A considerable proportion of the socialist movement remains, as it has

been from the first, vaguely democratic. It points to collective

ownership with no indication of the administrative scheme it

contemplates to realise that intention. Necessarily it remains a

formless claim without hands to take hold of the thing it desires.

Indeed, in a large number of cases it is scarcely more than a resentful

consciousness in the expropriated masses of a social disintegration. It

spends its force very largely in mere revenges upon property as such,

attacks simply destructive by reason of the absence of any definite

ulterior scheme. It is an ill-equipped and planless belligerent who must

destroy whatever he captures because he can neither use nor take away. A

council of democratic socialists in possession of London would be as

capable of an orderly and sustained administration as the Anabaptists in

Munster. But the discomforts and disorders of our present planless

system do tend steadily to the development of this crude socialistic

spirit in the mass of the proletariat; merely vindictive attacks upon

property, sabotage, and the general strike are the logical and

inevitable consequences of an uncontrolled concentration of property in

a few hands, and such things must and will go on, the deep undertow in

the deliquescence of the Normal Social Life, until a new justice, a new

scheme of compensations and satisfactions is attained, or the Normal

Social Life re-emerges.

Fabian socialism was the first systematic attempt to meet the fatal

absence of administrative schemes in the earlier socialisms. It can

scarcely be regarded now as anything but an interesting failure, but a

failure that has all the educational value of a first reconnaissance

into unexplored territory. Starting from that attack on aggregating

property, which is the common starting-point of all socialist projects,

the Fabians, appalled at the obvious difficulties of honest confiscation

and an open transfer from private to public hands, conceived the

extraordinary idea of _filching_ property for the state. A small body of

people of extreme astuteness were to bring about the municipalisation

and nationalisation first of this great system of property and then of

that, in a manner so artful that the millionaires were to wake up one

morning at last, and behold, they would find themselves poor men! For a

decade or more Mr. Pease, Mr. Bernard Shaw, Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb,

Mrs. Besant, Dr. Lawson Dodd, and their associates of the London Fabian

Society did pit their wits and ability, or at any rate the wits and

ability of their leisure moments, against the embattled capitalists of

England and the world, in this complicated and delicate enterprise,

without any apparent diminution of the larger accumulations of wealth.

But in addition they developed another side of Fabianism, still more

subtle, which professed to be a kind of restoration in kind of property

to the proletariat, and in this direction they were more successful. A

dexterous use, they decided, was to be made of the Poor Law, the public

health authority, the education authority, and building regulations and

so forth, to create, so to speak, a communism of the lower levels. The

mass of people whom the forces of change had expropriated were to be

given a certain minimum of food, shelter, education, and sanitation, and

this, the socialists were assured, could be used as the thin end of the

wedge towards a complete communism. The minimum, once established, could

obviously be raised continually until either everybody had what they

needed or the resources of society gave out and set a limit to the

process.

This second method of attack brought the Fabian movement into

co-operation with a large amount of benevolent and constructive

influence outside the socialist ranks altogether. Few wealthy people

really grudge the poor a share of the necessities of life, and most are

quite willing to assist in projects for such a distribution. But while

these schemes naturally involved a very great amount of regulation and

regimentation of the affairs of the poor, the Fabian Society fell away

more and more from its associated proposals for the socialisation of the

rich. The Fabian project changed steadily in character until at last it

ceased to be in any sense antagonistic to wealth as such. If the lion

did not exactly lie down with the lamb, at any rate the man with the gun

and the alleged social mad dog returned very peaceably together. The

Fabian hunt was up.

Great financiers contributed generously to a School of Economics that

had been founded with moneys left to the Fabian Society by earlier

enthusiasts for socialist propaganda and education. It remained for Mr.

Belloc to point the moral of the whole development with a phrase, to

note that Fabianism no longer aimed at the socialisation of the whole

community, but only at the socialisation of the poor. The first really

complete project for a new social order to replace the Normal Social

Life was before the world, and this project was the compulsory

regimentation of the workers and the complete state control of labour

under a new plutocracy. Our present chaos was to be organised into a

Servile State.

§ 4

Now to many of us who found the general spirit of the socialist movement

at least hopeful and attractive and sympathetic, this would be an almost

tragic conclusion, did we believe that Fabianism was anything more than

the first experiment in planning—and one almost inevitably shallow and

presumptuous—of the long series that may be necessary before a clear

light breaks upon the road humanity must follow. But we decline to be

forced by this one intellectual fiasco towards the _laissez faire_ of

the Individualist and the Marxist, or to accept the Normal Social Life

with its atmosphere of hens and cows and dung, its incessant toil, its

servitude of women, and its endless repetitions as the only tolerable

life conceivable for the bulk of mankind—as the ultimate life, that is,

of mankind. With less arrogance and confidence, but it may be with a

firmer faith, we declare that we believe a more spacious social order

than any that exists or ever has existed, a Peace of the World in which

there is an almost universal freedom, health, happiness, and well-being,

and which contains the seeds of a still greater future, is possible to

mankind. We propose to begin again with the recognition of those same

difficulties the Fabians first realised. But we do not propose to

organise a society, form a group for the control of the two chief

political parties, bring about “socialism” in twenty-five years, or do

anything beyond contributing in our place and measure to that

constructive discussion whose real magnitude we now begin to realise.

We have faith in a possible future, but it is a faith that makes the

quality of that future entirely dependent upon the strength and

clearness of purpose that this present time can produce. We do not

believe the greater social state is inevitable.

Yet there is, we hold, a certain qualified inevitability about this

greater social state because we believe any social state not affording a

general contentment, a general freedom, and a general and increasing

fullness of life, must sooner or later collapse and disintegrate again,

and revert more or less completely to the Normal Social Life, and

because we believe the Normal Social Life is itself thick-sown with the

seeds of fresh beginnings. The Normal Social Life has never at any time

been absolutely permanent, always it has carried within itself the germs

of enterprise and adventure and exchanges that finally attack its

stability. The superimposed social order of to-day, such as it is, with

its huge development of expropriated labour, and the schemes of the

later Fabians to fix this state of affairs in an organised form and

render it plausibly tolerable, seem also doomed to accumulate

catastrophic tensions. Bureaucratic schemes for establishing the regular

life-long subordination of a labouring class, enlivened though they may

be by frequent inspection, disciplinary treatment during seasons of

unemployment, compulsory temperance, free medical attendance, and a

cheap and shallow elementary education, fail to satisfy the restless

cravings in the heart of man. They are cravings that even the baffling

methods of the most ingeniously worked Conciliation Boards cannot

permanently restrain. The drift of any Servile State must be towards a

class revolt, paralysing sabotage, and a general strike. The more rigid

and complete the Servile State becomes, the more thorough will be its

ultimate failure. Its fate is decay or explosion. From its debris we

shall either revert to the Normal Social Life and begin again the long

struggle towards that ampler, happier, juster arrangement of human

affairs which we of this book, at any rate, believe to be possible, or

we shall pass into the twilight of mankind.

This greater social life we put, then, as the only real alternative to

the Normal Social Life from which man is continually escaping. For it we

do not propose to use the expressions the “socialist state” or

“socialism” because we believe those terms have now by constant confused

use become so battered and bent and discoloured by irrelevant

associations as to be rather misleading than expressive. We propose to

use the term The Great State to express this ideal of a social system no

longer localised, no longer immediately tied to and conditioned by the

cultivation of the land, worldwide in its interests and outlook and

catholic in its tolerance and sympathy, a system of great individual

freedom with a universal understanding among its citizens of a

collective thought and purpose.

Now, the difficulties that lie in the way of humanity in its complex and

toilsome journey through the coming centuries towards this Great State

are fundamentally difficulties of adaptation and adjustment. To no

conceivable social state is man inherently fitted: he is a creature of

jealousy and suspicion, unstable, restless, acquisitive, aggressive,

intractable, and of a most subtle and nimble dishonesty. Moreover, he is

imaginative, adventurous, and inventive. His nature and instincts are as

much in conflict with the necessary restrictions and subjugation of the

Normal Social Life as they are likely to be with any other social net

that necessity may weave about him. But the Normal Social Life has this

advantage, that it has a vast accumulated moral tradition and a minutely

worked-out material method. All the fundamental institutions have arisen

in relation to it and are adapted to its conditions. To revert to it

after any phase of social chaos and distress is and will continue for

many years to be the path of least resistance for perplexed humanity.

This conception of the Great State, on the other hand, is still

altogether unsubstantial. It is a project as dreamlike to-day as

electric lighting, electric traction, or aviation would have been in the

year 1850. In 1850 a man reasonably conversant with the physical science

of his time would have declared with a very considerable confidence

that, given a certain measure of persistence and social security, these

things were more likely to be attained than not in the course of the

next century. But such a prophecy was conditional on the preliminary

accumulation of a considerable amount of knowledge, on many experiments

and failures. Had the world of 1850, by some wave of impulse, placed all

its resources in the hands of the ablest scientific man alive, and asked

him to produce a practicable paying electric vehicle before 1852, at

best he would have produced some clumsy, curious toy, more probably he

would have failed altogether; and, similarly, if the whole population of

the world came to the present writer and promised meekly to do whatever

it was told, we should find ourselves still very largely at a loss in

our project for a millennium. Yet just as nearly every man at work upon

Voltaic electricity in 1850 knew that he was preparing for electric

traction, so do I know quite certainly in spite of a whole row of

unsolved problems before me, that I am working towards the Great State.

Let me briefly recapitulate the main problems which have to be attacked

in the attempt to realise the outline of the Great State. At the base of

the whole order there must be some method of agricultural production,

and if the agricultural labourer and cottager and the ancient life of

the small householder on the holding, a life laborious, prolific,

illiterate, limited, and in immediate contact with the land used, is to

recede and disappear, it must recede and disappear before methods upon a

much larger scale, employing wholesale machinery and involving great

economies. It is alleged by modern writers that the permanent residence

of the cultivator in close relation to his ground is a legacy from the

days of cumbrous and expensive transit, that the great proportion of

farm work is seasonal, and that a migration to and fro between rural and

urban conditions would be entirely practicable in a largely planned

community. The agricultural population could move out of town into an

open-air life as the spring approached, and return for spending,

pleasure, and education as the days shortened. Already something of this

sort occurs under extremely unfavourable conditions in the movement of

the fruit and hop pickers from the east end of London into Kent, but

that is a mere hint of the extended picnic which a broadly planned

cultivation might afford. A fully developed civilisation employing

machines in the hands of highly skilled men will minimise toil to the

very utmost, no man will shove where a machine can shove, or carry where

a machine can carry; but there will remain, more particularly in the

summer, a vast amount of hand operations, invigorating and even

attractive to the urban population. Given short hours, good pay, and all

the jolly amusement in the evening camp that a free, happy, and

intelligent people will develop for themselves, and there will be little

difficulty about this particular class of work to differentiate it from

any other sort of necessary labour.

One passes, therefore, with no definite transition from the root problem

of agricultural production in the Great State to the wider problem of

labour in general.

A glance at the countryside conjures up a picture of extensive tracts

being cultivated on a wholesale scale, of skilled men directing great

ploughing, sowing, and reaping plants, steering cattle and sheep about

carefully designed enclosures, constructing channels and guiding sewage

towards its proper destination on the fields, and then of added crowds

of genial people coming out to spray trees and plants, pick and sort and

pack fruits. But who are these people? Why are they in particular doing

this for the community? Is our Great State still to have a majority of

people glad to do commonplace work for mediocre wages, and will there be

other individuals who will ride by on the roads, sympathetically, no

doubt, but with a secret sense of superiority? So one opens the general

problem of the organisation for labour.

I am careful here to write “for labour” and not “of Labour,” because it

is entirely against the spirit of the Great State that any section of

the people should be set aside as a class to do most of the monotonous,

laborious, and uneventful things for the community. That is practically

the present arrangement; and that, with a quickened sense of the need of

breaking people in to such a life, is the ideal of the bureaucratic

Servile State to which, in common with the Conservators, we are bitterly

opposed. And here I know I am at my most difficult, most speculative,

and most revolutionary point. We who look to the Great State as the

present aim of human progress believe a state may solve its economic

problem without any section whatever of the community being condemned to

life-long labour. And contemporary events, the phenomena of recent

strikes, the phenomena of sabotage carry out the suggestion that in a

community where nearly everyone reads extensively, travels about, sees

the charm and variety in the lives of prosperous and leisurely people,

no class is going to submit permanently to modern labour conditions

without extreme resistance, even after the most elaborate Labour

Conciliation schemes and social minima are established. Things are

altogether too stimulating to the imagination nowadays. Of all

impossible social dreams that belief in tranquillised and submissive and

virtuous Labour is the wildest of all. No sort of modern men will stand

it. They will as a class do any vivid and disastrous thing rather than

stand it. Even the illiterate peasant will only endure life-long toil

under the stimulus of private ownership and with the consolations of

religion; and the typical modern worker has neither the one nor the

other. For a time, indeed, for a generation or so even, a labour mass

may be fooled or coerced, but in the end it will break out against its

subjection, even if it breaks out to a general social catastrophe.

We have, in fact, to invent for the Great State, if we are to suppose

any Great State at all, an economic method without any specific labour

class. If we cannot do so, we had better throw ourselves in with the

Conservators forthwith, for they are right and we are absurd. Adhesion

to the conception of the Great State involves adhesion to the belief

that the amount of regular labour, skilled and unskilled, required to

produce everything necessary for everyone living in its highly elaborate

civilisation may, under modern conditions, with the help of scientific

economy and power-producing machinery, be reduced to so small a number

of working hours per head in proportion to the average life of the

citizen, as to be met as regards the greater moiety of it by the payment

of wages over and above the gratuitous share of each individual in the

general output; and as regards the residue, a residue of rough,

disagreeable, and monotonous operations, by some form of conscription,

which will demand a year or so, let us say, of each person’s life for

the public service. If we reflect that in the contemporary state there

is already food, shelter, and clothing of a sort for everyone, in spite

of the fact that enormous numbers of people do no productive work at all

because they are too well off, that great numbers are out of work, great

numbers by bad nutrition and training incapable of work, and that an

enormous amount of the work actually done is the overlapping production

of competitive trade and work upon such politically necessary but

socially useless things as Dreadnoughts, it becomes clear that the

absolutely unavoidable labour in a modern community and its ratio to the

available vitality must be of very small account indeed. But all this

has still to be worked out even in the most general terms. An

intelligent science of Economics should afford standards and

technicalities and systematised facts upon which to base an estimate.

The point was raised a quarter of a century ago by Morris in his _News

from Nowhere_, and indeed it was already discussed by More in his

_Utopia_. Our contemporary economics is, however, still a foolish,

pretentious pseudo-science, a festering mass of assumptions about buying

and selling and wages-paying, and one would as soon consult Bradshaw or

the works of Dumas as our orthodox professors of Economics for any light

upon this fundamental matter.

Moreover, we believe that there is a real disposition to work in human

beings, and that in a well-equipped community, in which no one was under

an unavoidable urgency to work, the greater proportion of productive

operations could be made sufficiently attractive to make them desirable

occupations. As for the irreducible residue of undesirable toil, I owe

to my friend the late Professor William James this suggestion of a

general conscription and a period of public service for everyone, a

suggestion which greatly occupied his thoughts during the last years of

his life. He was profoundly convinced of the high educational and

disciplinary value of universal compulsory military service, and of the

need of something more than a sentimental ideal of duty in public life.

He would have had the whole population taught in the schools and

prepared for this year (or whatever period it had to be) of patient and

heroic labour, the men for the mines, the fisheries, the sanitary

services, railway routine, the women for hospital, and perhaps

educational work, and so forth. He believed such a service would

permeate the whole state with a sense of civic obligation....

But behind all these conceivable triumphs of scientific adjustment and

direction lies the infinitely greater difficulty on our way to the Great

State, the difficulty of direction. What sort of people are going to

distribute the work of the community, decide what is or is not to be

done, determine wages, initiate enterprises; and under what sort of

criticism, checks, and controls are they going to do this delicate and

extensive work? With this we open the whole problem of government,

administration, and officialdom.

The Marxist and the democratic socialist generally shirk this riddle

altogether; the Fabian conception of a bureaucracy, official to the

extent of being a distinct class and cult, exists only as a

starting-point for healthy repudiations. Whatever else may be worked out

in the subtler answers our later time prepares, nothing can be clearer

than that the necessary machinery of government must be elaborately

organised to prevent the development of a managing caste in permanent

conspiracy, tacit or expressed, against the normal man. Quite apart from

the danger of unsympathetic and fatally irritating government, there can

be little or no doubt that the method of making men officials for life

is quite the worst way of getting official duties done. Officialdom is a

species of incompetence. The rather priggish, teachable, and

well-behaved sort of boy who is attracted by the prospect of assured

income and a pension to win his way into the civil service, and who then

by varied assiduities rises to a sort of timidly vindictive importance,

is the last person to whom we would willingly intrust the vital

interests of a nation. We want people who know about life at large, who

will come to the public service seasoned by experience, not people who

have specialised and acquired that sort of knowledge which is called, in

much the same spirit of qualification as one speaks of German Silver,

Expert Knowledge. It is clear our public servants and officials must be

so only for their periods of service. They must be taught by life, and

not “trained” by pedagogues. In every continuing job there is a time

when one is crude and blundering, a time, the best time, when one is

full of the freshness and happiness of doing well, and a time when

routine has largely replaced the stimulus of novelty. The Great State

will, I feel convinced, regard changes in occupation as a proper

circumstance in the life of every citizen; it will value a certain

amateurishness in its service, and prefer it to the trite omniscience of

the stale official. On that score of the necessity for versatility, if

on no other score, I am flatly antagonistic to the conceptions of “Guild

Socialism” which has arisen recently out of the impact of M. Penty and

Syndicalism upon the uneasy intelligence of M. Orage.

And since the Fabian socialists have created a widespread belief that in

their projected state every man will be necessarily a public servant or

a public pupil because the state will be the only employer and the only

educator, it is necessary to point out that the Great State presupposes

neither the one nor the other. It is a form of liberty and not a form of

enslavement. We agree with the older forms of socialism in supposing an

initial proprietary independence in every citizen. The citizen is a

shareholder in the state. Above that and after that, he works if he

chooses. But if he likes to live on his minimum and do nothing—though

such a type of character is scarcely conceivable—he can. His earning is

his own surplus. Above the basal economics of the Great State we assume

with confidence there will be a huge surplus of free spending upon

extra-collective ends. Public organisations, for example, may distribute

impartially and possibly even print and make ink and paper for the

newspapers in the Great State, but they will certainly not own them.

Only doctrine-driven men have ever ventured to think they would. Nor

will the state control writers and artists, for example, nor the

state—though it may build and own theatres—the tailor, the dressmaker,

the restaurant cook, an enormous multitude of other busy

workers-for-preferences. In the Great State of the future, as in the

life of the more prosperous classes of to-day, the greater proportion of

occupations and activities will be private and free.

Social Forces in England and America · 第 8 / 24 段