respecting the meaning of seemingly the plainest
documents, assure us that, if a revelation were really given, the
like would be possible with that? It is doubtful with me, therefore,
whether God himself could give a revelation, such that men could not
misrepresent and pervert it; that is, as long as they were rational
creatures," he continued bitterly. "But the mischief of your theory
is, that it charges the inevitable result of man's perverseness or
ignorance on God, and the revelation he has been supposed to construct,
and that is to me an absurdity."
"I do not see that these answers are satisfactory," said the other.
"I must leave you to judge of that," said Harrington, "or to contest
it with my uncle here. I am keeping my next friend waiting, who, I can
see, is impatient to run a course in favor of his view of revelation.
He tells us, too, that a divine revelation, as conveyed in the New
Testament, is to be admitted, but he cannot away with the notion that
its certainty extends to any thing more than to what he calls the
'religious element.' Is not that your notion?"
"It is."
"You think, for example, that it is possible that the Apostles and
writers of the New Testament (in fact, whoever had the charge of
recording and transmitting to posterity the doctrines of this
revelation) were left liable, just as any other men, to all sorts
of errors, geographical, chronological, logical, historical,
political, moral--"
"No, no, not moral," said the other; "I did not say moral: their
morality is implied in their theology."
"O, very well! we shall better see that presently; only I have to
remind you, for the glory of your Rationalism, that other Rationalists
make the errors extend even to the 'moral element'; but it is all
one to me. You say, that, as far as regards every thing else, it is
very possible that these 'inspired' men might err to any amount?"
"Yes; I believe it."
"You have, doubtless, some reason for saying that they were made
infallible in religion and morality, but liable to all sorts of errors
on other subjects?"